Commit Graph
3 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
jschoubben ee84b624b1 A provision names the engine, because a consumer is coupled to one
Provisions were named after roles: provides "database", requires
"database". Nothing distinguished engines, so a module written against
PostgreSQL could be matched to a provider of SQL Server, resolve as
satisfied, deploy, and fail on its first query — with nothing
connecting that error back to a match made elsewhere by something that
believed it had done its job.

The failure is in the direction that hides. Refusing on ambiguity
exists precisely so this does not happen, and the generic name walked
around it: with one provider of each name nothing is ambiguous, so
nothing is asked.

How it got in: every resolver test had exactly one provider per name,
so no mismatch was expressible and none was caught. The fixtures agreed
with the design — the same fault as the imagined test output in
04-ISSUES/005, at the level of a name.

Refused rather than documented, because the old naming *was* the
documented convention. Providing database/db/sql/sql-database is now a
parse error naming what to write instead.

The rule is about coupling, not specificity everywhere: route and
resolver stay role-named, because a consumer genuinely cannot tell
which proxy answered. novox/hq ADR 0027.
2026-08-31 17:12:46 +02:00
jschoubben c4782ae2fd An app is told where its database is
Knowing that a machine needs the anchor's database is useless to the
program that needs it unless the program is told. It knew; nothing was
written anywhere it could read.

Two fields, mirroring contributes/receives in the other direction:

  serves: {database: {port: 5432, driver: postgres}}   on the provider
  binds:  {database: /etc/app/database.json}           on the consumer

The provider says what a consumer needs to know; the mesh adds the half
only it has — which machine, and what that machine is called on the
private network. The file says, in itself, that it carries no credential
and why. A missing field looks like a bug; a stated absence looks like a
boundary.

Binding something answered on this machine writes nothing. A file saying
"it is on this node" is a fact nobody needs and one more thing to keep
true.

And two machines that share no private network are refused rather than
wired together. An app here and a database there with no path between
them is a mesh that reports itself configured and does not work — the
failure surfaces as a connection timing out, which is the slowest place
to find it. This is checkable now only because the network became
something a machine is given rather than something it has by having an
address.

One fault, found by running it: working out who is on the private network
resolved the mesh, and resolving the mesh asks who is on the private
network. It hung for two minutes. The comment above the function said not
to do that and the function did it anyway; it now resolves each node
locally, which is the right answer to the question regardless — whether a
machine is on the network depends on what it was assigned, not on what it
takes from others.
2026-08-30 00:02:18 +02:00
jschoubben d4064122d6 Where the answer to a requirement is allowed to live
Two different things were both written `requires`. A shell, a display
server and a private network have to be on the machine that needs them.
A database does not — it runs somewhere and is reached over the network.
Both were answered the same way, so requiring a database installed
PostgreSQL on every machine that ran a web application.

What a module provides now carries a scope, the same idea claims already
use, written short in the ordinary case:

  "provides": ["shell"]
  "provides": [{"name": "database", "scope": "mesh"}]

A mesh-scoped requirement is answered by finding the node already running
it — never by installing it here. Choosing a machine to put a database on
is a decision with consequences, and nothing resolving a web application
should make it silently. With nothing anywhere it refuses and says which
module to assign; with two it refuses and says how to choose.

Choosing is `pin <node> <provision> <from>`, kept per node because that
is the granularity the choice has. A pin at a machine that does not
provide it refuses rather than falling back — a fallback would quietly
move somebody's data. One provider does not overrule a pin either.

Resolving a node now needs to know what the others offer, and working
that out needs them resolved, so it is two passes: the first answers only
what each node offers, the second answers everything. Nothing is ever
declared from the first.

A node's plan says what it takes from elsewhere. It is the only part of a
set that stops working when a different machine goes away, and nothing
else in that output would have said so. It is also where a credential
will hang once there is a mechanism for handing one back.

One test found passing for the wrong reason: it read pins through a join
on the provider, which hides a dangling row whether or not it was cleaned
up. It counts rows now, and bites when the cascade is removed.
2026-08-29 23:51:50 +02:00