Commit Graph
4 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
jschoubben ec78fafc82 A token can be issued for a machine's tunnel key, and it joins through the tunnel
token issue --overlay-key records the key the machine made, binds the
token to it, gives the machine its address and makes it a peer of the
hub, pushing the hub before the token is shown. The token carries the
hub's tunnel and the bus at its address on the private network, and
enrolment refuses any other key (novox/hq ADR 0169). Tokens without a
key enrol as before until the bus is closed. Also a token verb.
2026-10-02 18:02:48 +02:00
jschoubben 1c32af6a22 Record whether a node is adopted and which modules were taken on it (hq ADR 0100) 2026-09-22 17:14:05 +02:00
jschoubben 02d1020bce The token carries the node's name
Found by raising a mesh end to end. The broker account a joining node
authenticates as is named after the node, and exists before that machine
has been told anything — so the node has to know its name before the mesh
can tell it. Without it, enrolment fails at the broker with an empty
username, which says nothing about why.

Not a secret, and the issuer already knows it. The wire-format test now
covers it, so a rename on either side fails in both repositories rather
than at enrolment on a real machine.
2026-08-30 02:36:57 +02:00
jschoubben 7553af6c5a The control plane's signing key, and a second context to hold it
Everything is blocked on what a node presents to prove which node it is. This
builds the other direction, which is not blocked: what a node believes.

identity is the second of the seven contexts. It holds an Ed25519 signing key
the control plane generates once, whose public half now travels in every
enrolment token. A node believes a declaration because it carries a signature
that key made -- pinning only the broker would make the control plane's
authority transitive, and since the host applies whatever the link delivers, a
compromised broker forging declarations is the whole machine.

Establishing the key is idempotent, and it has to be: a second key generated by
a restart is a mesh where every node holds the wrong public half, so every
declaration is refused by every node with nothing visibly wrong. The guarantee
is a partial unique index plus a read-back, not the check before the insert --
six processes racing to establish all agree on one key, and there is a test
that runs them.

Tokens are now one line of base64 carrying three of their four parts. The
missing two are the broker's address and its certificate fingerprint, both step
5 of the bootstrap. The command prints the token and names what is missing
rather than emitting something that looks usable.

The second context also tests a claim this repository had made and never
checked: that a context reaches only its own store. Two databases, two
credentials, no setting that reaches both. Running migrate with one stops and
names the grant it lacks -- verified, not asserted. Assembling a token needs a
node record from one and a key from the other, and neither reads the other's
store; the process holding both grants asks each for its part.

45 tests, none skipped. Fault injection found one test whose property is
enforced somewhere other than where I injected -- idempotency comes from the
database constraint, not from the early return, which is what the code comment
already said.
2026-08-29 15:05:23 +02:00