mesh/merge-gate pass: builds build-agent, mesh-controller → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without …
A token a media server got from its vendor reached its consumers only as a value the mesh minted, which
the server refused, or as a copy typed by hand. An offer may now say its software issues the credential;
the new issued verb carries no value and asks the provider's tool, in the controller's own name, for the
value sealed to one call, then seals it to every pair that does not hold it yet.
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds build-agent, mesh-controller → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without …
The give verb opened the desk's hidden prompt for a module's own secret, with the desk named. Now the
secret-ask verb (secret ask <node> <module> <name> [--at <desk>]) opens the same prompt from anywhere on
the mesh, with the desk the module's machine unless named, and give composes the same line. Every ask
is recorded in the store before the prompt opens (migration 0091): one open ask per secret, three an
hour, so an agent cannot keep a prompt in front of the operator. The prompt names who asked, from the
bus's word on the caller cut to a name's characters, never an argument of the call. The value stays
typed at the desk, sealed to the one call and then to the module's machine, never in an argument, a
log or an event; a secret the mesh makes itself and a trusted party's secret are refused as before.
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds build-agent, mesh-controller, route-proxy → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it…
The terminal path's order is one function, keepGiven, so the test fails when the announcement before a
trusted party's secret is removed, and when a failed announcement still keeps it. give also refuses a
machine the mesh does not know, as the secret's or as the desk, before the prompt (the final review).
A desk's prompt is answered over the desk machine's bus, on a subject that machine's runtime answers;
on a desk machine agents run as the operator, who holds that credential, so an agent could answer first
with a bot token of its own sealed to the call's key. The secret of a module running as an account of
its own (the Telegram bot's token) is now refused at the desk, before anybody is asked, naming the line
to type at the controller's terminal; there it is announced on every channel, the old one among them,
before it is kept, and not kept when that announcement fails. What is typed at the terminal is not
echoed. Tests: the refusal with nobody asked, and only the desk machine's launcher may answer its
prompt (MaySubscribe).
The review of 2026-10-09 (M4):
- give refuses broker (the bus account issue mints) and any own secret the mesh may make itself;
- the desk's prompt is asked by module, secret and machine, never with words of the caller's, and the
bus denies the prompt's subjects to every principal but the controller, however wide its grant, so the
prompt's 'the controller asks' is the bus's word (Permissions.PublishDeny, broker.ControllerOnly);
- secret accept with a value is refused through a verb: a value comes from the terminal or the desk;
- every value given for an own secret, at the terminal or the desk, raises the urgent condition
secret-given on every channel, until the operator silences it.
A given own secret the module reads at start is held by nobody but that
module, so the mesh need not read it to replace it: secret rotate now
works on it, and a value given through secret accept is replaced on its
own after the module's first good start under the mesh. Only a value an
outside party issues (own-secrets "issued-by": "outside") or one the
module applies stays as given, refused with the reason.
An offer may say `"credential": {"own": "<secret>"}`: the provider's own secret is the credential
every consumer of that provision receives, in the shape of a pair credential. The vault keeps one
value, sealed to the provider, to every consumer that holds the provision and to the operator, all
under one generation stamp; a consumer binding later, or `secret rotate` on the provider's secret,
makes a fresh value and seals it to every holder in one act, and the rotate command sends every
holding machine together. An accepted value is sealed to the consumers of the moment and never
remade: a consumer binding after it is refused with the way out (ADR 0113). The named own secret
must say how it is taken (issue 180), so the provider's start applies the file.
A need carries the shared secret's name from either side of the machine boundary; the plan mints a
consumer's copy from the provider's value. Registered manifests keep their bytes.
`secret rotate <node> <module> <name>` makes the secret anew the way the first mint did, seals it
to the machine and the operator, and sends the machine, so the module starts again on the new value
— said in the log with who asked and when, never the value. Only for a secret whose definition says
`"taken": "at-start"`: an own secret is now a path, or {path, taken}, and a definition that says
nothing of how a secret is taken is refused with the word to write, because a credential rotated
under software that never reads it again is worse than one left alone (issue 179). `applied` is
refused by name until the staged form ADR 0114 decided is built; a value given to the mesh is
refused as ADR 0113 says. `rotate` is a verb on the controller's seat with two shapes — a pair
credential by provision, an own secret by machine, module and name — so the console can ask.
Registered manifests keep their bytes: a path alone is written back as a path.
A secrets object with one local name delivered no file. Two requirements could share
a local name. secret recover and the export could not tell two locals apart. The
recipe check missed continued lines and read heredoc bodies as bases. repo:tag@digest
kept the tag in the repository. ask now publishes mandatory, so a tool nothing serves
is said at once rather than after the wait.
secrets: maps a requirement to several files under local names. Each local name is
its own need, its own pair credential (the pair is keyed on it: migration 0027),
its own file on the consumer, its own holder at the provider (the identity with the
local name after it) and rotates apart from the others. The plain shape is
unchanged and every existing row is the credential it was (novox/hq 04-ISSUES/069,
ADR 0094).
secret accept grows --provider: the value is sealed to the consumer's node, the
provider's node and the operator's key, and the pair records origin 'accepted'.
An accepted pair is not remade when a key changes (the mesh does not hold the
value; the read is refused naming the remedy) and rotate refuses it (accepting a
new value is the rotation). The vault's third species has its entry
(novox/hq 04-ISSUES/070, ADR 0092).
From review: the export counted any operator-sealed row as recoverable, so a
secret sealed to a replaced key was reported as openable with the current one;
replacing the key counted orphans in one table of two; and a pair credential
held from two providers was recovered as whichever row came first. The export
now lists what the current key opens, what an earlier key opens, and what has
no copy; `secret recover` takes --provider and refuses ambiguity; files that
must not exist are created exclusively; one constructor builds the export for
the operator's file and the vault's disk alike.
novox/hq ADR 0085, amended: the mesh's root secrets — the store's superuser,
the broker's administrator, every secret a module holds for itself — were
sealed to a node key and nothing else, so a lost node took them with it.
Now the mesh records an operator's public sealing key and seals every own
secret to it as well, minted or accepted. The private half is written once
by `operator key new` to a file the operator keeps off the mesh; the mesh
holds one more blob per secret that it cannot open.
`secret recover` opens a secret with that key, to a 0600 file, from the
store or from an export; `secret export` writes every operator-sealed copy
as ciphertext. A module that `keeps` (the vault) is handed that export as a
declared file on its own disk, so recovery survives the store.
Secrets made before the key exists have no operator copy and are said so —
the plaintext was discarded — until each is issued again.
One name per thing, per the HQ glossary: the module/container/image/binary/repo
becomes mesh-controller, the seat the-controller, and the store+broker pair the
foundation (embedded base bundles, default template and example lock renamed with
their go:embed directives). No behaviour change — a pure vocabulary rename.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D6qtiYU3P9jk3pnAXyAFyx
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