Met a second time live on 2026-10-25 at 20:04 (note 35): mesh-build-go was
assigned to ace again, and its account rows, minted at 17:19, had outlived the
unassignment. The issue minted only when no row stood, so it minted and sealed
nothing; the node had no credential and the bus no user, and the module
crash-looped 20 times. The watch still said "the grants written".
- A bus account now says when its credential was sealed to its node (migration
0108; every account standing before is taken as sealed). An issue under the
assign act, the assignments' watch or a registration mints only an account
that is not issued, a row with no seal counting as none, under the store's
lock on the account across its look, mint and seal, and marks it sealed once
sealed. A seal that fails leaves it unsealed for the next issue.
- Unassigning a module forgets its bus accounts and their credentials on that
node, so an assignment again issues them afresh.
- Only sealed accounts count as minted for a composition and are named in a
grant, so the assigner, which now wants a node only once the grant names its
account (mesh-delivery, same branch), holds the node until it is.
- The assignment's log line says which accounts were issued and sealed, or that
they stood issued and sealed.
The process-only issue drops the atomic insert of the review of 9ff47f6a for
the lock, which also covers the seal. Tests: cases in the existing tables.
Research 072: the grants piece (memberships and credentials heard from placement).
The first pass of the adapter resolved every machine with no settings in the Input, so a provider whose served fact says ${setting:domain} could not be settled and the whole Input failed (the equality try on the live facts). The settings of every module that has any are read first; a module's settings that do not read are an error only for a machine that resolves to it. A recorded module that cannot be kept at the build a machine runs refuses that machine alone, as planFor did, and no longer the whole Input. The bus's refusal (no user has a credential) is carried for the machine that runs the bus.
How each pair credential a node takes stands (held with its sealed consumer copy, the next send makes it, only a person's to give and nobody gave, or refused in the controller's words), the credentials made for each provider's consumers, the own secrets with their origin and key and value, the vault's kept boxes, the bus's users, minted users and memberships, the mesh's authority and each machine's serving key and kept certificate, the repositories built, the current builds and the build of each commit a machine that reads them is sent. A credential no row holds is not made (planFor made it in every mode): the adapter returns it as would-make for perform (issue 1385). New reads in the inventory (OwnSecretRows, PairCredentialState, BusMinted) and the identity (KnownAuthority, KeptCertificate) write nothing.