route-proxy from the provisioner's plans with its own contract; the controller forwards accounts to the vault (issue 774) #487

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mesh-tools merged 6 commits from feat/072-moves into main 2026-10-31 10:31:07 +00:00
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// Package contract is route-proxy's contract for the provision `route`: what a consumer asks a route with, what the
// proxy keeps on the bus about what it serves, the events it says, and its tools' arguments (issue 774; research 072
// row 34; the operator, 2026-10-31: "the route-proxy should define its own contract for the seat (with the message
// contracts of course) which other modules can use").
//
// **Published by the repository that holds route-proxy, as its own Go module**, versioned by tags of the form
// `modules/route-proxy/contract/vX.Y.Z`, the subdirectory form Go's module system expects, the same way mesh-sdk is
// published (`go/vX.Y.Z`). A module that asks a route, reads what the proxy serves or hears its events imports this
// package; nothing imports the repository. Standard library only, so a consumer takes nothing else with it.
//
// **How a route travels.** A module that must be reachable requires `route` and says, in its manifest's
// `contributes.route`, one Request, or several by local name; Schema is that object's JSON schema. The controller
// composes each (its label joined to the node's domains into `name` and `internal-name`, its endpoint's port into
// `port`) and the seat mesh-provisioner carries the result in the consumer's plan entry as an opaque payload
// (mesh-sdk catalogue.PlanProvision.Contributed, in the generic catalogue.ContributedForm). Neither the seat nor its
// client knows a field of a route: route-proxy decodes each contribution with DecodeRequest, and refuses, saying why
// (EventRefused), what this contract does not admit.
//
// **Two name spaces, two authorities** (novox/hq ADR 0056, ADR 0138). `name` is public: served to anyone and
// certified by the public ACME directory (Let's Encrypt). `internal-name` is served only inside the private network
// and certified by the mesh's own authority. A route carries either, or both.
package contract
// Module is the module that provides a route, and Provision what it provides: what a plan's entry names when
// route-proxy is a route's provider.
const (
Module = "route-proxy"
Provision = "route"
)
// Version is the version of the Request form this package reads and writes.
const Version = 1
// The events route-proxy says (its manifest's `emits`), on mesh.mod.route-proxy.event.<type>, each with an Event.
const (
// EventServed: a name is now served by this proxy (it was not, or it is now served from other rules).
EventServed = "route.served"
// EventWithdrawn: a name this proxy served is served no more, because no plan gives it any longer.
EventWithdrawn = "route.withdrawn"
// EventRefused: a plan gives this proxy a route it does not serve, and Why says why.
EventRefused = "route.refused"
)
// Event is the body of every event route-proxy says: the proxy's machine, the name (empty for a refusal that named
// none), how far it reaches, and who asked it: the consumer module, its machine and the local name of its
// contribution. Why is set on a refusal alone.
type Event struct {
Proxy string `json:"proxy"`
Name string `json:"name,omitempty"`
Reach string `json:"reach,omitempty"`
Module string `json:"module,omitempty"`
Node string `json:"node,omitempty"`
Local string `json:"local,omitempty"`
Why string `json:"why,omitempty"`
}
// The tools route-proxy serves (its manifest's `tools`), each answering from its states RoutesState and UnroutedState.
const (
// ToolRoutes lists every name served, with RoutesArgs.
ToolRoutes = "route_proxy_routes"
// ToolRoute is one name in full, with RouteArgs.
ToolRoute = "route_proxy_route"
// ToolUnrouted lists the names asked for and not served, with RoutesArgs.
ToolUnrouted = "route_proxy_unrouted"
)
// RoutesArgs are ToolRoutes' and ToolUnrouted's arguments: Node narrows to the proxy on one machine, every machine
// when empty.
type RoutesArgs struct {
Node string `json:"node,omitempty"`
}
// RouteArgs are ToolRoute's arguments: the name, such as app.example.org, and optionally the machine whose proxy.
type RouteArgs struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Node string `json:"node,omitempty"`
}
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package contract
import (
"encoding/json"
"reflect"
"slices"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func limit(n int64) *int64 { return &n }
// A route is read strictly and whole (issue 774): what the contract names is admitted, what it does not, or a route
// it cannot serve, is refused naming why; and the published schema names exactly the fields the decoder reads.
func TestARouteIsReadStrictly(t *testing.T) {
for _, c := range []struct {
raw, refused string
want Request
}{
{raw: `{"name":"app.example.org","internal-name":"app.anchor.internal","label":"app","endpoint":"web","port":8080}`,
want: Request{Name: "app.example.org", InternalName: "app.anchor.internal", Label: "app", Endpoint: "web", Port: 8080}},
{raw: `{"internal-name":"app.anchor.internal","port":443,"scheme":"https","insecure":true,"max-request-body":1048576}`,
want: Request{InternalName: "app.anchor.internal", Port: 443, Scheme: "https", Insecure: true, MaxRequestBody: limit(1048576)}},
{raw: `{"name":"git.example.org","path":"/api/internal","deny":true,"priority":100000}`,
want: Request{Name: "git.example.org", Path: "/api/internal", Deny: true, Priority: 100000}},
{raw: `{"name":"old.example.org","redirect":"https://new.example.org"}`,
want: Request{Name: "old.example.org", Redirect: "https://new.example.org"}},
{raw: `{"name":"admin.example.org","port":80,"auth":"/run/secrets/admin"}`,
want: Request{Name: "admin.example.org", Port: 80, Auth: "/run/secrets/admin"}},
{raw: `{"label":"app","port":8080}`, refused: "names nothing"},
{raw: `{"name":"app.example.org"}`, refused: "gives no port"},
{raw: `{"name":"app.example.org","port":70000}`, refused: "not a port"},
{raw: `{"name":"app.example.org","port":80.5}`, refused: "not a route"},
{raw: `{"name":"app.example.org","port":"80"}`, refused: "not a route"},
{raw: `{"name":"app.example.org","port":80,"scheme":"ftp"}`, refused: "neither http nor https"},
{raw: `{"name":"app.example.org","port":80,"max-request-body":-1}`, refused: "max-request-body"},
{raw: `{"name":"app.example.org","port":80,"max-request-body":0}`, refused: "max-request-body"},
{raw: `{"name":"app.example.org","port":80,"auth":"admin:$2y$05$abc"}`, refused: "credential"},
{raw: `{"name":"app.example.org","port":80,"host":"x"}`, refused: "unknown field \"host\""},
{raw: `{"name":"app.example.org","port":80} {}`, refused: "more than one"},
} {
got, err := DecodeRequest([]byte(c.raw))
if c.refused != "" {
if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), c.refused) {
t.Errorf("DecodeRequest(%s) = %+v, %v; want refused for %q", c.raw, got, err, c.refused)
}
continue
}
if err != nil || !reflect.DeepEqual(got, c.want) {
t.Errorf("DecodeRequest(%s) = %+v, %v; want %+v", c.raw, got, err, c.want)
continue
}
// What it encodes, it reads back the same.
if raw, err := got.Encode(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("Encode(%+v): %v", got, err)
} else if again, err := DecodeRequest(raw); err != nil || !reflect.DeepEqual(again, got) {
t.Errorf("Encode then DecodeRequest of %+v = %+v, %v", got, again, err)
}
}
if (Request{Path: "api"}).Prefix() != "/api" || (Request{}).Prefix() != "" || (Request{Scheme: " HTTPS"}).SchemeOrDefault() != "https" ||
(Request{}).SchemeOrDefault() != "http" || (Request{Redirect: "x"}).Forwards() {
t.Error("Prefix, SchemeOrDefault or Forwards says otherwise than the contract")
}
var schema struct {
Properties map[string]json.RawMessage `json:"properties"`
AdditionalProperties bool `json:"additionalProperties"`
}
if err := json.Unmarshal(Schema, &schema); err != nil || schema.AdditionalProperties {
t.Fatalf("the schema is not a closed object: %v", err)
}
var tags []string
for f := range reflect.TypeFor[Request]().Fields() {
tags = append(tags, strings.Split(f.Tag.Get("json"), ",")[0])
}
var said []string
for name := range schema.Properties {
said = append(said, name)
}
slices.Sort(tags)
slices.Sort(said)
if !slices.Equal(tags, said) {
t.Fatalf("the schema names %v, the decoder reads %v", said, tags)
}
}
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module git.novox.be/novox/mesh-controller/modules/route-proxy/contract
go 1.26.0
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package contract
import (
"bytes"
_ "embed"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"strings"
)
// Request is one route a consumer asks for, as its manifest's `contributes.route` says it and the controller composes
// it: the object Schema describes. Every field is optional to the decoder; Validate says which a route needs.
type Request struct {
// Name is the public name, served to anyone and certified by the public ACME directory; InternalName the name on
// the private network, served inside it alone and certified by the mesh's own authority. The controller composes
// both from Label and the node's domains, as far as the endpoint reaches (novox/hq ADR 0138); a manifest writes a
// label, never a domain.
Name string `json:"name,omitempty"`
InternalName string `json:"internal-name,omitempty"`
Label string `json:"label,omitempty"`
// Endpoint names the manifest's endpoint the route serves; the controller fills Port from it.
Endpoint string `json:"endpoint,omitempty"`
Port int `json:"port,omitempty"`
// Path is the path prefix the rule is scoped to, every path when empty; Priority which rule wins where two match,
// higher first.
Path string `json:"path,omitempty"`
Priority int `json:"priority,omitempty"`
// Scheme is how the consumer is reached, http (the default) or https; Insecure skips verifying its certificate,
// for a backend that terminates TLS with its own.
Scheme string `json:"scheme,omitempty"`
Insecure bool `json:"insecure,omitempty"`
// MaxRequestBody is the largest body, in bytes, the route carries; no limit when absent. Said, it is whole and
// positive: a limit the proxy cannot keep is a route it does not serve.
MaxRequestBody *int64 `json:"max-request-body,omitempty"`
// The policy of the rule, a closed set (novox/hq ADR 0108): Deny refuses every request, Redirect answers with a
// permanent redirect to that address, and Auth names the file of the secret a request must present, never the
// secret itself.
Deny bool `json:"deny,omitempty"`
Redirect string `json:"redirect,omitempty"`
Auth string `json:"auth,omitempty"`
}
// Schema is Request's JSON schema, published with this package for what checks a manifest's `contributes.route`.
//
//go:embed route.schema.json
var Schema []byte
// DecodeRequest reads one contribution's object strictly: no field this contract does not name, one document, and
// a route Validate admits. What it refuses, it refuses whole, naming why: a route is never served half.
func DecodeRequest(raw []byte) (Request, error) {
var r Request
dec := json.NewDecoder(bytes.NewReader(raw))
dec.DisallowUnknownFields()
if err := dec.Decode(&r); err != nil {
return Request{}, fmt.Errorf("not a route this contract reads: %w", err)
}
if dec.More() {
return Request{}, errors.New("not a route this contract reads: more than one document")
}
if err := r.Validate(); err != nil {
return Request{}, err
}
return r, nil
}
// Encode is r as a contribution's object, refused where DecodeRequest would refuse it.
func (r Request) Encode() ([]byte, error) {
if err := r.Validate(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return json.Marshal(r)
}
// Validate says what makes r no route: no name of either kind; a port outside 1-65535, or none where the rule
// forwards (neither Deny nor Redirect); a scheme other than http or https; a body limit that is not positive; and a
// credential written where a secret's file is to be named (novox/hq ADR 0108: refused rather than tolerated).
func (r Request) Validate() error {
if strings.TrimSpace(r.Name) == "" && strings.TrimSpace(r.InternalName) == "" {
return errors.New("the route names nothing to be served under: neither name nor internal-name")
}
if r.Port < 0 || r.Port > 65535 {
return fmt.Errorf("the route's port %d is not a port", r.Port)
}
if r.Forwards() && r.Port == 0 {
return errors.New("the route forwards and gives no port")
}
switch strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(r.Scheme)) {
case "", "http", "https":
default:
return fmt.Errorf("the route's scheme %q is neither http nor https", r.Scheme)
}
if r.MaxRequestBody != nil && *r.MaxRequestBody <= 0 {
return fmt.Errorf("the route's max-request-body %d is not a positive number of bytes", *r.MaxRequestBody)
}
if LooksLikeACredential(r.Auth) {
return errors.New("the route's auth holds a credential rather than the name of a secret's file (novox/hq ADR 0108)")
}
return nil
}
// Forwards is whether the rule sends a request on to the consumer, rather than answering it itself.
func (r Request) Forwards() bool { return !r.Deny && r.Redirect == "" }
// Prefix is the path prefix the rule is scoped to, beginning with a slash, or "" for every path.
func (r Request) Prefix() string {
p := strings.TrimSpace(r.Path)
if p != "" && !strings.HasPrefix(p, "/") {
p = "/" + p
}
return p
}
// SchemeOrDefault is how the consumer is reached: the scheme, lower-cased, http when none is said.
func (r Request) SchemeOrDefault() string {
if s := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(r.Scheme)); s != "" {
return s
}
return "http"
}
// LooksLikeACredential is the check that keeps a secret out of a declaration: a value holding a `:` (the htpasswd
// separator) or opening with a bcrypt identifier is a credential, not a path, and no path the mesh writes needs
// either. It errs towards refusing.
func LooksLikeACredential(v string) bool {
v = strings.TrimSpace(v)
return strings.Contains(v, ":") || strings.HasPrefix(v, "$2")
}
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{
"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
"$id": "https://git.novox.be/novox/mesh-controller/modules/route-proxy/contract/route.schema.json",
"title": "route",
"description": "One route a consumer asks route-proxy for, as a manifest's contributes.route says it (one, or several by local name) and the controller composes it. Version 1 of route-proxy's contract.",
"type": "object",
"additionalProperties": false,
"anyOf": [
{"required": ["name"]},
{"required": ["internal-name"]},
{"required": ["label"]}
],
"properties": {
"name": {"type": "string", "description": "the public name, served to anyone and certified by the public ACME directory; composed from label"},
"internal-name": {"type": "string", "description": "the name on the private network, served inside it alone and certified by the mesh's own authority; composed from label"},
"label": {"type": "string", "description": "the subdomain the module chooses; joined to the node's domains by the controller"},
"endpoint": {"type": "string", "description": "the manifest's endpoint the route serves; the controller fills port from it"},
"port": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 1, "maximum": 65535},
"path": {"type": "string", "description": "the path prefix the rule is scoped to; every path when absent"},
"priority": {"type": "integer", "description": "which rule wins where two match, higher first"},
"scheme": {"enum": ["http", "https"], "description": "how the consumer is reached; http when absent"},
"insecure": {"type": "boolean", "description": "skip verifying the consumer's certificate over https"},
"max-request-body": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 1, "description": "the largest body, in bytes, the route carries"},
"deny": {"type": "boolean", "description": "refuse every request matching the rule"},
"redirect": {"type": "string", "description": "answer with a permanent redirect to this address"},
"auth": {"type": "string", "description": "the file of the secret a request must present, never the secret itself"}
}
}
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package contract
// What the web front keeps on the bus about the names it serves, and about the names it was asked for and does not
// serve (issue 774). The proxy writes it, on change, in its states `routes` and `unrouted`, announced readable; the
// module's tools, and any module that reads them, read it from there, so the question "is this site reachable, and
// is its certificate good" is answered from the bus rather than with curl.
//
// A key is `<node>.<name>`: the machine whose proxy answers, then the name as asked, lower-cased. A node's name holds
// no dot, so the first dot splits them.
import (
"net"
"regexp"
"strings"
"time"
)
// The states route-proxy keeps, by their local names (the buckets are route-proxy_<name>).
const (
// RoutesState holds one key per served name: where it forwards, its certificate, the last answer it got.
RoutesState = "routes"
// UnroutedState holds one key per name the proxy answered "no route for" with, and when it was last asked.
UnroutedState = "unrouted"
// BoundState is the provider helper's bucket of consumer entries (mesh-sdk go/provider).
BoundState = "bound"
)
// The words a route's reach and a certificate's authority are said in.
const (
ReachPublic = "public"
ReachInternal = "internal"
)
// The words a certificate's outcome is said in.
const (
// Issued: the authority issued it while this proxy ran, at RenewedAt.
Issued = "issued"
// Cached: this proxy served it from what it kept, and saw no issuance of it since it started.
Cached = "cached"
// Failed: the last attempt to have one failed, Error says why.
Failed = "failed"
)
// Target is one rule a name is served by: what a request matching it reaches, or what it is answered with.
type Target struct {
// Path is the path prefix the rule is scoped to; empty is every path.
Path string `json:"path,omitempty"`
// Module and Node are the consumer that contributed the route and the machine it runs on.
Module string `json:"module,omitempty"`
Node string `json:"node,omitempty"`
// Target is where the request is forwarded, scheme://address:port; empty for a rule that answers itself.
Target string `json:"target,omitempty"`
Deny bool `json:"deny,omitempty"`
Redirect string `json:"redirect,omitempty"`
// Auth says the rule asks for credentials; Sealed says why it cannot check them, and so refuses everything.
Auth bool `json:"auth,omitempty"`
Sealed string `json:"sealed,omitempty"`
}
// Certificate is what this proxy knows of a name's certificate.
type Certificate struct {
// Authority is which issuer certifies the name: public (the ACME directory the module names) or internal (the
// mesh's own).
Authority string `json:"authority"`
Issuer string `json:"issuer,omitempty"`
NotAfter *time.Time `json:"not_after,omitempty"`
// RenewedAt is when an authority last issued it to this proxy.
RenewedAt *time.Time `json:"renewed_at,omitempty"`
// Outcome is issued, cached or failed; empty until a handshake or an issuance said anything.
Outcome string `json:"outcome,omitempty"`
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
At *time.Time `json:"at,omitempty"`
}
// Answer is the last answer the proxy got from upstream for a name: the status it carried back, or the error that
// stood in for one (a 502).
type Answer struct {
Status int `json:"status"`
At time.Time `json:"at"`
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"`
Path string `json:"path,omitempty"`
}
// Route is one served name, the value of a key of RoutesState.
type Route struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
// Proxy is the machine whose proxy serves it.
Proxy string `json:"proxy"`
// Reach is public (a route's own name) or internal (only its internal-name, served inside the private network).
Reach string `json:"reach"`
Targets []Target `json:"targets"`
Certificate Certificate `json:"certificate"`
LastAnswer *Answer `json:"last_answer,omitempty"`
}
// Unrouted is one name the proxy answered "no route for", the value of a key of UnroutedState.
type Unrouted struct {
Name string `json:"name"`
Proxy string `json:"proxy"`
// AskedAt is when the name was last asked for. Who asked is not kept here: the journal keeps it, for the
// machine's intrusion prevention.
AskedAt time.Time `json:"asked_at"`
// Times is how often it was asked since the proxy last started.
Times int `json:"times"`
// InternalOnly says the name is served, but only inside the private network, and was asked from outside.
InternalOnly bool `json:"internal_only,omitempty"`
// Handshake says it was asked in a TLS handshake (the name a client sent), not in an HTTP request.
Handshake bool `json:"handshake,omitempty"`
}
// OtherName is the name of the one key per proxy that counts the refusals not kept by name: names under no domain
// the proxy serves (what a scan sends), and names past the limit of new names a minute. Its key is
// `<node>._other`; no host name begins with an underscore.
const OtherName = "_other"
// Other is the value of a proxy's OtherName key.
type Other struct {
Proxy string `json:"proxy"`
// Minute is the last whole minute counted, and LastMinute how many refusals it held.
Minute time.Time `json:"minute"`
LastMinute int `json:"last_minute"`
// SinceStart is every refusal not kept by name since the proxy started.
SinceStart int `json:"since_start"`
}
// Registrable is the domain a name is registered under, as its last two labels; "" for an address or a single
// label. Two labels is wrong for a public suffix of two (co.uk); it only decides which refused names are kept by name.
func Registrable(name string) string {
if net.ParseIP(strings.Trim(name, "[]")) != nil {
return ""
}
labels := strings.Split(name, ".")
if len(labels) < 2 {
return ""
}
return strings.Join(labels[len(labels)-2:], ".")
}
var keyable = regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-z0-9_]([a-z0-9_.-]{0,251}[a-z0-9_])?$`)
// Keyable says whether a name can be a key's name: what a host name or an address is. A name asked for in a request
// is whatever a client sent; one no key could hold is no site anybody runs.
func Keyable(name string) bool { return keyable.MatchString(name) && !strings.Contains(name, "..") }
// Key is the key of name served or asked at node's proxy.
func Key(node, name string) string { return node + "." + name }
// Split is a key's node and name.
func Split(key string) (node, name string) {
node, name, _ = strings.Cut(key, ".")
return node, name
}