internal/broker/nats.go

@@ -76,6 +76,10 @@ type Principal struct {
 	PasswordHash string
 }
 
+// enrolmentPrefix is the space every enrolling node's user and inbox live under, so the one place the
+// controller may answer an enrolment is derived from the same constant the user is named from.
+const enrolmentPrefix = "enrol"
+
 // safeSubject refuses anything that would change the meaning of a subject rather than sit inside
 // one. A name carrying a dot would silently widen a permission by adding a token; a name carrying
 // `>` or `*` would widen it to a wildcard, which is the whole authority model gone.
@@ -104,7 +108,7 @@ func (p Principal) Username() string {
 		// the mesh holds one live claim per record, and the node's name is the one identifier both
 		// sides already have before anything else is agreed. It is also exactly what the other
 		// transport does, where the account is named after the node and the secret is its password.
-		return "enrol." + p.Node
+		return enrolmentPrefix + "." + p.Node
 	}
 	return ""
 }
@@ -163,6 +167,22 @@ func PermissionsFor(p Principal) (Permissions, error) {
 		sub = append(sub, ControllerFollows...)
 		pub = append(pub, "$JS.ACK.EVENTS."+ControllerName+".>")
 
+		// **Where an enrolment's answer goes**, and `allow_responses` does not cover it. That
+		// permits one reply to the reply subject of a message the user received — and a message a
+		// JetStream consumer delivers has had that field claimed for the consumer's own ack address
+		// (design 25 §2), so the address the controller actually answers is the one the request
+		// carried in its payload, which is not a reply subject as the server understands it.
+		//
+		// Verified against a real server before this line existed: the answer was refused with
+		// "Permissions Violation for Publish to _INBOX.enrol.anchor…", and every enrolment on the
+		// mesh would have timed out while the controller logged success.
+		//
+		// **The enrolment inbox space, not a blanket `_INBOX.>`.** Design 25 §4 refuses that, and
+		// this is not it: nothing but an enrolling node ever subscribes under this prefix, each
+		// scoped to its own token's, so the controller publishing here is the mesh answering
+		// enrolments and can reach nothing else.
+		pub = append(pub, "_INBOX."+enrolmentPrefix+".>")
+
 	case KindPerson:
 		// Tools, and nothing else. Every subject a person may publish is a tool call; a person
 		// who could publish an event would be able to claim a module said something.

internal/broker/nats_test.go

@@ -256,3 +256,71 @@ func TestAToolGrantThatNamesNoToolIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatal("a grant naming a module but no tool was accepted")
 	}
 }
+
+// The controller can answer an enrolment, and reach no other inbox.
+//
+// **`allow_responses` does not cover this and that is the trap.** It permits one reply to the reply
+// subject of a message the user received — and a message a JetStream consumer delivers has had that
+// field claimed for the consumer's own ack address, so the address the controller actually answers is
+// the one the request carried in its payload, which the server does not recognise as a reply subject
+// at all.
+//
+// Found against a real server, after a live test on an *unpermissioned* one had passed: every
+// enrolment on the mesh would have timed out while the controller logged success.
+func TestTheControllerCanAnswerAnEnrolmentAndReachNoOtherInbox(t *testing.T) {
+	ctl, err := PermissionsFor(Principal{Kind: KindController, PasswordHash: "x"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	enrolling, err := PermissionsFor(Principal{Kind: KindEnrolment, Node: "anchor", PasswordHash: "x"})
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+
+	// Whatever the enrolling node waits on, the controller must be able to publish to.
+	if len(enrolling.Subscribe) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("an enrolling node subscribes %v, and this test knows only how to check one",
+			enrolling.Subscribe)
+	}
+	waitsOn := enrolling.Subscribe[0]
+	if !covers(ctl.Publish, waitsOn) {
+		t.Fatalf("the controller may publish %v, none of which reaches %s — so every enrolment on "+
+			"the mesh times out while the controller logs success", ctl.Publish, waitsOn)
+	}
+
+	// And nothing wider. A node's own inbox and a module's are not the controller's to write into:
+	// that is the blanket grant design 25 §4 refuses.
+	for _, other := range []string{"_INBOX.node.anchor.x", "_INBOX.one.shop.x", "_INBOX.person.ada.x"} {
+		if covers(ctl.Publish, other) {
+			t.Errorf("the controller can publish to %s, which is an inbox privacy the permission "+
+				"list is the only thing protecting", other)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// covers says whether any granted subject pattern admits one concrete subject, with NATS's own
+// wildcard meanings: `*` is one token, `>` is the rest.
+func covers(granted []string, subject string) bool {
+	want := strings.Split(subject, ".")
+	for _, pattern := range granted {
+		if admits(strings.Split(pattern, "."), want) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func admits(pattern, subject []string) bool {
+	for i, token := range pattern {
+		if token == ">" {
+			return i < len(subject)
+		}
+		if i >= len(subject) {
+			return false
+		}
+		if token != "*" && token != subject[i] {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return len(pattern) == len(subject)
+}

internal/broker/testdata/composed.conf

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ accounts {
   MESH {
     users = [
       { user: "controller", password: "$2a$11$cccccccccccccccccccccc", permissions: {
-        publish: { allow: ["$JS.ACK.CONTROL.controller.>", "$JS.ACK.EVENTS.controller.>", "$JS.API.>", "mesh.build.>", "mesh.control.>", "mesh.node.>"] }
+        publish: { allow: ["$JS.ACK.CONTROL.controller.>", "$JS.ACK.EVENTS.controller.>", "$JS.API.>", "_INBOX.enrol.>", "mesh.build.>", "mesh.control.>", "mesh.node.>"] }
         subscribe: { allow: ["$JS.API.>", "_INBOX.controller.>", "mesh.build.>", "mesh.control.>", "mesh.mod.mesh-catalog.event.module.mesh-catalog.catching-up", "mesh.mod.mesh-catalog.event.module.mesh-catalog.upgraded"] }
         allow_responses: { max: 1, ttl: "1m" }
       } }