Files
mesh-controller/internal/licences/migrations/0001-a-licence-is-a-named-thing.sql
jschoubben 33fd28ffa6 licences: deliver the refresh token by the ordinary sealed path, not a bespoke envelope
The refreshable-grant refresh token no longer rides a custom at-rest envelope that a
module opens with a node private key. A module is never given a node's private sealing
key, so that path could not exist -- the gap Phase C hit.

Instead the refresh token is a credential sealed to the MANAGER holder with the same
anonymous box (secrets.Seal / crypto_box_seal) every credential uses, stored as one
sealed blob, and delivered by the existing host-unseal-and-mount: the host opens it with
the node's real key and mounts the cleartext at the manager module's bound path, exactly
as a consumer's db password is delivered.

  - refresh_grant now stores { sealed, manager_key }, dropping the AtRest token/wrapped_key
    columns; internal/secrets/atrest.go is retired (nothing else used it).
  - the licence records its manager as (node, module); KeyFor delivers the refresh token to
    the manager holder and the access token to consumers, disambiguated by module so the two
    can co-locate. Accept and the reseal skip the manager holder.
  - the manager holder is delivered the node's PUBLIC sealing key in its bound facts, so the
    module can re-seal a rotated refresh token with no private key of its own; the
    declaration tolerates its empty pre-adoption secret rather than refusing.
  - SubmitRefresh / set-grant take a sealed blob, never a refresh token in the clear.

The invariant holds unchanged: the control plane never reads the refresh token, and no node
but the manager holds it. A committed cross-language test proves the TypeScript module seal
opens under Go box.OpenAnonymous (the host's Unseal) -- both are NaCl crypto_box_seal.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
2026-09-07 01:55:08 +02:00

89 lines
5.3 KiB
SQL

-- A licence is a named thing, and the name is the operator's.
--
-- novox/hq ADR 0024. Not an anonymous credential hanging off a vendor: *the personal account*,
-- *the organisation's account* are names a person uses, and the mesh has to use them too, because
-- the whole point is saying WHICH ONE a given consumer uses.
--
-- **Many to many.** One vendor has several licences; one licence serves several consumers. So it
-- is deliberately not a claim — claims are for things only one holder may have, and two machines
-- sharing an account is the ordinary case rather than a collision.
create table licence (
-- The operator's name for it. The primary key, because that is what a person types and what a
-- consumer is pinned to.
name text primary key,
-- Which company sells it: anthropic, openai, a model the mesh runs itself. Selects the adapter
-- that runs this licence's lifecycle (novox/hq ADR 0050). Named `vendor`, not `provider`: the
-- inventory already uses "provider" for which node answers a brokered provision.
vendor text not null,
-- What a consumer needs to know that is not secret -- a base URL, a model name. The key is
-- never here.
serves jsonb not null default '{}'::jsonb,
-- The one node that holds this licence's refresh token readably, and refreshes it (novox/hq
-- ADR 0050's carve-out). Null for a static-key licence, which has nothing to refresh and no
-- manager -- and the null is the check that a static key never grows a readable-at-rest value.
-- A name, not a foreign key: nodes live in another context this one may not join across
-- (novox/hq ADR 0008).
manager text,
-- The module ON the manager node that runs the refresh -- the manager holder. Named alongside
-- the manager node because a node may run the manager module AND a consuming module of the same
-- licence (the lab co-locates both), and which holder is delivered the refresh token rather than
-- an access token turns on the module, not the node alone. Null exactly when `manager` is.
manager_module text,
added_at timestamptz not null default now()
);
-- Who holds it, and the key sealed to them.
--
-- **The node is a name, not a foreign key.** It lives in another context and this one may not join
-- across that boundary (novox/hq ADR 0008); a name is the published identifier and is what
-- crossing a context boundary is allowed to carry.
create table licence_holder (
licence text not null references licence(name) on delete cascade,
node text not null,
module text not null,
-- Sealed to that node's key. Null until a key has been supplied while this holder existed --
-- which is a real state and not an error: the mesh discarded the plaintext, so it cannot seal
-- to a holder that arrived afterwards, and saying so is better than delivering nothing.
sealed text,
node_key text,
added_at timestamptz not null default now(),
primary key (licence, node, module)
);
-- The refresh token, sealed to the manager node's key -- the same anonymous box every credential
-- the mesh delivers uses.
--
-- **novox/hq ADR 0050's carve-out, delivered the way the mesh delivers everything else.** A
-- `refreshable-grant` licence cannot be both sealed so the mesh cannot read it and rotated centrally,
-- because rotating means a node reads the refresh token back. So exactly one node -- the licence's
-- manager -- reads it. But the earlier attempt at a bespoke at-rest envelope, and the module holding
-- the node's private key to open it, hit a wall the mesh's own design forbids: a module is never
-- given a node's private sealing key. So the refresh token rides the *ordinary* path instead -- it is
-- an anonymous sealed box (secrets.Seal, `crypto_box_seal`) to the manager node's public sealing key,
-- exactly like a consumer's db password, and the HOST unseals it and mounts the cleartext at the
-- manager module's bound path. This database on its own holds a sealed box with no private half to
-- open it (novox/hq ADR 0004), the same guarantee as every other sealed value here.
--
-- **Separate from the access tokens.** licence_holder.sealed is the ACCESS token, sealed per holder
-- and delivered to consumers. This is the REFRESH token, one per licence, delivered to the manager
-- holder alone. Keeping them apart is what makes "a consumer is never delivered the refresh token"
-- structural: a consumer's delivery reads licence_holder, and the refresh token is not there.
create table refresh_grant (
-- One refresh token per licence. On delete cascade: forgetting a licence forgets its refresh
-- token with it, the same way it forgets its holders.
licence text primary key references licence(name) on delete cascade,
-- base64( anonymous-box( manager sealing key, refresh_token ) ) -- the refresh token sealed to
-- the manager node, openable only by that node's private half, which the mesh never holds.
sealed text not null,
-- The manager's public sealing key the refresh token was sealed to. Kept so a manager that
-- regenerated its key can be told it can no longer open this, rather than discovering it as a
-- refresh that will not decrypt (the same reason licence_holder.node_key is kept).
manager_key text not null,
updated_at timestamptz not null default now()
);