The live tests reached one shared bus and assert, read and remove the mesh's own objects by their fixed names, so packages run in parallel deleted what each other read and the suite passed only one package at a time; a red suite read as noise. internal/testbus starts a server per test, linked in at the nats-server release go.mod pins, and a test holds that pin to the catalogue's bus image and to the facts snapshot's bus when there is one, so the tests never run a bus the mesh does not. The waiter test read a timing (the most connections held at one look) and now reads the state it means (the fewest held across the wait). make check runs the packages in parallel under the race detector, with a timeout.
276 lines
8.5 KiB
Go
276 lines
8.5 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2018-2025 The NATS Authors
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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package server
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import (
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"net"
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"os"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/nats-io/jwt/v2"
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"github.com/nats-io/nkeys"
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)
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// All JWTs once encoded start with this
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const jwtPrefix = "eyJ"
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// ReadOperatorJWT will read a jwt file for an operator claim. This can be a decorated file.
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func ReadOperatorJWT(jwtfile string) (*jwt.OperatorClaims, error) {
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_, claim, err := readOperatorJWT(jwtfile)
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return claim, err
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}
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func readOperatorJWT(jwtfile string) (string, *jwt.OperatorClaims, error) {
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contents, err := os.ReadFile(jwtfile)
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if err != nil {
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// Check to see if the JWT has been inlined.
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if !strings.HasPrefix(jwtfile, jwtPrefix) {
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return "", nil, err
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}
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// We may have an inline jwt here.
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contents = []byte(jwtfile)
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}
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defer wipeSlice(contents)
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theJWT, err := jwt.ParseDecoratedJWT(contents)
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if err != nil {
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return "", nil, err
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}
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opc, err := jwt.DecodeOperatorClaims(theJWT)
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if err != nil {
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return "", nil, err
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}
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return theJWT, opc, nil
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}
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// Just wipe slice with 'x', for clearing contents of nkey seed file.
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func wipeSlice(buf []byte) {
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for i := range buf {
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buf[i] = 'x'
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}
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}
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// validateTrustedOperators will check that we do not have conflicts with
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// assigned trusted keys and trusted operators. If operators are defined we
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// will expand the trusted keys in options.
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func validateTrustedOperators(o *Options) error {
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if len(o.TrustedOperators) == 0 {
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// if we have no operator, default sentinel shouldn't be set
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if o.DefaultSentinel != _EMPTY_ {
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return fmt.Errorf("default sentinel requires operators and accounts")
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}
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return nil
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}
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if o.DefaultSentinel != _EMPTY_ {
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juc, err := jwt.DecodeUserClaims(o.DefaultSentinel)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("default sentinel JWT not valid")
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}
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if !juc.BearerToken && juc.IssuerAccount != "" && juc.HasEmptyPermissions() {
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// we cannot resolve the account yet - but this looks like a scoped user
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// it will be rejected at runtime if not valid
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} else if !juc.BearerToken {
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return fmt.Errorf("default sentinel must be a bearer token")
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}
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}
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if o.AccountResolver == nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("operators require an account resolver to be configured")
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}
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if len(o.Accounts) > 0 {
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return fmt.Errorf("operators do not allow Accounts to be configured directly")
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}
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if len(o.Users) > 0 || len(o.Nkeys) > 0 {
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return fmt.Errorf("operators do not allow users to be configured directly")
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}
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if len(o.TrustedOperators) > 0 && len(o.TrustedKeys) > 0 {
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return fmt.Errorf("conflicting options for 'TrustedKeys' and 'TrustedOperators'")
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}
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if o.SystemAccount != _EMPTY_ {
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foundSys := false
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foundNonEmpty := false
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for _, op := range o.TrustedOperators {
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if op.SystemAccount != _EMPTY_ {
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foundNonEmpty = true
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}
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if op.SystemAccount == o.SystemAccount {
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foundSys = true
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break
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}
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}
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if foundNonEmpty && !foundSys {
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return fmt.Errorf("system_account in config and operator JWT must be identical")
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}
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} else if o.TrustedOperators[0].SystemAccount == _EMPTY_ {
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// In case the system account is neither defined in config nor in the first operator.
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// If it would be needed due to the nats account resolver, raise an error.
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switch o.AccountResolver.(type) {
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case *DirAccResolver, *CacheDirAccResolver:
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return fmt.Errorf("using nats based account resolver - the system account needs to be specified in configuration or the operator jwt")
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}
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}
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srvMajor, srvMinor, srvUpdate, _ := versionComponents(VERSION)
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for _, opc := range o.TrustedOperators {
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if major, minor, update, err := jwt.ParseServerVersion(opc.AssertServerVersion); err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("operator %s expects version %s got error instead: %s",
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opc.Subject, opc.AssertServerVersion, err)
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} else if major > srvMajor {
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return fmt.Errorf("operator %s expected major version %d > server major version %d",
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opc.Subject, major, srvMajor)
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} else if srvMajor > major {
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} else if minor > srvMinor {
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return fmt.Errorf("operator %s expected minor version %d > server minor version %d",
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opc.Subject, minor, srvMinor)
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} else if srvMinor > minor {
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} else if update > srvUpdate {
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return fmt.Errorf("operator %s expected update version %d > server update version %d",
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opc.Subject, update, srvUpdate)
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}
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}
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// If we have operators, fill in the trusted keys.
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// FIXME(dlc) - We had TrustedKeys before TrustedOperators. The jwt.OperatorClaims
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// has a DidSign(). Use that longer term. For now we can expand in place.
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for _, opc := range o.TrustedOperators {
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if o.TrustedKeys == nil {
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o.TrustedKeys = make([]string, 0, 4)
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}
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if !opc.StrictSigningKeyUsage {
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o.TrustedKeys = append(o.TrustedKeys, opc.Subject)
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}
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o.TrustedKeys = append(o.TrustedKeys, opc.SigningKeys...)
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}
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for _, key := range o.TrustedKeys {
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if !nkeys.IsValidPublicOperatorKey(key) {
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return fmt.Errorf("trusted Keys %q are required to be a valid public operator nkey", key)
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}
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}
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if len(o.resolverPinnedAccounts) > 0 {
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for key := range o.resolverPinnedAccounts {
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if !nkeys.IsValidPublicAccountKey(key) {
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return fmt.Errorf("pinned account key %q is not a valid public account nkey", key)
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}
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}
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// ensure the system account (belonging to the operator can always connect)
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if o.SystemAccount != _EMPTY_ {
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o.resolverPinnedAccounts[o.SystemAccount] = struct{}{}
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}
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}
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// If we have an auth callout defined make sure we are not in operator mode.
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if o.AuthCallout != nil {
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return errors.New("operators do not allow authorization callouts to be configured directly")
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}
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return nil
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}
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func validateSrc(claims *jwt.UserClaims, host string) bool {
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if claims == nil {
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return false
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} else if len(claims.Src) == 0 {
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return true
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} else if host == "" {
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return false
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}
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ip := net.ParseIP(host)
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if ip == nil {
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return false
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}
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for _, cidr := range claims.Src {
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if _, net, err := net.ParseCIDR(cidr); err != nil {
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return false // should not happen as this jwt is invalid
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} else if net.Contains(ip) {
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return true
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}
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}
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return false
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}
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func validateTimes(claims *jwt.UserClaims) (bool, time.Duration) {
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return validateTimesAt(claims, time.Now())
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}
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func validateTimesAt(claims *jwt.UserClaims, now time.Time) (bool, time.Duration) {
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if claims == nil {
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return false, time.Duration(0)
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} else if len(claims.Times) == 0 {
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return true, time.Duration(0)
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}
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loc := time.Local
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if claims.Locale != "" {
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var err error
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if loc, err = time.LoadLocation(claims.Locale); err != nil {
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return false, time.Duration(0) // parsing not expected to fail at this point
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}
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now = now.In(loc)
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}
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var ok bool
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var validFor time.Duration
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for _, timeRange := range claims.Times {
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start, err := time.ParseInLocation("15:04:05", timeRange.Start, loc)
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if err != nil {
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return false, time.Duration(0) // parsing not expected to fail at this point
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}
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end, err := time.ParseInLocation("15:04:05", timeRange.End, loc)
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if err != nil {
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return false, time.Duration(0) // parsing not expected to fail at this point
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}
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y, m, d := now.Date()
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start = time.Date(y, m, d, start.Hour(), start.Minute(), start.Second(), 0, loc)
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end = time.Date(y, m, d, end.Hour(), end.Minute(), end.Second(), 0, loc)
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inRange, expires := validateTimeRangeAt(start, end, now)
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if inRange && (!ok || expires > validFor) {
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ok = true
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validFor = expires
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}
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}
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return ok, validFor
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}
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// Returns true if now is within `start` and `end`, and
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// how much time is left until `end`.
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// False if `now` is not within range.
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func validateTimeRangeAt(start, end, now time.Time) (bool, time.Duration) {
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// Now falls within range.
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// For example 11:00-22:00 at 13:00
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if start.Before(now) && end.After(now) {
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return true, end.Sub(now)
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}
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// Range crosses midnight.
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if start.After(end) {
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// Now is after midnight.
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// For example 22:00-06:00 at 05:00.
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if end.After(now) {
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return true, end.Sub(now)
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}
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// Now is before midnight.
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// For example 22:00-06:00 at 23:30.
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end = end.AddDate(0, 0, 1)
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if start.Before(now) && end.After(now) {
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return true, end.Sub(now)
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}
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}
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return false, time.Duration(0)
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}
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