jochen
be92762969
The live tests reached one shared bus and assert, read and remove the mesh's own objects by their fixed names, so packages run in parallel deleted what each other read and the suite passed only one package at a time; a red suite read as noise. internal/testbus starts a server per test, linked in at the nats-server release go.mod pins, and a test holds that pin to the catalogue's bus image and to the facts snapshot's bus when there is one, so the tests never run a bus the mesh does not. The waiter test read a timing (the most connections held at one look) and now reads the state it means (the fewest held across the wait). make check runs the packages in parallel under the race detector, with a timeout.
406 lines
14 KiB
Go
406 lines
14 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2023-2025 The NATS Authors
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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package server
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import (
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"crypto/tls"
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"crypto/x509"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/ocsp"
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"github.com/nats-io/nats-server/v2/server/certidp"
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)
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func parseOCSPPeer(v any) (pcfg *certidp.OCSPPeerConfig, retError error) {
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var lt token
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defer convertPanicToError(<, &retError)
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tk, v := unwrapValue(v, <)
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cm, ok := v.(map[string]any)
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if !ok {
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return nil, &configErr{tk, fmt.Sprintf(certidp.ErrIllegalPeerOptsConfig, v)}
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}
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pcfg = certidp.NewOCSPPeerConfig()
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retError = nil
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for mk, mv := range cm {
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tk, mv = unwrapValue(mv, <)
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switch strings.ToLower(mk) {
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case "verify":
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verify, ok := mv.(bool)
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if !ok {
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return nil, &configErr{tk, fmt.Sprintf(certidp.ErrParsingPeerOptFieldGeneric, mk)}
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}
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pcfg.Verify = verify
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case "allowed_clockskew":
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at := float64(0)
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switch mv := mv.(type) {
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case int64:
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at = float64(mv)
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case float64:
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at = mv
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case string:
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d, err := time.ParseDuration(mv)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, &configErr{tk, fmt.Sprintf(certidp.ErrParsingPeerOptFieldTypeConversion, "unexpected type")}
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}
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at = d.Seconds()
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default:
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return nil, &configErr{tk, fmt.Sprintf(certidp.ErrParsingPeerOptFieldTypeConversion, "unexpected type")}
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}
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if at >= 0 {
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pcfg.ClockSkew = at
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}
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case "ca_timeout":
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at := float64(0)
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switch mv := mv.(type) {
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case int64:
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at = float64(mv)
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case float64:
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at = mv
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case string:
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d, err := time.ParseDuration(mv)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, &configErr{tk, fmt.Sprintf(certidp.ErrParsingPeerOptFieldTypeConversion, err)}
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}
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at = d.Seconds()
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default:
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return nil, &configErr{tk, fmt.Sprintf(certidp.ErrParsingPeerOptFieldTypeConversion, "unexpected type")}
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}
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if at >= 0 {
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pcfg.Timeout = at
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}
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case "cache_ttl_when_next_update_unset":
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at := float64(0)
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switch mv := mv.(type) {
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case int64:
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at = float64(mv)
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case float64:
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at = mv
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case string:
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d, err := time.ParseDuration(mv)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, &configErr{tk, fmt.Sprintf(certidp.ErrParsingPeerOptFieldTypeConversion, err)}
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}
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at = d.Seconds()
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default:
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return nil, &configErr{tk, fmt.Sprintf(certidp.ErrParsingPeerOptFieldTypeConversion, "unexpected type")}
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}
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if at >= 0 {
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pcfg.TTLUnsetNextUpdate = at
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}
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case "warn_only":
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warnOnly, ok := mv.(bool)
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if !ok {
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return nil, &configErr{tk, fmt.Sprintf(certidp.ErrParsingPeerOptFieldGeneric, mk)}
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}
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pcfg.WarnOnly = warnOnly
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case "unknown_is_good":
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unknownIsGood, ok := mv.(bool)
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if !ok {
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return nil, &configErr{tk, fmt.Sprintf(certidp.ErrParsingPeerOptFieldGeneric, mk)}
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}
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pcfg.UnknownIsGood = unknownIsGood
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case "allow_when_ca_unreachable":
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allowWhenCAUnreachable, ok := mv.(bool)
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if !ok {
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return nil, &configErr{tk, fmt.Sprintf(certidp.ErrParsingPeerOptFieldGeneric, mk)}
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}
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pcfg.AllowWhenCAUnreachable = allowWhenCAUnreachable
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default:
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return nil, &configErr{tk, fmt.Sprintf(certidp.ErrParsingPeerOptFieldGeneric, mk)}
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}
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}
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return pcfg, nil
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}
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func peerFromVerifiedChains(chains [][]*x509.Certificate) *x509.Certificate {
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if len(chains) == 0 || len(chains[0]) == 0 {
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return nil
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}
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return chains[0][0]
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}
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// plugTLSOCSPPeer will plug the TLS handshake lifecycle for client mTLS connections and Leaf connections
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func (s *Server) plugTLSOCSPPeer(config *tlsConfigKind) (*tls.Config, bool, error) {
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if config == nil || config.tlsConfig == nil {
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return nil, false, errors.New(certidp.ErrUnableToPlugTLSEmptyConfig)
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}
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kind := config.kind
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isSpoke := config.isLeafSpoke
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tcOpts := config.tlsOpts
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if tcOpts == nil || tcOpts.OCSPPeerConfig == nil || !tcOpts.OCSPPeerConfig.Verify {
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return nil, false, nil
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}
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s.Debugf(certidp.DbgPlugTLSForKind, config.kind)
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// peer is a tls client
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if kind == kindStringMap[CLIENT] || (kind == kindStringMap[LEAF] && !isSpoke) {
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if !tcOpts.Verify {
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return nil, false, errors.New(certidp.ErrMTLSRequired)
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}
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return s.plugClientTLSOCSPPeer(config)
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}
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// peer is a tls server
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if kind == kindStringMap[LEAF] && isSpoke {
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return s.plugServerTLSOCSPPeer(config)
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}
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return nil, false, nil
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}
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func (s *Server) plugClientTLSOCSPPeer(config *tlsConfigKind) (*tls.Config, bool, error) {
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if config == nil || config.tlsConfig == nil || config.tlsOpts == nil {
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return nil, false, errors.New(certidp.ErrUnableToPlugTLSClient)
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}
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tc := config.tlsConfig
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tcOpts := config.tlsOpts
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kind := config.kind
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if tcOpts.OCSPPeerConfig == nil || !tcOpts.OCSPPeerConfig.Verify {
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return tc, false, nil
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}
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tc.VerifyConnection = func(cs tls.ConnectionState) error {
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if !s.tlsClientOCSPValid(cs.VerifiedChains, tcOpts.OCSPPeerConfig) {
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s.sendOCSPPeerRejectEvent(kind, peerFromVerifiedChains(cs.VerifiedChains), certidp.MsgTLSClientRejectConnection)
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return errors.New(certidp.MsgTLSClientRejectConnection)
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}
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return nil
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}
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return tc, true, nil
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}
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func (s *Server) plugServerTLSOCSPPeer(config *tlsConfigKind) (*tls.Config, bool, error) {
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if config == nil || config.tlsConfig == nil || config.tlsOpts == nil {
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return nil, false, errors.New(certidp.ErrUnableToPlugTLSServer)
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}
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tc := config.tlsConfig
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tcOpts := config.tlsOpts
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kind := config.kind
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if tcOpts.OCSPPeerConfig == nil || !tcOpts.OCSPPeerConfig.Verify {
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return tc, false, nil
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}
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tc.VerifyConnection = func(cs tls.ConnectionState) error {
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if !s.tlsServerOCSPValid(cs.VerifiedChains, tcOpts.OCSPPeerConfig) {
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s.sendOCSPPeerRejectEvent(kind, peerFromVerifiedChains(cs.VerifiedChains), certidp.MsgTLSServerRejectConnection)
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return errors.New(certidp.MsgTLSServerRejectConnection)
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}
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return nil
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}
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return tc, true, nil
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}
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// tlsServerOCSPValid evaluates verified chains (post successful TLS handshake) against OCSP
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// eligibility. A verified chain is considered OCSP Valid if either none of the links are
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// OCSP eligible, or current "good" responses from the CA can be obtained for each eligible link.
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// Upon first OCSP Valid chain found, the Server is deemed OCSP Valid. If none of the chains are
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// OCSP Valid, the Server is deemed OCSP Invalid. A verified self-signed certificate (chain length 1)
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// is also considered OCSP Valid.
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func (s *Server) tlsServerOCSPValid(chains [][]*x509.Certificate, opts *certidp.OCSPPeerConfig) bool {
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s.Debugf(certidp.DbgNumServerChains, len(chains))
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return s.peerOCSPValid(chains, opts)
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}
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// tlsClientOCSPValid evaluates verified chains (post successful TLS handshake) against OCSP
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// eligibility. A verified chain is considered OCSP Valid if either none of the links are
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// OCSP eligible, or current "good" responses from the CA can be obtained for each eligible link.
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// Upon first OCSP Valid chain found, the Client is deemed OCSP Valid. If none of the chains are
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// OCSP Valid, the Client is deemed OCSP Invalid. A verified self-signed certificate (chain length 1)
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// is also considered OCSP Valid.
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func (s *Server) tlsClientOCSPValid(chains [][]*x509.Certificate, opts *certidp.OCSPPeerConfig) bool {
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s.Debugf(certidp.DbgNumClientChains, len(chains))
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return s.peerOCSPValid(chains, opts)
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}
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func (s *Server) peerOCSPValid(chains [][]*x509.Certificate, opts *certidp.OCSPPeerConfig) bool {
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peer := peerFromVerifiedChains(chains)
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if peer == nil {
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s.Errorf(certidp.ErrPeerEmptyAutoReject)
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return false
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}
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for ci, chain := range chains {
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s.Debugf(certidp.DbgLinksInChain, ci, len(chain))
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// Self-signed certificate is Client OCSP Valid (no CA)
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if len(chain) == 1 {
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s.Debugf(certidp.DbgSelfSignedValid, ci)
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return true
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}
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// Check if any of the links in the chain are OCSP eligible
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chainEligible := false
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var eligibleLinks []*certidp.ChainLink
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// Iterate over links skipping the root cert which is not OCSP eligible (self == issuer)
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for linkPos := 0; linkPos < len(chain)-1; linkPos++ {
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cert := chain[linkPos]
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link := &certidp.ChainLink{
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Leaf: cert,
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}
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if certidp.CertOCSPEligible(link) {
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chainEligible = true
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issuerCert := certidp.GetLeafIssuerCert(chain, linkPos)
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if issuerCert == nil {
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// unexpected chain condition, reject Client as OCSP Invalid
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return false
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}
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link.Issuer = issuerCert
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eligibleLinks = append(eligibleLinks, link)
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}
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}
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// A trust-store verified chain that is not OCSP eligible is always OCSP Valid
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if !chainEligible {
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s.Debugf(certidp.DbgValidNonOCSPChain, ci)
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return true
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}
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s.Debugf(certidp.DbgChainIsOCSPEligible, ci, len(eligibleLinks))
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// Chain has at least one OCSP eligible link, so check each eligible link;
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// any link with a !good OCSP response chain OCSP Invalid
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chainValid := true
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for _, link := range eligibleLinks {
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// if option selected, good could reflect either ocsp.Good or ocsp.Unknown
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if badReason, good := s.certOCSPGood(link, opts); !good {
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s.Debugf(badReason)
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s.sendOCSPPeerChainlinkInvalidEvent(peer, link.Leaf, badReason)
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chainValid = false
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break
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}
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}
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if chainValid {
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s.Debugf(certidp.DbgChainIsOCSPValid, ci)
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return true
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}
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}
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// If we are here, all chains had OCSP eligible links, but none of the chains achieved OCSP valid
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s.Debugf(certidp.DbgNoOCSPValidChains)
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return false
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}
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func (s *Server) certOCSPGood(link *certidp.ChainLink, opts *certidp.OCSPPeerConfig) (string, bool) {
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if link == nil || link.Leaf == nil || link.Issuer == nil || link.OCSPWebEndpoints == nil || len(*link.OCSPWebEndpoints) < 1 {
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return "Empty chainlink found", false
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}
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var err error
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sLogs := &certidp.Log{
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Debugf: s.Debugf,
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Noticef: s.Noticef,
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Warnf: s.Warnf,
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Errorf: s.Errorf,
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Tracef: s.Tracef,
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}
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fingerprint := certidp.GenerateFingerprint(link.Leaf)
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// Used for debug/operator only, not match
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subj := certidp.GetSubjectDNForm(link.Leaf)
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var rawResp []byte
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var ocspr *ocsp.Response
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var useCachedResp bool
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var rc = s.ocsprc
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var cachedRevocation bool
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// Check our cache before calling out to the CA OCSP responder
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s.Debugf(certidp.DbgCheckingCacheForCert, subj, fingerprint)
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if rawResp = rc.Get(fingerprint, sLogs); len(rawResp) > 0 {
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// Signature validation of CA's OCSP response occurs in ParseResponse
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ocspr, err = ocsp.ParseResponse(rawResp, link.Issuer)
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if err == nil && ocspr != nil {
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// Check if OCSP Response delegation present and if so is valid
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if !certidp.ValidDelegationCheck(link.Issuer, ocspr) {
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// Invalid delegation was already in cache, purge it and don't use it
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s.Debugf(certidp.MsgCachedOCSPResponseInvalid, subj)
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rc.Delete(fingerprint, true, sLogs)
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goto AFTERCACHE
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}
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if certidp.OCSPResponseCurrent(ocspr, opts, sLogs) {
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s.Debugf(certidp.DbgCurrentResponseCached, certidp.GetStatusAssertionStr(ocspr.Status))
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useCachedResp = true
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} else {
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// Cached response is not current, delete it and tidy runtime stats to reflect a miss;
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// if preserve_revoked is enabled, the cache will not delete the cached response
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s.Debugf(certidp.DbgExpiredResponseCached, certidp.GetStatusAssertionStr(ocspr.Status))
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rc.Delete(fingerprint, true, sLogs)
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}
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// Regardless of currency, record a cached revocation found in case AllowWhenCAUnreachable is set
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if ocspr.Status == ocsp.Revoked {
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cachedRevocation = true
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}
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} else {
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// Bogus cached assertion, purge it and don't use it
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s.Debugf(certidp.MsgCachedOCSPResponseInvalid, subj, fingerprint)
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rc.Delete(fingerprint, true, sLogs)
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goto AFTERCACHE
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}
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}
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AFTERCACHE:
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if !useCachedResp {
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// CA OCSP responder callout needed
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rawResp, err = certidp.FetchOCSPResponse(link, opts, sLogs)
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if err != nil || rawResp == nil || len(rawResp) == 0 {
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s.Warnf(certidp.ErrCAResponderCalloutFail, subj, err)
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if opts.WarnOnly {
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s.Warnf(certidp.MsgAllowWarnOnlyOccurred, subj)
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return _EMPTY_, true
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}
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if opts.AllowWhenCAUnreachable && !cachedRevocation {
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// Link has no cached history of revocation, so allow it to pass
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s.Warnf(certidp.MsgAllowWhenCAUnreachableOccurred, subj)
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return _EMPTY_, true
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} else if opts.AllowWhenCAUnreachable {
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// Link has cached but expired revocation so reject when CA is unreachable
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s.Warnf(certidp.MsgAllowWhenCAUnreachableOccurredCachedRevoke, subj)
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}
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return certidp.MsgFailedOCSPResponseFetch, false
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}
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// Signature validation of CA's OCSP response occurs in ParseResponse
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ocspr, err = ocsp.ParseResponse(rawResp, link.Issuer)
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if err == nil && ocspr != nil {
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// Check if OCSP Response delegation present and if so is valid
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if !certidp.ValidDelegationCheck(link.Issuer, ocspr) {
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s.Warnf(certidp.MsgOCSPResponseDelegationInvalid, subj)
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if opts.WarnOnly {
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// Can't use bogus assertion, but warn-only set so allow link to pass
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s.Warnf(certidp.MsgAllowWarnOnlyOccurred, subj)
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return _EMPTY_, true
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}
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return fmt.Sprintf(certidp.MsgOCSPResponseDelegationInvalid, subj), false
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}
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if !certidp.OCSPResponseCurrent(ocspr, opts, sLogs) {
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s.Warnf(certidp.ErrNewCAResponseNotCurrent, subj)
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if opts.WarnOnly {
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// Can't use non-effective assertion, but warn-only set so allow link to pass
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s.Warnf(certidp.MsgAllowWarnOnlyOccurred, subj)
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return _EMPTY_, true
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}
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return certidp.MsgOCSPResponseNotEffective, false
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}
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} else {
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s.Errorf(certidp.ErrCAResponseParseFailed, subj, err)
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if opts.WarnOnly {
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// Can't use bogus assertion, but warn-only set so allow link to pass
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s.Warnf(certidp.MsgAllowWarnOnlyOccurred, subj)
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return _EMPTY_, true
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}
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return certidp.MsgFailedOCSPResponseParse, false
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}
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// cache the valid fetched CA OCSP Response
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rc.Put(fingerprint, ocspr, subj, sLogs)
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}
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// Whether through valid cache response available or newly fetched valid response, now check the status
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if ocspr.Status == ocsp.Revoked || (ocspr.Status == ocsp.Unknown && !opts.UnknownIsGood) {
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s.Warnf(certidp.ErrOCSPInvalidPeerLink, subj, certidp.GetStatusAssertionStr(ocspr.Status))
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if opts.WarnOnly {
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s.Warnf(certidp.MsgAllowWarnOnlyOccurred, subj)
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return _EMPTY_, true
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}
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return fmt.Sprintf(certidp.MsgOCSPResponseInvalidStatus, certidp.GetStatusAssertionStr(ocspr.Status)), false
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}
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s.Debugf(certidp.DbgOCSPValidPeerLink, subj)
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return _EMPTY_, true
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}
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