The refreshable-grant refresh token no longer rides a custom at-rest envelope that a
module opens with a node private key. A module is never given a node's private sealing
key, so that path could not exist -- the gap Phase C hit.
Instead the refresh token is a credential sealed to the MANAGER holder with the same
anonymous box (secrets.Seal / crypto_box_seal) every credential uses, stored as one
sealed blob, and delivered by the existing host-unseal-and-mount: the host opens it with
the node's real key and mounts the cleartext at the manager module's bound path, exactly
as a consumer's db password is delivered.
- refresh_grant now stores { sealed, manager_key }, dropping the AtRest token/wrapped_key
columns; internal/secrets/atrest.go is retired (nothing else used it).
- the licence records its manager as (node, module); KeyFor delivers the refresh token to
the manager holder and the access token to consumers, disambiguated by module so the two
can co-locate. Accept and the reseal skip the manager holder.
- the manager holder is delivered the node's PUBLIC sealing key in its bound facts, so the
module can re-seal a rotated refresh token with no private key of its own; the
declaration tolerates its empty pre-adoption secret rather than refusing.
- SubmitRefresh / set-grant take a sealed blob, never a refresh token in the clear.
The invariant holds unchanged: the control plane never reads the refresh token, and no node
but the manager holds it. A committed cross-language test proves the TypeScript module seal
opens under Go box.OpenAnonymous (the host's Unseal) -- both are NaCl crypto_box_seal.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
154 lines
5.8 KiB
Go
154 lines
5.8 KiB
Go
package licences
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import (
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"strings"
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"testing"
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"github.com/novox/mesh-control/internal/secrets"
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)
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// SubmitRefresh is the boundary a manager NODE crosses to publish a refresh it performed: the control
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// plane is given only the access token in the clear and an opaque re-sealed refresh box — never the
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// refresh token. These tests defend that the boundary keeps its shape.
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// A submitted refresh seals the access token to every CONSUMER holder, exactly as an in-process
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// refresh does, and delivers no refresh token to a consumer.
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func TestSubmitRefreshSealsTheAccessTokenAndNeverTheRefreshToken(t *testing.T) {
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held, ctx := fresh(t)
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// No in-process refresher registered: the anthropic production path uses SubmitRefresh, not
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// Refresh, precisely so nothing opens the box inside this process.
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_, _, _, holders, keys := aRefreshableLicence(t, held, ctx, &fakeRefresher{})
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sealed, err := held.SubmitRefresh(ctx, "personal", "at-from-the-manager-node", "", "", keys)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if sealed != 2 {
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t.Fatalf("%d consumer holder(s) were resealed, expected 2", sealed)
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}
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for node, open := range holders {
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blob, err := held.KeyFor(ctx, "personal", node, "assistant")
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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got, err := open(blob)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("%s cannot open what it was delivered", node)
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}
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if string(got) != "at-from-the-manager-node" {
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t.Fatalf("%s was delivered %q, not the access token", node, got)
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}
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if string(got) == "rt-the-refresh-token" || strings.Contains(blob, "rt-the-refresh-token") {
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t.Fatalf("%s was delivered the refresh token", node)
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}
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}
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}
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// The refresh token is untouched by a submit that carried no rotation, and the manager node — and
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// only it — still opens it. The submit path never saw the refresh token in the clear.
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func TestSubmitRefreshWithoutRotationLeavesTheGrantOpenableByTheManagerAlone(t *testing.T) {
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held, ctx := fresh(t)
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managerPub, managerPriv, _, _, keys := aRefreshableLicence(t, held, ctx, &fakeRefresher{})
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before := grantRow(t, held, ctx)
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if _, err := held.SubmitRefresh(ctx, "personal", "at-access", "", "", keys); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if grantRow(t, held, ctx) != before {
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t.Fatal("a submit with no rotation changed the stored refresh token")
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}
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sealed, _, ok, err := held.RefreshGrant(ctx, "personal")
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if err != nil || !ok {
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t.Fatalf("the grant is not stored: ok=%v err=%v", ok, err)
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}
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got := openAnon(t, sealed, managerPub, managerPriv)
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if string(got) != "rt-the-refresh-token" {
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t.Fatalf("the manager read back %q", got)
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}
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// A node that is not the manager cannot: the whole of "the manager node only".
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otherPub, otherPriv, _ := managerPair(t)
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if _, ok := tryOpenAnon(sealed, otherPub, otherPriv); ok {
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t.Fatal("a node that is not the manager opened the refresh token")
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}
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}
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// A submit that carries a rotated box replaces the stored one — and the control plane stored it
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// without opening it: only the manager node reads the rotated token back.
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func TestSubmitRefreshWithRotationReplacesTheBoxUnopened(t *testing.T) {
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held, ctx := fresh(t)
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managerPub, managerPriv, _, _, keys := aRefreshableLicence(t, held, ctx, &fakeRefresher{})
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before := grantRow(t, held, ctx)
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// The manager node re-sealed the rotated refresh token to its own key; the control plane is handed
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// only this box.
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rotated, err := secrets.Seal(managerPub, []byte("rt-a-rotated-refresh-token"))
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if _, err := held.SubmitRefresh(ctx, "personal", "at-access", rotated, managerPub, keys); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if grantRow(t, held, ctx) == before {
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t.Fatal("the rotated refresh token did not replace the stored box")
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}
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sealed, _, ok, err := held.RefreshGrant(ctx, "personal")
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if err != nil || !ok {
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t.Fatalf("the rotated grant is not stored: ok=%v err=%v", ok, err)
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}
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got := openAnon(t, sealed, managerPub, managerPriv)
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if string(got) != "rt-a-rotated-refresh-token" {
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t.Fatalf("the stored grant opened to %q, not the rotated token", got)
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}
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}
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// A submit with an empty access token is refused before anything is sealed: publishing nothing while
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// reporting success is the failure this whole design refuses.
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func TestSubmitRefreshRefusesAnEmptyAccessToken(t *testing.T) {
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held, ctx := fresh(t)
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_, _, _, _, keys := aRefreshableLicence(t, held, ctx, &fakeRefresher{})
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if _, err := held.SubmitRefresh(ctx, "personal", " ", "", "", keys); err == nil {
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t.Fatal("a refresh with no access token was published")
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}
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}
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// A static-key licence cannot have a refresh submitted for it: the carve-out never fires, so the
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// machinery that holds a token readably is unreachable.
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func TestSubmitRefreshRefusesAStaticKeyLicence(t *testing.T) {
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held, ctx := fresh(t)
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if err := held.Add(ctx, "plain", "anthropic-api-key", nil); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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if err := held.Use(ctx, "plain", "workstation", "assistant"); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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_, err := held.SubmitRefresh(ctx, "plain", "at-access", "", "",
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func(string) (string, error) { return ASealingKey(t), nil })
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("a refresh was submitted for a static-key licence")
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}
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if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "refreshable-grant") {
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t.Fatalf("the refusal does not name the shape: %v", err)
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}
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}
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// A refreshable licence with no manager named refuses a submit and says how to name one: a refresh
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// cannot be published for a licence no node is responsible for.
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func TestSubmitRefreshRefusesWithoutAManager(t *testing.T) {
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held, ctx := fresh(t)
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if err := held.Add(ctx, "personal", "anthropic", nil); err != nil {
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t.Fatal(err)
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}
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_, err := held.SubmitRefresh(ctx, "personal", "at-access", "", "",
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func(string) (string, error) { return "", nil })
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if err == nil {
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t.Fatal("a refresh was submitted for a licence with no manager")
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}
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if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "manager") {
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t.Fatalf("the refusal does not point at the missing manager: %v", err)
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}
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}
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