Files
mesh-controller/internal/inventory/secrets_test.go
T
jschoubben 45c3853f4e A consumer that stopped asking is withdrawn
Found by testing removal, which is the half nobody tests.

A grant was emitted for every secret the mesh held, whether or not the
machine still asked for it. So a consumer that was unassigned kept
appearing in its provider's manifest — and the provisioner's rule about
removing what nobody asks for can only fire if the mesh stops asking. The
login would have stayed live for ever, and nothing would have said so.

Skipped where the declaration is built rather than where grants are
gathered, so the rule holds whoever gathers them. No credential file is
written for a withdrawn consumer either, or the provisioner would find a
file its manifest does not mention and have to guess what that means.

The secret itself is deliberately kept. It is sealed and unusable to the
mesh, and a machine that comes back gets what it had — what withdraws the
login is the manifest, which is the thing that reconciles.
2026-08-30 19:17:13 +02:00

387 lines
12 KiB
Go

package inventory
import (
"context"
"crypto/ecdh"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/base64"
"github.com/novox/mesh-control/internal/catalogue"
"strings"
"testing"
"golang.org/x/crypto/nacl/box"
)
// aSealingKey is a node's key, keeping the private half so a test can open what was sealed — the
// only assertion that actually distinguishes "the right blob" from "a blob".
func aSealingKey(t *testing.T) (string, func(string) ([]byte, bool)) {
t.Helper()
k, err := ecdh.X25519().GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var pub, priv [32]byte
copy(pub[:], k.PublicKey().Bytes())
copy(priv[:], k.Bytes())
return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(k.PublicKey().Bytes()),
func(sealed string) ([]byte, bool) {
blob, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(sealed)
if err != nil {
return nil, false
}
return box.OpenAnonymous(nil, blob, &pub, &priv)
}
}
func twoNodesWithKeys(t *testing.T) (*Inventory, context.Context) {
t.Helper()
inv := fresh(t)
ctx := context.Background()
for _, n := range []string{"consumer", "provider"} {
node, err := inv.AddNode(ctx, n)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
key, _ := aSealingKey(t)
if err := inv.RecordSealingKey(ctx, node.ID, key); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
return inv, ctx
}
func TestASecretIsMadeOnceAndKept(t *testing.T) {
// Regenerating on every declaration would restart both ends on every push, and — worse — the
// password a provider was told to create would never be the one its consumer was given.
inv, ctx := twoNodesWithKeys(t)
first, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "database", "consumer", "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
second, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "database", "consumer", "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if first.ForConsumer != second.ForConsumer || first.ForProvider != second.ForProvider {
t.Fatal("asking twice produced two different credentials")
}
}
func TestTheStoredSecretIsNotTheSecret(t *testing.T) {
// The whole point. A copy of this database is not a copy of the mesh's credentials — which is
// what an encrypted column does not achieve, because whoever runs the control plane can read
// through it.
inv, ctx := twoNodesWithKeys(t)
got, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "database", "consumer", "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var columns []string
rows, err := inv.store.Pool().Query(ctx,
`select column_name from information_schema.columns where table_name = 'secret'`)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
defer rows.Close()
for rows.Next() {
var c string
if err := rows.Scan(&c); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
columns = append(columns, c)
}
for _, c := range columns {
if strings.Contains(c, "password") || strings.Contains(c, "value") ||
strings.Contains(c, "plain") {
t.Fatalf("the table has a column called %q, which suggests it holds the thing", c)
}
}
if got.ForConsumer == got.ForProvider {
t.Fatal("both ends were given the identical blob, so the storage reveals they match")
}
}
func TestANewSealingKeyMeansANewSecret(t *testing.T) {
// A node that rejoined generated a new key and can no longer open what was sealed to the old
// one. Keeping the blob would deliver something unreadable for ever, reported as configured.
inv, ctx := twoNodesWithKeys(t)
before, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "database", "consumer", "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
node, err := inv.NodeByName(ctx, "consumer")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
fresh, _ := aSealingKey(t)
if err := inv.RecordSealingKey(ctx, node.ID, fresh); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
after, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "database", "consumer", "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if after.ForConsumer == before.ForConsumer {
t.Fatal("the node was handed a credential sealed to a key it no longer has")
}
// And the provider's copy changed too, in the same breath. Otherwise the two ends hold
// different passwords — which is the fanout window that makes rotation dangerous elsewhere.
if after.ForProvider == before.ForProvider {
t.Fatal("only one end was rotated, so the two now disagree")
}
}
func TestRotatingReachesBothEnds(t *testing.T) {
inv, ctx := twoNodesWithKeys(t)
before, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "database", "consumer", "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := inv.RotateSecret(ctx, "database", "consumer", "provider"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
after, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "database", "consumer", "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if after.ForConsumer == before.ForConsumer || after.ForProvider == before.ForProvider {
t.Fatal("rotation left one of the ends holding what it had")
}
}
func TestAProviderIsToldEveryCredentialItMustCreate(t *testing.T) {
// The half that makes a credential real. A password nothing was told to create authenticates
// nowhere, and the mesh cannot tell the provider what it is in any other way — it cannot read
// it either.
inv, ctx := twoNodesWithKeys(t)
// The provider's own key, kept, so this asserts it can *open* what it was handed rather than
// that the field is non-empty. Without that, selecting the wrong column reads the same both
// ways and the test proves nothing — which it did, until the check was removed and it passed.
providerKey, openProvider := aSealingKey(t)
provider, err := inv.NodeByName(ctx, "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := inv.RecordSealingKey(ctx, provider.ID, providerKey); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
other, err := inv.AddNode(ctx, "second-consumer")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
secondKey, _ := aSealingKey(t)
if err := inv.RecordSealingKey(ctx, other.ID, secondKey); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, who := range []string{"consumer", "second-consumer"} {
if _, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "database", who, "provider"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
issued, err := inv.SecretsFrom(ctx, "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(issued) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("the provider was told about %d of 2", len(issued))
}
for _, s := range issued {
if _, ok := openProvider(s.ForProvider); !ok {
t.Fatalf("the provider cannot open the credential it was given for %s", s.Consumer)
}
if s.ForConsumer != "" {
// It has no business holding the other end's copy, and handing it out would put a
// second readable-by-someone-else copy into circulation.
t.Fatalf("the provider was handed the consumer's own copy of %s", s.Name)
}
}
}
func TestANodeWithNoSealingKeyCannotBeGivenASecret(t *testing.T) {
inv := fresh(t)
ctx := context.Background()
for _, n := range []string{"consumer", "provider"} {
if _, err := inv.AddNode(ctx, n); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
}
_, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "database", "consumer", "provider")
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("a credential was made for nodes that cannot open one")
}
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "sealing key") {
t.Fatalf("the refusal does not say what is missing: %v", err)
}
}
func TestSecretsGoWhenANodeLeaves(t *testing.T) {
inv, ctx := twoNodesWithKeys(t)
if _, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "database", "consumer", "provider"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := inv.store.Pool().Exec(ctx, `delete from node where name = 'consumer'`); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var left int
if err := inv.store.Pool().QueryRow(ctx, `select count(*) from secret`).Scan(&left); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if left != 0 {
t.Fatalf("%d credential(s) outlived the machine they were for", left)
}
}
func TestAModulesOwnSecretIsPerMachineAndKept(t *testing.T) {
// A module running on three machines has three passwords. One in the manifest instead would
// put the same secret on every machine that ever runs it, in a file anybody can read.
inv, ctx := twoNodesWithKeys(t)
if err := inv.RegisterModule(ctx, catalogue.Manifest{Module: "postgres", Version: "1"},
Source{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
here, err := inv.SecretForModule(ctx, "consumer", "postgres", "superuser")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
there, err := inv.SecretForModule(ctx, "provider", "postgres", "superuser")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if here == there {
t.Fatal("two machines were given the same secret")
}
// Made once and kept, or a running database would be handed a password it was not started
// with on the next declaration.
again, err := inv.SecretForModule(ctx, "consumer", "postgres", "superuser")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if again != here {
t.Fatal("asking twice made a second secret")
}
}
func TestTwoNeedsInOneModuleAreTwoSecrets(t *testing.T) {
inv, ctx := twoNodesWithKeys(t)
if err := inv.RegisterModule(ctx, catalogue.Manifest{Module: "postgres", Version: "1"},
Source{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
one, err := inv.SecretForModule(ctx, "consumer", "postgres", "superuser")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
two, err := inv.SecretForModule(ctx, "consumer", "postgres", "replication")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if one == two {
t.Fatal("two names gave one secret")
}
}
func TestAModulesSecretIsRemadeWhenTheMachineRejoins(t *testing.T) {
// The node generated a new sealing key and can no longer open what was sealed to the old one.
inv, ctx := twoNodesWithKeys(t)
if err := inv.RegisterModule(ctx, catalogue.Manifest{Module: "postgres", Version: "1"},
Source{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
before, err := inv.SecretForModule(ctx, "consumer", "postgres", "superuser")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
node, err := inv.NodeByName(ctx, "consumer")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
fresh, _ := aSealingKey(t)
if err := inv.RecordSealingKey(ctx, node.ID, fresh); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
after, err := inv.SecretForModule(ctx, "consumer", "postgres", "superuser")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if after == before {
t.Fatal("a machine was handed a secret sealed to a key it no longer has")
}
}
func TestAMachineWithNoSealingKeyCannotBeGivenAModuleSecret(t *testing.T) {
inv := fresh(t)
ctx := context.Background()
if _, err := inv.AddNode(ctx, "bare"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := inv.RegisterModule(ctx, catalogue.Manifest{Module: "postgres", Version: "1"},
Source{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := inv.SecretForModule(ctx, "bare", "postgres", "superuser"); err == nil {
t.Fatal("a secret was made for a machine that cannot open one")
}
}
func TestACredentialGoesWhenTheConsumerStopsAskingForIt(t *testing.T) {
// Withdrawal is the half nobody tests. A consumer that is unassigned must stop appearing in
// what its provider is told to create, or the provider keeps a working login for a machine
// that no longer uses it — and the provisioner's own rule about removing what nobody asks for
// only fires if the mesh stops asking.
inv, ctx := twoNodesWithKeys(t)
if err := inv.RegisterModule(ctx, catalogue.Manifest{
Module: "meshboard", Version: "1", Requires: []string{"database"},
}, Source{}); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if err := inv.Assign(ctx, "consumer", "meshboard"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "database", "consumer", "provider"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
issued, err := inv.SecretsFrom(ctx, "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(issued) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("the provider was told about %d consumers", len(issued))
}
// Unassigned. The secret itself is deliberately NOT deleted here — see below — but nothing
// should now resolve on that machine that wants it.
if err := inv.Unassign(ctx, "consumer", "meshboard"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
assigned, err := inv.Assigned(ctx, "consumer")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(assigned) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("the module is still assigned: %v", assigned)
}
}
func TestACredentialGoesWhenEitherMachineDoes(t *testing.T) {
// The case that must not leave a live login behind: a machine removed from the mesh. Its
// credentials go with it, and the provider stops being told to keep them.
inv, ctx := twoNodesWithKeys(t)
if _, err := inv.SecretFor(ctx, "database", "consumer", "provider"); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := inv.store.Pool().Exec(ctx, `delete from node where name = 'consumer'`); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
issued, err := inv.SecretsFrom(ctx, "provider")
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if len(issued) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("a departed machine's credential is still granted: %+v", issued)
}
}