Files
mesh-controller/internal/token/token_test.go
T
jschoubben 02d1020bce The token carries the node's name
Found by raising a mesh end to end. The broker account a joining node
authenticates as is named after the node, and exists before that machine
has been told anything — so the node has to know its name before the mesh
can tell it. Without it, enrolment fails at the broker with an empty
username, which says nothing about why.

Not a secret, and the issuer already knows it. The wire-format test now
covers it, so a rename on either side fails in both repositories rather
than at enrolment on a real machine.
2026-08-30 02:36:57 +02:00

159 lines
5.0 KiB
Go

package token
import (
"crypto/ed25519"
"encoding/json"
"strings"
"testing"
)
func complete(t *testing.T) Token {
t.Helper()
public, _, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return Token{
Node: "anchor",
Broker: "192.0.2.10:5671",
Fingerprint: "sha256:" + strings.Repeat("ab", 32),
Signer: public,
Secret: "a-one-time-secret",
}
}
func TestATokenSurvivesBeingCarried(t *testing.T) {
// It is copied by hand out of a terminal and into a machine. Whatever comes back must be
// exactly what went in, including the key — a signing key that changed in transit is a node
// that refuses every declaration it is later sent.
original := complete(t)
encoded, err := original.Encode()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if strings.ContainsAny(encoded, " \n\t") {
t.Error("the encoded token contains whitespace; it is copied by hand as one line")
}
back, err := Decode(encoded)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if back.Broker != original.Broker || back.Fingerprint != original.Fingerprint ||
back.Secret != original.Secret || string(back.Signer) != string(original.Signer) {
t.Errorf("the token changed in transit:\n sent %+v\n got %+v", original, back)
}
}
func TestSurroundingWhitespaceIsTolerated(t *testing.T) {
// It arrives pasted. A trailing newline is not a corrupted token, and refusing one would
// send somebody hunting for a fault that is not there.
encoded, err := complete(t).Encode()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := Decode(" " + encoded + "\n"); err != nil {
t.Errorf("a pasted token was refused: %v", err)
}
}
func TestGarbageIsRefusedAsNotBeingAToken(t *testing.T) {
for _, bad := range []string{"", "not-base64-!!!", "aGVsbG8"} {
if _, err := Decode(bad); err == nil {
t.Errorf("%q was accepted as a token", bad)
}
}
}
func TestATokenFromAnotherVersionIsRefusedClearly(t *testing.T) {
// The host must tell "this is not from the mesh I joined" apart from "this is malformed"
// (novox/hq ADR 0004). A version it does not understand is the first case.
future := complete(t)
encoded, err := future.Encode()
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Re-encode by hand at a version this build does not know.
raw := strings.Replace(string(mustDecodeBase64(t, encoded)), `"v":1`, `"v":99`, 1)
if _, err := Decode(encodeBase64(raw)); err == nil {
t.Fatal("a token from an unknown version was accepted")
}
}
func TestEveryMissingPartIsNamed(t *testing.T) {
// "This token cannot be used" is not something anybody can act on. "It has no broker
// address" is. And all of them at once, not the first: fixing one at a time turns a single
// decision into four.
empty := Token{}
missing := empty.Missing()
if len(missing) != 5 {
t.Fatalf("an empty token named %d missing parts, expected 5: %v", len(missing), missing)
}
if empty.Complete() {
t.Error("an empty token reported itself complete")
}
}
func TestAShortSigningKeyIsNotASigningKey(t *testing.T) {
// The one that would pass a nil check and fail at the moment a declaration is verified —
// which is on a node, in production, long after this.
t1 := complete(t)
t1.Signer = []byte("too short")
if t1.Complete() {
t.Error("a truncated signing key was accepted as present")
}
}
func TestACompleteTokenIsComplete(t *testing.T) {
if got := complete(t); !got.Complete() {
t.Errorf("a token with every part reported missing: %v", got.Missing())
}
}
func mustDecodeBase64(t *testing.T, s string) []byte {
t.Helper()
raw, err := base64Decode(s)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
return raw
}
func TestTheWireFormatIsExactlyTheseFieldNames(t *testing.T) {
// The contract with the host, which defines this format separately because it requires
// nothing present and does not import this (novox/hq ADR 0005). There is a matching test on
// that side. Rename a field on either and both fail — the alternative is a rename that only
// shows up at enrolment, on a real machine.
raw, err := json.Marshal(complete(t))
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
var fields map[string]any
if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &fields); err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, want := range []string{"v", "node", "broker", "fingerprint", "signer", "secret"} {
if _, ok := fields[want]; !ok {
t.Errorf("the token has no %q field; the host reads that name", want)
}
}
if len(fields) != 6 {
t.Errorf("the token has %d fields, expected 6: %v", len(fields), fields)
}
}
func TestATokenWithNoNameIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
// The broker account a joining node authenticates as is named after the node, so the node has
// to know its name before the mesh can tell it anything. Without this the connection is
// refused with an empty username, which says nothing about the cause — which is exactly how
// it went the first time a mesh was raised end to end.
without := complete(t)
without.Node = ""
if without.Complete() {
t.Fatal("a token with no node name reported itself usable")
}
if !strings.Contains(strings.Join(without.Missing(), " "), "node's name") {
t.Fatalf("the refusal does not say what is missing: %v", without.Missing())
}
}