mesh-controller/internal/secrets/seal_test.go

package secrets

import (
	"crypto/ecdh"
	"crypto/rand"
	"encoding/base64"
	"strings"
	"testing"

	"golang.org/x/crypto/nacl/box"
)

// A node's key, as the node would generate it and report the public half.
func nodeKey(t *testing.T) (public string, open func(string) ([]byte, error)) {
	t.Helper()
	private, err := ecdh.X25519().GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	var pub, priv [32]byte
	copy(pub[:], private.PublicKey().Bytes())
	copy(priv[:], private.Bytes())
	return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(private.PublicKey().Bytes()),
		func(sealed string) ([]byte, error) {
			blob, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(sealed)
			if err != nil {
				return nil, err
			}
			out, ok := box.OpenAnonymous(nil, blob, &pub, &priv)
			if !ok {
				return nil, errNotForYou
			}
			return out, nil
		}
}

var errNotForYou = &notForYou{}

type notForYou struct{}

func (*notForYou) Error() string { return "not sealed to this node" }

func TestBothEndsGetTheSameSecretAndTheMeshGetsNeither(t *testing.T) {
	// The whole arrangement in one test. The provider must create the credential the consumer was
	// given, or the mesh reports success and nothing can connect — and neither blob is readable
	// by whoever is holding them, which is the part encrypting a column does not achieve.
	consumerPub, openConsumer := nodeKey(t)
	providerPub, openProvider := nodeKey(t)

	sealed, err := Make(consumerPub, providerPub)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	forConsumer, err := openConsumer(sealed.ForConsumer)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	forProvider, err := openProvider(sealed.ForProvider)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	if string(forConsumer) != string(forProvider) {
		t.Fatalf("the two ends were given different passwords: %q and %q",
			forConsumer, forProvider)
	}
	if len(forConsumer) < 32 {
		t.Fatalf("the password is %d characters, which is not a password", len(forConsumer))
	}
	// Neither can open the other's, which is what makes two blobs different from one shared key.
	if _, err := openConsumer(sealed.ForProvider); err == nil {
		t.Fatal("the consumer opened the provider's copy")
	}
}

func TestTheSealedFormLooksNothingLikeTheSecret(t *testing.T) {
	consumerPub, openConsumer := nodeKey(t)
	providerPub, _ := nodeKey(t)
	sealed, err := Make(consumerPub, providerPub)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	password, err := openConsumer(sealed.ForConsumer)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	if strings.Contains(sealed.ForConsumer, string(password)) {
		t.Fatal("the secret is visible inside what is stored")
	}
	if sealed.ForConsumer == sealed.ForProvider {
		// Sealed boxes are randomised, so an observer cannot tell the two ends hold the same
		// value — nor that a rotation changed nothing.
		t.Fatal("the two blobs are identical, so the storage says they hold the same value")
	}
}

func TestAPasswordIsSafeToPutInAFile(t *testing.T) {
	// It lands in a file something else reads. A newline or a quote in it is a support call.
	consumerPub, openConsumer := nodeKey(t)
	providerPub, _ := nodeKey(t)
	for i := 0; i < 50; i++ {
		sealed, err := Make(consumerPub, providerPub)
		if err != nil {
			t.Fatal(err)
		}
		password, err := openConsumer(sealed.ForConsumer)
		if err != nil {
			t.Fatal(err)
		}
		if strings.ContainsAny(string(password), "\n\r\t \"'\\$`") {
			t.Fatalf("a password needs quoting: %q", password)
		}
	}
}

func TestEverySecretIsDifferent(t *testing.T) {
	consumerPub, openConsumer := nodeKey(t)
	providerPub, _ := nodeKey(t)
	seen := map[string]bool{}
	for i := 0; i < 50; i++ {
		sealed, _ := Make(consumerPub, providerPub)
		password, _ := openConsumer(sealed.ForConsumer)
		if seen[string(password)] {
			t.Fatalf("the same password came out twice: %q", password)
		}
		seen[string(password)] = true
	}
}

func TestAnEndWithNoSealingKeyIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
	// Sealing to nothing would produce a blob nobody can open, stored as though it were a working
	// credential — which is the failure this whole design exists to make impossible.
	//
	// Asserted on the message, not merely on failing. Seal refuses an empty key anyway, so a test
	// that only checked for an error passed with this check removed and proved nothing about it.
	// What the check adds is a reason a person can act on: the remedy is on the node, not here.
	public, _ := nodeKey(t)
	for _, pair := range [][2]string{{public, ""}, {"", public}} {
		_, err := Make(pair[0], pair[1])
		if err == nil {
			t.Fatal("a secret was made for a node with no sealing key")
		}
		if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "both ends need a sealing key") {
			t.Fatalf("the refusal does not say what is missing: %v", err)
		}
	}
}

func TestSomethingThatIsNotAKeyIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
	if _, err := Seal("not-a-key", []byte("x")); err == nil {
		t.Fatal("a secret was sealed to nonsense")
	}
	short := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("too short"))
	if _, err := Seal(short, []byte("x")); err == nil {
		t.Fatal("a secret was sealed to a key of the wrong length")
	}
}