jschoubben
be2dca27ab
Every one of these declared `own-secrets` pointing at a path called
`.env` and then mounted it as `env-file`. The file's whole content is
the password. Docker reads that as a malformed line and the container
starts with no password set — which is not a failure to start, it is a
service running with the wrong credential.
They parsed, they resolved, and none of them could ever have worked.
That is what a manifest checked only by the parser buys.
Each now keeps the sealed file as what it is — a password, alone — and
declares a file beside it whose content says ${secret:name}. The host
fills the hole on the machine, which is the only place both halves
exist. The provisioners mount the bare file, because they read a
password file and always did.
Two tests, both driven from the manifests on disk rather than from
fixtures: every ${secret:x} must name something the module declared, and
nothing may read a bare password file as an env file. Injecting the
shipped bug reproduces it word for word.
Keycloak, Gitea and Mailu still cannot connect to their databases, for
the reason in 04-ISSUES/023 — the user name is the provisioner's
invention and the bound values cannot reach a config file. Their own
credentials are right now; that half was independent and is done.
examples
Things that run, kept here because a contract is easier to read as working code than as prose.
Nothing here is part of the control plane. The control plane decides and never touches a machine (README); everything in this directory runs on a machine and touches it. These are reference implementations of contracts the control plane defines, and a real one ships with the module that ships the software it configures.
postgres-provisioner |
the last step of a credential: reads what the mesh delivered and makes PostgreSQL accept it |
Running the provisioner
--watch reconciles now and again whenever what the mesh delivered changes. That is what lets it
be a module: an ordinary long-running service the host supervises, rather than something that has
to be invoked after every declaration by a timer or a unit wired to a file.
It polls rather than watching the filesystem, because the host writes atomically — the file is replaced, so a watch on the path stops seeing anything after the first replacement. A watcher that silently stops working is worse than a poll.
Credentials are compared by digest and never by content. This runs for as long as the machine is up, and a secret does not belong in a long-lived variable when a hash answers the same question.