Converge openings through the firewall an adopted node was found with, and retire it only when the node converges (hq ADR 0100)

internal/apply/apply.go

@@ -150,8 +150,21 @@ func ApplyKeeping(
 		declared[r.Identity()] = true
 	}
 
+	// Which firewall is found here, before anything else, since an unsupported one refuses the
+	// whole declaration (novox/hq ADR 0100). Nothing for a converged node.
+	fw, err := foundFirewall(ctx, d, &known, run, log)
+	if err != nil {
+		return report, known, &Error{Resource: "the firewall found on this machine", Err: err, Done: report}
+	}
+
 	for _, orphan := range known.Orphans(declared, origin) {
-		action, detail, err := remove(ctx, sys, orphan, run)
+		var action, detail string
+		var err error
+		if declaration.Type(orphan.Type) == declaration.TypeOpening {
+			action, detail, err = removeOpening(ctx, orphan, run, known.Firewall)
+		} else {
+			action, detail, err = remove(ctx, sys, orphan, run)
+		}
 		if err != nil {
 			return report, known, &Error{Resource: orphan.ID, Err: err, Done: report}
 		}
@@ -235,7 +248,13 @@ func ApplyKeeping(
 		}
 
 		was, _ := known.Find(resource.Identity())
-		outcome, err := applyOne(ctx, sys, resource, run, changed, declares, was, unseal)
+		var outcome Outcome
+		var err error
+		if o, isOpening := resource.(*declaration.Opening); isOpening {
+			outcome, err = applyOpening(ctx, o, run, fw)
+		} else {
+			outcome, err = applyOne(ctx, sys, resource, run, changed, declares, was, unseal)
+		}
 		if err != nil {
 			failed := &Error{Resource: resource.Identity(), Err: err, Done: report}
 			failures = append(failures, failed)
@@ -293,6 +312,14 @@ func ApplyKeeping(
 		}
 	}
 
+	// A converged node whose found firewall was in force retires it only now, once everything —
+	// the mesh's derived filter among it — applied cleanly (novox/hq ADR 0100).
+	if len(failures) == 0 {
+		if err := retireFirewall(ctx, d, &known, run, log); err != nil {
+			return report, known, &Error{Resource: "the firewall found on this machine", Err: err, Done: report}
+		}
+	}
+
 	if len(failures) > 0 {
 		// The first, carrying everything that did happen. One error is what the caller reports
 		// and what a person reads first; the rest are in the report, which is what the mesh

internal/apply/opening.go

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+package apply
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/novox/mesh-host/internal/declaration"
+	"github.com/novox/mesh-host/internal/firewall"
+	"github.com/novox/mesh-host/internal/store"
+)
+
+// foundFirewall settles, before anything else in an apply, which firewall this node has — and on
+// an adopted node that the mesh had converged, puts it back in force first (novox/hq ADR 0100).
+//
+// Only an adopted node asks. It is detected on every apply rather than remembered, so a firewall
+// switched on after adoption is spoken to from the next reconcile; what is remembered is what was
+// found first, and whether the mesh retired it. An unsupported firewall refuses the whole
+// declaration: the mesh could neither open what it needs through it nor say what it would close.
+func foundFirewall(ctx context.Context, d *declaration.Declaration, known *store.State, run Runner,
+	log func(string)) (firewall.Kind, error) {
+	if d.Adoption == nil {
+		return "", nil
+	}
+	rec := known.Firewall
+	if rec != nil && rec.DisabledByMesh && rec.Kind == string(firewall.UFW) {
+		// Returned to adopted: the found firewall is enabled again before the openings are
+		// converged through it, and the derived filter is gone with this declaration.
+		if err := firewall.Enable(ctx, run); err != nil {
+			return "", err
+		}
+		rec.DisabledByMesh = false
+		log("  enabled ufw again: this node is adopted, and the firewall found on it is in force")
+	}
+	kind, name, err := firewall.Detect(ctx, run)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	if kind == firewall.Unsupported {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf(
+			"this machine is filtered by %s, and no host speaks that firewall yet. An adopted node "+
+				"keeps the firewall it was found with, so the mesh could neither open what it needs "+
+				"through it nor say what it would close; this declaration is refused whole", name)
+	}
+	if rec == nil {
+		rec = &store.FoundFirewall{Kind: string(kind), WasActive: kind == firewall.UFW,
+			FoundAt: time.Now().UTC()}
+	} else {
+		rec.Kind = string(kind)
+		rec.WasActive = rec.WasActive || kind == firewall.UFW
+	}
+	known.Firewall = rec
+	return kind, nil
+}
+
+// retireFirewall disables the found firewall once a converged declaration has applied cleanly,
+// which is when the mesh's derived filter has taken its place. Disabled, never flushed: its
+// configuration stays on disk for a return to adopted, and the container runtime's rules are not
+// its to take.
+func retireFirewall(ctx context.Context, d *declaration.Declaration, known *store.State, run Runner,
+	log func(string)) error {
+	rec := known.Firewall
+	if d.Adoption != nil || rec == nil || rec.Kind != string(firewall.UFW) || !rec.WasActive ||
+		rec.DisabledByMesh {
+		return nil
+	}
+	if err := firewall.Disable(ctx, run); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	rec.DisabledByMesh = true
+	log("  disabled ufw: this node is converged and filtered by the mesh; ufw's configuration is left on disk")
+	return nil
+}
+
+// applyOpening makes one opening true through the firewall found here.
+func applyOpening(ctx context.Context, o *declaration.Opening, run Runner, kind firewall.Kind) (Outcome, error) {
+	out := begin(o)
+	switch kind {
+	case firewall.None:
+		out.Action = "unchanged"
+		out.Detail = "no firewall found; nothing filters this port"
+		return out, nil
+	case firewall.UFW:
+		action, err := firewall.Converge(ctx, run, o)
+		if err != nil {
+			return out, err
+		}
+		out.Action = action
+		out.Detail = "through ufw, marked " + firewall.Mark(o)
+		return out, nil
+	}
+	return out, fmt.Errorf("no firewall is known for this node, so %s cannot be opened", o.Target())
+}
+
+// removeOpening deletes the rules the mesh marked for an opening no longer declared, and nothing
+// the machine had before.
+func removeOpening(ctx context.Context, a store.Applied, run Runner, rec *store.FoundFirewall) (string, string, error) {
+	if rec == nil || rec.Kind != string(firewall.UFW) {
+		return "forgotten", "no firewall held a rule for it", nil
+	}
+	n, err := firewall.Remove(ctx, run, a.ID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", "", err
+	}
+	if n == 0 {
+		return "forgotten", "ufw held no rule marked for it", nil
+	}
+	return "removed", fmt.Sprintf("%d ufw rule(s) marked as the mesh's deleted", n), nil
+}

internal/apply/opening_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+package apply
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/novox/mesh-host/internal/declaration"
+	"github.com/novox/mesh-host/internal/store"
+)
+
+// Defends novox/hq ADR 0100: the firewall found on an adopted node stays in force; converging the
+// node retires it by disabling it, and returning the node to adopted enables it again.
+
+type ufwMachine struct {
+	installed, active bool
+	rules             []string
+	ruleset           string
+	asked             []string
+}
+
+func (u *ufwMachine) run(_ context.Context, name string, args ...string) (string, error) {
+	u.asked = append(u.asked, name+" "+strings.Join(args, " "))
+	switch name {
+	case "nft":
+		return u.ruleset, nil
+	case "ufw":
+		if !u.installed {
+			return "", &exec.Error{Name: name, Err: exec.ErrNotFound}
+		}
+	default:
+		return "", &exec.Error{Name: name, Err: exec.ErrNotFound}
+	}
+	switch args[0] {
+	case "status":
+		if u.active {
+			return "Status: active\n", nil
+		}
+		return "Status: inactive\n", nil
+	case "show":
+		out := "Added user rules (see 'ufw status' for running firewall):\n"
+		for _, r := range u.rules {
+			out += "ufw " + r + "\n"
+		}
+		return out, nil
+	case "--force":
+		u.active = true
+		return "", nil
+	case "disable":
+		u.active = false
+		return "", nil
+	case "delete":
+		want := strings.Join(args[1:], " ")
+		for i, r := range u.rules {
+			if strings.ReplaceAll(r, "'", "") == want {
+				u.rules = append(u.rules[:i], u.rules[i+1:]...)
+				return "", nil
+			}
+		}
+		return "", errors.New("Could not delete non-existent rule")
+	default:
+		// Printed back the way it was given, with the comment quoted as ufw does.
+		line := strings.Join(args[:len(args)-1], " ") + " '" + args[len(args)-1] + "'"
+		u.rules = append(u.rules, line)
+		return "", nil
+	}
+}
+
+func (u *ufwMachine) index(prefix string) int {
+	for i, a := range u.asked {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(a, prefix) {
+			return i
+		}
+	}
+	return -1
+}
+
+const busOpening = `{"id":"adoption.opening-tcp-5671-incoming","type":"opening","port":5671,"protocol":"tcp","from":"everywhere","path":"incoming"}`
+
+func withConf(dir string) string {
+	return `{"id":"x.conf","type":"file","path":"` + filepath.Join(dir, "x.conf") + `","content":"x\n"}`
+}
+
+func applyWith(t *testing.T, d *declaration.Declaration, known store.State, run Runner) (Report, store.State, error) {
+	t.Helper()
+	return ApplyKeeping(context.Background(), archHost(t), d, known, store.OriginDeclared, run, nil, nil,
+		KeepIn(t.TempDir()))
+}
+
+func TestAnOpeningOnAMachineWithNoFirewallChangesNothing(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	u := &ufwMachine{}
+	report, state, err := applyWith(t, adopted(t, `{"taken":[]}`, busOpening+","+withConf(dir)), store.State{}, u.run)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	o := outcomeOf(report, "adoption.opening-tcp-5671-incoming")
+	if o.Action != "unchanged" || !strings.Contains(o.Detail, "nothing filters this port") {
+		t.Errorf("an opening with no firewall: %+v", o)
+	}
+	if state.Firewall == nil || state.Firewall.Kind != "none" {
+		t.Errorf("the firewall found was not recorded: %+v", state.Firewall)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAnUnsupportedFirewallRefusesTheWholeDeclaration(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	u := &ufwMachine{ruleset: "table inet filter {\n\tchain input {\n\t\ttype filter hook input priority filter; policy drop;\n\t}\n}\n"}
+	_, state, err := applyWith(t, adopted(t, `{"taken":[]}`, busOpening+","+withConf(dir)), store.State{}, u.run)
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "no host speaks that firewall") {
+		t.Fatalf("an unsupported firewall was not refused: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, statErr := os.Stat(filepath.Join(dir, "x.conf")); !errors.Is(statErr, os.ErrNotExist) {
+		t.Error("part of a refused declaration was applied")
+	}
+	if state.Firewall != nil {
+		t.Errorf("an unsupported firewall was recorded: %+v", state.Firewall)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestConvergingRetiresTheFoundFirewallAndReturningRestoresIt(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	u := &ufwMachine{installed: true, active: true, rules: []string{"allow 22/tcp"}}
+
+	// Adopted: the opening goes through ufw.
+	_, state, err := applyWith(t, adopted(t, `{"taken":[]}`, busOpening+","+withConf(dir)), store.State{}, u.run)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(u.rules) != 2 || !u.active {
+		t.Fatalf("adopted: rules %v, active %v", u.rules, u.active)
+	}
+	if state.Firewall == nil || state.Firewall.Kind != "ufw" || !state.Firewall.WasActive {
+		t.Fatalf("adopted: firewall recorded as %+v", state.Firewall)
+	}
+
+	// Converged: the opening's rule goes, and only then is ufw disabled — never reset.
+	u.asked = nil
+	converged := parse(t, `{"declaration":1,"resources":[`+withConf(dir)+`]}`)
+	_, state, err = applyWith(t, converged, state, u.run)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if u.active || !state.Firewall.DisabledByMesh {
+		t.Fatalf("converged: ufw still active (%v) or not recorded as retired (%+v)", u.active, state.Firewall)
+	}
+	if len(u.rules) != 1 || u.rules[0] != "allow 22/tcp" {
+		t.Errorf("converged: the operator's rules were touched, or the mesh's left: %v", u.rules)
+	}
+	if del, dis := u.index("ufw delete"), u.index("ufw disable"); del < 0 || dis < del {
+		t.Errorf("converged: the opening was not removed before ufw was disabled: %v", u.asked)
+	}
+	for _, a := range u.asked {
+		if strings.Contains(a, "reset") {
+			t.Errorf("converged: ufw was reset: %s", a)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Converged again: nothing more to retire.
+	u.asked = nil
+	if _, state, err = applyWith(t, converged, state, u.run); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if u.index("ufw") >= 0 {
+		t.Errorf("a converged node kept talking to a retired ufw: %v", u.asked)
+	}
+
+	// Returned to adopted: ufw is enabled before the opening is converged through it.
+	u.asked = nil
+	_, state, err = applyWith(t, adopted(t, `{"taken":[]}`, busOpening+","+withConf(dir)), state, u.run)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if !u.active || state.Firewall.DisabledByMesh {
+		t.Fatalf("returned: ufw active %v, record %+v", u.active, state.Firewall)
+	}
+	if en, add := u.index("ufw --force enable"), u.index("ufw allow"); en < 0 || add < en {
+		t.Errorf("returned: ufw was not enabled before the opening was added: %v", u.asked)
+	}
+	if len(u.rules) != 2 {
+		t.Errorf("returned: the opening was not converged again: %v", u.rules)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAConvergedNodeThatWasNeverAdoptedNeverAsksAboutAFirewall(t *testing.T) {
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	u := &ufwMachine{installed: true, active: true}
+	if _, _, err := applyWith(t, parse(t, `{"declaration":1,"resources":[`+withConf(dir)+`]}`), store.State{}, u.run); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	if len(u.asked) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("a converged apply asked the machine about its firewall: %v", u.asked)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAnOpeningOnAConvergedNodeIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
+	if _, err := declaration.Parse([]byte(`{"declaration":1,"resources":[` + busOpening + `]}`)); err == nil {
+		t.Error("an opening was accepted on a node the declaration does not say is adopted")
+	}
+}

internal/declaration/declaration.go

@@ -78,6 +78,12 @@ const (
 	// cadence. Tools, hooks and event consumers are not separate modes: they are loaded by a tool
 	// host, which is itself a process that stays up.
 	TypeProcess Type = "process"
+
+	// TypeOpening is a port the mesh needs reachable on an adopted node, converged through the
+	// firewall found there in that firewall's own terms (novox/hq ADR 0100). A state, not a
+	// command: the host adds the rule it marks as the mesh's when it is missing, and removes only
+	// what it marked — which is what lets it travel over the link.
+	TypeOpening Type = "opening"
 )
 
 // Resource is one thing that should be true of the machine.
@@ -603,6 +609,74 @@ func (s *Service) validate(where string, _ bool) []string {
 	return problems
 }
 
+// Opening is a port reachable on an adopted node, from where, and on which path.
+//
+// **From** is everywhere or mesh — the private network, by its interface. **Path** is incoming,
+// for something listening on the machine, or forwarded, for a published container port: the found
+// firewall sees a published port after the runtime has translated it, so a forwarded opening names
+// the container's own port in To as well as the machine's in Port.
+type Opening struct {
+	ID       string `json:"id"`
+	Type     Type   `json:"type"`
+	Port     int    `json:"port"`
+	Protocol string `json:"protocol"`
+	From     string `json:"from"`
+	Path     string `json:"path"`
+	To       int    `json:"to,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// Where an opening admits from, and the path it is on.
+const (
+	FromEverywhere = "everywhere"
+	FromMesh       = "mesh"
+	PathIncoming   = "incoming"
+	PathForwarded  = "forwarded"
+)
+
+func (o *Opening) Identity() string { return o.ID }
+func (o *Opening) Kind() Type       { return TypeOpening }
+
+func (o *Opening) Target() string {
+	if o.Path == PathForwarded {
+		return fmt.Sprintf("%s/%d forwarded to %d from %s", o.Protocol, o.Port, o.To, o.From)
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%s/%d %s from %s", o.Protocol, o.Port, o.Path, o.From)
+}
+
+func (o *Opening) validate(where string, _ bool) []string {
+	var problems []string
+	if o.Port < 1 || o.Port > 65535 {
+		problems = append(problems, fmt.Sprintf("%s: an opening's port is 1-65535, not %d", where, o.Port))
+	}
+	if o.Protocol != "tcp" && o.Protocol != "udp" {
+		problems = append(problems, fmt.Sprintf("%s: an opening is tcp or udp, not %q", where, o.Protocol))
+	}
+	if o.From != FromEverywhere && o.From != FromMesh {
+		problems = append(problems, fmt.Sprintf(
+			"%s: an opening is from %q or %q, not %q", where, FromEverywhere, FromMesh, o.From))
+	}
+	switch o.Path {
+	case PathIncoming:
+		if o.To != 0 {
+			problems = append(problems, where+
+				": an incoming opening names no container port; only a forwarded one does")
+		}
+	case PathForwarded:
+		if o.To < 1 || o.To > 65535 {
+			problems = append(problems, where+
+				": a forwarded opening names the container's port it reaches, as to, 1-65535")
+		}
+	default:
+		problems = append(problems, fmt.Sprintf(
+			"%s: an opening's path is %q or %q, not %q", where, PathIncoming, PathForwarded, o.Path))
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(o.ID, AdoptionPrefix) {
+		problems = append(problems, fmt.Sprintf(
+			"%s: an opening is the mesh's own, so its id starts %q", where, AdoptionPrefix))
+	}
+	return problems
+}
+
 // Package is a package that should be present.
 //
 // Present is the whole of what it asserts, never a version: version is the package manager's
@@ -810,6 +884,8 @@ func newOf(t Type) Resource {
 		return &Access{}
 	case TypeProcess:
 		return &Process{}
+	case TypeOpening:
+		return &Opening{}
 	}
 	return nil
 }
@@ -818,7 +894,7 @@ func newOf(t Type) Resource {
 func Vocabulary() []Type {
 	return []Type{
 		TypeAccess, TypeAction, TypeArchive, TypeContainer, TypeDirectory, TypeFile,
-		TypeNetwork, TypePackage, TypeProcess, TypeService, TypeUser,
+		TypeNetwork, TypeOpening, TypePackage, TypeProcess, TypeService, TypeUser,
 	}
 }
 
@@ -1051,6 +1127,18 @@ func parse(raw []byte, allowActions bool) (*Declaration, error) {
 		d.Resources = append(d.Resources, resource)
 	}
 	problems = append(problems, checkAdoption(env.Adoption, d.Resources, allowActions)...)
+	if env.Adoption == nil {
+		for _, r := range d.Resources {
+			if r.Kind() == TypeOpening {
+				// On a converged node the mesh's own filter admits what is declared, and the
+				// found firewall is retired; an opening there would be a rule in a firewall the
+				// mesh has disabled (novox/hq ADR 0100).
+				problems = append(problems, fmt.Sprintf(
+					"resource %q: an opening is for an adopted node, and this declaration does not "+
+						"say the node is adopted", r.Identity()))
+			}
+		}
+	}
 
 	if len(problems) > 0 {
 		return nil, &RefusalError{Problems: problems}

internal/declaration/declaration_test.go

@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ func TestAFieldTheNewTypesDoNotUseIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestTheVocabularyIsTheElevenShapesTheMeshNeeds(t *testing.T) {
+func TestTheVocabularyIsTheTwelveShapesTheMeshNeeds(t *testing.T) {
 	// Six of them the bootstrap uses (novox/hq 07-the-foundation.md), and removing one is a
 	// failing test rather than a discovery during a first-node install.
 	//
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ func TestTheVocabularyIsTheElevenShapesTheMeshNeeds(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 	for _, want := range []Type{
 		TypeDirectory, TypeFile, TypeService, TypePackage, TypeContainer, TypeAction,
-		TypeUser, TypeArchive, TypeNetwork, TypeAccess, TypeProcess,
+		TypeUser, TypeArchive, TypeNetwork, TypeAccess, TypeProcess, TypeOpening,
 	} {
 		if !speaks[want] {
 			t.Errorf("the host no longer speaks %q", want)
@@ -309,8 +309,12 @@ func TestTheVocabularyIsTheElevenShapesTheMeshNeeds(t *testing.T) {
 	// It is a full-host shape rather than a portable one: it needs a process supervisor to install
 	// into. It does NOT need a container runtime, which is the point — only software that
 	// genuinely needs isolation asks for a container.
-	if len(speaks) != 11 {
-		t.Errorf("the vocabulary is %d shapes rather than 11; every addition widens what a compromised "+
+	//
+	// `opening` is the twelfth, and novox/hq ADR 0100 is its decision: on an adopted node the
+	// firewall found there stays in force, and what the mesh needs reachable is converged through
+	// it as a state the host marks as the mesh's — never a command, which the link may not carry.
+	if len(speaks) != 12 {
+		t.Errorf("the vocabulary is %d shapes rather than 12; every addition widens what a compromised "+
 			"control plane can express, so a change here is a decision: %s",
 			len(speaks), vocabulary())
 	}

internal/firewall/firewall.go

@@ -0,0 +1,431 @@
+// Package firewall speaks the firewall found on an adopted node, in that firewall's own terms
+// (novox/hq ADR 0100).
+//
+// **The found firewall stays in force.** On an adopted node the mesh loads nothing that drops by
+// default or holds an accept; what it needs reachable it converges as openings through what it
+// found, marks each rule as its own, and removes only what it marked. It never resets or flushes:
+// the rules the machine already had are the operator's, and they are what keeps it serving.
+package firewall
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"os/exec"
+	"regexp"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+
+	"github.com/novox/mesh-host/internal/declaration"
+	"github.com/novox/mesh-host/internal/system"
+)
+
+// Runner executes a command.
+type Runner = system.Runner
+
+// Kind is what firewall a machine has, as far as the mesh is concerned.
+type Kind string
+
+const (
+	// UFW is an active ufw — the one kind found on the machines measured, and the one spoken.
+	UFW Kind = "ufw"
+	// None is a machine where nothing refuses anything, which needs no openings.
+	None Kind = "none"
+	// Unsupported is a firewall no host speaks yet. A machine with one is refused adoption: the
+	// mesh could neither open what it needs nor know what it would be closing.
+	Unsupported Kind = "unsupported"
+)
+
+// MeshInterface is the private network's interface, the way an opening from the mesh is known.
+// It must be the controller's overlay interface name.
+const MeshInterface = "mesh0"
+
+// Detect says which firewall this machine has. For Unsupported the string names it.
+func Detect(ctx context.Context, run Runner) (Kind, string, error) {
+	if out, err := run(ctx, "firewall-cmd", "--state"); err == nil && strings.TrimSpace(out) == "running" {
+		return Unsupported, "firewalld", nil
+	}
+	ufwActive := false
+	if out, err := run(ctx, "ufw", "status"); err == nil {
+		ufwActive = statusActive(out)
+	}
+
+	out, err := run(ctx, "nft", "list", "ruleset")
+	switch {
+	case err == nil:
+		if refusing := Refusing(out, ufwActive); len(refusing) > 0 {
+			return Unsupported, "nftables rules that refuse traffic, in " + strings.Join(refusing, ", "), nil
+		}
+	case !missing(err):
+		return "", "", fmt.Errorf("cannot read this machine's packet filter to know what it has: %w", err)
+	}
+
+	if !ufwActive {
+		// iptables with the legacy backend is invisible to nft.
+		for _, legacy := range []string{"iptables-legacy", "ip6tables-legacy"} {
+			out, err := run(ctx, legacy, "-S")
+			if err != nil {
+				continue
+			}
+			if refusing := RefusingLegacy(out); len(refusing) > 0 {
+				return Unsupported, legacy + " rules that refuse traffic, in " + strings.Join(refusing, ", "), nil
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ufwActive {
+		return UFW, "ufw", nil
+	}
+	return None, "", nil
+}
+
+func missing(err error) bool {
+	return errors.Is(err, exec.ErrNotFound)
+}
+
+func statusActive(out string) bool {
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(out, "\n") {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(line), "Status:") {
+			return strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(line), "Status:")) == "active"
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// Refusing names the tables of an `nft list ruleset` holding something that refuses traffic — a
+// drop or reject, or a base chain whose policy drops — and that is neither the mesh's own nor the
+// container runtime's. With ufw active, the tables iptables-nft manages are ufw's and the runtime's
+// and are not counted.
+func Refusing(ruleset string, ufwActive bool) []string {
+	var refusing []string
+	managed := map[string]bool{}
+	var table, chain string
+	counted := map[string]bool{}
+	note := func() {
+		if !counted[table] {
+			counted[table] = true
+			refusing = append(refusing, "table "+table)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, raw := range strings.Split(ruleset, "\n") {
+		line := strings.TrimSpace(raw)
+		switch {
+		case strings.HasPrefix(line, "# Warning: table ") && strings.Contains(line, "managed by iptables-nft"):
+			name := strings.TrimPrefix(line, "# Warning: table ")
+			name, _, _ = strings.Cut(name, " is managed")
+			managed[name] = true
+			continue
+		case strings.HasPrefix(line, "table "):
+			table = strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimPrefix(line, "table ")), "{")
+			table = strings.TrimSpace(table)
+			chain = ""
+			continue
+		case strings.HasPrefix(line, "chain "):
+			chain = strings.TrimSpace(strings.TrimSuffix(strings.TrimPrefix(line, "chain "), "{"))
+			continue
+		case line == "" || line == "}" || strings.HasPrefix(line, "#") || chain == "":
+			continue
+		}
+		if table == "inet mesh" || table == "inet mesh_guard" {
+			continue
+		}
+		iptables := managed[table] || iptablesTable(table)
+		if iptables && ufwActive {
+			continue
+		}
+		if strings.HasPrefix(line, "type ") {
+			if strings.Contains(line, "policy drop") && !(iptables && runtimes(table, chain, line)) {
+				note()
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		if !verdictRefuses(line) {
+			continue
+		}
+		if iptables && runtimes(table, chain, line) {
+			continue
+		}
+		note()
+	}
+	return refusing
+}
+
+// iptablesTable is whether a table is one iptables-nft writes. Named rather than read from the
+// warning nft prints above it, because nft does not print that for every such table: a captured
+// ruleset carried it on ip filter and not on ip raw, where the runtime keeps its drops.
+func iptablesTable(table string) bool {
+	family, name, _ := strings.Cut(table, " ")
+	if family != "ip" && family != "ip6" {
+		return false
+	}
+	switch name {
+	case "filter", "nat", "raw", "mangle", "security":
+		return true
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// runtimes is whether a refusal in an iptables-nft table is the container runtime's own: in its
+// DOCKER chains, its forward policy, or its guard against reaching a container's address directly
+// from outside its bridge, in the raw table.
+func runtimes(table, chain, line string) bool {
+	_, name, _ := strings.Cut(table, " ")
+	switch {
+	case strings.HasPrefix(chain, "DOCKER"):
+		return true
+	case name == "filter" && chain == "FORWARD" && strings.HasPrefix(line, "type "):
+		return true
+	case name == "raw" && chain == "PREROUTING":
+		return strings.Contains(line, "daddr") && strings.Contains(line, "iifname !=")
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+var verdict = regexp.MustCompile(`(^|\s)(drop|reject)(\s|$)`)
+
+func verdictRefuses(line string) bool {
+	return verdict.MatchString(line)
+}
+
+// RefusingLegacy names the chains of an `iptables-legacy -S` that refuse traffic outside the
+// container runtime's own.
+func RefusingLegacy(rules string) []string {
+	var refusing []string
+	seen := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(rules, "\n") {
+		fields := strings.Fields(line)
+		if len(fields) < 3 {
+			continue
+		}
+		chain := fields[1]
+		refuses := false
+		switch fields[0] {
+		case "-P":
+			refuses = fields[2] == "DROP" && chain != "FORWARD"
+		case "-A":
+			for i, f := range fields {
+				if f == "-j" && i+1 < len(fields) && (fields[i+1] == "DROP" || fields[i+1] == "REJECT") {
+					refuses = !strings.HasPrefix(chain, "DOCKER")
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		if refuses && !seen[chain] {
+			seen[chain] = true
+			refusing = append(refusing, "chain "+chain)
+		}
+	}
+	return refusing
+}
+
+// --- ufw ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// Mark is the comment every rule the mesh adds carries: whose it is, which opening, and a digest
+// of the rule itself, so a rule the opening no longer describes is recognised as stale without the
+// host having to know how ufw prints a rule back.
+func Mark(o *declaration.Opening) string {
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(strings.Join(Rule(o), " ")))
+	return marker(o.ID) + " " + hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])[:8]
+}
+
+func marker(id string) string { return "mesh-host " + id }
+
+// markedFor is whether a comment is the mesh's, for this opening.
+func markedFor(comment, id string) bool {
+	return comment == marker(id) || strings.HasPrefix(comment, marker(id)+" ")
+}
+
+// Rule is the ufw rule an opening becomes, without its comment.
+//
+//	incoming from everywhere  allow proto tcp to any port P
+//	incoming from the mesh    allow in on mesh0 proto tcp to any port P
+//	forwarded                 route allow [in on mesh0] proto tcp to any port <container port>
+//
+// A forwarded opening names the container's port because ufw's route rules are matched after the
+// runtime's destination translation.
+func Rule(o *declaration.Opening) []string {
+	var rule []string
+	port := o.Port
+	if o.Path == declaration.PathForwarded {
+		rule = append(rule, "route")
+		port = o.To
+	}
+	rule = append(rule, "allow")
+	if o.From == declaration.FromMesh {
+		rule = append(rule, "in", "on", MeshInterface)
+	}
+	return append(rule, "proto", o.Protocol, "to", "any", "port", strconv.Itoa(port))
+}
+
+var commentOf = regexp.MustCompile(`comment '([^']*)'`)
+
+// added is every rule `ufw show added` lists, each without its leading "ufw".
+func added(ctx context.Context, run Runner) ([]string, error) {
+	out, err := run(ctx, "ufw", "show", "added")
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("reading ufw's rules: %w", err)
+	}
+	var rules []string
+	for _, line := range strings.Split(out, "\n") {
+		line = strings.TrimSpace(line)
+		if strings.HasPrefix(line, "ufw ") {
+			rules = append(rules, strings.TrimPrefix(line, "ufw "))
+		}
+	}
+	return rules, nil
+}
+
+func comment(rule string) string {
+	m := commentOf.FindStringSubmatch(rule)
+	if m == nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return m[1]
+}
+
+// words splits a rule as ufw printed it into arguments, keeping a quoted comment whole.
+func words(rule string) []string {
+	var out []string
+	var cur strings.Builder
+	quoted, any := false, false
+	for _, r := range rule {
+		switch {
+		case r == '\'':
+			quoted = !quoted
+			any = true
+		case r == ' ' && !quoted:
+			if any {
+				out = append(out, cur.String())
+				cur.Reset()
+				any = false
+			}
+		default:
+			cur.WriteRune(r)
+			any = true
+		}
+	}
+	if any {
+		out = append(out, cur.String())
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// Converge makes one opening true in ufw: its marked rule present, and any rule marked for it that
+// no longer describes it deleted. Nothing unmarked is touched. The outcome is created, updated or
+// unchanged, read back from ufw rather than assumed.
+func Converge(ctx context.Context, run Runner, o *declaration.Opening) (string, error) {
+	rules, err := added(ctx, run)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	mark := Mark(o)
+	present := false
+	var stale []string
+	for _, rule := range rules {
+		c := comment(rule)
+		switch {
+		case c == mark:
+			present = true
+		case markedFor(c, o.ID):
+			stale = append(stale, rule)
+		}
+	}
+	if present && len(stale) == 0 {
+		return "unchanged", nil
+	}
+	for _, rule := range stale {
+		if _, err := run(ctx, "ufw", append([]string{"delete"}, words(rule)...)...); err != nil {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("deleting the mesh's stale ufw rule %q: %w", rule, err)
+		}
+	}
+	if !present {
+		args := append(Rule(o), "comment", mark)
+		if _, err := run(ctx, "ufw", args...); err != nil {
+			return "", fmt.Errorf("adding the ufw rule for %s: %w", o.Target(), err)
+		}
+	}
+	after, err := added(ctx, run)
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", err
+	}
+	found, leftover := false, 0
+	for _, rule := range after {
+		c := comment(rule)
+		if c == mark {
+			found = true
+		} else if markedFor(c, o.ID) {
+			leftover++
+		}
+	}
+	if !found {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("ufw was asked for %s and does not list it afterwards", o.Target())
+	}
+	if leftover > 0 {
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("ufw still lists %d stale rule(s) marked for %s after deleting them", leftover, o.ID)
+	}
+	if len(stale) > 0 {
+		return "updated", nil
+	}
+	return "created", nil
+}
+
+// Remove deletes the rules marked for one opening, and nothing else.
+func Remove(ctx context.Context, run Runner, id string) (int, error) {
+	rules, err := added(ctx, run)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	removed := 0
+	for _, rule := range rules {
+		if !markedFor(comment(rule), id) {
+			continue
+		}
+		if _, err := run(ctx, "ufw", append([]string{"delete"}, words(rule)...)...); err != nil {
+			return removed, fmt.Errorf("deleting the mesh's ufw rule %q: %w", rule, err)
+		}
+		removed++
+	}
+	after, err := added(ctx, run)
+	if err != nil {
+		return removed, err
+	}
+	for _, rule := range after {
+		if markedFor(comment(rule), id) {
+			return removed, fmt.Errorf("ufw still lists a rule marked for %s after deleting it", id)
+		}
+	}
+	return removed, nil
+}
+
+// Enable turns ufw back on, as found, and reads back that it is.
+func Enable(ctx context.Context, run Runner) error {
+	if _, err := run(ctx, "ufw", "--force", "enable"); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("enabling ufw again: %w", err)
+	}
+	return expectActive(ctx, run, true)
+}
+
+// Disable retires ufw without flushing it: its configuration stays on disk, and the container
+// runtime's rules are not its to remove.
+func Disable(ctx context.Context, run Runner) error {
+	if _, err := run(ctx, "ufw", "disable"); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("disabling ufw: %w", err)
+	}
+	return expectActive(ctx, run, false)
+}
+
+func expectActive(ctx context.Context, run Runner, want bool) error {
+	out, err := run(ctx, "ufw", "status")
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("reading ufw's status back: %w", err)
+	}
+	if statusActive(out) != want {
+		state := "inactive"
+		if want {
+			state = "active"
+		}
+		return fmt.Errorf("ufw was asked to be %s and says: %s", state, strings.TrimSpace(out))
+	}
+	return nil
+}

internal/firewall/firewall_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
+package firewall
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"os"
+	"os/exec"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/novox/mesh-host/internal/declaration"
+)
+
+// Defends novox/hq ADR 0100: the firewall found on an adopted node stays in force, the mesh opens
+// what it needs through it in its own terms, and removes only what it marked.
+
+func dockerOnly(t *testing.T) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	// Captured from a real machine running the container runtime and nothing else that filters:
+	// its nat, filter and raw tables as iptables-nft writes them.
+	raw, err := os.ReadFile("testdata/docker-only.nft")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	return string(raw)
+}
+
+const aDroppingTable = `
+table inet filter {
+	chain input {
+		type filter hook input priority filter; policy drop;
+		ct state established,related accept
+		tcp dport 22 accept
+	}
+}
+`
+
+const ufwChains = `
+# Warning: table ip filter is managed by iptables-nft, do not touch!
+table ip filter {
+	chain INPUT {
+		type filter hook input priority filter; policy drop;
+		counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump ufw-before-input
+	}
+	chain ufw-user-input {
+		tcp dport 22 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+	}
+	chain ufw-reject-input {
+		counter packets 0 bytes 0 reject
+	}
+}
+`
+
+const theMeshsOwn = `
+table inet mesh {
+	chain input {
+		type filter hook input priority filter; policy drop;
+		iif lo accept
+	}
+}
+table inet mesh_guard {
+	chain prerouting {
+		type filter hook prerouting priority raw; policy accept;
+		iifname != "lo" tcp dport { 5432, 15672 } drop
+	}
+}
+`
+
+func TestTheContainerRuntimesOwnRulesAreNotAFirewall(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := Refusing(dockerOnly(t), false); len(got) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("the runtime's own rules read as a firewall: %v", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestTheMeshsOwnTablesAreNotAFirewall(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := Refusing(dockerOnly(t)+theMeshsOwn, false); len(got) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("the mesh's own tables read as a found firewall: %v", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestATableThatDropsIsAFirewall(t *testing.T) {
+	got := Refusing(dockerOnly(t)+aDroppingTable, false)
+	if len(got) != 1 || got[0] != "table inet filter" {
+		t.Errorf("a dropping table was not named: %v", got)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestUfwsOwnChainsAreUfwsWhenItIsActive(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := Refusing(dockerOnly(t)+ufwChains, true); len(got) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("ufw's own chains read as a second firewall: %v", got)
+	}
+	if got := Refusing(dockerOnly(t)+ufwChains, false); len(got) == 0 {
+		t.Error("iptables rules that refuse, with ufw not active, were not counted")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestLegacyIptablesThatRefusesIsAFirewall(t *testing.T) {
+	docker := "-P INPUT ACCEPT\n-P FORWARD DROP\n-P OUTPUT ACCEPT\n-N DOCKER\n-A DOCKER -i docker0 -j DROP\n"
+	if got := RefusingLegacy(docker); len(got) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("the runtime's legacy rules read as a firewall: %v", got)
+	}
+	if got := RefusingLegacy(docker + "-A INPUT -p tcp --dport 25 -j REJECT\n"); len(got) != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("a legacy reject was not counted: %v", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// fakeUFW is ufw as far as the host can see it: a status, and user rules it prints back in its
+// own canonical form — deliberately not the order the host wrote them in.
+type fakeUFW struct {
+	active    bool
+	installed bool
+	rules     []string
+	ruleset   string
+	firewalld bool
+	asked     []string
+}
+
+func canonical(args []string) string {
+	var route, in, port, proto, comment string
+	for i := 0; i < len(args); i++ {
+		switch args[i] {
+		case "route":
+			route = "route "
+		case "in":
+			in = "in on " + args[i+2] + " "
+			i += 2
+		case "port":
+			port = args[i+1]
+			i++
+		case "proto":
+			proto = args[i+1]
+			i++
+		case "comment":
+			comment = args[i+1]
+			i++
+		}
+	}
+	line := route + "allow " + in + port + "/" + proto
+	if comment != "" {
+		line += " comment '" + comment + "'"
+	}
+	return line
+}
+
+func (f *fakeUFW) run(_ context.Context, name string, args ...string) (string, error) {
+	f.asked = append(f.asked, name+" "+strings.Join(args, " "))
+	switch name {
+	case "firewall-cmd":
+		if f.firewalld {
+			return "running\n", nil
+		}
+		return "", &exec.Error{Name: name, Err: exec.ErrNotFound}
+	case "nft":
+		return f.ruleset, nil
+	case "iptables-legacy", "ip6tables-legacy":
+		return "", &exec.Error{Name: name, Err: exec.ErrNotFound}
+	case "ufw":
+	default:
+		return "", fmt.Errorf("unexpected %s", name)
+	}
+	if !f.installed {
+		return "", &exec.Error{Name: name, Err: exec.ErrNotFound}
+	}
+	switch {
+	case args[0] == "status":
+		if f.active {
+			return "Status: active\n\nTo                         Action      From\n", nil
+		}
+		return "Status: inactive\n", nil
+	case args[0] == "show":
+		out := "Added user rules (see 'ufw status' for running firewall):\n"
+		for _, r := range f.rules {
+			out += "ufw " + r + "\n"
+		}
+		return out, nil
+	case args[0] == "--force" && args[1] == "enable":
+		f.active = true
+		return "Firewall is active and enabled on system startup\n", nil
+	case args[0] == "disable":
+		f.active = false
+		return "Firewall stopped and disabled on system startup\n", nil
+	case args[0] == "delete":
+		for i, r := range f.rules {
+			if strings.Join(words(r), "\x00") == strings.Join(args[1:], "\x00") {
+				f.rules = append(f.rules[:i], f.rules[i+1:]...)
+				return "Rule deleted\n", nil
+			}
+		}
+		return "", errors.New("Could not delete non-existent rule")
+	default:
+		f.rules = append(f.rules, canonical(args))
+		return "Rule added\n", nil
+	}
+}
+
+func (f *fakeUFW) added() int {
+	n := 0
+	for _, a := range f.asked {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(a, "ufw allow") || strings.HasPrefix(a, "ufw route") {
+			n++
+		}
+	}
+	return n
+}
+
+func opening(id string, port int, from, path string, to int) *declaration.Opening {
+	return &declaration.Opening{ID: id, Type: declaration.TypeOpening, Port: port, Protocol: "tcp",
+		From: from, Path: path, To: to}
+}
+
+func TestAnOpeningBecomesTheUfwRuleForItsPathAndOrigin(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, c := range []struct {
+		o    *declaration.Opening
+		want string
+	}{
+		{opening("adoption.a", 5671, "everywhere", "incoming", 0), "allow proto tcp to any port 5671"},
+		{opening("adoption.b", 5432, "mesh", "incoming", 0), "allow in on mesh0 proto tcp to any port 5432"},
+		{opening("adoption.c", 20001, "everywhere", "forwarded", 8080), "route allow proto tcp to any port 8080"},
+		{opening("adoption.d", 20001, "mesh", "forwarded", 8080), "route allow in on mesh0 proto tcp to any port 8080"},
+	} {
+		if got := strings.Join(Rule(c.o), " "); got != c.want {
+			t.Errorf("%s: %q, want %q", c.o.ID, got, c.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAnOpeningIsAddedOnceAndMarkedAsTheMeshs(t *testing.T) {
+	f := &fakeUFW{installed: true, active: true, rules: []string{"allow 22/tcp"}}
+	o := opening("adoption.opening-tcp-5671-incoming", 5671, "everywhere", "incoming", 0)
+
+	action, err := Converge(context.Background(), f.run, o)
+	if err != nil || action != "created" {
+		t.Fatalf("first converge: %q %v", action, err)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(f.rules[1], "comment 'mesh-host adoption.opening-tcp-5671-incoming ") {
+		t.Errorf("the rule is not marked as the mesh's: %v", f.rules)
+	}
+	action, err = Converge(context.Background(), f.run, o)
+	if err != nil || action != "unchanged" {
+		t.Fatalf("second converge: %q %v", action, err)
+	}
+	if f.added() != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("re-converging added again: %v", f.asked)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAnOpeningLostToAReloadIsAddedAgain(t *testing.T) {
+	f := &fakeUFW{installed: true, active: true}
+	o := opening("adoption.x", 5671, "everywhere", "incoming", 0)
+	if _, err := Converge(context.Background(), f.run, o); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	f.rules = nil // what a reload that lost the rule leaves
+	action, err := Converge(context.Background(), f.run, o)
+	if err != nil || action != "created" || len(f.rules) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("a lost opening was not put back: %q %v %v", action, err, f.rules)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAChangedOpeningReplacesOnlyItsOwnRule(t *testing.T) {
+	f := &fakeUFW{installed: true, active: true, rules: []string{"allow 22/tcp", "allow 8080/tcp comment 'someone else'"}}
+	if _, err := Converge(context.Background(), f.run, opening("adoption.x", 5671, "everywhere", "incoming", 0)); err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	action, err := Converge(context.Background(), f.run, opening("adoption.x", 5671, "mesh", "incoming", 0))
+	if err != nil || action != "updated" {
+		t.Fatalf("%q %v", action, err)
+	}
+	if len(f.rules) != 3 || f.rules[0] != "allow 22/tcp" || f.rules[1] != "allow 8080/tcp comment 'someone else'" ||
+		!strings.Contains(f.rules[2], "in on mesh0") {
+		t.Errorf("rules afterwards: %v", f.rules)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestRemovingAnOpeningRemovesOnlyWhatWasMarkedForIt(t *testing.T) {
+	f := &fakeUFW{installed: true, active: true, rules: []string{"allow 22/tcp", "allow 8080/tcp"}}
+	for _, o := range []*declaration.Opening{
+		opening("adoption.a", 5671, "everywhere", "incoming", 0),
+		opening("adoption.ab", 5000, "everywhere", "incoming", 0),
+	} {
+		if _, err := Converge(context.Background(), f.run, o); err != nil {
+			t.Fatal(err)
+		}
+	}
+	n, err := Remove(context.Background(), f.run, "adoption.a")
+	if err != nil || n != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("removed %d: %v", n, err)
+	}
+	if len(f.rules) != 3 || f.rules[0] != "allow 22/tcp" || f.rules[1] != "allow 8080/tcp" ||
+		!strings.Contains(f.rules[2], "adoption.ab") {
+		t.Errorf("more than the marked rule went: %v", f.rules)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestEnableAndDisableReadBack(t *testing.T) {
+	f := &fakeUFW{installed: true, active: true}
+	if err := Disable(context.Background(), f.run); err != nil || f.active {
+		t.Fatalf("disable: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := Enable(context.Background(), f.run); err != nil || !f.active {
+		t.Fatalf("enable: %v", err)
+	}
+	for _, a := range f.asked {
+		if strings.Contains(a, "reset") || strings.Contains(a, "flush") {
+			t.Errorf("the found firewall was reset: %s", a)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestDetectingTheFoundFirewall(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, c := range []struct {
+		name string
+		f    *fakeUFW
+		want Kind
+	}{
+		{"nothing but the runtime", &fakeUFW{ruleset: dockerOnly(t)}, None},
+		{"ufw active", &fakeUFW{installed: true, active: true, ruleset: dockerOnly(t) + ufwChains}, UFW},
+		{"ufw installed and inactive", &fakeUFW{installed: true, ruleset: dockerOnly(t)}, None},
+		{"firewalld", &fakeUFW{firewalld: true, ruleset: dockerOnly(t)}, Unsupported},
+		{"an nftables table of its own", &fakeUFW{ruleset: dockerOnly(t) + aDroppingTable}, Unsupported},
+		{"ufw beside an nftables table", &fakeUFW{installed: true, active: true, ruleset: dockerOnly(t) + ufwChains + aDroppingTable}, Unsupported},
+	} {
+		got, name, err := Detect(context.Background(), c.f.run)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("%s: %v", c.name, err)
+		}
+		if got != c.want {
+			t.Errorf("%s: detected %s (%s), want %s", c.name, got, name, c.want)
+		}
+		if got == Unsupported && name == "" {
+			t.Errorf("%s: an unsupported firewall was not named", c.name)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/firewall/testdata/docker-only.nft

@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+# Warning: table ip nat is managed by iptables-nft, do not touch!
+table ip nat {
+	chain DOCKER {
+		iifname != "br-c70303d221ee" tcp dport 5680 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "br-c70303d221ee" tcp dport 15673 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		iifname != "br-3636e05760a9" tcp dport 59000 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		iifname != "br-3636e05760a9" tcp dport 59001 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		iifname != "br-3636e05760a9" tcp dport 55672 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		iifname != "br-3636e05760a9" tcp dport 55673 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		iifname != "br-3636e05760a9" tcp dport 55432 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "docker0" tcp dport 57732 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "docker0" tcp dport 57733 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		iifname != "docker0" tcp dport 5314 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		iifname != "br-613eb68ef5fb" tcp dport 4848 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		iifname != "br-b3240c822bce" tcp dport 5679 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "br-b3240c822bce" tcp dport 15672 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		iifname != "br-4b504efd6080" tcp dport 9000 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		iifname != "br-4b504efd6080" tcp dport 9001 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "br-ef6df03f71a0" tcp dport 5432 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "br-ef6df03f71a0" tcp dport 8081 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "br-ec480f77ac34" tcp dport 6379 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" tcp dport 8001 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "br-669fda75f1ac" tcp dport 28080 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" tcp dport 6789 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" tcp dport 8770 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" tcp dport 1212 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" tcp dport 80 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" tcp dport 443 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "docker0" tcp dport 55541 counter packets 0 bytes 0 xt target "DNAT"
+	}
+
+	chain PREROUTING {
+		type nat hook prerouting priority dstnat; policy accept;
+		xt match "addrtype" counter packets 437947 bytes 71410534 jump DOCKER
+	}
+
+	chain OUTPUT {
+		type nat hook output priority dstnat; policy accept;
+		ip daddr != 127.0.0.0/8 xt match "addrtype" counter packets 5761 bytes 423317 jump DOCKER
+	}
+
+	chain POSTROUTING {
+		type nat hook postrouting priority srcnat; policy accept;
+		ip saddr 172.22.0.0/16 oifname != "br-65f6dc782562" counter packets 124 bytes 16328 xt target "MASQUERADE"
+		ip saddr 172.28.0.0/16 oifname != "br-669fda75f1ac" counter packets 127 bytes 16928 xt target "MASQUERADE"
+		ip saddr 172.31.0.0/16 oifname != "br-ec480f77ac34" counter packets 127 bytes 16928 xt target "MASQUERADE"
+		ip saddr 192.168.48.0/20 oifname != "br-ef6df03f71a0" counter packets 127 bytes 16928 xt target "MASQUERADE"
+		ip saddr 172.25.0.0/16 oifname != "br-4b504efd6080" counter packets 129 bytes 17052 xt target "MASQUERADE"
+		ip saddr 192.168.32.0/20 oifname != "br-613eb68ef5fb" counter packets 1124 bytes 76748 xt target "MASQUERADE"
+		ip saddr 172.17.0.0/16 oifname != "docker0" counter packets 1833 bytes 150990 xt target "MASQUERADE"
+		ip saddr 172.18.0.0/16 oifname != "br-07a5e2f2c42f" counter packets 504 bytes 65112 xt target "MASQUERADE"
+		ip saddr 172.27.0.0/16 oifname != "br-160f55da427c" counter packets 508 bytes 65784 xt target "MASQUERADE"
+		ip saddr 192.168.16.0/20 oifname != "br-dba077b9b543" counter packets 503 bytes 64784 xt target "MASQUERADE"
+		ip saddr 192.168.64.0/20 oifname != "br-d44fef8fd602" counter packets 1282 bytes 111308 xt target "MASQUERADE"
+		ip saddr 172.30.0.0/16 oifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" counter packets 2503 bytes 190324 xt target "MASQUERADE"
+		ip saddr 172.21.0.0/16 oifname != "br-9d6c95e8d80c" counter packets 1289 bytes 112644 xt target "MASQUERADE"
+		ip saddr 172.23.0.0/16 oifname != "br-679db9b21e00" counter packets 506 bytes 65384 xt target "MASQUERADE"
+		ip saddr 172.24.0.0/16 oifname != "br-40094534a5ee" counter packets 508 bytes 65784 xt target "MASQUERADE"
+		ip saddr 172.26.0.0/16 oifname != "br-3dcb6ef83ea1" counter packets 508 bytes 65784 xt target "MASQUERADE"
+		ip saddr 172.20.0.0/16 oifname != "br-3a760a74f4f6" counter packets 1153 bytes 104344 xt target "MASQUERADE"
+		ip saddr 192.168.80.0/20 oifname != "br-3636e05760a9" counter packets 546 bytes 70540 xt target "MASQUERADE"
+		ip saddr 172.29.0.0/16 oifname != "br-b3240c822bce" counter packets 551 bytes 71492 xt target "MASQUERADE"
+		ip saddr 172.19.0.0/16 oifname != "br-c70303d221ee" counter packets 1136 bytes 106592 xt target "MASQUERADE"
+	}
+}
+# Warning: table ip filter is managed by iptables-nft, do not touch!
+table ip filter {
+	chain DOCKER {
+		ip daddr 172.17.0.5 iifname != "docker0" oifname "docker0" tcp dport 5432 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 172.30.0.2 iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" oifname "br-af4c9c2aa60a" tcp dport 443 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 172.30.0.2 iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" oifname "br-af4c9c2aa60a" tcp dport 80 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 172.30.0.10 iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" oifname "br-af4c9c2aa60a" tcp dport 3000 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 172.30.0.5 iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" oifname "br-af4c9c2aa60a" tcp dport 8000 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 172.30.0.3 iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" oifname "br-af4c9c2aa60a" tcp dport 6789 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 172.28.0.3 iifname != "br-669fda75f1ac" oifname "br-669fda75f1ac" tcp dport 8080 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 172.30.0.4 iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" oifname "br-af4c9c2aa60a" tcp dport 5540 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 172.31.0.2 iifname != "br-ec480f77ac34" oifname "br-ec480f77ac34" tcp dport 6379 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 192.168.48.3 iifname != "br-ef6df03f71a0" oifname "br-ef6df03f71a0" tcp dport 8081 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 192.168.48.2 iifname != "br-ef6df03f71a0" oifname "br-ef6df03f71a0" tcp dport 5432 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 172.25.0.2 iifname != "br-4b504efd6080" oifname "br-4b504efd6080" tcp dport 9001 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 172.25.0.2 iifname != "br-4b504efd6080" oifname "br-4b504efd6080" tcp dport 9000 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 172.29.0.2 iifname != "br-b3240c822bce" oifname "br-b3240c822bce" tcp dport 15672 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 172.29.0.2 iifname != "br-b3240c822bce" oifname "br-b3240c822bce" tcp dport 5672 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 192.168.32.2 iifname != "br-613eb68ef5fb" oifname "br-613eb68ef5fb" tcp dport 1433 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 172.17.0.3 iifname != "docker0" oifname "docker0" tcp dport 5000 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 172.17.0.2 iifname != "docker0" oifname "docker0" tcp dport 15672 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 172.17.0.2 iifname != "docker0" oifname "docker0" tcp dport 5672 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 192.168.80.4 iifname != "br-3636e05760a9" oifname "br-3636e05760a9" tcp dport 5432 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 192.168.80.3 iifname != "br-3636e05760a9" oifname "br-3636e05760a9" tcp dport 15672 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 192.168.80.3 iifname != "br-3636e05760a9" oifname "br-3636e05760a9" tcp dport 5672 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 192.168.80.2 iifname != "br-3636e05760a9" oifname "br-3636e05760a9" tcp dport 9001 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 192.168.80.2 iifname != "br-3636e05760a9" oifname "br-3636e05760a9" tcp dport 9000 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 172.19.0.2 iifname != "br-c70303d221ee" oifname "br-c70303d221ee" tcp dport 15672 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		ip daddr 172.19.0.2 iifname != "br-c70303d221ee" oifname "br-c70303d221ee" tcp dport 5672 counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		iifname != "br-c70303d221ee" oifname "br-c70303d221ee" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		iifname != "br-b3240c822bce" oifname "br-b3240c822bce" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		iifname != "br-3636e05760a9" oifname "br-3636e05760a9" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		iifname != "br-3a760a74f4f6" oifname "br-3a760a74f4f6" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		iifname != "br-3dcb6ef83ea1" oifname "br-3dcb6ef83ea1" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		iifname != "br-40094534a5ee" oifname "br-40094534a5ee" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		iifname != "br-679db9b21e00" oifname "br-679db9b21e00" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		iifname != "br-9d6c95e8d80c" oifname "br-9d6c95e8d80c" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" oifname "br-af4c9c2aa60a" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		iifname != "br-d44fef8fd602" oifname "br-d44fef8fd602" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		iifname != "br-dba077b9b543" oifname "br-dba077b9b543" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		iifname != "br-160f55da427c" oifname "br-160f55da427c" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		iifname != "br-07a5e2f2c42f" oifname "br-07a5e2f2c42f" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		iifname != "docker0" oifname "docker0" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		iifname != "br-613eb68ef5fb" oifname "br-613eb68ef5fb" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		iifname != "br-4b504efd6080" oifname "br-4b504efd6080" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		iifname != "br-ef6df03f71a0" oifname "br-ef6df03f71a0" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		iifname != "br-ec480f77ac34" oifname "br-ec480f77ac34" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		iifname != "br-669fda75f1ac" oifname "br-669fda75f1ac" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		iifname != "br-65f6dc782562" oifname "br-65f6dc782562" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+	}
+
+	chain DOCKER-FORWARD {
+		counter packets 6530319 bytes 11196484299 jump DOCKER-CT
+		counter packets 3312487 bytes 5001091084 jump DOCKER-INTERNAL
+		counter packets 3312487 bytes 5001091084 jump DOCKER-BRIDGE
+		iifname "br-c70303d221ee" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		iifname "br-b3240c822bce" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		iifname "br-3636e05760a9" counter packets 43 bytes 9355 accept
+		iifname "br-3a760a74f4f6" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		iifname "br-3dcb6ef83ea1" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		iifname "br-40094534a5ee" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		iifname "br-679db9b21e00" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		iifname "br-9d6c95e8d80c" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		iifname "br-af4c9c2aa60a" counter packets 2761311 bytes 4959915711 accept
+		iifname "br-d44fef8fd602" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		iifname "br-dba077b9b543" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		iifname "br-160f55da427c" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		iifname "br-07a5e2f2c42f" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		iifname "docker0" counter packets 460394 bytes 25754554 accept
+		iifname "br-613eb68ef5fb" counter packets 10805 bytes 1792862 accept
+		iifname "br-4b504efd6080" counter packets 33 bytes 2892 accept
+		iifname "br-ef6df03f71a0" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		iifname "br-ec480f77ac34" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		iifname "br-669fda75f1ac" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		iifname "br-65f6dc782562" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+	}
+
+	chain DOCKER-BRIDGE {
+		oifname "br-c70303d221ee" counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER
+		oifname "br-b3240c822bce" counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER
+		oifname "br-3636e05760a9" counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER
+		oifname "br-3a760a74f4f6" counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER
+		oifname "br-3dcb6ef83ea1" counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER
+		oifname "br-40094534a5ee" counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER
+		oifname "br-679db9b21e00" counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER
+		oifname "br-9d6c95e8d80c" counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER
+		oifname "br-af4c9c2aa60a" counter packets 118 bytes 8400 jump DOCKER
+		oifname "br-d44fef8fd602" counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER
+		oifname "br-dba077b9b543" counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER
+		oifname "br-160f55da427c" counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER
+		oifname "br-07a5e2f2c42f" counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER
+		oifname "docker0" counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER
+		oifname "br-613eb68ef5fb" counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER
+		oifname "br-4b504efd6080" counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER
+		oifname "br-ef6df03f71a0" counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER
+		oifname "br-ec480f77ac34" counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER
+		oifname "br-669fda75f1ac" counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER
+		oifname "br-65f6dc782562" counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER
+	}
+
+	chain DOCKER-CT {
+		oifname "br-c70303d221ee" xt match "conntrack" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		oifname "br-b3240c822bce" xt match "conntrack" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		oifname "br-3636e05760a9" xt match "conntrack" counter packets 35 bytes 23113 accept
+		oifname "br-3a760a74f4f6" xt match "conntrack" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		oifname "br-3dcb6ef83ea1" xt match "conntrack" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		oifname "br-40094534a5ee" xt match "conntrack" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		oifname "br-679db9b21e00" xt match "conntrack" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		oifname "br-9d6c95e8d80c" xt match "conntrack" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		oifname "br-af4c9c2aa60a" xt match "conntrack" counter packets 2488066 bytes 1053784742 accept
+		oifname "br-d44fef8fd602" xt match "conntrack" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		oifname "br-dba077b9b543" xt match "conntrack" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		oifname "br-160f55da427c" xt match "conntrack" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		oifname "br-07a5e2f2c42f" xt match "conntrack" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		oifname "docker0" xt match "conntrack" counter packets 666252 bytes 5079577802 accept
+		oifname "br-613eb68ef5fb" xt match "conntrack" counter packets 7926 bytes 7636543 accept
+		oifname "br-4b504efd6080" xt match "conntrack" counter packets 29 bytes 10870 accept
+		oifname "br-ef6df03f71a0" xt match "conntrack" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		oifname "br-ec480f77ac34" xt match "conntrack" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		oifname "br-669fda75f1ac" xt match "conntrack" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+		oifname "br-65f6dc782562" xt match "conntrack" counter packets 0 bytes 0 accept
+	}
+
+	chain DOCKER-INTERNAL {
+	}
+
+	chain FORWARD {
+		type filter hook forward priority filter; policy drop;
+		counter packets 33747166 bytes 176750349038 jump DOCKER-USER
+		counter packets 6530319 bytes 11196484299 jump DOCKER-FORWARD
+	}
+
+	chain DOCKER-USER {
+		oifname "mlab*" counter packets 15657582 bytes 162801189460 accept
+		iifname "mlab*" counter packets 10958315 bytes 687322055 accept
+		oifname "incusbr0" counter packets 388768 bytes 2053271282 accept
+		iifname "incusbr0" counter packets 212182 bytes 12081942 accept
+	}
+}
+# Warning: table ip6 nat is managed by iptables-nft, do not touch!
+table ip6 nat {
+	chain DOCKER {
+	}
+
+	chain PREROUTING {
+		type nat hook prerouting priority dstnat; policy accept;
+		xt match "addrtype" counter packets 532 bytes 113834 jump DOCKER
+	}
+
+	chain OUTPUT {
+		type nat hook output priority dstnat; policy accept;
+		ip6 daddr != ::1 xt match "addrtype" counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER
+	}
+}
+table ip6 filter {
+	chain DOCKER {
+	}
+
+	chain DOCKER-FORWARD {
+		counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER-CT
+		counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER-INTERNAL
+		counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER-BRIDGE
+	}
+
+	chain DOCKER-BRIDGE {
+	}
+
+	chain DOCKER-CT {
+	}
+
+	chain DOCKER-INTERNAL {
+	}
+
+	chain FORWARD {
+		type filter hook forward priority filter; policy accept;
+		counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER-USER
+		counter packets 0 bytes 0 jump DOCKER-FORWARD
+	}
+
+	chain DOCKER-USER {
+	}
+}
+table ip raw {
+	chain PREROUTING {
+		type filter hook prerouting priority raw; policy accept;
+		ip daddr 172.19.0.2 iifname != "br-c70303d221ee" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 192.168.80.2 iifname != "br-3636e05760a9" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 192.168.80.3 iifname != "br-3636e05760a9" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "lo" tcp dport 15673 counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 192.168.80.4 iifname != "br-3636e05760a9" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 172.17.0.2 iifname != "docker0" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "lo" tcp dport 57732 counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "lo" tcp dport 57733 counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 172.17.0.3 iifname != "docker0" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 172.17.0.4 iifname != "docker0" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 192.168.32.2 iifname != "br-613eb68ef5fb" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 172.30.0.7 iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 172.29.0.2 iifname != "br-b3240c822bce" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "lo" tcp dport 15672 counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 172.25.0.2 iifname != "br-4b504efd6080" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 172.30.0.9 iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 192.168.48.2 iifname != "br-ef6df03f71a0" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "lo" tcp dport 5432 counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 192.168.48.3 iifname != "br-ef6df03f71a0" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "lo" tcp dport 8081 counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 172.30.0.8 iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 172.31.0.2 iifname != "br-ec480f77ac34" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "lo" tcp dport 6379 counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 172.30.0.4 iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "lo" tcp dport 8001 counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 172.31.0.3 iifname != "br-ec480f77ac34" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 172.28.0.2 iifname != "br-669fda75f1ac" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 172.30.0.6 iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 172.28.0.3 iifname != "br-669fda75f1ac" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "lo" tcp dport 28080 counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 172.30.0.3 iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "lo" tcp dport 6789 counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 172.30.0.5 iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 172.22.0.2 iifname != "br-65f6dc782562" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 172.30.0.10 iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 172.22.0.3 iifname != "br-65f6dc782562" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 172.30.0.2 iifname != "br-af4c9c2aa60a" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 172.17.0.5 iifname != "docker0" counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+		ip daddr 127.0.0.1 iifname != "lo" tcp dport 55541 counter packets 0 bytes 0 drop
+	}
+}
+table ip mangle {
+	chain FORWARD {
+		type filter hook forward priority mangle; policy accept;
+		tcp flags & (syn | rst) == syn counter packets 13760 bytes 825476 xt target "TCPMSS"
+	}
+}

internal/store/store.go

@@ -83,6 +83,23 @@ type State struct {
 	// nothing here is ever removed as an orphan — what is held is not the host's to remove, even
 	// when its module is unassigned.
 	Held []Held `json:"held,omitempty"`
+
+	// Firewall is the firewall found on this machine when it was first adopted, and whether the
+	// mesh has since retired it (novox/hq ADR 0100). Nil on a node that was never adopted.
+	Firewall *FoundFirewall `json:"firewall,omitempty"`
+}
+
+// FoundFirewall is what the host found filtering this machine, and what it did about it.
+type FoundFirewall struct {
+	// Kind is ufw or none: an unsupported kind is refused adoption, never recorded.
+	Kind string `json:"kind"`
+	// WasActive is whether it was in force when found — which is what converging the node
+	// retires, and returning it to adopted restores.
+	WasActive bool `json:"was_active,omitempty"`
+	// DisabledByMesh is set when converging retired it, so returning to adopted enables it again
+	// and nothing else ever does.
+	DisabledByMesh bool      `json:"disabled_by_mesh,omitempty"`
+	FoundAt        time.Time `json:"found_at"`
 }
 
 // Held is one file or container found on an adopted node — present at a declared path or name,

internal/system/system.go

@@ -178,6 +178,9 @@ func everyShape() []declaration.Type {
 		// it: the mesh's own code runs as a process on the machine, and only software that
 		// genuinely needs isolation asks for a container.
 		declaration.TypeProcess,
+		// An opening is a rule in the firewall found on the machine, which a partial host neither
+		// has nor can manage (novox/hq ADR 0100).
+		declaration.TypeOpening,
 	}
 }