Build the rollback mechanism, and test it
ADR 0059's recovery path: the pieces that run when the host will not start. internal/upgrade -- two facts, neither of them the host judging its health. Whether the executable this process started from has been replaced on disk, and which version last completed a reconcile. The first design was wrong and the tests caught it, not review. It asked /proc/self/exe whether it was marked deleted. That is Linux procfs behaviour rather than a fact about files, and it catches only unlink -- a binary swapped by rename onto the same path reads as untouched, which is exactly what a package manager does. Now the identity is captured at start and compared later: no procfs, and neither case missed. known-good is one bare line. The reader is a shell script on a machine where the host is failing to start, so it must not need a parser to be present and working. Written only after a clean apply, which is the whole claim -- not health, because a disconnected node is ordinary and a failing resource is the machine's problem rather than the binary's. packaging/ -- the unit, the rollback unit, and the rollback script. The script shares no code with the host and calls none of it: a binary that cannot start cannot be its own recovery. POSIX sh, nothing that has to be installed. The unit carries Restart=always with a comment saying why on-failure would break every upgrade. Both are tested and both sets of tests were confirmed to bite. Injecting five faults broke exactly the intended tests -- except one, and chasing why it did not found a placebo assertion I had written: `check "exits zero" ... "0" "0"` compares a literal to itself and can never fail. Replaced with the real exit code, after which the injection bites. Also caught: an injection that produced a build failure rather than a test failure, which my grep read as "no failure". Re-run so it compiled, and the test did bite. The script test runs in `make check`, so it is a gate rather than something that was run once. Verified against the real binary: known-good is written beside the store after a clean apply and is NOT written after a failed one.
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@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ import (
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"github.com/novox/mesh-host/internal/inventory"
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"github.com/novox/mesh-host/internal/profile"
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"github.com/novox/mesh-host/internal/store"
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"github.com/novox/mesh-host/internal/upgrade"
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)
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// version is stamped at build time. Unset in a development build, and said so rather than
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@@ -312,6 +313,21 @@ func runApply(ctx context.Context, opts options, d *declaration.Declaration, sou
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return applyErr
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}
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// Only now, and only after a clean apply: this version got as far as a completed
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// reconcile, which is the whole of what "known good" claims (novox/hq ADR 0059). Not
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// health — a disconnected node is ordinary, and a resource that fails is the machine's
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// problem rather than the binary's.
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//
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// A failure to record is reported and does not fail the apply. The apply worked; what is
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// lost is a rollback's ability to come back here, which is worse to hide than to say.
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if version != "" {
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if err := upgrade.RecordKnownGood(upgrade.KnownGoodPath(opts.state), version); err != nil {
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fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr,
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"mesh-host: applied, but could not record %s as known-good: %v\n"+
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" a rollback would have nothing to return to.\n", version, err)
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}
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}
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if opts.json {
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return writeJSON(report)
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}
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