The launcher already ran `host run`, and `run` on a machine with no identity
exited with an error. So a freshly installed host, sitting exactly as intended
waiting for somebody to bring it a token, would have counted three failed
starts and rolled back its own installation.
It waits now, and says what it is waiting for. That is the *hosted* state from
the lifecycle: the host is running, it has no identity, and there is nobody to
link to. Every machine passes through it.
An identity that exists and cannot be read is still a fault rather than a wait.
Treating that as "not enrolled yet" would leave a node sitting quietly for ever
while the mesh believes it is a member.
Also: a node now says it is there once a minute. Nothing but its name, because
anything more would be a report, and reports are rare where this is constant --
reading one as the other would make a quiet node look like a stale one. Not
published mandatory, unlike a report: losing one is nothing, the next is a
minute away, and the mesh reads a gap rather than counting arrivals.
Verified in the lab: a node was stopped and the mesh said "out of touch 4m",
then it was started and the mesh said "here" again, without anything else being
touched.
The loop the whole thing exists for: told, apply, report.
`run` holds one outbound connection open and consumes the node's own queue.
Every declaration is verified against the control plane's signing key before a
byte of it is read as an instruction -- not once at connect, every time. The
transport being pinned is a different question from the instruction being
genuine, and pinning only the first would make the second transitive: a
compromised broker could forge declarations, and this host applies whatever the
link delivers.
Malformed and forged are reported differently, because ADR 0004 requires a host
to tell "this is not from the mesh I joined" from "this is broken". One means
somebody is trying and the other means something needs fixing.
A node now keeps what it needs to come back on its own: the broker's address
and fingerprint, the signing key it believes, and its own broker password --
which the mesh issues at enrolment to replace the token's secret, so the
one-time thing stays one-time and the credential it holds for years is not the
one that was pasted into a terminal.
Verified in the lab end to end. The node enrolled, held its link, received a
signed declaration and applied it -- the file is on the machine with the right
contents, and the host's own record lists both resources.
That run also found issue 010, which is recorded in novox/hq: the declaration
removed every container on the machine, including the control plane that sent
it. Correct reconciliation, shared store, and the first thing that happens.
jschoubben