The bundle raised the store as mesh-store, on upstream postgres, in a docker volume; the postgres
module keeps it as postgres, on its pgvector image, in /var/lib/mesh-store owned 999:70, reading its
superuser password from a file. The store step refused, and genesis stopped at step 17 of 24.
The bundle now raises the store with the module's name, image, data directory and password file, and
every step of the bundle and the installer reaches it by that name. The refusal to raise a store over
data it cannot open looks for a cluster in the store's directory, no longer for the old volume.
The installer could not raise a first node: the old bundle's control plane had no
MESH_BUS_NATS and crash-looped, and the NATS bundle was refused because rootsecrets
only knew the previous broker's guest:guest@ template.
One bundle now, the NATS one. rootsecrets makes the controller's bus account and puts
it in both placeholders (the address and the bcrypt hash in the carried user list),
kept with its hash so a re-run writes the same bundle. Preflight refuses a template
naming no bus connection it knows, naming the placeholder, instead of waiting out the
verify step. The broker step adopts the bus as the nats module and refuses, by name,
a catalogue without it or a server that is not the foundation's container.
Review of the first cut found four things.
A directory mounted into a container is no longer looked inside, not even
for the files this host wrote there. The controller records every
provider's received and contributions file as a plain file under a mounted
directory, so folding those in would have recreated the route proxy — which
re-reads its routes live, by design — on every route change, and killed
every provisioner sidecar, which polls what it receives, mid-reconcile on
every grant. Whether a service reads a file under its directory once or
watches it is the service's; restart-on is how a module says "once", and it
stays the opt-in. Env-files and files mounted directly remain by content.
Genesis wrote the superuser secret as `value\n`; `secret accept` strips the
line ending by design, so the postgres module declared `value` — and with
a mounted file's content in the spec, phase three would have recreated the
store it meant to adopt in place, with the temporary control plane
connected to it. Genesis now writes the value alone. readCredentialFile
tolerated both endings already. Pinned with the bytes the genesis code
path writes, then the module's declaration of the same container: it must
reconcile.
A container carrying a label from before the host folded in what it reads
is accepted rather than recreated, when that label matches the spec as it
used to be computed: what it reads is recorded then, a change is caught
from that record from the next apply on, and the label is renewed at the
next genuine recreate. Recreating them all would have been a restart storm
across the mesh in declaration order, the store first. The trade-off is
stated in the code: a container already stale at upgrade time is not
caught, and could not have been either way.
The record of what a container read is looked up by its name when its
declared id has none — the bundle's `store` becomes `postgres.server` for
the same container — so a change on the day it is adopted still names the
file. The by-target lookup takes the most recently applied record, since
the bundle's record for the same target is never removed by the mesh's.
novox/hq 04-ISSUES/103
The verify reads the marker with the shell's read, which fails at end of file
without a line ending; the action ran and its verify said no. And the applier
reports each action with its command line, two of which now carry the real
store and broker passwords — the installer masks the values it made in
everything it says.
From review: the store and broker passwords genesis makes were carried into
the controller through a world-readable file in /tmp, a bundle left at 0644 by
an earlier installer kept that mode while now holding them, a mesh raised by
the old installer would have been handed new passwords its servers do not have,
and the broker-admin action's marker did not depend on the value. Secrets now
stage in a 0700 directory owned by the controller's account; the bundle is
chmod'd; an existing store or broker volume with no credential file is refused
by name; the marker holds the password's fingerprint. Also: one install path
for the store, broker and vault, no error-string matching for the operator
key, and no unreachable fallback for the superuser.
The template raises the store with the password 'bootstrap' and the broker
with its image's default administrator, and the installer carried both into
the mesh as accepted secrets — permanent, and not secret (novox/hq issue 071).
Now the installer makes both credentials, once, at the paths the postgres and
lavinmq modules declare as their own secrets, rewrites the produced bundle to
use them (the store reads its password from a file; the broker's default
account is given the new password by an action before anything dials it), and
writes the bundle at 0600 since it now carries them.
Before the first secret is accepted it makes the operator's sealing key beside
the bundle and gives the mesh the public half, so everything minted from there
is sealed to it too (ADR 0085, amended). Phase three adopts the broker as the
lavinmq module beside the store and installs mesh-vault as a foundation module;
the run ends by writing the operator-sealed export beside the key.
jochen
jschoubben