Disconnection is an ordinary situation and not a failure, and until now the
host treated it as the end: the link dropped and the process returned. A laptop
shut for a week would have come back needing somebody to start it again.
Now it reconnects, with a backoff that starts at two seconds and slows to two
minutes. The two common reasons differ in how long they last -- a broker
restarting is back in seconds, a machine that has moved to a network with no
route may be hours -- so it starts fast and slows down, and resets once a
connection has actually held for thirty seconds. Without that reset, a node
that reconnects and immediately drops climbs to the maximum and stays there
long after the cause is gone.
A wrong certificate is said in full every time rather than folded into a retry
count. That does not mean the network is down; it means what answered is not
the mesh this node joined, and no waiting fixes it.
And it says when it gets back in. It logged every failure and nothing on
success, so a log full of "trying again" followed by silence read as still
broken when it meant the opposite.
The other half: a node now keeps what it was told, not only what it applied.
The record of what was applied holds an id, a type and a target -- what removal
needs, not what creation needs -- so it could not be re-applied. The
declaration is kept whole, signed, and verified again every time it is read
back, so the file on disk is trusted for the same reason the message was rather
than for being local. A tampered one is refused, and so is one signed by
another mesh.
With both, the host reconciles against what it was last told every five
minutes, connected or not. That is not polling for changes -- changes are
pushed -- it is the answer to a machine drifting: a file edited by hand, a
container somebody stopped, a service that died.
Verified in the lab. The broker was stopped: the node retried at 2s, 4s, 8s,
saying why each time, and kept its overlay up throughout. The broker came back
and the node rejoined without being touched. A declaration published while a
node was away was waiting on the broker and applied the moment it connected,
which is the buffer ADR 0006 describes doing its job.
04-ISSUES/010. The store now records where each resource came from -- carried,
or declared -- and each origin removes only its own. A declaration removes what
the mesh previously declared and never what the bundle raised.
State written before the field existed reads as carried, because everything a
host had applied by then came from its bundle: there was no other way to tell
it anything. Guessing the other way would have the first upgrade remove the
substrate, which is this fault arriving through the change that fixes it.
Verified on the scenario that caused it, and on the property that had to
survive it: a later declaration dropping a resource still removes that
resource, so removal by omission still means what it meant.
Also stops swallowing a publish failure. A node that applied a declaration and
could not tell the mesh looked exactly like one that had -- the mesh believing
it never answered, the node believing it did, and nothing anywhere saying so.
Reports are published mandatory now, so anything the broker cannot route comes
back and is said out loud rather than dropped in silence.
The loop the whole thing exists for: told, apply, report.
`run` holds one outbound connection open and consumes the node's own queue.
Every declaration is verified against the control plane's signing key before a
byte of it is read as an instruction -- not once at connect, every time. The
transport being pinned is a different question from the instruction being
genuine, and pinning only the first would make the second transitive: a
compromised broker could forge declarations, and this host applies whatever the
link delivers.
Malformed and forged are reported differently, because ADR 0004 requires a host
to tell "this is not from the mesh I joined" from "this is broken". One means
somebody is trying and the other means something needs fixing.
A node now keeps what it needs to come back on its own: the broker's address
and fingerprint, the signing key it believes, and its own broker password --
which the mesh issues at enrolment to replace the token's secret, so the
one-time thing stays one-time and the credential it holds for years is not the
one that was pasted into a terminal.
Verified in the lab end to end. The node enrolled, held its link, received a
signed declaration and applied it -- the file is on the machine with the right
contents, and the host's own record lists both resources.
That run also found issue 010, which is recorded in novox/hq: the declaration
removed every container on the machine, including the control plane that sent
it. Correct reconciliation, shared store, and the first thing that happens.
jschoubben