package identity

import (
	"crypto/ecdh"
	"crypto/rand"
	"encoding/base64"
	"fmt"
	"os"
	"strings"

	"golang.org/x/crypto/nacl/box"
)

// The key a secret is sealed to, so the mesh can carry one without ever holding a usable copy.
//
// **The fault this exists to avoid is documented, in another mesh, in its own tooling.** There,
// credentials live in the control plane's database, encrypted at rest — which protects against
// somebody reading the database file and nothing else. The same secret is also in each node's
// environment file in plain text, and, worse, inside every connection string composed from it, so
// the tool for finding copies has to search *by value* rather than by name. Its own documentation
// says the copies inside composed URLs "are often the only copies actually in use". Encryption at
// rest also cost the ability to audit: a query against the encrypted column returns zero rows and
// proves nothing.
//
// So the arrangement here is the other one. **The node generates this key and the mesh only ever
// sees the public half**, exactly as with the identity and overlay keys
// (novox/hq ADR 0004). A secret is sealed to that public half before it is stored, so:
//
//   - the control plane's database holds nothing usable, and a copy of it grants nothing
//   - the broker relays a blob it cannot read, which is the point of not trusting it
//   - *compromise of a node is compromise of that node* becomes true of secrets too, rather
//     than being true of identity and quietly false of everything that matters
//
// A third key rather than reusing one of the two that exist. The identity key signs and is
// Ed25519; the overlay key is WireGuard's and is tied to being on the private network, which a
// machine may not be. A key used for two purposes is one rotation away from breaking the other.

// SealingKey is an X25519 keypair used only for receiving secrets.
type SealingKey struct {
	// Public is what the mesh records.
	Public string `json:"public"`
	// Private never leaves this machine.
	Private string `json:"private"`
}

// GenerateSealingKey makes this node's key for receiving secrets.
func GenerateSealingKey() (SealingKey, error) {
	private, err := ecdh.X25519().GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
	if err != nil {
		return SealingKey{}, fmt.Errorf("cannot generate this node's sealing key: %w", err)
	}
	return SealingKey{
		Public:  base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(private.PublicKey().Bytes()),
		Private: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(private.Bytes()),
	}, nil
}

// SealingKeyPath is where the private half lives.
func SealingKeyPath(statePath string) string {
	return dirOf(statePath) + "/sealing.key"
}

// LoadSealingKey reads this node's sealing key.
//
// It does not make one. A key the mesh has never been told about is a key nothing can be sealed
// to, so creating one here would produce a node that silently cannot receive any secret and looks
// fine — the key is generated at enrolment, where its public half is reported in the same breath.
func LoadSealingKey(path string) (SealingKey, error) {
	raw, err := os.ReadFile(path)
	if err != nil {
		if os.IsNotExist(err) {
			return SealingKey{}, fmt.Errorf(
				"this node has no sealing key at %s, so nothing can be sealed to it — it is made "+
					"at enrolment, and a node that joined before secrets existed must join again",
				path)
		}
		return SealingKey{}, err
	}
	{
		private, decodeErr := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(strings.TrimSpace(string(raw)))
		if decodeErr != nil || len(private) != 32 {
			return SealingKey{}, fmt.Errorf(
				"%s is not a sealing key; move it aside to have a new one made", path)
		}
		key, keyErr := ecdh.X25519().NewPrivateKey(private)
		if keyErr != nil {
			return SealingKey{}, fmt.Errorf("%s is not a usable sealing key: %w", path, keyErr)
		}
		return SealingKey{
			Public:  base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(key.PublicKey().Bytes()),
			Private: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(key.Bytes()),
		}, nil
	}
}

// Unseal opens something the mesh sealed to this node.
//
// Anonymous sealed boxes: the sender is not authenticated here, and does not need to be. What a
// node applies is bounded by the declaration's signature, which is checked before any of this —
// so a blob that arrives in a verified declaration came from the mesh, and this only has to
// answer whether it was meant for this machine.
func (s SealingKey) Unseal(sealed string) ([]byte, error) {
	blob, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(sealed)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("this is not a sealed value: %w", err)
	}
	private, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(s.Private)
	if err != nil || len(private) != 32 {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("this node's sealing key is unusable")
	}
	public, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(s.Public)
	if err != nil || len(public) != 32 {
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("this node's sealing key is unusable")
	}

	var pub, priv [32]byte
	copy(pub[:], public)
	copy(priv[:], private)
	out, ok := box.OpenAnonymous(nil, blob, &pub, &priv)
	if !ok {
		// Sealed to a different node, or to a key this one no longer has. Said as one thing
		// because from here they are indistinguishable, and both mean the same: this machine
		// cannot read it and applying it would write a file of rubbish.
		return nil, fmt.Errorf("this was not sealed to this node's current key")
	}
	return out, nil
}

// Seal closes a value to a node's public sealing key. Here so that a test can produce what the
// mesh produces, rather than asserting against a blob nobody can regenerate.
func Seal(publicKey string, value []byte) (string, error) {
	public, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(publicKey)
	if err != nil || len(public) != 32 {
		return "", fmt.Errorf("%q is not a sealing key", publicKey)
	}
	var pub [32]byte
	copy(pub[:], public)
	sealed, err := box.SealAnonymous(nil, value, &pub, rand.Reader)
	if err != nil {
		return "", err
	}
	return base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(sealed), nil
}