package apply

import (
	"context"
	"encoding/json"
	"os"
	"strings"
	"testing"

	"github.com/novox/mesh-host/internal/declaration"
	"github.com/novox/mesh-host/internal/identity"
	"github.com/novox/mesh-host/internal/store"
)

// A file the mesh delivers without being able to read.
//
// Everything else in a declaration is visible to whatever carried it: the message is signed, so
// it cannot be forged, and signing does not make it unreadable. A password in `content` is a
// password the broker sees — the transitive trust this design refuses everywhere else.

func sealedTo(t *testing.T, key identity.SealingKey, value string) string {
	t.Helper()
	sealed, err := identity.Seal(key.Public, []byte(value))
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	return sealed
}

func opener(key identity.SealingKey) Unseal {
	return func(sealed string) ([]byte, error) { return key.Unseal(sealed) }
}

func sealedFile(t *testing.T, path, sealed string) *declaration.Declaration {
	t.Helper()
	raw := map[string]any{"declaration": 1, "resources": []map[string]any{
		{"id": "creds", "type": "file", "path": path, "sealed": sealed},
	}}
	body, _ := json.Marshal(raw)
	d, err := declaration.Parse(body)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	return d
}

func TestASealedFileIsOpenedAndWritten(t *testing.T) {
	key, err := identity.GenerateSealingKey()
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	dir := t.TempDir()
	path := dir + "/db.json"
	d := sealedFile(t, path, sealedTo(t, key, `{"password":"hunter2"}`))

	report, _, err := Apply(context.Background(), archHost(t), d, store.State{},
		store.OriginCarried, noServices, nil, opener(key))
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	if !report.Changed() {
		t.Fatal("nothing changed")
	}
	on, err := os.ReadFile(path)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	if string(on) != `{"password":"hunter2"}` {
		t.Fatalf("the file holds %q", on)
	}
}

func TestASecretIsNotWorldReadableByDefault(t *testing.T) {
	// An ordinary file defaults to 0644, which for a credential is the whole problem. The default
	// differs because the consequence differs; an explicit mode still wins, since a module may
	// need its own user to read it and only the module knows which.
	key, _ := identity.GenerateSealingKey()
	dir := t.TempDir()
	path := dir + "/db.json"
	d := sealedFile(t, path, sealedTo(t, key, "secret"))
	if _, _, err := Apply(context.Background(), archHost(t), d, store.State{},
		store.OriginCarried, noServices, nil, opener(key)); err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	info, err := os.Stat(path)
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	if info.Mode().Perm() != 0o600 {
		t.Fatalf("a credential landed mode %o", info.Mode().Perm())
	}
}

func TestSomethingSealedToAnotherNodeIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
	// Refused, not skipped, and refused before anything is written. A machine that quietly does
	// not apply the one resource carrying a credential looks configured and cannot connect.
	mine, _ := identity.GenerateSealingKey()
	theirs, _ := identity.GenerateSealingKey()
	dir := t.TempDir()
	path := dir + "/db.json"
	d := sealedFile(t, path, sealedTo(t, theirs, "not for you"))

	_, _, err := Apply(context.Background(), archHost(t), d, store.State{},
		store.OriginCarried, noServices, nil, opener(mine))
	if err == nil {
		t.Fatal("a file sealed to another node was applied")
	}
	if _, statErr := os.Stat(path); statErr == nil {
		t.Fatal("something was written before the failure")
	}
}

func TestANodeWithNoSealingKeyRefusesRatherThanSkipping(t *testing.T) {
	key, _ := identity.GenerateSealingKey()
	dir := t.TempDir()
	d := sealedFile(t, dir+"/db.json", sealedTo(t, key, "secret"))
	_, _, err := Apply(context.Background(), archHost(t), d, store.State{},
		store.OriginCarried, noServices, nil, nil)
	if err == nil {
		t.Fatal("a sealed file was skipped by a node that cannot open one")
	}
	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "sealing key") {
		t.Fatalf("the failure does not say why: %v", err)
	}
}

func TestTheSecretIsNeverInWhatTheMeshIsToldBack(t *testing.T) {
	// The node reports what it applied, and that report goes over the same broker the sealing was
	// for. A digest is a fact about the file; the file is not.
	key, _ := identity.GenerateSealingKey()
	dir := t.TempDir()
	d := sealedFile(t, dir+"/db.json", sealedTo(t, key, "hunter2"))
	report, state, err := Apply(context.Background(), archHost(t), d, store.State{},
		store.OriginCarried, noServices, nil, opener(key))
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	said, _ := json.Marshal(report)
	kept, _ := json.Marshal(state)
	for what, blob := range map[string][]byte{"the report": said, "the node's state": kept} {
		if strings.Contains(string(blob), "hunter2") {
			t.Fatalf("%s carries the secret in plain text:\n%s", what, blob)
		}
	}
}

func TestASealedFileStillNoticesAHandEdit(t *testing.T) {
	// Drift detection must survive not holding the plaintext. It does, because what is recorded
	// is a digest of what was written rather than what was written.
	key, _ := identity.GenerateSealingKey()
	dir := t.TempDir()
	path := dir + "/db.json"
	d := sealedFile(t, path, sealedTo(t, key, "hunter2"))
	_, state, err := Apply(context.Background(), archHost(t), d, store.State{},
		store.OriginCarried, noServices, nil, opener(key))
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	if err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte("meddled"), 0o600); err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	again, _, err := Apply(context.Background(), archHost(t), d, state,
		store.OriginCarried, noServices, nil, opener(key))
	if err != nil {
		t.Fatal(err)
	}
	if !again.Changed() {
		t.Fatal("a hand-edited credential was left as it was found")
	}
	on, _ := os.ReadFile(path)
	if string(on) != "hunter2" {
		t.Fatalf("it was not put back: %q", on)
	}
}

func TestContentAndSealedTogetherIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
	// Otherwise nobody can tell by looking whether what landed on the machine was the secret or
	// the placeholder.
	_, err := declaration.Parse([]byte(`{"declaration":1,"resources":[
		{"id":"f","type":"file","path":"/etc/x","content":"a","sealed":"b"}]}`))
	if err == nil {
		t.Fatal("a file that is both literal and sealed was accepted")
	}
	if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "exactly once") {
		t.Fatalf("unhelpful refusal: %v", err)
	}
}