Transit, host firewalls, and the whole topology raising

The full topology now raises: four machines, three routers, a transit
router, six segments, in 35 seconds. Everything the declaration model can
express except `place`, which is refused because the node host it would
place does not exist yet.

Transit was a real gap, not a bug. The design says public networks are
unrelated and routed to each other, never bridged — and I built the
segments and never built the thing that routes between them, so three
public networks were islands and nothing crossed. A transit router now
holds an interface on every public segment, forwarding and no translation:
the closest thing the lab has to the internet, deliberately dumb.

Proven rather than asserted, by ping TTL across the raised topology:

  within one segment                     ttl=64   no hops
  across two unrelated public networks   ttl=62   gateway + transit
  multicast between public networks      0 replies

A flat internet would have shown ttl=64 and answered multicast — which
would let a node discover a peer it could never reach in production, and
report success. That is the fault the as-is layer records the mesh already
hitting with multicast name resolution.

inbound: deny is implemented as a host firewall on the machine, read back
after applying. A declared refusal that silently did not load leaves the
machine wide open, which looks exactly like a machine that is working.
Established and related traffic is accepted, so a defended machine can
still dial out rather than being a disconnected one.

Verified by running, all of it:

  home -> devices (policy allow)               reachable
  devices -> home (policy deny)                blocked
  behind unforwardable NAT -> out              reachable
  in -> behind unforwardable NAT               unreachable
  inbound: deny, dialling out                  reachable
  reaching a machine that denies inbound       refused

The two routers differ exactly as declared: the forwardable one carries the
policy rule and no inbound drop, the unforwardable one carries `ct state
new drop` and no DNAT.
This commit is contained in:
2026-08-24 01:49:30 +02:00
parent a270cd5b02
commit 5d01006eab
9 changed files with 295 additions and 31 deletions
+26 -8
View File
@@ -110,10 +110,11 @@ than ignored:
| gateways, NAT, masquerade | **works** |
| `published:` ports (DNAT through the gateway's address) | **works** |
| `mapping_ttl:` (conntrack timeout) | **works**, and verified after setting — a declared expiry that silently did not apply would be the fault this catches |
| `forwardable: false` | implemented, **not yet verified by running** |
| `policy:` between segments | implemented, **not yet verified by running** |
| `inbound: deny` | **refused at raise** |
| `place:` | **refused at raise** |
| `forwardable: false` | **works** — outbound only, no DNAT, unsolicited inbound dropped |
| `policy:` between segments | **works**, asymmetric |
| `inbound: deny` | **works** — host firewall, read back after applying |
| several public networks, routed not bridged | **works** — a transit router, never a shared bridge |
| `place:` | **refused at raise** — the node host it would place does not exist yet |
`raise` refuses a scenario declaring anything in the lower half, naming every gap. It does not
raise a mesh that silently lacks what it declared — that is the fault this lab exists to catch
@@ -138,12 +139,29 @@ something under test (`novox/hq` ADR 0033).
gateway, reached from a machine on a routable address:
```
home-server -> anchor 0% loss, through masquerade
anchor -> 192.168.1.135 (private, direct) unreachable ✓
anchor -> 192.0.2.50:8080 (the GATEWAY) HTTP 200
home-server -> anchor 0% loss, through masquerade
anchor -> 192.168.1.135 (private, direct) unreachable ✓
anchor -> 192.0.2.50:8080 (the GATEWAY) HTTP 200
home -> devices (policy allow) reachable ✓
devices -> home (policy deny) blocked ✓
roamer behind unforwardable NAT -> anchor reachable ✓ (outbound only)
anchor -> roamer unreachable ✓
workstation with inbound: deny, dialling out reachable ✓ (defended, not disconnected)
home-server -> workstation refused ✓
```
The last line is the case research 004 says only exists in production.
The third line is the case research 004 says only exists in production.
**Routed, never bridged**, proven rather than asserted — ping TTL across the full topology:
```
within one segment ttl=64 no hops
across two unrelated public networks ttl=62 gateway + transit
multicast between public networks 0 replies
```
A flat "internet" would have shown ttl=64 and answered multicast, which would have let a node
discover a peer it could never reach in production — and report success.
Machines boot concurrently, so a second machine costs seconds rather than doubling the wait.
Nearly all of the remaining time is boot, which cannot be avoided.