The home segment moves off 192.168.1.0/24
It is the commonest home LAN range there is, so on an ordinary workstation the lab's private segment and the machine's own network are the same addresses. The scenario routes an egress machine explicitly and marks the rest unreachable, so nothing leaked — but that guard was carrying the whole weight of a collision nobody chose, and a guard is a bad place for that. 10.99.1.0/24 is still RFC 1918, so the bed still models a home LAN behind an access point. It is simply far from what this kind of machine already has: 192.168.1 is the LAN, 172.16-31 and 192.168.16-95 are container bridges, and 10.10/10.42/10.208 are a tunnel, the mesh overlay and the virtualisation daemon. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
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@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@
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* anchor, everything on one public segment) into what production actually is:
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*
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* hosting (public) home (private, behind a NAT access point)
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* novox 192.0.2.20 — the ANCHOR: ace 192.168.1.10 the home server, media/IoT set
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* substrate (store/broker/ shanks 192.168.1.20 workstation (light: portainer only)
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* control) + the whole novox g14 192.168.1.30 workstation (light: portainer only)
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* novox 192.0.2.20 — the ANCHOR: ace 10.99.1.10 the home server, media/IoT set
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* substrate (store/broker/ shanks 10.99.1.20 workstation (light: portainer only)
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* control) + the whole novox g14 10.99.1.30 workstation (light: portainer only)
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* set + overlay hub + ingress
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*
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* There is NO separate anchor: novox IS the anchor. The substrate runs on novox, and novox also
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