From aafa11756a5b1593d921acc8008d8b711569d7f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: jochen Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2026 00:27:46 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] e2e: a provider creates the resource with the mesh's credential (ADR 0053) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Assigns redis as a provider, puts the contributions and unsealed password the mesh would deliver in its receives path, and authenticates as the consumer with the mesh's password — PONG proves the login was created with exactly that password (a self-generated one answers WRONGPASS), with MESH_SEAL_KEY set nowhere. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF --- .../provider-uses-mesh-credential.test.ts | 242 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 242 insertions(+) create mode 100644 test/integration/provider-uses-mesh-credential.test.ts diff --git a/test/integration/provider-uses-mesh-credential.test.ts b/test/integration/provider-uses-mesh-credential.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8724872 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/integration/provider-uses-mesh-credential.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,242 @@ +/** + * A provider creates the resource with the credential the mesh minted — novox/hq ADR 0053. + * + * The old provisioner generated its own password, sealed it with a key nothing delivered, and + * handed it back. This proves the corrected contract: redis's provisioner reads the mesh's + * contributions file and, for each consumer, the password the mesh minted and the host unsealed, and + * creates the ACL user under the login the mesh derived, with that exact password. No $MESH_SEAL_KEY + * is set anywhere. The proof is authentication: a client logging in as that consumer with the mesh's + * password gets PONG — where a provisioner that invented its own password would answer WRONGPASS. + * + * A hand-written contributions file and secret stand in for the control plane here (a full grant + * from a second module is a heavier bed); their SHAPE is exactly what mesh-control writes — a + * `receives` doc with `as`/`secret`, and the secret file the host leaves after unsealing. + * + * MESH_LAB_HOST_BINARY=.../mesh-host MESH_LAB_BUNDLE=.../examples/substrate-first-node.lock + * scripts/build-module-runtime.sh redis builds mesh-runtime-redis:development, which + * scenarios/redis-node.yml stocks. + */ + +import { test, before, after } from "node:test"; +import assert from "node:assert/strict"; +import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs"; +import { loadScenario } from "../../src/declaration/parse.ts"; +import { raise } from "../../src/lifecycle/raise.ts"; +import { destroy, exec } from "../../src/lifecycle/operate.ts"; +import { hostBinaryPath, HOST_PATH } from "../../src/lifecycle/place.ts"; +import { labIsUsable, destroyAll } from "./harness.ts"; + +const capability = await labIsUsable(); +const binary = hostBinaryPath(); +const bundle = process.env["MESH_LAB_BUNDLE"] ?? ""; + +const skip = !capability.usable + ? `lab not usable: ${capability.why}` + : !binary || !existsSync(binary) + ? "MESH_LAB_HOST_BINARY is not set to a built mesh-host" + : !bundle || !existsSync(bundle) + ? "MESH_LAB_BUNDLE is not set to a substrate bundle (mesh-host examples/)" + : false; + +const SCENARIO = "redis-node"; +const MACHINE = "anchor"; + +let instanceId = ""; +let stocked: string[] = []; + +function quote(s: string): string { + return `'${s.replaceAll("'", `'\\''`)}'`; +} + +async function on(command: string, timeoutMs?: number): Promise<{ out: string; ok: boolean }> { + const { stdout } = await exec(instanceId, MACHINE, [ + "sh", "-c", `exec 2>&1\n${command}\necho "__exit=$?"`, + ], timeoutMs); + const marker = stdout.lastIndexOf("__exit="); + if (marker < 0) return { out: stdout, ok: false }; + return { out: stdout.slice(0, marker), ok: stdout.slice(marker + 7).trim() === "0" }; +} + +async function must(command: string, timeoutMs?: number): Promise { + const { out, ok } = await on(command, timeoutMs); + if (!ok) throw new Error(`${MACHINE}: ${command}\n${out}`); + return out; +} + +async function mesh(command: string, timeoutMs?: number): Promise { + return must(`docker exec mesh-control /mesh-control ${command}`, timeoutMs); +} + +function pinned(repository: string): string { + const found = stocked.find((r) => r.slice(r.indexOf("/") + 1, r.indexOf("@")) === repository); + assert.ok(found, `the scenario stocks no ${repository}; it serves ${stocked.join(", ")}`); + return found; +} + +function bundleFor(images: string[]): string { + let text = readFileSync(bundle, "utf8"); + for (const ref of images) { + const repository = ref.slice(ref.indexOf("/") + 1, ref.indexOf("@")); + const escaped = repository.replaceAll("/", "\\/").replaceAll(".", "\\."); + text = text.replaceAll(new RegExp(`[A-Za-z0-9_.:-]+\\/${escaped}@sha256:[0-9a-f]+`, "g"), ref); + } + return text; +} + +function tokenFrom(said: string): string { + const found = said.split("\n").map((l) => l.trim()).find((l) => l.length > 100 && !l.includes(" ")); + assert.ok(found, `no token in:\n${said}`); + return found; +} + +async function settled(withinMs = 480_000): Promise { + const until = Date.now() + withinMs; + let last = ""; + while (Date.now() < until) { + const asked = await on(`docker exec mesh-control /mesh-control status --json`); + if (asked.ok) { + try { + const state = JSON.parse(asked.out) as { + wrong: { node: string; outcome: string }[]; + waiting: { node: string }[]; + reported: { node: string; outcome: string; current: boolean }[]; + }; + const bad = state.wrong.find((w) => w.node === MACHINE); + if (bad) throw new Error(`${MACHINE} did not apply what it was sent: ${bad.outcome}\n${asked.out}`); + const word = state.reported.find((r) => r.node === MACHINE); + if (!state.waiting.some((w) => w.node === MACHINE) && word?.outcome === "applied" && word.current) return; + last = asked.out; + } catch (err) { + if (err instanceof Error && err.message.includes("did not apply")) throw err; + last = asked.out; + } + } + await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 5000)); + } + throw new Error(`${MACHINE} never caught up within ${Math.round(withinMs / 1000)}s. Last:\n${last}`); +} + +before(async () => { + if (skip) return; + + const raised = await raise(loadScenario(`scenarios/${SCENARIO}.yml`), { + onProgress: (m) => console.log(`raise: ${m}`), + }); + instanceId = raised.instanceId; + stocked = raised.images; + + await must(`cat > /tmp/substrate.lock <<'MESHBUNDLE'\n${bundleFor(raised.images)}\nMESHBUNDLE`); + await must(`${HOST_PATH} apply /tmp/substrate.lock`, 600_000); + const up = await must(`docker ps --format '{{.Names}}'`); + for (const c of ["mesh-store", "mesh-broker", "mesh-control"]) { + assert.match(up, new RegExp(c), `the substrate did not raise ${c}:\n${up}`); + } + + await mesh(`node add ${MACHINE}`); + const token = tokenFrom(await mesh(`token issue --node ${MACHINE}`)); + await must(`${HOST_PATH} enrol --token ${quote(token)}`); + await must(`nohup ${HOST_PATH} run > /var/log/mesh-host.log 2>&1 & sleep 3`); +}, { timeout: 1_800_000 }); + +after(async () => { + if (instanceId) await destroy(instanceId); + await destroyAll(`${SCENARIO}-`); +}, { timeout: 600_000 }); + +test("redis creates a consumer's login with the password the mesh minted, sealing nothing", { + skip, timeout: 900_000, +}, async () => { + // redis as a provider: the server, and a broker-bound runtime that serves its tools AND runs its + // provisioner. The provisioner is pointed at the contributions file the mesh would write + // (MESH_RECEIVES). There is NO MESH_SEAL_KEY — the whole point of ADR 0053 is that a provider + // needs none. + const manifest = JSON.stringify({ + module: "redis", + version: "1", + emits: ["module.redis.cache.provisioned", "module.redis.cache.deprovisioned"], + consumes: ["module.redis.cache.provisioned", "module.redis.cache.deprovisioned"], + "own-secrets": { default: "/var/lib/redis-module/default.secret", broker: "/var/lib/mesh/redis/broker" }, + resources: [ + { id: "mesh-state", type: "directory", path: "/var/lib/mesh/redis", mode: "0700" }, + { id: "state", type: "directory", path: "/var/lib/redis-module", mode: "0700" }, + { id: "grants-dir", type: "directory", path: "/var/lib/redis-module/grants", mode: "0700" }, + { id: "data", type: "directory", path: "/services/redis/data", mode: "0700", owner: "999:999" }, + { + id: "server-conf", type: "file", path: "/var/lib/redis-module/redis.conf", mode: "0644", + content: "requirepass ${secret:default}\nappendonly no\ndir /data\n", + }, + { + id: "server", type: "container", name: "redis", image: pinned("redis"), network: "host", + volumes: [ + "/services/redis/data:/data", + "/var/lib/redis-module/redis.conf:/etc/redis/redis.conf:ro", + ], + args: ["/etc/redis/redis.conf"], + }, + { + id: "runtime", type: "container", name: "mesh-redis", image: pinned("mesh-runtime-redis"), + network: "host", + volumes: [ + "/var/lib/mesh/redis/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro", + "/var/lib/redis-module/grants:/var/lib/redis-module/grants", + "/var/lib/redis-module/default.secret:/run/secrets/default:ro", + ], + env: { + MESH_BROKER_FILE: "/run/secrets/broker", + MESH_RECEIVES: "/var/lib/redis-module/grants/redis-cache.json", + MESH_PROVISION_REDIS: "127.0.0.1:6379", + MESH_PROVISION_PASSWORD_FILE: "/run/secrets/default", + }, + }, + ], + }); + await must(`printf %s ${quote(manifest)} > /tmp/redis.json && docker cp /tmp/redis.json mesh-control:/redis.json`); + await mesh("module add /redis.json"); + await mesh(`module issue redis --node ${MACHINE}`); + await mesh(`assign ${MACHINE} redis`); + await mesh(`push ${MACHINE}`); + await settled(); + + const running = await must(`docker ps --format '{{.Names}}'`); + assert.match(running, /mesh-redis/, `redis's runtime is not running:\n${(await on(`docker logs mesh-redis 2>&1 | tail -20`)).out}`); + + // What the mesh delivers to the provider: a contributions file naming the consumer's login and + // where its password is, and the password itself as the file the host leaves after unsealing. + const password = "mesh-minted-9f3c2a"; + await must(`printf %s ${quote(password)} > /var/lib/redis-module/grants/app.secret`); + const contributions = JSON.stringify({ + contributions: 1, + requirement: "redis-cache", + generated: "by the mesh — do not edit", + given: [ + { from: "app", node: "app-node", at: "192.0.2.20:6379", as: "app-one", secret: "/var/lib/redis-module/grants/app.secret", values: {} }, + ], + }); + await must(`printf %s ${quote(contributions)} > /var/lib/redis-module/grants/redis-cache.json`); + + // Within a reconcile tick the provisioner creates the ACL user. It exists on the server. + let acl = ""; + const until = Date.now() + 60_000; + while (Date.now() < until) { + acl = (await on(`docker exec redis redis-cli -a ${quote(await must(`cat /var/lib/redis-module/default.secret`))} --no-auth-warning ACL LIST 2>/dev/null`)).out; + if (/app-one/.test(acl)) break; + await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 3000)); + } + assert.match(acl, /app-one/, `the provisioner never created the consumer's login:\n${(await on(`docker logs mesh-redis 2>&1 | tail -30`)).out}\n---\n${acl}`); + + // The proof: authenticate as that consumer with the password the MESH minted. PONG means the + // provisioner created the login with exactly that password. A provisioner that invented its own + // (the old behaviour) would answer WRONGPASS here. + const authed = await on(`docker exec redis redis-cli --user app-one --pass ${quote(password)} --no-auth-warning PING 2>&1`); + assert.doesNotMatch(authed.out, /WRONGPASS/, + `the consumer could not authenticate with the mesh's password — the provider used a different one:\n${authed.out}`); + assert.match(authed.out, /PONG/, `expected PONG authenticating as the consumer:\n${authed.out}`); + + // And it needed no seal key: the runtime came up and provisioned with MESH_SEAL_KEY set nowhere. + const env = await must(`docker inspect mesh-redis --format '{{json .Config.Env}}'`); + assert.doesNotMatch(env, /MESH_SEAL_KEY/, `a seal key was set after all — ADR 0053 is not what ran:\n${env}`); + + // The provisioner emitted its lifecycle event under the bound account, and no emit was refused. + const log = (await on(`docker logs mesh-redis 2>&1`)).out; + assert.doesNotMatch(log, /emit .*failed/, `the provisioned event was refused:\n${log}`); +});