Commit Graph
2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
jschoubben 71bea08f3b anthropic-bed: prove the host unseals the refresh token, no node-key stub
The bed follows the reworked flow: the manager module seals the refresh token to the node's
PUBLIC key, the HOST unseals it and mounts the cleartext at the manager's bound path, and the
refresh reads that cleartext -- no fake node key pair is mounted any more, the host uses its
own real sealing key.

  - the manager is a model-access holder deployed first, so its bound facts (carrying the node
    public key) are delivered; the consumer is added only once an access token exists to seal.
  - adopt reads the node public key from the bound facts; the test asserts the host mounts the
    cleartext refresh token for the manager, and that it reaches nowhere on the consuming node.
  - the refresh_grant assertion reads { sealed, manager_key }.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
2026-09-07 01:55:28 +02:00
jschoubben 6be5072565 anthropic-bed: prove model-access refreshes on the manager node
A lab bed for Phase C of model-access (ADR 0050), OAuth endpoint stubbed.
It drives the real runtime images through the whole flow: the manager
seals a refresh token at rest and opens it on the manager node alone,
mesh-control is handed only the access token and an opaque re-sealed
envelope via licence submit-refresh, and the consumer writes an
access-token-only credential. Asserts the refresh token -- original and
rotated -- is nowhere on the consuming node and only ciphertext in the
control plane's database.

build-module-runtime.sh also compiles adopt/refresh/apply/usage
entrypoints. Stubbed and flagged: the vendor endpoint, the manager node's
private key (mounted; a host capability to deliver it does not exist
today), and the submit transport (the test invokes the CLI on the
manager's output).

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
2026-09-07 01:00:37 +02:00