A segment named "uplink" is refused. The lab claims that name for the
NAT bridge behind `egress: true`, and a scenario wearing it first would
have its egress machines silently attached to an isolated bridge — a
declared key doing nothing, which is the fault this repo exists to
refuse, in the repo that refuses it.
settled() parses inside the try. A truncated status from a struggling
machine was the one shape of bad answer that still threw out of the
wait, and the likeliest moment for one is exactly the machine the poll
is watching. Malformed now counts as "could not ask", like the exec
that times out.
And a sentence on the uplink's UseDNS saying its inertness is
load-bearing: it matters only where systemd-resolved runs, and on a
machine whose modules own resolv.conf the uplink must not outvote the
resolver a scenario is testing.
Three changes, found by one failing test.
The forge failed three runs in a row as "status hangs", and it was
diagnosed twice as contention — real defects, fixed, and not the cause.
The heartbeats told the truth in the end: every exec on anchor crawled
from 15s to 105s, because eleven containers plus a database pull were
running in a 1GiB machine. Starvation presents as whatever you were
doing when the page-outs start, which is why it wore two other bugs'
clothes first.
So machine size is now the scenario's to declare — memory and cpus per
machine, default unchanged. The anchor that carries the whole substrate
is bigger than the laptop that joins it, and the comment on the
scenario says why in terms of what lands there.
`egress: true` gives a machine one extra interface on a lab-supplied
NAT network, addressed by DHCP because the one address a scenario has
no business choosing is on the host's side of the fence. Declared
per machine and off by default: a closed scenario stays the rule
(novox/hq ADR 0016), and the exception exists because a first node
fetches its images before any mesh can serve them — which is now the
tested path (04-ISSUES/029), and a lab that can never reach upstream
cannot prove the bootstrap it exists to prove. The uplink route is
metric-4096, so it never shadows a route the scenario declared. A
detached machine declaring egress is refused, not ignored.
And settled() treats a poll that threw as a poll that missed. An exec
timeout at minute four of a wait is "could not ask", not a verdict on
the machine.
Found by asking what gw-devices and gw-home actually were, in a picture that
finally made them easy to see side by side.
planRouters grouped on the exact address list, so `home` declaring a v4 and a v6
address and `devices` declaring only the v4 became two router containers — both
holding 198.51.100.7 on the same segment. The lab raised it without complaint.
Not theoretical. On the raised instance the transit router resolved that one
address to two different MACs across a cache flush:
198.51.100.7 -> 02:c9:16:70:23:29 (gw0, which HAS the :443 dnat)
198.51.100.7 -> 02:bd:75:0b:b0:75 (gw1, which has none)
So home-server's published port worked or did not depending on which container
answered ARP last — intermittent, and it would have presented as a flaky test
rather than as a broken scenario.
One public address is one box. Checked against the thing this models rather than
argued from the model: a bridged modem, a single gateway holding the public
address, one network behind it, and every port forward landing on one host at
that address. Two routers on one address is not a topology, it is a collision.
Gateways to the same segment sharing any address are now one router and their
address lists union, so a v6 address declared on only one of the segments it
serves is still carried. Where such declarations disagree on nat, forwardable or
mapping_ttl, validate refuses — one box cannot behave two ways.
the-ordinary-shape now raises 7 machines instead of 8, and gw0 holds the public
address on eth0 while serving home on eth1 and devices on eth2.
A declaration goes in and a disposable mesh comes out. Verified on a
workstation, not asserted: two machines raised and addressed in 14.6s,
snapshot 0.28s, restore-to-usable 11.6s, both families pinging with no
loss, and the workstation with no route into any of it.
The declaration layer implements the model in full — three positions a
machine can be in, keyed on forwardability; gateways carrying the address
the world sees them as; both address families; multi-homing; MTU;
inter-segment policy. It is validated hard because the failures it prevents
are silent: a private range on a public segment produces no error, the mesh
simply never forms. Public segments are refused unless they use RFC 5737 or
RFC 3849 space, and a range wider than the reserved block is refused too.
33 tests, all offline.
The runtime implements less than the model, and refuses the difference.
A scenario declaring gateways, published ports, policy, inbound deny or
place is rejected at raise with every gap named. Raising it would produce a
mesh that silently lacks what it declared, which is the fault this lab
exists to catch — 04-ISSUES/003, where a firewall key is declared in five
manifests and read by no code.
Three bugs found by review and by running it, all of one family:
The readiness check truthiness-tested incusOk's return. `exec … true`
succeeds with EMPTY output, so every machine reported unreachable while
incus exec on it worked perfectly. succeeds() now exists so the mistake is
not available, and network delete had the same bug — it counted zero
segments removed while removing them.
list() split instance from machine on the last dash, so a machine called
home-server absorbed half the instance id and destroy found nothing.
Resources are now found by the metadata they carry, never by name.
restore reported success in 0.79s while the machine's agent was still
starting, so the next command failed. Both raise and restore now wait for
usable and say how long that took — reporting the earlier number is
transport reported as effect, which is the fault the lab is being built to
find.
Two incus behaviours worth recording. Its CLI reads a YAML definition from
stdin when stdin is not a terminal, so a spawned command hangs until the
timeout kills it and arrives with empty stderr — a failure with no
explanation, on a command that works when typed. And it assigns a MAC at
runtime without recording it in device config, so MACs are derived and set
explicitly, which the guest needs anyway: it names interfaces by bus
position, and matching by name configures the wrong one on a multi-homed
machine.
No build step; Node strips the types. The lifecycle has no unit tests
because a fake hypervisor would assert that the fake behaves as expected,
which is the shape of test this project exists to stop shipping.
jschoubben