6ed5fdb3c2e1e9685b6e57105ab78b8189684c04
5
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 jschoubben
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751948f0f9 |
The lab had a registry that production does not, so it tested a fiction
The lab raised a `registry` VM, pushed ~73 images into it from the workstation, and rewrote every manifest reference — third-party ones included — to point at it. No production mesh has such a thing. So every bed proved that a machine could fetch an image from a registry that exists nowhere else, and the bootstrap problems that only appear when a machine has to fetch for itself went unfound. What replaces it is the two things that are true in the world: **Public images come from the public internet.** mesh-lab already created a NAT'd uplink for exactly this and attached it to any machine declaring `egress`; no scenario ever declared it. They do now, and third-party references are left exactly as the catalogue writes them. **The mesh's own images have no registry and never will.** mesh-control, mesh-builder, mesh-route-proxy and the per-module runtimes are built from source and exist in no registry. A machine gets them the way an operator's machine does — they are built here and loaded onto it — and is then named by the digest of its own image configuration, which mesh-host now accepts as "an image this machine already holds". `images:` therefore means only *ours*, and a third-party entry is refused rather than quietly loaded: otherwise the fiction returns one convenient line at a time. It is per-machine as well, because "everything, everywhere" was never a description of anything real — handing whole-mesh-full's union to its two 30GiB workstations would fill the disk with runtimes nothing on them will start. **The uplink and the declared gateway would have fought, silently.** A gateway container and the transit router reach the scenario and nothing else; a default route through either is a black hole for anything outside, and it beats the uplink's DHCP route on metric. So a machine with egress states the scenario's ranges explicitly — through the same gateway or transit it would have defaulted to, so the overlay-across-NAT path is unchanged — and leaves the default to the uplink. A range with no path inside the scenario becomes `unreachable` rather than falling through: 192.168.1.0/24 is an ordinary private range in fact, and letting it escape would put scenario traffic on whatever network the workstation is sitting on. `scenarioRoutesFor` is pure and tested, because a decision only a full raise could check is one nobody checks. The registry-reachability check the raise gained earlier is kept, pointed at the real thing: every machine with egress must resolve a name and reach the internet before the raise says it finished. Same failure it was written for — a raise that returns, an apply that dies on its first pull, an instance left a bare shell — now guarding the path that actually carries. The base image's trust of the documentation ranges as plain-HTTP registries STAYS. It was never only for the lab's registry: the mesh has one of its own, the `registry` module, serving artifacts to the whole mesh over plain HTTP from whatever node runs it. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF |
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jschoubben
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a9ecce25cb |
Two-node DB-consumer bed + a scenario disk field
The GREEN multi-node regression bed that proves the DB-consumer gate: substrate/control on one node, postgres+redis providers and baserow+letta consumers on another, each consumer getting its own credential and its own mesh-named database across the overlay. Requires the mesh-control provider-seal-key fix and the mesh-catalog db-name fix. Includes a general lab capability: a machine 'disk' field sizing the VM root disk (a broad install exhausts the pool default and the host fails mid-apply with 'no space left on device'). The bed sets 60GiB. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF |
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jschoubben
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4a343a2652 |
A machine is as big as the scenario says, and may reach the world
Three changes, found by one failing test. The forge failed three runs in a row as "status hangs", and it was diagnosed twice as contention — real defects, fixed, and not the cause. The heartbeats told the truth in the end: every exec on anchor crawled from 15s to 105s, because eleven containers plus a database pull were running in a 1GiB machine. Starvation presents as whatever you were doing when the page-outs start, which is why it wore two other bugs' clothes first. So machine size is now the scenario's to declare — memory and cpus per machine, default unchanged. The anchor that carries the whole substrate is bigger than the laptop that joins it, and the comment on the scenario says why in terms of what lands there. `egress: true` gives a machine one extra interface on a lab-supplied NAT network, addressed by DHCP because the one address a scenario has no business choosing is on the host's side of the fence. Declared per machine and off by default: a closed scenario stays the rule (novox/hq ADR 0016), and the exception exists because a first node fetches its images before any mesh can serve them — which is now the tested path (04-ISSUES/029), and a lab that can never reach upstream cannot prove the bootstrap it exists to prove. The uplink route is metric-4096, so it never shadows a route the scenario declared. A detached machine declaring egress is refused, not ignored. And settled() treats a poll that threw as a poll that missed. An exec timeout at minute four of a wait is "could not ask", not a verdict on the machine. |
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jschoubben
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be176bab2e |
Automate the lab registry: a sealed machine pulls by digest
Closes 04-ISSUES/009. A scenario declares `images:` by tag; the lab stocks a
registry on this workstation where there is a network, raises it inside the
scenario as scenery, and reports the references a declaration pins -- which are
the digests THIS registry assigned, and are not knowable until it is raised.
Verified in a sealed machine, confirmed by ping to have no route out: package,
service including boot state, a container pinned by digest, and an action
inside that container. Applied, idempotent on re-apply, and read back from the
machine rather than from the apply's own report. That is the first time the
container shape has worked in the lab at all, and it was the shape blocking the
substrate bootstrap.
Four faults found by running it, three of them mine and one worth keeping:
The read-back checked that the catalog endpoint answered, by looking for the
substring "repositories" -- which `{"repositories":[]}` also contains. So it
passed on a registry holding nothing, and the failure surfaced much later as a
container that could not be pulled. It now asks for each image's manifest BY
DIGEST, which is what a machine does.
A recursive push needs its destination to exist, or incus copies the source's
contents rather than the source. The data landed one directory too shallow and
the registry found nothing where it looks.
The registry writes its blobs as root through a bind mount, so the workstation
could not remove its own scratch directory afterwards. Whoever made the files
removes them -- the cleanup now runs in a container too. And a cleanup failure
no longer fails a raise that succeeded: the scenario is standing and usable,
and saying otherwise would be a false report.
The base image build did not verify that the runtime trusts the documentation
ranges as plain-HTTP registries. Writing the file is not the daemon honouring
it, and a base image that looks right fails much later, in a sealed scenario,
a long way from its cause. It is now read back from `docker info`.
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jschoubben
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a27d861d3b |
Scenario lifecycle: raise, exec, snapshot, restore, destroy
A declaration goes in and a disposable mesh comes out. Verified on a workstation, not asserted: two machines raised and addressed in 14.6s, snapshot 0.28s, restore-to-usable 11.6s, both families pinging with no loss, and the workstation with no route into any of it. The declaration layer implements the model in full — three positions a machine can be in, keyed on forwardability; gateways carrying the address the world sees them as; both address families; multi-homing; MTU; inter-segment policy. It is validated hard because the failures it prevents are silent: a private range on a public segment produces no error, the mesh simply never forms. Public segments are refused unless they use RFC 5737 or RFC 3849 space, and a range wider than the reserved block is refused too. 33 tests, all offline. The runtime implements less than the model, and refuses the difference. A scenario declaring gateways, published ports, policy, inbound deny or place is rejected at raise with every gap named. Raising it would produce a mesh that silently lacks what it declared, which is the fault this lab exists to catch — 04-ISSUES/003, where a firewall key is declared in five manifests and read by no code. Three bugs found by review and by running it, all of one family: The readiness check truthiness-tested incusOk's return. `exec … true` succeeds with EMPTY output, so every machine reported unreachable while incus exec on it worked perfectly. succeeds() now exists so the mistake is not available, and network delete had the same bug — it counted zero segments removed while removing them. list() split instance from machine on the last dash, so a machine called home-server absorbed half the instance id and destroy found nothing. Resources are now found by the metadata they carry, never by name. restore reported success in 0.79s while the machine's agent was still starting, so the next command failed. Both raise and restore now wait for usable and say how long that took — reporting the earlier number is transport reported as effect, which is the fault the lab is being built to find. Two incus behaviours worth recording. Its CLI reads a YAML definition from stdin when stdin is not a terminal, so a spawned command hangs until the timeout kills it and arrives with empty stderr — a failure with no explanation, on a command that works when typed. And it assigns a MAC at runtime without recording it in device config, so MACs are derived and set explicitly, which the guest needs anyway: it names interfaces by bus position, and matching by name configures the wrong one on a multi-homed machine. No build step; Node strips the types. The lifecycle has no unit tests because a fake hypervisor would assert that the fake behaves as expected, which is the shape of test this project exists to stop shipping. |