The base ruleset (ADR 0088) admits ssh, the bus and the registry and nothing else until the mesh
derives one, and the mesh derives one only where the filter module is assigned — which genesis
does and these beds did not. Without it the hub's WireGuard port stayed closed, no joined node's
tunnel formed, and every module dialling the anchor by its overlay name timed out fetching the
broker's certificate; the model-usage bed showed it as a login that failed for a role never made.
One name per thing, per the HQ glossary: the module/container/image/binary/repo
becomes mesh-controller, the seat the-controller, and the store+broker pair the
foundation (embedded base bundles, default template and example lock renamed with
their go:embed directives). No behaviour change — a pure vocabulary rename.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D6qtiYU3P9jk3pnAXyAFyx
Twenty-eight integration tests each carried their own copy of the same two helpers,
which pointed a manifest and the substrate bundle at whatever the lab's registry had
assigned. They now share two in the harness, and the difference is the point: ours is
rewritten to the ID the machine holds it under, and everything else is left exactly as
written so the machine pulls it.
**The substrate bundle is where the fiction was most load-bearing.** mesh-host's
`examples/substrate-first-node.lock` pins all three of its images at
`192.0.2.250:5000/…`, which is the address the lab's registry served from — it was
written for a target, and the target was the lab. Two of those are ordinary third-party
images and become the digests mesh-catalog's own postgres and lavinmq modules pin, so
the substrate's store and broker are literally the images the mesh runs. mesh-control
exists in no registry at all and becomes the ID the machine was handed. **The bundle
itself should be fixed in mesh-host and this substitution deleted with it.**
Beds that wrote a manifest by hand named an image by repository and let the rewrite
supply a digest. There is nothing to supply one now, so `onTheMachine` refuses an
unpinned reference and hands back the digest the catalogue pins — a bed runs the image
the mesh ships, and a bed that drifts from the catalogue is testing a different
postgres.
Three beds took a third-party image out of the raised list, which no longer contains
one: certificates (pebble), objectstore (minio and its client) and provisioner
(postgres) now name theirs and pull it. builds and mesh publish into the MESH's own
artifact store — the `registry` module's image, on the node, on 5000 — rather than into
scenery the lab raised. That is a different claim, and only one of them exists in
production.
New unit tests cover what a full raise would otherwise be the only way to check: the
routes an egress machine gets (that its gateway is still the path to the rest of the
scenario, that a range with no path is unreachable rather than leaked to the uplink,
that each family gets its own next hop), which machine is handed which of our images,
and the `images:` rule that refuses a third-party entry. The "shipped scenarios are
valid" test now loads every scenario rather than two of them.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
Two-node: substrate broker on anchor, lavinmq provider + amqp-ping consumer on laptop. The
consumer gets its scoped vhost+user, connects, and round-trips a message. Requires the
mesh-control require-only-mint fix. Diagnostic removed now it's green. SUITE_EXIT=0.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
The lavinmq AMQP provider comes up and serves, but its receives file has given:[] — the
consumer amqp-ping (requires amqp, contributes nothing, as a parameterless provision like
redis-cache takes no per-consumer payload) is never minted a credential, so the provisioner
creates no vhost. Diagnostic in the test dumps the empty grants file + the provisioner log.
This is the resolve/plan mint path (grantsFor -> SecretsFrom), ADR 0048 territory, and it
likely affects redis-cache consumers the same way. Preserved for a focused fix; not merged.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
A lavinmq provider and an amqp-ping consumer ride laptop while the
substrate's own broker owns 5672 on anchor — the twin of two-node-db.
lavinmq is the mesh's control broker AND a user-facing capability, so a
provider must publish 5672 for its consumers and cannot share a node
with the control broker that already owns it; the split unblocks the
chain single-node.
The bed proves, layered: the run-once bootstrap computed the admin hash
and wrote the broker config before the broker started (ADR 0052); the
service and both runtimes are up and stable; each module got its scoped
broker account on the substrate broker; the provisioner created the
consumer's vhost AND user, both named for the derived login; and the
consumer connected to that vhost with the mesh-minted password and
round-tripped a message. The consumer uses ${bound:amqp:as} for user
and vhost both, and the provider's serves carries the port.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
jschoubben