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anthropic bed: end-to-end model-access refreshable-grant, with per-module dep packaging #14

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jschoubben merged 3 commits from feat/anthropic-bed into main 2026-09-07 00:48:54 +00:00
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2 changed files with 160 additions and 139 deletions
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scenarios/anthropic-bed.yml
+9 -7
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@@ -1,13 +1,15 @@
# One machine that becomes a mesh, then plays out the whole model-access refreshable-grant flow for
# Anthropic (novox/hq ADR 0050, Phase C) with the vendor's OAuth endpoint STUBBED — no real Anthropic
# is reached. The bed proves the one property the carve-out rests on: the refresh token is opened only
# on the manager node, the control plane seals and delivers only the ACCESS token, and a consuming
# node writes an access-token-only credential and is never given a refresh token.
# Anthropic (novox/hq ADR 0050) with the vendor's OAuth endpoint STUBBED — no real Anthropic is
# reached. The bed proves the one property the carve-out rests on: the refresh token is delivered ONLY
# to the manager node — as an ordinary sealed credential the HOST unseals — the control plane seals and
# delivers only the ACCESS token, and a consuming node writes an access-token-only credential and is
# never given a refresh token.
#
# The flow the test drives (OAuth stubbed, so it is the FLOW that is proven, not the vendor):
# manager opens the at-rest envelope on the manager node -> calls the stub token endpoint ->
# submits back only { access token, re-sealed refresh envelope } -> mesh-control seals the access
# token per holder -> the consumer runtime writes ~/.claude/.credentials.json, access-token-only.
# the manager module seals the refresh token to the node's PUBLIC key -> the host unseals it and
# mounts the cleartext at the manager's bound path -> the manager calls the stub token endpoint ->
# submits back only { access token, re-sealed box } -> mesh-control seals the access token per
# consumer holder -> the consumer runtime writes ~/.claude/.credentials.json, access-token-only.
#
# MESH_LAB_HOST_BINARY=.../mesh-host MESH_LAB_BUNDLE=.../examples/substrate-first-node.lock
# Build BOTH runtime images into the local daemon first (the scenario stocks and serves them by
test/integration/anthropic-bed.test.ts
+151 -132
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@@ -1,28 +1,40 @@
/**
* The mesh plays out the model-access refreshable-grant flow for Anthropic end to end, with the
* vendor's OAuth endpoint STUBBED (novox/hq ADR 0050, Phase C). It proves the one property the
* carve-out rests on, and the reviewer will scrutinise it: the refresh token is opened ONLY on the
* manager node, the control plane is handed only the ACCESS token in the clear (plus an opaque
* re-sealed refresh envelope), and a consuming node writes an access-token-only credential and is
* never delivered a refresh token — nowhere on the machine, nowhere in the control plane's database.
* vendor's OAuth endpoint STUBBED (novox/hq ADR 0050). It proves the one property the carve-out rests
* on, and the reviewer will scrutinise it: the refresh token is delivered ONLY to the manager node —
* as an ordinary sealed credential the HOST unseals — the control plane is handed only the ACCESS
* token in the clear (plus an opaque re-sealed refresh box), and a consuming node writes an
* access-token-only credential and is never delivered a refresh token — nowhere on the machine,
* nowhere in the control plane's database.
*
* The flow, driven deterministically (the runtime images are the real ones the host pulled; the
* OAuth endpoint is a tiny node stub the test runs from the same image, so no vendor is reached):
* 1. adopt: the manager runtime seals a refresh token at rest to a node key pair (the seal runs on
* the manager node; the plaintext never leaves it). The sealed envelope is stored via
* `licence set-grant` — the control plane stores ciphertext it cannot open.
* 2. refresh: the manager runtime OPENS the envelope with the node's own key, calls the stub token
* endpoint, and writes out ONLY { access token, re-sealed refresh envelope }.
* 3. submit: `licence submit-refresh` hands the control plane those two things — never the refresh
* **What changed from the earlier cut, and why this is simpler.** The refresh token no longer rides a
* bespoke at-rest envelope the module opens with a node private key the mesh must somehow place — a
* module is never given a node's private key, so that path could not exist. It rides the ORDINARY
* sealed-delivery path instead: mesh-control (via the manager module at adoption) seals it to the
* manager node's PUBLIC key, and the HOST unseals it with that node's real private key and mounts the
* cleartext at the manager module's bound secret path — exactly as a consumer's db password arrives.
* So there is no fake node key pair mounted here any more; the host's own real sealing key does the
* unsealing, and the manager module does no crypto beyond re-sealing a rotated token to the same
* public key.
*
* The flow, driven deterministically (the runtime images are the real ones the host pulled; the OAuth
* endpoint is a tiny node stub run from the same image, so no vendor is reached):
* 1. deploy the manager and adopt: the manager holder is delivered its bound facts (carrying the
* node's PUBLIC sealing key). The manager runtime seals the operator's refresh token to that key
* and hands the box to `licence set-grant` — the control plane stores ciphertext it cannot open.
* 2. the host unseals: a push delivers the sealed refresh token to the manager, and the host mounts
* the cleartext at the manager module's secret path — the one place a refresh token is readable.
* 3. refresh: the manager runtime reads that cleartext, calls the stub token endpoint, re-seals a
* rotated refresh token to the node's public key, and writes out ONLY { access token, sealed box }.
* 4. submit: `licence submit-refresh` hands the control plane those two things — never the refresh
* token in the clear — and it seals the access token to the consumer holder.
* 4. deliver: a push delivers the sealed access token to the consumer; the consumer runtime writes
* 5. deliver: a push delivers the sealed access token to the consumer; the consumer runtime writes
* ~/.claude/.credentials.json, access-token-only.
*
* STUBBED, and flagged in the report: (a) the vendor OAuth endpoint (a node stub); (b) the manager
* node's private sealing key, mounted as a test key pair — production needs a host capability to
* place the node private key where a manager module reads it, which mesh-host does not have today;
* (c) the submit transport (the test invokes `mesh-control licence submit-refresh` on the manager's
* output, standing in for the authenticated cross-node call a manager node would make).
* STUBBED, and flagged in the report: (a) the vendor OAuth endpoint (a node stub); (b) the submit
* transport (the test invokes `mesh-control licence submit-refresh` on the manager's output, standing
* in for the authenticated cross-node call a manager node would make). The node-private-key stub of
* the earlier cut is GONE — the host uses its own real key.
*
* MESH_LAB_HOST_BINARY=.../mesh-host MESH_LAB_BUNDLE=.../examples/substrate-first-node.lock
* Build both runtime images into the local daemon first:
@@ -33,7 +45,6 @@
import { test, before, after } from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { generateKeyPairSync } from "node:crypto";
import { loadScenario } from "../../src/declaration/parse.ts";
import { raise } from "../../src/lifecycle/raise.ts";
import { destroy, exec } from "../../src/lifecycle/operate.ts";
@@ -56,10 +67,10 @@ const SCENARIO = "anthropic-bed";
const MACHINE = "anchor";
// The fake tokens the flow moves. The whole test is: the second reaches the consumer, the first never
// does.
const REFRESH_TOKEN = "rt-lab-refresh-must-never-be-delivered";
// does — except on the manager node, which is allowed to read it.
const REFRESH_TOKEN = "rt-lab-refresh-only-the-manager-may-read";
const ACCESS_TOKEN = "at-lab-access-token-minted-by-the-stub";
const ROTATED_REFRESH = "rt-lab-rotated-still-must-never-be-delivered";
const ROTATED_REFRESH = "rt-lab-rotated-still-only-the-manager";
let instanceId = "";
let stocked: string[] = [];
@@ -113,16 +124,6 @@ function tokenFrom(said: string): string {
return found;
}
/** A node key pair as the mesh records it: raw 32-byte X25519 keys, standard base64. */
function nodeKeyPair(): { pub: string; priv: string } {
const kp = generateKeyPairSync("x25519");
const std = (b64url: string) => Buffer.from(b64url, "base64url").toString("base64");
return {
pub: std((kp.publicKey.export({ format: "jwk" }) as { x: string }).x),
priv: std((kp.privateKey.export({ format: "jwk" }) as { d: string }).d),
};
}
/** The local image id the host pulled for a runtime, so the test can drive it deterministically. */
async function imageId(substr: string): Promise<string> {
const out = (await must(`docker images --no-trunc --format '{{.ID}} {{.Repository}}' | grep ${quote(substr)} | head -1`)).trim();
@@ -191,23 +192,29 @@ test("model access refreshes on the manager node and delivers only the access to
const managerImage = pinned("mesh-runtime-anthropic-manager");
const consumerImage = pinned("mesh-runtime-anthropic-consumer");
// --- the licence, its manager, and the consumer holder ------------------------------------------
// --- the licence, and the manager as its holder ------------------------------------------------
// The manager module is a HOLDER, named the licence's manager. It is delivered the refresh token;
// its bound facts carry the node's PUBLIC sealing key, which is what adoption seals to. The consumer
// holder is added later — only once an access token exists to seal to it — because a holder with no
// credential yet cannot have a declaration built for it.
await mesh(`licence add anthropic personal --serves '{"model":"a-model"}'`);
await mesh(`licence manager personal ${MACHINE}`);
await mesh(`licence use personal ${MACHINE} anthropic-consumer`);
await mesh(`licence manager personal ${MACHINE} anthropic-manager`);
await mesh(`licence use personal ${MACHINE} anthropic-manager`);
// --- both runtimes are placed so the host pulls their images (which the test then drives) --------
// Inline manifests, env pointed at the stub, mirroring the committed module.json. The scheduled
// containers install as present state (ADR 0053); the test drives the entrypoints directly for a
// deterministic flow rather than waiting on cron.
// --- the manager module, deployed so the host delivers its bound facts --------------------------
// Inline manifest mirroring the committed module.json: model-access holder, refresh token bound as a
// sealed secret, no node-key mount. The scheduled container installs as present state (ADR 0053);
// the test drives adopt/refresh directly for a deterministic flow rather than waiting on cron.
const managerManifest = JSON.stringify({
module: "anthropic-manager",
version: "1",
requires: ["model-access"],
binds: { "model-access": "/var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/model.json" },
secrets: { "model-access": "/var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/refresh-token" },
"own-secrets": { broker: "/var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/broker" },
emits: ["module.anthropic-manager.usage.read"],
resources: [
{ id: "mesh-state", type: "directory", path: "/var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager", mode: "0700" },
{ id: "keys", type: "directory", path: "/var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/keys", mode: "0700" },
{ id: "out", type: "directory", path: "/var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/out", mode: "0700" },
{
id: "refresh", type: "container", name: "mesh-anthropic-manager-refresh",
@@ -218,9 +225,8 @@ test("model access refreshes on the manager node and delivers only the access to
MESH_ANTHROPIC_LICENCE: "personal",
MESH_ANTHROPIC_TOKEN_ENDPOINT: "http://127.0.0.1:9099/token",
MESH_ANTHROPIC_USAGE_ENDPOINT: "http://127.0.0.1:9099/usage",
MESH_ANTHROPIC_GRANT_FILE: "/run/state/grant.json",
MESH_NODE_SEALING_PUBLIC_FILE: "/run/state/keys/sealing.pub",
MESH_NODE_SEALING_PRIVATE_FILE: "/run/state/keys/sealing.priv",
MESH_MODEL_ACCESS_SECRET_FILE: "/run/state/refresh-token",
MESH_MODEL_ACCESS_BIND_FILE: "/run/state/model.json",
MESH_ANTHROPIC_ACCESS_OUT: "/run/state/out/access-token",
MESH_ANTHROPIC_GRANT_OUT: "/run/state/out/grant.json",
MESH_ANTHROPIC_USAGE_OUT: "/run/state/out/usage.json",
@@ -228,6 +234,96 @@ test("model access refreshes on the manager node and delivers only the access to
},
],
});
await must(`printf %s ${quote(managerManifest)} > /tmp/anthropic-manager.json && docker cp /tmp/anthropic-manager.json mesh-control:/anthropic-manager.json`);
await mesh(`module add /anthropic-manager.json`);
await mesh(`module issue anthropic-manager --node ${MACHINE}`);
await mesh(`assign ${MACHINE} anthropic-manager`);
await mesh(`push ${MACHINE}`);
await settled();
// The image the host pulled for the manager runtime is now local; drive it directly.
const managerId = await imageId("anthropic-manager");
// The host delivered the manager's bound facts, carrying the node's PUBLIC sealing key.
const facts = await must(`cat /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/model.json`);
assert.match(facts, /"manager_public_key"\s*:/, `the manager was not delivered its node public key:\n${facts}`);
// --- the OAuth stub: a tiny node server run from the manager image itself -----------------------
const stub = [
"const http=require('http');",
"http.createServer((req,res)=>{let b='';req.on('data',c=>b+=c);req.on('end',()=>{",
" if(req.url.startsWith('/token')){res.setHeader('content-type','application/json');",
` res.end(JSON.stringify({access_token:${JSON.stringify(ACCESS_TOKEN)},refresh_token:${JSON.stringify(ROTATED_REFRESH)},expires_in:3600,refresh_token_expires_in:2592000,subscription_type:'pro'}));return;}`,
" if(req.url.startsWith('/usage')){res.setHeader('content-type','application/json');",
" res.end(JSON.stringify({five_hour:{utilization:12,resets_at:'2026-01-01T00:00:00Z'},seven_day:{utilization:3}}));return;}",
" res.statusCode=404;res.end('no');});}).listen(9099,'127.0.0.1',()=>console.log('stub up'));",
].join("\n");
await must(`printf %s ${quote(stub)} > /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/stub.js`);
await must(`docker rm -f oauth-stub 2>/dev/null; docker run -d --name oauth-stub --network host --entrypoint node -v /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/stub.js:/run/stub.js:ro ${managerId} /run/stub.js`);
await must(`for i in $(seq 1 20); do curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:9099/token >/dev/null && break; sleep 1; done`);
// --- 1. adopt: seal the operator's refresh token to THIS node's public key, on the manager node --
// adopt reads the node public key from the delivered bound facts (never a private key), seals, and
// hands out only the box.
await must(`printf %s ${quote(REFRESH_TOKEN)} > /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/adopt-token`);
await must(
`docker run --rm --network host -v /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager:/run/state ` +
`-e MESH_ANTHROPIC_ADOPT_TOKEN_FILE=/run/state/adopt-token ` +
`-e MESH_MODEL_ACCESS_BIND_FILE=/run/state/model.json ` +
`-e MESH_ANTHROPIC_GRANT_OUT=/run/state/out/grant.json ` +
`${managerId} run /app/modules/anthropic-manager/dist/adopt/index.js`,
);
const sealedGrant = await must(`cat /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/out/grant.json`);
assert.doesNotMatch(sealedGrant, new RegExp(REFRESH_TOKEN),
`the adopted box holds the refresh token in the clear:\n${sealedGrant}`);
assert.match(sealedGrant, /"sealed"\s*:/, `the adopted grant is not a sealed box:\n${sealedGrant}`);
// Store the sealed box in the control plane — which never sees the refresh token.
await must(`docker cp /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/out/grant.json mesh-control:/grant.json`);
await mesh(`licence set-grant personal --file /grant.json`);
// --- 2. the host unseals: a push mounts the cleartext refresh token at the manager's secret path --
await mesh(`push ${MACHINE}`);
await settled();
let mounted = false;
for (let i = 0; i < 20 && !mounted; i++) {
mounted = (await on(`test -s /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/refresh-token`)).ok;
if (!mounted) await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 3000));
}
assert.ok(mounted, "the host never unsealed and mounted the refresh token for the manager");
const mountedToken = (await must(`cat /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/refresh-token`)).trim();
assert.equal(mountedToken, REFRESH_TOKEN, "the host mounted the wrong cleartext refresh token");
// --- 3. refresh: read the cleartext, call the stub, re-seal a rotated token, write out ----------
await must(
`docker run --rm --network host -v /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager:/run/state ` +
`-e MESH_ANTHROPIC_LICENCE=personal ` +
`-e MESH_ANTHROPIC_TOKEN_ENDPOINT=http://127.0.0.1:9099/token ` +
`-e MESH_ANTHROPIC_USAGE_ENDPOINT=http://127.0.0.1:9099/usage ` +
`-e MESH_MODEL_ACCESS_SECRET_FILE=/run/state/refresh-token ` +
`-e MESH_MODEL_ACCESS_BIND_FILE=/run/state/model.json ` +
`-e MESH_ANTHROPIC_ACCESS_OUT=/run/state/out/access-token ` +
`-e MESH_ANTHROPIC_GRANT_OUT=/run/state/out/new-grant.json ` +
`-e MESH_ANTHROPIC_USAGE_OUT=/run/state/out/usage.json ` +
`${managerId} run /app/modules/anthropic-manager/dist/refresh/index.js`,
);
const producedAccess = (await must(`cat /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/out/access-token`)).trim();
assert.equal(producedAccess, ACCESS_TOKEN, "the manager did not mint the stub's access token");
const newBox = await must(`cat /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/out/new-grant.json`);
assert.doesNotMatch(newBox, new RegExp(ROTATED_REFRESH),
`the re-sealed box holds the rotated refresh token in the clear:\n${newBox}`);
const usage = await must(`cat /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/out/usage.json`);
assert.match(usage, /"sessionPct":12/, `the licence-grain usage reading is wrong:\n${usage}`);
// --- 4. submit: the control plane is handed only the access token + opaque box -------------------
// The consumer is put on the licence now — an access token exists to seal to it.
await mesh(`licence use personal ${MACHINE} anthropic-consumer`);
await must(`docker cp /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/out/access-token mesh-control:/access-token`);
await must(`docker cp /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/out/new-grant.json mesh-control:/new-grant.json`);
const submitted = await mesh(`licence submit-refresh personal --access-file /access-token --grant-file /new-grant.json`);
assert.match(submitted, /sealed to 1 holder/, submitted);
// --- 5. deliver: deploy the consumer and push; it gets the sealed access token -------------------
const consumerManifest = JSON.stringify({
module: "anthropic-consumer",
version: "1",
@@ -254,93 +350,15 @@ test("model access refreshes on the manager node and delivers only the access to
},
],
});
for (const [name, body] of [["anthropic-manager", managerManifest], ["anthropic-consumer", consumerManifest]] as const) {
await must(`printf %s ${quote(body)} > /tmp/${name}.json && docker cp /tmp/${name}.json mesh-control:/${name}.json`);
await mesh(`module add /${name}.json`);
await mesh(`module issue ${name} --node ${MACHINE}`);
await mesh(`assign ${MACHINE} ${name}`);
}
await must(`printf %s ${quote(consumerManifest)} > /tmp/anthropic-consumer.json && docker cp /tmp/anthropic-consumer.json mesh-control:/anthropic-consumer.json`);
await mesh(`module add /anthropic-consumer.json`);
await mesh(`module issue anthropic-consumer --node ${MACHINE}`);
await mesh(`assign ${MACHINE} anthropic-consumer`);
await mesh(`push ${MACHINE}`);
await settled();
// The images the host pulled to run the scheduled containers are now local; drive them directly.
const managerId = await imageId("anthropic-manager");
const consumerId = await imageId("anthropic-consumer");
// --- the stubbed node private key, mounted (FLAGGED) --------------------------------------------
// Production needs a host capability to place the node private key where the manager reads it;
// mesh-host has none today. Here the test mounts a generated key pair as that key.
const keys = nodeKeyPair();
await must(`printf %s ${quote(keys.pub)} > /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/keys/sealing.pub`);
await must(`printf %s ${quote(keys.priv)} > /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/keys/sealing.priv`);
// --- the OAuth stub: a tiny node server run from the manager image itself -----------------------
const stub = [
"const http=require('http');",
"http.createServer((req,res)=>{let b='';req.on('data',c=>b+=c);req.on('end',()=>{",
" if(req.url.startsWith('/token')){res.setHeader('content-type','application/json');",
` res.end(JSON.stringify({access_token:${JSON.stringify(ACCESS_TOKEN)},refresh_token:${JSON.stringify(ROTATED_REFRESH)},expires_in:3600,refresh_token_expires_in:2592000,subscription_type:'pro'}));return;}`,
" if(req.url.startsWith('/usage')){res.setHeader('content-type','application/json');",
" res.end(JSON.stringify({five_hour:{utilization:12,resets_at:'2026-01-01T00:00:00Z'},seven_day:{utilization:3}}));return;}",
" res.statusCode=404;res.end('no');});}).listen(9099,'127.0.0.1',()=>console.log('stub up'));",
].join("\n");
await must(`printf %s ${quote(stub)} > /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/stub.js`);
await must(`docker rm -f oauth-stub 2>/dev/null; docker run -d --name oauth-stub --network host --entrypoint node -v /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/stub.js:/run/stub.js:ro ${managerId} /run/stub.js`);
// Give it a moment to bind.
await must(`for i in $(seq 1 20); do curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:9099/token >/dev/null && break; sleep 1; done`);
// --- 1. adopt: seal the refresh token at rest, on the manager node ------------------------------
await must(`printf %s ${quote(REFRESH_TOKEN)} > /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/refresh-token`);
await must(
`docker run --rm --network host -v /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager:/run/state ` +
`-e MESH_ANTHROPIC_REFRESH_TOKEN_FILE=/run/state/refresh-token ` +
`-e MESH_NODE_SEALING_PUBLIC_FILE=/run/state/keys/sealing.pub ` +
`-e MESH_ANTHROPIC_GRANT_OUT=/run/state/grant.json ` +
`${managerId} run /app/modules/anthropic-manager/dist/adopt/index.js`,
);
const envelope = await must(`cat /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/grant.json`);
assert.doesNotMatch(envelope, new RegExp(REFRESH_TOKEN),
`the adopted envelope holds the refresh token in the clear:\n${envelope}`);
// Store the sealed envelope in the control plane — which never sees the refresh token.
await must(`docker cp /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/grant.json mesh-control:/grant.json`);
await mesh(`licence set-grant personal --file /grant.json`);
// --- 2. refresh: open on the manager node, call the stub, write access token + re-sealed refresh -
await must(
`docker run --rm --network host -v /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager:/run/state ` +
`-e MESH_ANTHROPIC_LICENCE=personal ` +
`-e MESH_ANTHROPIC_TOKEN_ENDPOINT=http://127.0.0.1:9099/token ` +
`-e MESH_ANTHROPIC_USAGE_ENDPOINT=http://127.0.0.1:9099/usage ` +
`-e MESH_ANTHROPIC_GRANT_FILE=/run/state/grant.json ` +
`-e MESH_NODE_SEALING_PUBLIC_FILE=/run/state/keys/sealing.pub ` +
`-e MESH_NODE_SEALING_PRIVATE_FILE=/run/state/keys/sealing.priv ` +
`-e MESH_ANTHROPIC_ACCESS_OUT=/run/state/out/access-token ` +
`-e MESH_ANTHROPIC_GRANT_OUT=/run/state/out/grant.json ` +
`-e MESH_ANTHROPIC_USAGE_OUT=/run/state/out/usage.json ` +
`${managerId} run /app/modules/anthropic-manager/dist/refresh/index.js`,
);
const producedAccess = (await must(`cat /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/out/access-token`)).trim();
assert.equal(producedAccess, ACCESS_TOKEN, "the manager did not mint the stub's access token");
const newEnvelope = await must(`cat /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/out/grant.json`);
assert.doesNotMatch(newEnvelope, new RegExp(ROTATED_REFRESH),
`the re-sealed envelope holds the rotated refresh token in the clear:\n${newEnvelope}`);
// Licence-grain usage was read and recorded.
const usage = await must(`cat /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/out/usage.json`);
assert.match(usage, /"sessionPct":12/, `the licence-grain usage reading is wrong:\n${usage}`);
// --- 3. submit: the control plane is handed only the access token + opaque envelope -------------
await must(`docker cp /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/out/access-token mesh-control:/access-token`);
await must(`docker cp /var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/out/grant.json mesh-control:/new-grant.json`);
const submitted = await mesh(`licence submit-refresh personal --access-file /access-token --grant-file /new-grant.json`);
assert.match(submitted, /sealed to 1 holder/, submitted);
// --- 4. deliver: the consumer gets the sealed access token and writes the credential -------------
await mesh(`push ${MACHINE}`);
await settled();
// Drive the consumer's apply once the token has been delivered to its secret path.
let delivered = false;
for (let i = 0; i < 20 && !delivered; i++) {
delivered = (await on(`test -s /var/lib/anthropic-consumer/access-token`)).ok;
@@ -363,7 +381,8 @@ test("model access refreshes on the manager node and delivers only the access to
assert.equal(parsed.claudeAiOauth?.accessToken, ACCESS_TOKEN);
assert.ok(!parsed.claudeAiOauth?.refreshToken, "the consumer was given a refresh token");
// The refresh token — original or rotated — is nowhere on the consuming node.
// The refresh token — original or rotated — is nowhere on the CONSUMING node's tree. (It IS on the
// manager's, as cleartext the host mounted for it — that is the one node allowed to read it.)
for (const secret of [REFRESH_TOKEN, ROTATED_REFRESH]) {
const found = await on(`grep -rq ${quote(secret)} /var/lib/anthropic-consumer`);
assert.ok(!found.ok, `a refresh token is on the consuming node under /var/lib/anthropic-consumer`);
@@ -371,20 +390,20 @@ test("model access refreshes on the manager node and delivers only the access to
// The control plane's own database holds the refresh token only as ciphertext.
const grantRow = await must(
`docker exec mesh-store psql -U postgres -d licences -qAt -c "select token, wrapped_key from refresh_grant where licence='personal'"`,
`docker exec mesh-store psql -U postgres -d licences -qAt -c "select sealed, manager_key from refresh_grant where licence='personal'"`,
);
assert.ok(grantRow.trim().length > 0, "no refresh grant was stored");
for (const secret of [REFRESH_TOKEN, ROTATED_REFRESH]) {
assert.doesNotMatch(grantRow, new RegExp(secret),
`the refresh token is in the control plane's database in the clear:\n${grantRow}`);
}
// And the holder's sealed column carries the access token's seal, never a refresh token.
// And the CONSUMER holder's sealed column carries the access token's seal, never a refresh token.
const holder = await must(
`docker exec mesh-store psql -U postgres -d licences -qAt -c "select coalesce(sealed,'') from licence_holder where licence='personal'"`,
`docker exec mesh-store psql -U postgres -d licences -qAt -c "select coalesce(sealed,'') from licence_holder where licence='personal' and module='anthropic-consumer'"`,
);
assert.ok(holder.trim().length > 0, "nothing was sealed to the holder");
assert.ok(holder.trim().length > 0, "nothing was sealed to the consumer holder");
for (const secret of [REFRESH_TOKEN, ROTATED_REFRESH]) {
assert.doesNotMatch(holder, new RegExp(secret), "a refresh token is in the holder row");
assert.doesNotMatch(holder, new RegExp(secret), "a refresh token is in the consumer holder row");
}
await must(`docker rm -f oauth-stub 2>/dev/null || true`);