/** * Confirming a machine that says it can reach the outside actually can. * * **This is what the registry-reachability check became.** The old one proved that every machine * could fetch a manifest from the registry the lab raised inside the scenario — a real check of a * fake path, since no production mesh has such a registry. What a machine actually does is pull * from the internet, and that is now the thing worth proving before a raise says it is finished. * * The failure it exists to stop is the same one, in the same shape: `raise` returns, the caller * applies a foundation, the first pull fails, no node enrols, and the instance is left a bare * shell — with the cause several steps back and looking like a mesh fault rather than a lab one. * * Two things are checked, in this order, because they fail differently and the difference is the * whole diagnosis: * * - **A name resolves.** Without this the machine has a route and no way to use it, and every * pull dies inside the runtime saying it cannot look up a host. * - **The path carries.** A request to the registry every image ultimately comes from, over the * uplink, through whatever gateway sits in front of this machine. Any HTTP answer counts: what * is in question is the path, not whether Docker Hub likes us. */ import type { Scenario } from "../declaration/types.ts"; import { incus, incusOk } from "../incus/client.ts"; export class EgressError extends Error { constructor(message: string) { super(message); this.name = "EgressError"; } } /** The host every image is fetched through, in the end. Asked for, never pulled from, here. */ const UPSTREAM = "registry-1.docker.io"; /** * Confirm every machine declaring `egress` can resolve and reach the outside. * * Run after the routes and the firewalls, because that is the path a pull will take: a home node's * default is the uplink, its route to the rest of the scenario is through its gateway, and its own * filtering is in place. Checking earlier would prove something no pull relies on. */ export async function confirmEgress( scenario: Scenario, machineNames: Map, log: (message: string) => void = () => {}, waitSeconds = 120, ): Promise { for (const [machine, spec] of Object.entries(scenario.machines)) { if (!spec.egress || spec.at === "detached") continue; const name = machineNames.get(machine); if (!name) continue; if (!(await resolves(name, waitSeconds))) { // One repair, then a verdict. The uplink is the lab's own network and its DHCP server is // also its resolver, so the machine has been told the answer and may simply have nowhere // to write it — an image without systemd-resolved leaves `UseDNS=yes` inert. await pointResolverAtTheUplink(name); if (!(await resolves(name, 30))) { throw new EgressError( `${machine} declares egress and cannot resolve ${UPSTREAM}.\n` + ` It has a route out and no way to use it, so every image pulled from the internet ` + `would fail inside the runtime as a lookup error.\n` + ` The uplink's DHCP server is also its resolver; this machine has not taken it.`, ); } } const code = await reaches(name, waitSeconds); if (!code) { throw new EgressError( `${machine} declares egress, resolves names, and cannot reach ${UPSTREAM}.\n` + ` This is the PATH: its default route, the uplink, or the host's own forwarding. ` + `Every third-party image this machine needs is pulled from the internet, so anything ` + `applied to it would stop at the first container.`, ); } log(` ${machine} reaches the internet over its uplink (${UPSTREAM} answered ${code})`); // **Now that the path is proven, stop one dropped packet from costing a whole run.** // // The check above deliberately uses the uplink alone, because proving that path is the point // of it. What follows is a different concern: a bed runs for hours after this, pulling images // on four machines at once, and the uplink's resolver is a single server under exactly that // load. Three runs have died at a lookup timeout well after this check passed — not because // the path was broken, but because one query went unanswered. // // So the uplink stays first and keeps being used; public resolvers are appended behind it, and // the retry is tightened so a silent server costs seconds rather than the step. A broken uplink // still fails the check above, before any of this. await resilientResolver(name); // **And then prove it is STEADY, because one success proved nothing.** // // The check above is satisfied by a single answer, and that is how a machine resolving one // query in three passed it and then killed two installs twenty minutes later. What a run needs // is not "a name resolved once" but "names resolve reliably", and those differ by exactly the // failure that has cost the most time here. Consecutive, because alternating success and // timeout is the observed shape — a total count would pass on the same machine. const steady = await steadilyResolves(name, 5); if (steady < 5) { throw new EgressError( `${machine} resolves ${UPSTREAM} only ${steady} time(s) in five consecutive tries.\n` + ` It has egress and an unreliable resolver, which does not fail here — it fails later, ` + `inside a pull or a clone, as "could not resolve host" with the cause long out of view.\n` + ` The uplink's own resolver is the usual culprit and is deliberately last in the list; ` + `a machine still failing this has something wrong upstream of the lab.`, ); } log(` ${machine} resolves steadily (5/5)`); } } /** How many of `tries` consecutive lookups answered. Stops at the first failure. */ async function steadilyResolves(name: string, tries: number): Promise { for (let i = 0; i < tries; i++) { const said = await incusOk( ["exec", name, "--", "sh", "-c", `timeout 8 getent hosts ${UPSTREAM} >/dev/null && echo yes`], 20_000, ); if (said?.trim() !== "yes") return i; } return tries; } async function resolves(name: string, waitSeconds: number): Promise { const deadline = Date.now() + waitSeconds * 1_000; while (Date.now() < deadline) { const said = await incusOk( ["exec", name, "--", "sh", "-c", `getent hosts ${UPSTREAM} >/dev/null && echo yes`], 30_000, ); if (said?.trim() === "yes") return true; await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 3_000)); } return false; } /** * Any HTTP status at all, which is what "the path carries" means. * * Not 200: an unauthenticated `/v2/` is answered 401 by design, and a check demanding 200 would * fail on a machine whose network is perfect. */ async function reaches(name: string, waitSeconds: number): Promise { const deadline = Date.now() + waitSeconds * 1_000; while (Date.now() < deadline) { const said = (await incusOk( ["exec", name, "--", "sh", "-c", `curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' --max-time 15 https://${UPSTREAM}/v2/`], 40_000, ))?.trim(); if (said && /^[1-5][0-9]{2}$/.test(said)) return said; await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 5_000)); } return null; } /** * Write a resolver of last resort: the uplink's own gateway, which serves DHCP and DNS both. * * Deliberately the machine's default next hop rather than a name looked up somewhere — for a * machine with egress that is the uplink by construction, since every scenario range is routed * explicitly and nothing else defaults. */ /** * Give the machine's uplink more than one resolver, through the thing that owns resolvers. * * **Not by writing /etc/resolv.conf**, which was the first attempt and was wrong: on these images * that path is a symlink managed by systemd-resolved, so a file written over it is either reverted * or breaks the link. Checked on a running machine rather than assumed. * * The shape of the problem is visible in `resolvectl status`: the machine has sensible global * fallbacks, and the *link* carrying the default route has exactly one server — the uplink gateway. * resolved will not reach for a global fallback while the link it is using has a server of its own, * so one unanswered packet is one failed lookup. * * **The uplink goes last, and this is a preference, not a fix.** The uplink's resolver is a single * dnsmasq with no unique knowledge any scenario machine needs — machines here address each other by * address, and the mesh writes its own names into /etc/hosts — so there is no reason for anything * to wait on it. It is kept, last, so DHCP-supplied names still answer. * * **It is written down as a preference because it was once mistaken for the cure.** Lookups were * timing out two times in three; the uplink was first in the list; reordering it made five in five; * the conclusion drew itself and was wrong. The machines were sharing ONE DHCP lease (see * `distinguishMachines` in raise.ts), so which machine could resolve anything depended on which had * last won an ARP race — and reordering resolvers on a machine that has just won looks exactly like * a fix. Nothing below this line will save a bed whose machines share an address. * * The caches are flushed afterwards, because resolved remembers the failures it collected while * the bad server was in front. */ async function resilientResolver(name: string): Promise { await incus([ "exec", name, "--", "sh", "-c", `link=$(ip -4 route show default | awk '{print $5}' | head -n1); ` + `via=$(ip -4 route show default | awk '{print $3}' | head -n1); ` + `if [ -n "$link" ] && command -v resolvectl >/dev/null 2>&1; then ` + `resolvectl dns "$link" 1.1.1.1 8.8.8.8 9.9.9.9 $via >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; ` + `resolvectl flush-caches >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; fi; true`, ], 30_000); } async function pointResolverAtTheUplink(name: string): Promise { await incus([ "exec", name, "--", "sh", "-c", `via=$(ip -4 route show default | awk '{print $3}' | head -n1); ` + `[ -n "$via" ] && printf 'nameserver %s\\n' "$via" > /etc/resolv.conf; true`, ], 30_000); }