jschoubben
94e617915c
It is the commonest home LAN range there is, so on an ordinary workstation the lab's private segment and the machine's own network are the same addresses. The scenario routes an egress machine explicitly and marks the rest unreachable, so nothing leaked — but that guard was carrying the whole weight of a collision nobody chose, and a guard is a bad place for that. 10.99.1.0/24 is still RFC 1918, so the bed still models a home LAN behind an access point. It is simply far from what this kind of machine already has: 192.168.1 is the LAN, 172.16-31 and 192.168.16-95 are container bridges, and 10.10/10.42/10.208 are a tunnel, the mesh overlay and the virtualisation daemon. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
32 lines
842 B
YAML
32 lines
842 B
YAML
# A machine on a routable address, and a machine behind a household connection.
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#
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# This is the case that only exists in production today: the second machine is reachable
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# from the first only through a forwarded port, at the GATEWAY's address, never its own.
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scenario: behind-nat
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segments:
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hosting:
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kind: public
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cidr: [192.0.2.0/24]
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home:
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kind: private
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cidr: [10.99.1.0/24]
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gateway:
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to: hosting
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address: [192.0.2.50] # what the world sees the household as
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nat: [v4]
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forwardable: true
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mapping_ttl: 120s
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machines:
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anchor:
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at: { segment: hosting, address: [192.0.2.10] }
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inbound: allow
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home-server: # a dash in the name, on purpose
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at: { segment: home, address: [10.99.1.135] }
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published:
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- { port: 8080, on: home }
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inbound: allow
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