jschoubben
5c91c0ecd2
Every scenario that places a container runtime gives each of its machines `egress: true` — a node that runs modules pulls images from the internet, which is what a node does. The underlay-only scenarios (bootstrap-single, behind-nat, segmented-and-unforwardable, the-ordinary-shape, two-on-a-segment) stay sealed on purpose: an extra NIC would change the very reachability they are asserting about. `images:` keeps only the mesh's own — 55 third-party entries leave whole-mesh-full alone, and the machine fetches them itself by the digest its module.json already pins. The whole-mesh beds also say per machine which of ours they get: novox the substrate control plane and its own fifteen runtimes, ace its twenty-four, the two workstations one each. That is not a lab economy. An operator's workstation holds the images its own modules need, and giving these two the union would put some thirty gigabytes onto a thirty-gigabyte disk. bootstrap-with-registry.yml is deleted. It existed only to demonstrate the lab's registry, nothing referenced it, and there is nothing left for it to demonstrate. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
46 lines
2.2 KiB
YAML
46 lines
2.2 KiB
YAML
# One machine that becomes a mesh, then plays out the whole model-access refreshable-grant flow for
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# Anthropic (novox/hq ADR 0050) with the vendor's OAuth endpoint STUBBED — no real Anthropic is
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# reached. The bed proves the one property the carve-out rests on: the refresh token is delivered ONLY
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# to the manager node — as an ordinary sealed credential the HOST unseals — the control plane seals and
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# delivers only the ACCESS token, and a consuming node writes an access-token-only credential and is
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# never given a refresh token.
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#
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# The flow the test drives (OAuth stubbed, so it is the FLOW that is proven, not the vendor):
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# the manager module seals the refresh token to the node's PUBLIC key -> the host unseals it and
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# mounts the cleartext at the manager's bound path -> the manager calls the stub token endpoint ->
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# submits back only { access token, re-sealed box } -> mesh-control seals the access token per
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# consumer holder -> the consumer runtime writes ~/.claude/.credentials.json, access-token-only.
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#
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# MESH_LAB_HOST_BINARY=.../mesh-host MESH_LAB_BUNDLE=.../examples/substrate-first-node.lock
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# Build BOTH runtime images into the local daemon first (the scenario stocks and serves them by
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# digest, which is where the host pulls them from):
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# scripts/build-module-runtime.sh anthropic-manager /tmp/anthropic-manager.tar
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# scripts/build-module-runtime.sh anthropic-consumer /tmp/anthropic-consumer.tar
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# (the tar output is incidental — the build also tags the image into the local docker daemon, which
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# is what raise() stocks.) The stub OAuth endpoint is a tiny node server the test runs from the
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# manager runtime image itself, so no extra image is needed.
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scenario: anthropic-bed
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segments:
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hosting:
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kind: public
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cidr: [192.0.2.0/24]
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machines:
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anchor:
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at: { segment: hosting, address: [192.0.2.10] }
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egress: true
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inbound: allow
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memory: 3GiB
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cpus: 2
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images:
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- mesh-control:development
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# The two model-access runtimes, built by scripts/build-module-runtime.sh into the local daemon and
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# loaded onto the machine, which holds them by their own image IDs.
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- mesh-runtime-anthropic-manager:development
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- mesh-runtime-anthropic-consumer:development
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place:
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all: [host, runtime]
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