jschoubben
5c91c0ecd2
Every scenario that places a container runtime gives each of its machines `egress: true` — a node that runs modules pulls images from the internet, which is what a node does. The underlay-only scenarios (bootstrap-single, behind-nat, segmented-and-unforwardable, the-ordinary-shape, two-on-a-segment) stay sealed on purpose: an extra NIC would change the very reachability they are asserting about. `images:` keeps only the mesh's own — 55 third-party entries leave whole-mesh-full alone, and the machine fetches them itself by the digest its module.json already pins. The whole-mesh beds also say per machine which of ours they get: novox the substrate control plane and its own fifteen runtimes, ace its twenty-four, the two workstations one each. That is not a lab economy. An operator's workstation holds the images its own modules need, and giving these two the union would put some thirty gigabytes onto a thirty-gigabyte disk. bootstrap-with-registry.yml is deleted. It existed only to demonstrate the lab's registry, nothing referenced it, and there is nothing left for it to demonstrate. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
25 lines
872 B
YAML
25 lines
872 B
YAML
# One machine serving a public name with a certificate from an authority it did not run itself.
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#
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# The lab keeps production's two-authority split rather than collapsing it (01-RESEARCH/004): the
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# mesh's own authority certifies `.internal` names, and a name reachable from outside is certified
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# by ACME. A single-authority lab would hide any fault living in that split, so this raises a real
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# ACME server and makes the proxy actually order from it.
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#
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# Pebble rather than a stub, for the reason the lab exists at all: what is under test is whether an
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# HTTP-01 challenge is answered at the name being certified, and a fake would be told to agree.
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scenario: a-public-name
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segments:
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hosting:
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kind: public
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cidr: [192.0.2.0/24]
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machines:
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anchor:
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at: { segment: hosting, address: [192.0.2.10] }
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egress: true
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inbound: allow
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place:
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all: [runtime]
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