messenger invoked seat:node-engine.root-free while nothing answered it, and Telegram held every ask that offers an
approval, silently. Nothing judged a seat:<seat>.<verb> invoke beyond its spelling: not that the seat exists, that
it promises the verb, nor that anything holds it.
Quick fix: messenger asks the controller's root-free (mesh-catalog bc271896) and the engine announces its seat as
discovery reads it (mesh-host 7ecf7ba). Thorough fix, chosen because an invoke nothing answers fails only at the
call, silently for whoever waits on it: CatalogueProblems refuses every seat verb a module or one of its processes
invokes whose seat no module declares and the mesh does not define, whose seat does not promise the verb, or whose
seat no module claims (a seat every node's engine holds, ADR 0563 §1, is held). Over some manifests alone a seat
whose holder was not given is a note (IsUndeclaredSeat). Over every manifest of mesh-catalog, mesh-control and
mesh-delivery today it refuses nothing.
Since 13:25 the vault, the assigner, the watchman, the grants part and the artifact store's tools were refused
mesh-controller.lease, and the vault mesh-grants.accounts, though the composer names them those states' readers
(ADR 0547 clause 9): the controller splits reads with its own copy of the reader-less ReadsAnnounced, which knows
no named readers, and Users only moved reads from granted to refused, never back.
Quick fix: the controller calls ReadsAnnouncedBy with the module. Thorough fix, chosen because the kind was met
on four owners and the judgement had two copies: Users judges every read again for its reader against the
announcements in Records (withAnnouncedReads), whatever split the caller made, and the reader-less
ReadsAnnounced is removed so no caller can judge without the reader. A rule over manifests was not added:
ADR 0495 clauses 1 and 5 keep readability out of the manifest and replaced the merge gate's reads check by each
module's announcement test. gitea.bound and disk-load.readings stay refused: their owners announce them not
readable, which their own code fixes.
mesh-grants' sealed grants and the controller's merge record each met "message size exceeds maximum" (JetStream
10054) only after the put, and a writer that retries looped on a value that can never land; an update over the
limit was even answered as a revision mismatch, which every compare-and-set writer retries.
Quick fix: cap the two values in their modules. Thorough fix, chosen because the kind was met twice and every
module writes through the SDK: the package kvlimit checks a value against its bucket's largest message (read from
its stream and kept) before the put, naming the bucket, the key, the size and the limit, and turns the bus's own
refusal into the same *TooLarge (errors.Is kvlimit.ErrTooLarge), so no writer retries it. The SDK's own writers
use it: process.State (Put, Create, CreateTTL, Update), process.AwaitedBucket, the runtime state of a bundle
(stdio KeptState, against the module state's 256 KiB) and mesh-hand-compose. A value that can outgrow its bucket
is split over keys or kept in the object store with its name in the key.
PlansHeld holds a module whose build cannot be taken in or whose plan refuses, by composeEach's rule, and composes
every other module's plan; sealedFor gives a file the stand-in its own secret's file has (baserow on ace); shipsABundle
reads a built manifest's Bundles (nats on novox).
mesh/check being carried to af66ccb8335a on 1d9de5dbb63b | from 42988a734b3d | novox/mesh-sdk#137 in group fix/provisioner-reads-every-plan
The client V3 watches the seat's plans whole to bind a provider's consumers (ADR 0373); the grant gave each machine
only its own keys, so its watch was refused and no files were placed. Quick fix, chosen in a recovery: plans join
the buckets a client reads whole (references, never secret values). Thorough fix, queued: the client fills consumers
from the seat's provision keys (ADR 0570 clause 3) and plans go back to its own machine's keys.
mesh/check checking 6e7820395952 on 42988a734b3d | novox/mesh-sdk#136 in group fix/runner-carries-no-engine-state
Second meeting of the engine-state-in-runner kind (mesh-host_acts this
morning, mesh-host_health now); thorough: the runner never carries the
engine module. One predicate, Composed, keeps the engine out of the
placed loop (no user, no process, nothing carried); CarriedByRunner is
the one test of what the runner carries. The engine's grants stay the
node account's, its state created through Records.Engine.
mesh/check checking 9379e9a96ad4 on d0625eea3d11 | novox/mesh-sdk#135 in group fix/credential-forms-one-list
Second meeting of the credential-form list kind: the provisioner client's
own copy lacked "none" and refused every plan naming it, as the
controller's had before. Thorough: one list in mesh-sdk,
catalogue.CredentialForms and IsCredentialForm; provisions' forms are now
the catalogue's constants.
mesh/check checking 83cf97b690f5 on 0c99e847a2ae | novox/mesh-sdk#134 in group fix/memberships-shape
The grants part's old build wrote its wrapper for every membership, a held-back one too, with the unpublished
composition inside; the new part never rewrites such a key, so the decoder took the held-back membership as given.
It now reads a wrapper only when its published says published or unchanged. The codec's rows join the round-trip
test (mesh-sdk is over its unit budget). Review round 1 of issue 774's fix.
The grants part wrote its own wrapper into mesh-grants_memberships while the tool runner read the value as a bare
membership: novox's tool runner served no tool. EncodeGrantsMembership writes the bare membership;
DecodeGrantsMembership and BareGrantsMembership read it, still read the old wrapper for the transition, and refuse a
value naming no node or module instead of answering an empty membership.
Issue 774 (the bus login list, L3). Quick fix: write the bare membership in the grants part alone. Thorough, chosen:
one codec in mesh-sdk both sides use, because a hand-built test fixture agreed with the mistake and hid it.
NodeHealth.Root: each such account's verdict (healthy, unhealthy with its way to root, unknown while the setuid search
runs), the module and resource declaring it. NodeHealth.Contract: the engine's statement contract, so a reader tells an
engine older than the judging. Test: a row in TestTheControlRecordsReadTheirWritersValues, read back byte-equal.
NetworkPart.Targets: the hub's machine for "hub", the machine whose tunnel address is each resolver's; empty where the
part is the machine's own. Filled by the node-engine from its tunnel's peers. Test: a row in
TestTheControlRecordsReadTheirWritersValues, read back byte-equal.