A handler takes an event by returning and asks for it again by throwing;
any mesh/event answer but an error is taken. Written down in the README
where event handling is, with what follows for a handler: throw only when
the work was not done, and be safe to run twice.
Both SDKs added the handler before asking the runtime and kept it when the
runtime refused, so a module that asks again until it is taken (every Go
consumer does) ran its handler once per attempt for every event. A refused
subscribe now removes its handler; one the Go runtime did not answer in
time is kept, since the runtime may have bound it.
The hourly release let a mistaken bulk unassignment drain one consumer an hour
with nobody deciding. Per novox/hq ADR 0230 a consumer is retired (disabled,
marked, data kept) only after the same unasked set in five consecutive passes;
more than 3, or more than half of those held, waits for approve or reject.
Deletion is a separate act of a person, of a retired consumer only.
Issue 241 withdrew seven consumers in one pass; 0.1.10 refuses a file it
cannot read, and a file read whole that names nobody still withdrew
everybody. A pass that would withdraw more than withdrawAtOnce consumers
(1), or more than withdrawFraction (0.5) of those held, now withdraws
nothing and says so; while the mesh goes on not asking, one is let go every
releaseEveryMs (an hour). A consumer asked for again is kept.
The harness says 'secret not readable yet' when it cannot open a consumer's
sealed credential, which is true and ordinary on the first pass. It said it
4330 times in three hours on the control machine while two consumers were
never provisioned, because a permission the host will never grant reads
exactly like a file that has not arrived.
After about a minute it says so plainly instead, once and then rarely, and
names what to look at: who owns the file and who this process runs as. The
ownership itself is the controller's to fix.
0.1.9.
Two pull requests bumped 0.1.6 to 0.1.7 within four minutes of each other —
#18 (a module's state through the runtime) and #10 (a provisioner is told
what the mesh derived). Both built and both published @novox/mesh-sdk@0.1.7,
with different contents. The store kept the first.
So the toolchain installs a 0.1.7 that has no `derived`, and every module
compiled in it fails on a field main's source says is there. minio is the
first to hit it; novox's push is refused because of it.
A version is a name for one set of bytes. This takes the next one.
state(name) / stdio.State(name): get, put, delete, keys and watch over the
runtime's mesh/state verbs. A watch's handler is registered under the id it
is asked with, so its current values — which arrive before the watch is
answered — and its changes reach it and no other watch.
An optional holds() on the adapter is asked for every applied consumer
every minute; false applies it again. A backend that forgets what it was
given while the provisioner runs (hq issue 120) is healed within a
minute instead of failing its consumers in silence. Unable to ask is not
treated as loss. Adapters without holds() behave as before.
Per novox/hq ADR 0044/0045: the sdk holds only what rarely changes and
is shared across modules; per-module code (a client, tool impls, a
create-a-resource adapter) lives in the module.
Five areas, real and tested:
- contracts: the runtime shapes module code touches (grant, credential,
a mesh Interface, tool + envelope types) — not the manifest schema,
which the control plane owns.
- provisioner: the reconcile harness every provider shares (watch grants,
create via the module's adapter, seal + write the credential, remove on
withdrawal). A module writes only the adapter.
- tools: registerModuleTools + collectTools — the serving harness; tools
and their client live in the module.
- messaging: the Broker/Envelope/event contract over the mesh broker; the
concrete binding is provided by the hosting runtime.
- primitives: AES-256-GCM seal/unseal, semver, resolved-env access.
Compiles (tsc, NodeNext) and passes tests: sealing round-trip + wrong-key
rejection, semver, tool registration (a thrower is skipped not fatal), and
the provisioner creating then removing a sealed grant.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF
jochen
jschoubben