Design 29: versioning, provisioning and secrets on the bus

Versioning: additive is free; a breaking change is refused while callers are
bound, and the refusal names them, because the mesh already holds the uses
graph; a real break versions the subject, not the seat name, so the role
does not fork; binding is a recorded pin, not a drift to whatever is newest.
Semantic change stays open — no fingerprint sees it, and saying so beats
implying the check is complete.

Provisioning: a provisioner's create/remove/holds IS a serves protocol, so a
provision interface is a seat that also delivers a credential — which is why
design 26 already allowed that. The per-consumer resource is what stops the
two collapsing into one.

Secrets: sealed, so the bus is never trusted with plaintext — but sealed is
not enough, because a stream persists and a durable ciphertext is an archive
the day a key leaks. So a secret never enters a stream: core request/reply
only, and a declaration names a secret rather than carrying one, which is
0098's fetch-don't-store applied where carrying is worst. The vault's own
credential and the bus's own accounts are the two bootstrap exceptions,
resolved the way 0067 resolves the control plane.

Also rewrote the addresses paragraph, which was too compressed to follow:
on-bus addresses disappear because nothing stores them, off-bus ones are
untouched and still 0098's problem, and the bus's own address is the one
that cannot be a subject.
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@@ -183,12 +183,140 @@ not an outage for its callers — it is latency.
That difference is worth choosing on purpose. A dependency expressed as a provision must be
ordered; the same dependency expressed as a seat need not be.
## 8. Open
## 8. Versioning a protocol
**Protocol versioning.** A seat's protocol is a compatibility surface between modules that do not
know each other, and nothing here says what happens when it changes under callers already bound to
it. This is the first thing to answer and the one most likely to hurt in year two rather than week
one.
A seat's protocol is a compatibility surface between modules that do not know each other and are
deployed at different times. Four ways it can change, and they are not equally dangerous:
| change | example | detectable |
|---|---|---|
| **additive** | a new `accepts` subject, a new optional field | nothing breaks |
| **removal or rename** | `send` becomes `deliver` | yes, mechanically |
| **shape** | an optional field becomes required | yes, if shapes are specified |
| **semantic** | `send` starts meaning *queue for tomorrow* | **no** |
**Additive is free.** A seat may grow without a version, without re-registering a caller, and
without ceremony. Most change is this.
**A breaking change is refused while anyone is bound.** Registration computes a compatibility
fingerprint over the seat's protocol — its subjects and the shapes they carry. A registration that
alters the fingerprint while callers are bound is refused, **and the refusal names them**. The
mesh already holds the `uses` graph, so this is derived rather than declared, and it turns a
runtime breakage into a registration-time conversation.
**When a break is genuinely needed, the version goes in the subject, not the name.** The seat stays
one thing; `mesh.seat.<seat>.v2.<verb>` runs beside v1 and the holder serves both. A caller moves
when it is ready. Versioning the *seat name* was considered and rejected: it forks the role, so
"one holder" stops meaning one provider of the capability, and every document naming the seat has
to be found and changed.
**Binding is recorded, not inferred.** A caller declares `uses: telegram-sender` with no version,
and resolution binds it to the current one and records that — the same **pin** machinery
[design 27](27-a-module-requires-the-mesh-resolves.md) already uses when resolution had a choice
to make. Moving to v2 is a deliberate re-pin, so nothing drifts onto a new protocol because it
happened to be newest.
**Retirement is reported, never automatic.** When the `uses` graph shows nothing bound to v1, the
overview says it is retirable. The mesh does not remove it.
**And none of this catches a semantic change.** Same subject, same shape, new meaning: no
fingerprint sees it, and no check proposed here would. The defences are review, and pushing
meaning into shape wherever it can go — a required `channel` field is caught, a changed
interpretation of an existing one is not. Saying so is better than implying the fingerprint is
complete, because a team that believes it is complete stops reviewing for the case it misses.
## 9. Provisioning over the bus
Provisioning rides the bus, and the provider stops having an address.
| part of a provision | shape |
|---|---|
| the requirement resolving to a provider | the controller's, not the bus's |
| the grant reaching the provisioner | request/reply to a **role** |
| `holds` — the reconcile question, every minute | the same call, on a timer |
| `provisioned` / `deprovisioned` | events |
| the credential reaching the consumer | §10 — fetched, never carried |
A provisioner's interface is already three calls — create, remove, holds — which is exactly a
`serves` protocol. So **a provision interface is a seat whose protocol is those three**, which is
why [design 26](26-the-seats.md) already allows a seat to deliver a provision. The two concepts
were converging before this document; here they meet.
What stays different, and must not be unified away: a provision has a **per-consumer resource and
a sealed credential**, created and destroyed per consumer. A seat protocol has neither — it is a
role you send to. Collapsing them would mean pretending a database is a subject.
### Where addresses survive
"Where is it?" is two different problems, and the bus solves one of them completely and the other
not at all. Keeping them apart matters, because a reader who thinks the mesh no longer has
addresses will believe a class of bug is fixed when it is untouched.
**Something that is on the bus: the address disappears.** A host reporting in used to need the
controller's address — recorded somewhere, at some moment, and wrong as soon as anything moved.
Now it publishes to `mesh.seat.mesh-controller.report` and the bus routes it to whoever holds the
seat. Nothing anywhere records where the controller is, so nothing can record it *wrongly*. The
same is true of the builder, the catalogue, the telegram sender. This class is not mitigated; it
is gone, because the information is no longer stored.
**Something that is not on the bus: the address stays, exactly as before.** A module that requires
a database does not reach postgres over NATS — it opens a postgres connection, because postgres
speaks postgres and is not listening on any subject. Its credential contains a host and a port,
and no amount of subject addressing changes that.
So the fix for that second class is unchanged and is not this document's:
[ADR 0098](../../02-DECISIONS/0098-a-fact-a-provider-makes-at-first-start-is-fetched-from-it.md) —
fetch the fact where it is used rather than storing a copy — which is what
[issue 102](../../04-ISSUES/102-an-address-recorded-at-genesis-or-build-does-not-follow-the-nodes-ports/00-report.md)
is actually about. The bus makes that class *smaller* by removing every mesh-internal address from
it. It does not make it empty.
**And one address is irreducible: the bus's own.** A node has to know where the broker is before
it can use subjects for anything, so that one cannot be a subject. It is the addressing equivalent
of §10's bootstrap — the first thing cannot be found by the mechanism that finds everything else.
## 10. Secrets, and why they never enter a stream
Everything the vault does is request/reply to the `mesh-vault` role: mint, fetch, rotate. In that
sense it is as much on the bus as anything else.
**The bus is not trusted with a secret, and does not need to be.** A secret is sealed to its
recipient, so what crosses the bus is ciphertext only that recipient can open. The broker sees
that a secret moved, and to whom — metadata, which is acceptable — and never a plaintext.
**But sealed is not enough on its own, because a stream persists.** A sealed secret written into
a JetStream stream is a durable ciphertext sitting in the mesh's own storage, and the day a
sealing key leaks, that stream is an archive rather than a moment. So:
- **A secret travels on core request/reply, never through a stream.** No persistence, no replay,
nothing to exfiltrate later.
- **A declaration names a secret; it does not carry one.** Declarations are the state shape, which
*is* a stream — so the host fetches the secret from the vault at apply time, over the core path.
That is [ADR 0098](../../02-DECISIONS/0098-a-fact-a-provider-makes-at-first-start-is-fetched-from-it.md)'s
existing discipline — *fetched from it, not carried* — applied to the one payload where carrying
it is worst.
**The bootstrap, which is circular and has a precedent.** The vault makes every secret
([ADR 0113](../../02-DECISIONS/0113-the-vault-makes-every-secret.md)), including the bus's own
passwords. The vault is a module, and a module needs a bus account, whose password the vault
makes. Nothing can go first.
This is the shape [ADR 0067](../../02-DECISIONS/0067-genesis-is-a-pivot.md) already resolves for
the control plane: **genesis is a pivot.** The controller mints the handful of foundation
credentials itself, raises the store, the broker and the vault, and then the vault takes over and
mints everything from there — the same move as raising a temporary control plane and reinstalling
it as an ordinary module once the registry exists.
So there are exactly two things the normal path cannot make, both at genesis, both ending the
moment the mesh can mint for itself: **the bus's own accounts** (§the bootstrap argument in
[ADR 0117](../../02-DECISIONS/0117-the-bus-is-the-only-broker.md) — a provisioner is a module and
needs an account before it can run) and **the vault's own credential**. Any third exception is a
design failure, and naming these two is what makes a third one visible.
## 11. Open
**Semantic change has no mechanical defence** (§8). Recorded as open rather than solved, because
it is the residue of a question the rest of §8 answers and the part a fingerprint cannot reach.
**Whether a module may declare a seat it does not itself claim** — the contract as one thing, the
implementation as another, which is how two competing implementations would ever exist.
@@ -197,7 +325,7 @@ implementation as another, which is how two competing implementations would ever
an event's provenance is its meaning — but a consumer of `billing.order.placed` does depend on
billing existing under that name.
## 9. How it is checked
## 12. How it is checked
- **A manifest holds no subject.** A catalogue test: no manifest contains a string matching the
subject grammar. The rule is worthless if it is followed by convention.