Accept ADR 0053 and resolve issue 008 — provider contract implemented and proven

ADR 0053 accepted; adds the scope boundary the umami rework surfaced (credential
provisions vs data provisions — analytics' generated siteId return is left to a
separate decision) and records the lab proof. Issue 008 marked resolved: the sdk
harness and the four adapters are reworked, the symmetric seal removed, and
provider-uses-mesh-credential is green.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01LrgweAeERJYBg88c5cKDzF

02-DECISIONS/0053-a-provider-creates-the-credential-the-mesh-minted.md

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 ---
-status: proposed
+status: accepted
 date: 2026-09-05
 deciders: jochen
 reconstructed: false
@@ -93,14 +93,24 @@ consumer cannot learn is a name it cannot authenticate with.
 - The four current providers (redis, postgres, minio, umami) each lose their `generatePassword`
   + seal code and gain a `create` that takes the password it is given. Their teardown becomes
   "withdraw the login named `As`".
-- The symmetric `seal()`/`unseal()` primitive loses its only caller. If nothing else uses it,
-  it leaves with the provisioner; that is checked, not assumed.
-- **How this is verified:** a provider is assigned in the lab, a consumer is granted its
-  resource, and the consumer authenticates against the provider using only what the mesh
-  delivered — no `$MESH_SEAL_KEY` set anywhere, no `.credential` file written. The trail is the
-  consumer connecting; a provider that invented its own password fails it. This replaces the
-  audit-logger/redis lab beds' current use of a hand-set lab seal key, which existed only to
-  get the orphaned harness to start.
+- The symmetric `seal()`/`unseal()` primitive loses its only caller and leaves — checked, not
+  assumed: nothing else in the sdk or the catalogue called it, so it is removed with the
+  provisioner it belonged to.
+- **How this is verified:** redis is assigned as a provider in the lab, the contributions and
+  the unsealed password the mesh would deliver are put in its `receives` path, and a client
+  authenticates as that consumer with the mesh's password and gets PONG — where a provider that
+  invented its own password answers WRONGPASS — with `$MESH_SEAL_KEY` set nowhere and no
+  `.credential` file written. Proven: `provider-uses-mesh-credential` is green.
+
+**What this does not cover — credential provisions, not data provisions.** This decision is about a
+provision whose credential is a *secret the mesh mints* — a login and password (redis, postgres,
+minio). A provider that instead *generates* the thing the consumer needs, and that thing is not a
+secret — umami's `analytics`, where the consumer wants back a `siteId` umami assigned — does not fit,
+because a contract that returns nothing has no way to hand that data back. The seal-key fault was
+never umami's (it sealed no password; it returned a public id), so removing the seal does not break
+it further, and it still reconciles its sites off the mesh's contributions. But delivering
+provider-generated data back to a consumer is a *return path* the mesh does not have and this
+decision does not build — a separate shape, left to a separate decision.
 - Teardown beyond "remove the login" — data an object store leaves behind when a consumer
   leaves — is named by each provider's adapter, not by the harness, and is out of scope here
   except to say the contract must leave room for it.

04-ISSUES/008-provider-runtime-has-no-seal-key/00-report.md

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 ---
-status: open
+status: resolved
 opened: 2026-09-04
 located-in: [mesh-sdk, mesh-catalog]
-fixed-by:
-amended-design:
+fixed-by: mesh-sdk src/provisioner rework + redis/postgres/minio/umami adapters (ADR 0053)
+amended-design: 0053-a-provider-creates-the-credential-the-mesh-minted.md
 ---
 
 # A provider's provisioner seals with a key the mesh has no way to deliver — and does not need to
@@ -107,10 +107,29 @@ not per-provider surgery, and inherited correctly by every provider after them:
 
 This is proposed as ADR 0053, which defines the corrected provider contract, for ratification.
 
-## Open questions
+## Resolution
 
-- Does anything legitimate still use the symmetric `seal()`/`unseal()` primitive, or does it
-  leave with the provisioner?
-- On withdrawal the mesh drops the consumer from the contributions file; is "remove the login"
-  the whole of teardown for every provider, or does an object store (data left behind) need a
-  policy the contract should name?
+ADR 0053 was accepted and implemented on the branches this issue is fixed by:
+
+- `mesh-sdk` `src/provisioner/index.ts` now reconciles the mesh's `receives` contributions and,
+  per consumer, reads the mesh-minted password from the file the host unsealed, calling the
+  adapter to create the resource under the mesh's login. `$MESH_SEAL_KEY`, the symmetric seal,
+  `writeSealedCredential`, and the `*.grant.json` / `*.credential` files are gone. The symmetric
+  `seal()`/`unseal()` primitive had no other caller and was removed.
+- The four adapters (redis, postgres, minio, umami) were re-pointed at the new contract —
+  `create({ as, password, values })` / `remove({ as })`, returning nothing. minio's client gained
+  a secret-key argument so it sets the mesh's secret rather than generating one.
+- Proven in the mesh-lab: `provider-uses-mesh-credential` is green — redis creates the consumer's
+  login with the password the mesh minted, a client authenticates as that consumer and gets PONG,
+  with no seal key set anywhere.
+
+Two things were carved out deliberately, neither blocking:
+
+- **Data provisions are a separate shape.** umami's `analytics` returns a `siteId` umami
+  *generates*, not a secret the mesh mints, and a contract that returns nothing cannot hand that
+  back. ADR 0053 is scoped to credential provisions and says so; the provider→consumer return
+  path for generated data is left to a separate decision. umami compiles and reconciles under the
+  new harness; only that return is unaddressed, and it never had the seal-key fault.
+- **Teardown beyond "remove the login"** — an object store's leftover data — is each adapter's to
+  name (minio leaves a non-empty bucket for an operator rather than deleting a consumer's data),
+  not the harness's.