Issues 054, 055 — the debt adopting the store and broker leaves
054: the adopted servers bind 0.0.0.0 from genesis but the packet filter is installed later, so there is a window where they are open with only bootstrap credentials. 055: the servers bind on the control-node and the one-node bed cannot prove a consumer on another machine can reach them over the overlay. Both are follow-ups to issue 051's adoption (WBS Phase 3), tracked rather than rushed. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01D6qtiYU3P9jk3pnAXyAFyx
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status: open
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opened: 2026-09-16
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located-in: []
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fixed-by:
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amended-design:
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---
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# 054 — The adopted store and broker are open before the packet filter exists
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## Symptom
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Adopting the store and broker as ordinary modules (issue 051) needs them reachable by
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consumers across the mesh, so genesis now raises `mesh-store` and `mesh-broker` bound to
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`0.0.0.0` rather than to loopback as the foundation used to. The packet filter is a module,
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installed several steps after the store, the broker and the catalogue are already running.
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Between each server coming up and the filter being applied, both listen on every interface
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of the machine with only the genesis bootstrap credentials, and nothing drops traffic to
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them. On a control-node that faces the network while it is being adopted, that is postgres
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(bootstrap superuser) and a message broker open to anyone who can reach the machine, for the
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length of the install.
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## Why it matters
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The design's rule is that what a port is reachable from is decided by the firewall, computed
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from each module's `listens.from` — `mesh` for both of these. A rule enforced by nothing is
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indistinguishable from a wrong one, and for the duration of this window that rule is enforced
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by nothing: the thing that would apply it does not exist yet. It is the same window the ssh
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rule already reasons about ("reached over the network, before the private network exists"),
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but ssh is one guarded port and this is the mesh's whole store.
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The foundation used to sidestep this by binding the store to loopback — only the co-located
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control plane reached it — and adoption trades that away, because a module that adopts the
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container in place must declare the same bind, and the module has to serve consumers.
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## Open questions
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- Can a default-deny base filter (drop everything but loopback, established, and ssh) be
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applied at genesis, before the store and broker come up, and the mesh-scoped rules refined
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once the private network has addresses to name? The consumers that must reach the store
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(the catalogue) come up before the network step, so the `from: mesh` rule would have to be
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in place by then.
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- Or should the servers bind narrowly at genesis (loopback plus the container bridge) and
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widen only once the filter that protects them exists — accepting that a bind change is a
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recreate, so this would mean the store is recreated once during install?
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- Is the window acceptable as-is, given the machine is mid-bootstrap and the exposure matches
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what the pre-adoption `postgres`/`lavinmq` modules already had in steady state?
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+40
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---
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status: open
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opened: 2026-09-16
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located-in: []
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fixed-by:
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amended-design:
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---
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# 055 — The adopted store and broker may be reachable on the control-node only
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## Symptom
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The adopted `mesh-store` and `mesh-broker` bind `0.0.0.0` on the control-node. The
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co-located provisioner and control plane reach them over loopback, and a co-located consumer
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reaches them through the container bridge — which is what the one-node bed proves. A consumer
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on ANOTHER machine reaches a provider by its `.internal` name over the private network, and
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whether that path resolves to the control-node's bind is unproven: the one-node bed cannot
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exercise it, and no multi-node bed installs the adopted store or broker.
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## Why it matters
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Phase 3's stated goal is a mesh — of any size — that runs one postgres and one lavinmq. The
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whole point of a shared store and broker is that a module on any machine that is granted a
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database or a vhost can open it. If the adopted servers are reachable only on the machine
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they run on, a grant to a module placed elsewhere names an endpoint that machine cannot dial,
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and the failure surfaces far from here as a consumer that cannot connect.
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Before adoption this was a non-question: the store served the control plane alone and the
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`postgres` module raised a second server that published mesh-wide. Collapsing to one server
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means the one server has to be the mesh-wide one, reachable across the overlay.
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## Open questions
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- Does the mesh deliver the store and broker endpoint to a remote consumer as an address that
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consumer can dial — the provider's overlay address — rather than a loopback or bridge
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address meaningful only on the control-node?
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- Is a `0.0.0.0` bind on the control-node reachable over the WireGuard overlay from a joined
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machine, and is the packet filter's `from: mesh` rule enough to let it through?
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- What is the smallest multi-node bed that would prove a database granted to a module on a
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joined machine can be opened from there?
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