2026-09-16 23:44:59 +00:00
3 changed files with 155 additions and 3 deletions
@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
 ---
-status: open
+status: resolved
 opened: 2026-09-16
-located-in: []
-fixed-by:
+located-in:
+  - mesh-controller/cmd/mesh-controller/modules.go
+  - mesh-controller/cmd/mesh-controller/build.go
+  - mesh-catalog/modules/lavinmq/module.json
+fixed-by: mesh-controller multi-node/broker-reaches-over-overlay; mesh-catalog fix/broker-declares-amqps-port
 amended-design:
 ---

@@ -38,3 +41,64 @@ means the one server has to be the mesh-wide one, reachable across the overlay.
  machine, and is the packet filter's `from: mesh` rule enough to let it through?
 - What is the smallest multi-node bed that would prove a database granted to a module on a
  joined machine can be opened from there?
+
+## Diagnosis (2026-09-17)
+
+A focused two-node bed (`mesh-lab test/integration/adopted-store-cross-node.test.ts`, scenario
+`adopted-store-cross-node.yml`) puts the adopted broker on `anchor` and runs `amqp-ping` on the
+joined `node2`. It fails, and the cause is two-layered — the first fixed, the second the real one:
+
+1. **Firewall (fixed).** The adopted `lavinmq` module declared only `5672` in `listens`, not the
+   amqps bus port `5671`. mesh-broker's ports are published (DNAT'd → the nftables *forward* chain),
+   so with no `5671` forward rule the bus was dropped cross-node. Fix: the module declares `5671`
+   from `mesh` too (mesh-catalog `fix/broker-declares-amqps-port`). Confirmed: after it, `node2 ->
+   10.42.0.1:5671` (overlay) is OPEN and the forward chain carries `proto-dst 5671`.
+
+2. **The broker address is the genesis public one, not the overlay (the real bug).** The broker
+   secret handed to a module is built at `cmd/mesh-controller/modules.go:294` (and the builder's at
+   `build.go:231`) as `amqps://<acct>:<pw>@<known.Address>/`, where `known.Address` is
+   `MESH_BROKER_ADDRESS` — the genesis PUBLIC endpoint (e.g. `192.0.2.10:5671`). `amqp-ping` on
+   node2 therefore dials `192.0.2.10:5671`, which the firewall does NOT admit cross-node (it admits
+   the overlay `10.42.0.1:5671`), and times out "fetching the broker's certificate." Its grant
+   never completes, so the provisioner's receives file shows `given: []` and no vhost is minted —
+   the downstream symptom.
+
+The consumer already resolves the provider's `.internal` overlay name for its *provision* binding
+(`bound.at == anchor.internal`) — that half works. What does not is the *bus account* URL, which
+uses the public address for every module regardless of node.
+
+## Open questions
+
+- The broker URL for a module on a joined node should name the control-node's overlay address
+  (`<control-node>.internal:5671`), which resolves (via `--add-host`) and the firewall admits.
+- But genesis-time accounts (the builder, issued on the control-node before the overlay exists)
+  must keep a locally-reachable address, or genesis breaks. So the fix is conditional on the
+  target node being on the overlay, not a blanket switch — where is that known at `module issue`?
+- Should the control-node's own modules also move to the overlay name for uniformity, or keep the
+  local address they already reach?
+
+## Resolution (2026-09-17)
+
+A two-node bed (`mesh-lab test/integration/adopted-store-cross-node.test.ts`) proves it: a
+consumer (`amqp-ping`) on a joined node reaches the adopted broker (`mesh-broker`) on the
+control-node over the overlay, its binding names `anchor.internal`, its vhost is minted, and it
+holds the connection. Three things were wrong, now fixed:
+
+1. **The broker's amqps port was not in the firewall.** The `lavinmq` module declared only `5672`
+   in `listens`; the bus is `5671`. Published container ports are matched in the nftables *forward*
+   chain, so `5671` was dropped cross-node. The module now declares `5671` from `mesh`
+   (mesh-catalog `fix/broker-declares-amqps-port`).
+
+2. **The broker credential named the public address.** `module issue` and `builder issue` built
+   the URL with `MESH_BROKER_ADDRESS` — the broker's genesis public endpoint, which a joined
+   node's firewall does not admit. A new `brokerReachableAt` returns the broker as the target node
+   can reach it: a node on the overlay gets the hub's `.internal` name (fingerprint pinning makes
+   the host swap safe for TLS); a node not yet on the overlay keeps the genesis address, so
+   bring-up is unchanged (mesh-controller `multi-node/broker-reaches-over-overlay`).
+
+3. **The provider was not recomposed after the remote consumer arrived (operational).** A
+   provision secret is minted as a side-effect of composing the CONSUMER's plan; the provider's
+   grant list is a pure read of secrets already issued from it. So the provider's provisioner
+   learns of a cross-node consumer only when the provider node is composed again. Pushing the
+   provider node after adding the remote consumer mints the vhost. This is not a code fix — it is
+   an ordering the operator must follow, and its silent-failure edge is opened as issue 057.
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+---
+status: open
+opened: 2026-09-17
+located-in: [mesh-controller, mesh-host]
+fixed-by:
+amended-design:
+---
+
+# 056 — An adopted module assigned to a second node raises a second server
+
+## Symptom
+
+The store and broker are adopted in place ([ADR 0078](../../02-DECISIONS/0078-the-store-and-broker-are-modules.md),
+issue 051): genesis raises `mesh-store`/`mesh-broker` on the control-node, and assigning the
+`postgres`/`lavinmq` module there makes the module reconcile the already-running container instead
+of raising a new one. Adoption works *because the container is already running on that node*.
+
+Nothing stops the same module being assigned to a **second** node. On a node where no
+`mesh-store` is running, the applier finds no container by that name and raises one — a second
+postgres, a second broker. The whole point of Phase 3 — "one postgres, one lavinmq" — holds only
+by the convention that genesis assigns these modules to the control-node alone; it is not enforced.
+
+## Why it matters
+
+"There is one store and one broker" is stated as a property of the mesh, and a property enforced by
+nothing is indistinguishable from a wrong one. A single extra `assign` — the ordinary verb an
+operator types — silently produces a divergent second server holding none of the first's data, and
+consumers resolved to it get an empty store. The failure is silent and far from its cause.
+
+The exclusive foundation modules are the mesh's clearest case of "there is one of me," yet unlike a
+mesh-scoped seat, an adopted module carries no claim that the resolver would refuse a second holder
+for.
+
+## Open questions
+
+- Should `postgres`/`lavinmq` claim a mesh-scoped exclusive seat (the way `mesh-controller` claims
+  `the-controller`), so the resolver refuses a second assignment by the same mechanism that keeps
+  one controller?
+- Or should adoption be explicit — a module that adopts a foundation container declares it, and the
+  controller refuses to place it on a node whose foundation did not raise that container?
+- How is "one postgres, one lavinmq" checked, rather than assumed — in the resolver, in `status`, or
+  in a bed that tries the second assignment and asserts the refusal?
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+---
+status: open
+opened: 2026-09-17
+located-in: []
+fixed-by:
+amended-design:
+---
+
+# 057 — A cross-node consumer is provisioned only when the provider is pushed again
+
+## Symptom
+
+Adding a module that requires a mesh-scoped provision (a broker vhost, a database) on one node,
+and pushing that node, is not enough for the provision to be made. The consumer starts, cannot
+connect, and retries forever, while nothing says why. The provision appears only after the
+*provider's* node is pushed a second time — an action the operator has no signal to take.
+
+Observed while proving [issue 055](../055-the-adopted-store-and-broker-may-be-reachable-on-one-node-only/00-report.md).
+A consumer was assigned to a joined node and that node was pushed; the consumer came up but
+logged `amqp connection closed before the round-trip completed` on a loop. The provider's grant
+file listed no consumers (`given: []`), so its provisioner minted nothing. Pushing the provider's
+node again populated the grant, the vhost was minted, and the consumer connected on its next
+retry. No error was raised at any point — the only symptom was a consumer that never became ready.
+
+## Why it matters beyond the instance
+
+A provision secret is minted as a side-effect of composing the **consumer's** plan; the provider's
+grant list is a pure read of secrets already issued from it. So composing the provider *before* a
+new cross-node consumer exists — or never recomposing it — leaves the provider blind to that
+consumer. Co-located consumer and provider hide this: one push composes both. The failure is
+therefore invisible until the mesh is actually multi-node, which is exactly when it is hardest to
+diagnose, and it fails silently — the one shape [AGENTS.md](../../AGENTS.md) says belongs here.
+
+The rule "push the provider node too" is real and undocumented, and a rule enforced by nothing is
+indistinguishable from a wrong one.
+
+## Open questions
+
+- Should composing any node that adds or removes a cross-node consumer also recompose the
+  providers it now binds to, so a single push is sufficient? What is the blast radius of that?
+- Failing that, should composing a consumer whose provider is on another node *report* that the
+  provider must be pushed, rather than issue a grant no one will read?
+- A consumer that cannot reach its provision retries silently. Should a consumer that has waited
+  past some bound surface as un-ready in the mesh's own view, not only in its container log?
+- Does the same gap withdraw provisions late — is a provider told a cross-node consumer left only
+  when the provider is next pushed?