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hq/01-RESEARCH/016-how-a-credential-can-be-rotated/01-the-providers.md
T
jochen 942ebe350f Research 016: survey how each provider can rotate a credential
Overlap as drafted in 0113 would have deleted consumer data: seven of
eight providers name the resource after the login and five drop it on
remove. Rotation is now undecided in 0113 and to-be 27, pending the
survey. Also: a requirement naming a seat resolves to its holder, a
person chooses among remaining candidates at assignment, the controller's
secrets are requirements of its definition, genesis seals to the
control-node key, and moving the vault or broker is break-glass.
2026-09-26 00:14:23 +02:00

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Markdown

# 01 — The providers
Read from the catalogue's main branch: each provider's provisioner adapter (`create`, `remove`),
the client functions they call, and each definition's own credentials. The provisioner harness in
`mesh-sdk` calls `create` for a consumer when its contribution appears or changes, and after the
provisioner restarts, and `remove` when the contribution goes. Its record of what was applied is
kept in memory.
## The credential providers
`login` is the consumer's derived identity, which the adapter receives as `as`
([ADR 0049](../../02-DECISIONS/0049-a-consumers-identity-fits-the-tightest-backend.md)).
| provider | the consumer's resource is named | remove destroys | create re-applies the password | two secrets on one login | two logins on one resource |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| postgres | a database named `login`, owned by the role `login` | the database and the role | yes, `ALTER ROLE … PASSWORD` when the role exists | no: a role has one password | yes, both as members of one role that owns the database. Not done today |
| mssql | a database named `login`, with the login mapped into it | the database and the login | yes, `ALTER LOGIN … WITH PASSWORD` | no: a login has one password | yes, two logins mapped to users in `db_owner`. Not done today |
| mongodb | a database named `login`, with a user holding `dbOwner` | the database and the user | yes, `updateUser` with the new password | no: a user has one credential | yes, two users with `dbOwner` on one database. Not done today |
| redis | the key prefix `login:` on an ACL user named `login` | the user, **not** its keys | yes: `ACL SETUSER … reset … >password` replaces all of them | **yes**: an ACL user holds several passwords, added with `>` and removed with `<`. Today's `reset` discards all but the new one | yes, two users on one key prefix, once the prefix is not the login |
| minio | a bucket derived from `login`, and a service account whose access key is `login` | the access key and the bucket | yes, by removing the access key and adding it again | no, but an access key *is* the login: a second key is a second login | yes, two service accounts with one bucket policy. The access key is capped at 20 characters |
| lavinmq | a virtual host named `login`, and a user named `login` with permissions on it | the virtual host and the user | yes, the user is written again with the password | no: a user has one password | yes, permissions for two users on one virtual host |
| mosquitto | a client named `login`, with a role named for it on the topic prefix `login/#` | the client and its role | yes, the password is set when the client exists | no: a client has one password | yes, two clients holding one role, once the prefix is not the login. An MQTT client identifier still has to be unique per connection |
| gitea (npm) | a user named `login` on a team of an organisation that owns every package | the user; **packages survive**, because the organisation owns them | yes, the user's password is set on every run | no for the password; a user can hold several access tokens | yes, trivially: a second member of the same team |
## The other providers
| provider | answers with | credential |
|---|---|---|
| umami | a website, found by its public name | none. The site id it makes has no way back to the consumer today |
| cloudflare-dns | a public name derived from `login` | none handed to the consumer; its own API token is an operator value |
| showcase | a route | none |
| mesh-vault | custody: it records and withdraws sealed values in a ledger | it holds secrets; it makes none today |
## Each provider's own administrative credential
| provider | identity | how the backend takes it |
|---|---|---|
| postgres | a fixed superuser | from a file **only at first initialisation**. Afterwards the file is read by the provisioner to connect, and changing it changes nothing in the database |
| mssql | `sa` | from the environment at first setup. The image documents no file form, and the definition records that as a declared exception |
| mongodb | a fixed `root` | from a file **only at first initialisation**, when the data directory is empty |
| redis | the default user | from `requirepass` in a configuration the mesh renders, read when the server starts |
| minio | a fixed root user | from a file, read when the server starts |
| lavinmq | a fixed admin name | from the module's own secret, which its provisioner connects with |
| mosquitto | a fixed admin client | from the module's own secret, which its provisioner connects with; the broker's dynamic-security file holds it |
Every provider module also has its own bus account, an own secret, read at start.
## What the table shows
1. **Every credential provider already rotates in place.** All eight re-apply the password on the
same login each time `create` runs. The controller's `rotate` command relies on that: it replaces
the credential in the inventory and sends both ends in one push. Its own comments state the window,
between the provider applying and the consumer restarting, in which the consumer cannot
authenticate.
2. **Seven of eight name the consumer's resource after its login.** Only gitea separates them,
because an organisation owns the packages. A second login therefore has no resource of its own to
reach, and cannot share the first one's without the adapter granting it.
3. **Five of eight destroy the resource when they remove the login.** These are postgres, mssql, mongodb,
minio and lavinmq. In today's adapters, *retire a login* and *delete the consumer's data* are one call.
This is the fault the first overlap draft would have triggered.
4. **Only redis holds two passwords on one login**, and gitea through tokens rather than its
password. A rotation built on two secrets per login would work for one provider out of eight.
5. **Every backend can give two logins the same rights over one resource.** Group roles in postgres,
database roles in mssql and mongodb, permissions in lavinmq, a shared role in mosquitto, a shared
policy in minio, a shared key prefix in redis, a shared team in gitea. No adapter does it today.
6. **The administrative credentials have one party and a fixed name.** The provider module is both the
one that applies the credential and the only one that reads it. In postgres, mongodb and mssql, a new
value only takes effect through a command run with the old value. A restart changes nothing.
7. **A consumer's identity is already the resource's name.** The login is derived from the
assignment, which is a module on a node, so the current login and "the consumer" are the same
string today. A second login would need a new name. The resource can keep the one it has.