mesh/delivery-group group feat/sdk1 rejected: composed together: the checker's verdict at the members' heads (6b0f5a2e9397): integration: meshbuildgo/cmd/mesh-…
mesh/check failed: integration: meshbuildgo/cmd/mesh-build-go… | 68e7a2ddbfb9 on ee75d4327ce5 | judged by the candidate's mesh-build-go at 773f299aed81
mesh/check pass 019614aedc14 on fe7c5ccb64bf | unit 6028 run, 142 kept, 16 skipped | integration 6091 run, 174 kept, 25 skipped | over bound: unit, in…
With the controller gone nothing made the pair row of a new consumer: the vault minted only for a provider
handed to the provisioner (ADR 0349 clause 17's premise, that a holder filled the old way gets the controller's
value). A node composing its own now asks the vault for its credentials (own, ADR 0547 §2, ADR 0550 §5), so the
vault makes the first value of a shared or per-login provision for every holder, create-only (issue 1126; ADR
0570 §6). A remake or a rotation still waits while a holder is filled the old way. A credential asked of the
vault in mesh-provisioner's provisions starts a pass at once, one pass at a time, and vault_status answers each
provider and provision's last outcome as `credentials`.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcbgfJ9Gum47zkFKWRaovL
mesh/delivery-group group feat/1126-removal rejected: composed together: the checker's verdict at the members' heads (a523066f1791): integration: meshbuildgo/c…
mesh/check failed: integration: meshbuildgo/cmd/mesh-build-go… | 7f8701637f9d on 32c4c52261c4 | judged by the candidate's mesh-build-go at b82f7f676986
nox cleanup delete without --confirm deletes nothing; the vault refuses it
for its missing confirm alone and judges only a confirmed delete, and nox
records the warranting act only for that one (issue 1126 review 2).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcbgfJ9Gum47zkFKWRaovL
The controller is not placed (ADR 0590), yet the vault still answered a
caller named controller alone (accept), took its relay of who asked
(secret-ask, rotate's by) and sealed it the core's credentials. Those
branches and accept go with their tests; a node's account alone is never
minted or rotated here. The sensitive-verb judge now needs the act's verb to
be the vault's own, mesh-vault.<verb>, not any verb ending so (issue 1126
review 1).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcbgfJ9Gum47zkFKWRaovL
mesh-hand-acts records one what per act, so an approve of two consumers
could never be warranted. The judge reads each word of the act's what as a
name, and nox records one act listing the consumers (issue 1126 review 1).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcbgfJ9Gum47zkFKWRaovL
Each sensitive vault verb judges its own caller, and nox reaches the vault
as its machine's runtime, never as a person, so it could use none of them.
Before rotate, retire approve, cleanup delete and secret export nox records
the act through mesh-hand-acts (the vault verb as its verb, what it acts on
as its what) and names it as act; a refused recording calls the vault not at
all (ADR 0590 §8, issue 1126 review 1).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcbgfJ9Gum47zkFKWRaovL
move-asks copied the controller's record of asks into the vault's once;
the controller is not placed (ADR 0590) and nothing else calls it. move-in
stays: the node-engine calls it. The drift test names the node's own
composition now that the controller composes for none (issue 1126).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcbgfJ9Gum47zkFKWRaovL
The controller judged the operator's account for approving or deleting a
retirement, rotating a secret and exporting sealed copies; it is not
placed, and these verbs are reached through the mesh MCP server on each
machine. Each now answers the operator's account (person.<name>), or a
caller naming its own recorded hand act for that verb and subject, and
nothing else (ADR 0590 §8, issue 1126).
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcbgfJ9Gum47zkFKWRaovL
The controller ended by its unassignment and its lease key expired, so the
gate on a handed lease kept retirement, rotation and node-login rotation off
for good (issue 1126, A3). Drop the gate, the lease watch and the manifest's
read of mesh-controller.lease; vault_status no longer reports a lease.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcbgfJ9Gum47zkFKWRaovL
mesh-sdk now carries the hand acts that warranted a node's rotations as NodeLogin.Acts (ADR 0583 §2), so the vault's
own `acts` field beside the codec is gone: a used act is refused from the key's Acts, and a key written without them
keeps the ones recorded. The seat's tunnel takes all five fields; the wire table refuses an issue missing the machine's
tunnel key or the range as well. Built against mesh-sdk 4224665; mesh-vault stays at 134 unit tests.
(issue 774, 774/S43, 774/S46, review round 1b)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcbgfJ9Gum47zkFKWRaovL
Review round 1 found that redeem could never succeed: the vault's answers were not the shapes mesh-enrolment decodes.
- enrolment-token reads `sealed` (not `show`), so asking for the sealed token no longer mints a new one; it answers
delivery.EnrolmentTokenAnswer: at issue the bus address, its certificate fingerprint and the vault's signing key.
- Issue takes the machine's first tunnel (`tunnel`), keeps it beside the token and refuses a token whose Missing() is
not empty, so the sealed token is one a machine can use (ADR 0587 §3, insight 2026-11-02).
- node-account answers delivery.NodeAccountAnswer: the login, and the password sealed anonymously to the presented
raw X25519 key in base64, as the node-engine's SealingKey.Open reads it.
- A joining node's certificate is signed for the serving key presented at the redeem, only when the four presented keys
have the digest node-account recorded; the name comes from placement (ADR 0587 §6).
- rotate-node refuses a hand act that is not rotate-node of this node, keeps the act id in the node's node-logins key
(`acts`, beside mesh-sdk's fields) and refuses an id used before (ADR 0583 §2).
The enrolment test now calls the real tool handlers and decodes every answer into mesh-sdk's types, failing on an
empty field; it replaces the earlier enrolment test, so mesh-vault stays at 134 unit tests.
(issue 774, 774/S43, 774/S44, 774/S45, 774/S46, review round 1)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcbgfJ9Gum47zkFKWRaovL
The vault wrote its own copies of the NodeLogin key and the token; the node-engine and the grants part read them through
mesh-sdk's codec (delivery.EncodeNodeLogin refuses a key without its version, a login that is not the node's, a stage
without a rotation). It now writes and reads through that codec and builds the token with delivery.Token, so the shapes
are one (ADR 0583 §1 insight, ADR 0587 §3). Built against the group's mesh-sdk with a go.work outside the worktree; go.mod
still pins the earlier mesh-sdk, for the lead to re-pin.
(issue 774, 774/S43, 774/S46, 774/S49)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcbgfJ9Gum47zkFKWRaovL
The vault serves the verbs enrolment-token, node-account, rotate-node, node-account-confirm and abandon, keeps the state
node-logins, and says rotation-begun, node-account-ready and rotation-done (ADR 0587 §3, §5, §8; ADR 0583 §1-§7 and
insights; ADR 0561 §4, §5). Only mesh-enrolment asks the first two and sign for an enrolment; a rotation needs a hand act
read back from mesh-hand-acts by its id, runs one at a time with the bus node last, and is ready only when the loaded list
holds the new login and done when it lacks the old one. A node's login is handed to that node's engine alone, sealed to
the key it stated. The key of a node that leaves the placement is deleted. Accounts kept for an enrolment or a node are
marked and never retired as unwanted.
Subtasks 774/S43 to S50 in one commit: they share enrolment.go, noderotation.go, tools.go and the manifest, and could not
be cut apart without a commit that does not build. New tests: 3 unit functions (table-style flows) and the one
integration test of S50; mesh-vault stays at 134 unit and 2 integration tests, within the module budget of 500 and 50, so
none was merged or deleted. The integration test's player gained a mesh/ask answer.
(issue 774, 774/S43, 774/S44, 774/S45, 774/S46, 774/S47, 774/S48, 774/S49, 774/S50)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcbgfJ9Gum47zkFKWRaovL
A test that slept a fixed time and then asserted what a goroutine, process or
watcher did failed under the checker's load. Each now waits for its positive
evidence (a started baseline, a call counted, a state reached) within 30 s, and
the concurrency-limit tests meet at a barrier instead of overlapping by sleep.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcbgfJ9Gum47zkFKWRaovL
mesh/delivery-group group feat/judge-once rejected: composed together: the checker's verdict at the members' heads (5c42ba1fb5f3): integration: artifactstoreto…
mesh/check failed: integration: artifactstoretools/cmd/artifa… | 3e08301b27ea on 4b16c193f0fb | judged by the candidate's mesh-build-go at 8dd51540f73a
mesh/check being carried to b60138990b34 on dcf3950f7b07 | from 0e78909a75b9
Quick fix: the plan reader keeps the machine's one placement key for the answer, as it keeps each module's assignment (issue 1126, 2026-10-28); the second time one answer's reads per credential held own past the node-engine's 15 s.
Thorough fix (not here): the node-engine asks own only when a secret or a credential it composes from changed, and the assigner writes no want that is unchanged.
mesh-provisioner, mesh-config, mesh-issues and mesh-healers need KeptState.Follow; mesh-build-go, -image and -node the
retry of a state write the bus delivered to no one; claude-code asks.Condition; mesh-vault the credential forms list.
Each passes go vet, go vet -tags integration and go test on this pin, built with no go.work.
683fd547 and b7f87822 took every `broker-<id>` own secret for a bus account. mesh-controller's broker-address is the
bus's address (MESH_BROKER_ADDRESS_FILE, read by broker.FromEnvironment to issue enrolment tokens and credentials):
c1 would have refused to keep it, and it was counted among the "owed bus-account hashes" every minute.
A name is now a bus account when it is declared: `broker` or `provisioner-broker`, or the own secret of an account the
grants part wants, which it composes from the manifests' bus processes (what catalogue.ToolsBusSecret names). A
`broker-<id>` holding an account the controller issued before its want was heard is still hashed. Anything else is
kept as given, never refused, never minted over, never hashed and never owed. The mint path replaced only wanted
names already, so the address was never at risk of replacement there; the test now proves it.
Quick fix: except broker-address by name. Thorough fix: the declaration decides, for every name. Chose thorough.
Table rows: broker-address kept as given, not replaced, owed nothing; broker-nats-tools replaced by a minted account
once wanted and refused a plain value after. They fail on the previous code.
move-in's refusal "the vault already holds another value for ..." was an error's text, which the node-engine and the
controller could only quote. It is now an answer: `refused` with the reason holds-another-value and the held value's
record (generation, changed by, changed at, origin; never the value), `why` in words, and no read-back, so an
engine that does not read `refused` still fails as before ("answered with no read-back"). keepLocked's refusal is a
typed error (HeldAnother) whose text is unchanged for every other path.
Quick fix: a stable prefix in the text. Thorough fix: the fields. Chose thorough, as asked; mesh-host's
moveIntoTheVault has to read `refused` to use them.
The three random values kept before the vault judged them (own/novox/nats/broker-nats-tools,
own/novox/mesh-controller/broker-address and broker-management) are held, so minting refused them ("held already")
and their users stay off the bus. A value that is no account has no hash and logs in nowhere, so replacing it
breaks no login the grants part composed. When the grants part wants the user (every want is heard at the vault's
start), the vault now mints an account in its place, judged again under the store's lock, keeping the value it
replaces beside it. A held account is still never minted anew (ADR 0561 §4).
Quick fix: let an operator rotate the three by hand. Thorough fix: the mint path replaces any such value, so no
other one stays behind. Chose thorough.
own/novox/nats/broker-nats-tools (moved in today) and mesh-controller's broker-address and broker-management (moved in
from the controller's store) are random values, not the account JSON a bus user is hashed from, so the hash step says
"not JSON" and the grants part leaves those users off the bus. The controller made them (fixed there, c421629f); the
vault kept them, since nothing it keeps judged a covered name's value.
Quick fix: refuse a plain value in move-in. Thorough fix: keepLocked, which every way into the store passes, refuses
for any covered name (broker, provisioner-broker, broker-<binary>, which catalogue.ToolsBusSecret names) a value that
is no account, saying "not issued". Chose thorough: one rule where every value is kept.
pair.go kept its own copy of the forms a plan may name; the copy in the provisioner client went in #564, after it
refused plans naming `none` while the vault's copy took them. Quick fix and thorough fix are the same here: the vault's
constants are mesh-sdk's (catalogue.CredentialForm*), and a form is judged by catalogue.IsCredentialForm, so a new
form is added in one place. No new test: behaviour is unchanged, and the existing form tests pass on the shared list.
mesh-vault's mesh-sdk pin moves to 9379e9a9, the provisioner client's, the first with the list.
mesh/delivery-group group feat/774-l3-reland rejected: composed together: the checker's verdict at the members' heads (b48c90fea31f): integration: mesh-self-ch…
mesh/check failed: integration: mesh-self-check/cmd/mesh-self-check.TestTheSelfCheckWholeRunsOnTheBus: the run answered {Run:doctor-1793351737-1 At:20…
One commit with exactly the tree of the reviewed head 35b4509c0a, on main 12c2574c9d, so two compiled programs added and removed on the branch leave no trace in history (issue 1577).
jschoubben