The controller ended by its unassignment and its lease key expired, so the
gate on a handed lease kept retirement, rotation and node-login rotation off
for good (issue 1126, A3). Drop the gate, the lease watch and the manifest's
read of mesh-controller.lease; vault_status no longer reports a lease.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcbgfJ9Gum47zkFKWRaovL
mesh-sdk now carries the hand acts that warranted a node's rotations as NodeLogin.Acts (ADR 0583 §2), so the vault's
own `acts` field beside the codec is gone: a used act is refused from the key's Acts, and a key written without them
keeps the ones recorded. The seat's tunnel takes all five fields; the wire table refuses an issue missing the machine's
tunnel key or the range as well. Built against mesh-sdk 4224665; mesh-vault stays at 134 unit tests.
(issue 774, 774/S43, 774/S46, review round 1b)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcbgfJ9Gum47zkFKWRaovL
Review round 1 found that redeem could never succeed: the vault's answers were not the shapes mesh-enrolment decodes.
- enrolment-token reads `sealed` (not `show`), so asking for the sealed token no longer mints a new one; it answers
delivery.EnrolmentTokenAnswer: at issue the bus address, its certificate fingerprint and the vault's signing key.
- Issue takes the machine's first tunnel (`tunnel`), keeps it beside the token and refuses a token whose Missing() is
not empty, so the sealed token is one a machine can use (ADR 0587 §3, insight 2026-11-02).
- node-account answers delivery.NodeAccountAnswer: the login, and the password sealed anonymously to the presented
raw X25519 key in base64, as the node-engine's SealingKey.Open reads it.
- A joining node's certificate is signed for the serving key presented at the redeem, only when the four presented keys
have the digest node-account recorded; the name comes from placement (ADR 0587 §6).
- rotate-node refuses a hand act that is not rotate-node of this node, keeps the act id in the node's node-logins key
(`acts`, beside mesh-sdk's fields) and refuses an id used before (ADR 0583 §2).
The enrolment test now calls the real tool handlers and decodes every answer into mesh-sdk's types, failing on an
empty field; it replaces the earlier enrolment test, so mesh-vault stays at 134 unit tests.
(issue 774, 774/S43, 774/S44, 774/S45, 774/S46, review round 1)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcbgfJ9Gum47zkFKWRaovL
The vault wrote its own copies of the NodeLogin key and the token; the node-engine and the grants part read them through
mesh-sdk's codec (delivery.EncodeNodeLogin refuses a key without its version, a login that is not the node's, a stage
without a rotation). It now writes and reads through that codec and builds the token with delivery.Token, so the shapes
are one (ADR 0583 §1 insight, ADR 0587 §3). Built against the group's mesh-sdk with a go.work outside the worktree; go.mod
still pins the earlier mesh-sdk, for the lead to re-pin.
(issue 774, 774/S43, 774/S46, 774/S49)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcbgfJ9Gum47zkFKWRaovL
The vault serves the verbs enrolment-token, node-account, rotate-node, node-account-confirm and abandon, keeps the state
node-logins, and says rotation-begun, node-account-ready and rotation-done (ADR 0587 §3, §5, §8; ADR 0583 §1-§7 and
insights; ADR 0561 §4, §5). Only mesh-enrolment asks the first two and sign for an enrolment; a rotation needs a hand act
read back from mesh-hand-acts by its id, runs one at a time with the bus node last, and is ready only when the loaded list
holds the new login and done when it lacks the old one. A node's login is handed to that node's engine alone, sealed to
the key it stated. The key of a node that leaves the placement is deleted. Accounts kept for an enrolment or a node are
marked and never retired as unwanted.
Subtasks 774/S43 to S50 in one commit: they share enrolment.go, noderotation.go, tools.go and the manifest, and could not
be cut apart without a commit that does not build. New tests: 3 unit functions (table-style flows) and the one
integration test of S50; mesh-vault stays at 134 unit and 2 integration tests, within the module budget of 500 and 50, so
none was merged or deleted. The integration test's player gained a mesh/ask answer.
(issue 774, 774/S43, 774/S44, 774/S45, 774/S46, 774/S47, 774/S48, 774/S49, 774/S50)
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcbgfJ9Gum47zkFKWRaovL
A test that slept a fixed time and then asserted what a goroutine, process or
watcher did failed under the checker's load. Each now waits for its positive
evidence (a started baseline, a call counted, a state reached) within 30 s, and
the concurrency-limit tests meet at a barrier instead of overlapping by sleep.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NcbgfJ9Gum47zkFKWRaovL
mesh/delivery-group group feat/judge-once rejected: composed together: the checker's verdict at the members' heads (5c42ba1fb5f3): integration: artifactstoreto…
mesh/check failed: integration: artifactstoretools/cmd/artifa… | 3e08301b27ea on 4b16c193f0fb | judged by the candidate's mesh-build-go at 8dd51540f73a
mesh/check being carried to b60138990b34 on dcf3950f7b07 | from 0e78909a75b9
Quick fix: the plan reader keeps the machine's one placement key for the answer, as it keeps each module's assignment (issue 1126, 2026-10-28); the second time one answer's reads per credential held own past the node-engine's 15 s.
Thorough fix (not here): the node-engine asks own only when a secret or a credential it composes from changed, and the assigner writes no want that is unchanged.
mesh-provisioner, mesh-config, mesh-issues and mesh-healers need KeptState.Follow; mesh-build-go, -image and -node the
retry of a state write the bus delivered to no one; claude-code asks.Condition; mesh-vault the credential forms list.
Each passes go vet, go vet -tags integration and go test on this pin, built with no go.work.
683fd547 and b7f87822 took every `broker-<id>` own secret for a bus account. mesh-controller's broker-address is the
bus's address (MESH_BROKER_ADDRESS_FILE, read by broker.FromEnvironment to issue enrolment tokens and credentials):
c1 would have refused to keep it, and it was counted among the "owed bus-account hashes" every minute.
A name is now a bus account when it is declared: `broker` or `provisioner-broker`, or the own secret of an account the
grants part wants, which it composes from the manifests' bus processes (what catalogue.ToolsBusSecret names). A
`broker-<id>` holding an account the controller issued before its want was heard is still hashed. Anything else is
kept as given, never refused, never minted over, never hashed and never owed. The mint path replaced only wanted
names already, so the address was never at risk of replacement there; the test now proves it.
Quick fix: except broker-address by name. Thorough fix: the declaration decides, for every name. Chose thorough.
Table rows: broker-address kept as given, not replaced, owed nothing; broker-nats-tools replaced by a minted account
once wanted and refused a plain value after. They fail on the previous code.
move-in's refusal "the vault already holds another value for ..." was an error's text, which the node-engine and the
controller could only quote. It is now an answer: `refused` with the reason holds-another-value and the held value's
record (generation, changed by, changed at, origin; never the value), `why` in words, and no read-back, so an
engine that does not read `refused` still fails as before ("answered with no read-back"). keepLocked's refusal is a
typed error (HeldAnother) whose text is unchanged for every other path.
Quick fix: a stable prefix in the text. Thorough fix: the fields. Chose thorough, as asked; mesh-host's
moveIntoTheVault has to read `refused` to use them.
The three random values kept before the vault judged them (own/novox/nats/broker-nats-tools,
own/novox/mesh-controller/broker-address and broker-management) are held, so minting refused them ("held already")
and their users stay off the bus. A value that is no account has no hash and logs in nowhere, so replacing it
breaks no login the grants part composed. When the grants part wants the user (every want is heard at the vault's
start), the vault now mints an account in its place, judged again under the store's lock, keeping the value it
replaces beside it. A held account is still never minted anew (ADR 0561 §4).
Quick fix: let an operator rotate the three by hand. Thorough fix: the mint path replaces any such value, so no
other one stays behind. Chose thorough.
own/novox/nats/broker-nats-tools (moved in today) and mesh-controller's broker-address and broker-management (moved in
from the controller's store) are random values, not the account JSON a bus user is hashed from, so the hash step says
"not JSON" and the grants part leaves those users off the bus. The controller made them (fixed there, c421629f); the
vault kept them, since nothing it keeps judged a covered name's value.
Quick fix: refuse a plain value in move-in. Thorough fix: keepLocked, which every way into the store passes, refuses
for any covered name (broker, provisioner-broker, broker-<binary>, which catalogue.ToolsBusSecret names) a value that
is no account, saying "not issued". Chose thorough: one rule where every value is kept.
pair.go kept its own copy of the forms a plan may name; the copy in the provisioner client went in #564, after it
refused plans naming `none` while the vault's copy took them. Quick fix and thorough fix are the same here: the vault's
constants are mesh-sdk's (catalogue.CredentialForm*), and a form is judged by catalogue.IsCredentialForm, so a new
form is added in one place. No new test: behaviour is unchanged, and the existing form tests pass on the shared list.
mesh-vault's mesh-sdk pin moves to 9379e9a9, the provisioner client's, the first with the list.
mesh/delivery-group group feat/774-l3-reland rejected: composed together: the checker's verdict at the members' heads (b48c90fea31f): integration: mesh-self-ch…
mesh/check failed: integration: mesh-self-check/cmd/mesh-self-check.TestTheSelfCheckWholeRunsOnTheBus: the run answered {Run:doctor-1793351737-1 At:20…
One commit with exactly the tree of the reviewed head 35b4509c0a, on main 12c2574c9d, so two compiled programs added and removed on the branch leave no trace in history (issue 1577).
mesh/check pass a9d96b30be8d on 69056948bfa8 | unit 1639 run, 4201 kept, 46 skipped | integration 1674 run, 4215 kept, 47 skipped | over bound: unit, …
A watch that failed partway kept what it had taken; begun again, the runtime does not hand a key deleted meanwhile, so
a removed assignment read as standing and credentialRefusal could hand a consumer credential to a node no longer
running its module. Each attempt now begins from nothing held, and a late delivery to an older attempt changes nothing.
A 'not on the node' refusal is confirmed by a direct read first, since a watched mirror can be behind.
Seed-9's probe (13:31-13:36Z): novox's own of 57 secrets and 146 credentials took 26 s, past the node-engine's 15 s,
and ace and novox refused their whole shadow answer. own read the controller's assignment over the bus once per secret
and per credential (203 reads), read every record of every node, and synced the hand-out record once per value, under
the one lock every node's answers share.
Now the vault watches the assignments mirror (a watch, never a poll) and reads it from memory once caught up, over the
bus until then; one answer reads each module's assignment once; only own/<node>/ records are read; and every hand-out
of one answer is recorded in one synced write, none handed when it cannot be.
Quick fix weighed: a longer bound in the node-engine (VaultWithin). Thorough fix chosen: the cost grows with every
module and every node, and the lock is shared by every shadow answer and every apply.
move-in never replaces a value the vault holds, so where the controller made an own secret anew after the move, the
new value runs while the vault keeps the first. The verb own-take-running takes it from the node-engine of the machine
it is for, keeps the replaced value as the previous generation, raises the generation and says own-replaced without a
value; own_drift lists every own secret a node's shadow answer says another value of, mesh-wide. The module needs the
mesh-sdk head of fix/1126-seed-same-own-resync (delivery.OwnValuesDiffer, the seat's verb).
jschoubben