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Author SHA1 Message Date
mesh-admin ec909d3542 Merge pull request 'nodered: settings.json sits beside settings.js' (#187) from fix/nodered-settings-json-beside-settings-js into main 2026-09-30 16:32:15 +00:00
jschoubben 409fe7ef06 nodered: settings.json sits beside settings.js, which reads it from its own directory
#186 moved settings.js to /data for the image's health check but left
settings.json at /config; settings.js requires ./settings.json, so node-red
crashed at start. Both now mount under /data.
2026-09-30 18:32:11 +02:00
mesh-admin c91d12a11d Merge pull request 'nodered: mount its settings where the image's health check reads them' (#186) from fix/nodered-healthcheck-settings-path into main 2026-09-30 16:28:09 +00:00
jschoubben 82686e44f3 nodered: mount its settings where the image's health check reads them
The image's /healthcheck.js requires /data/settings.js, so with the mesh's
settings mounted at /config the container ran fine but reported unhealthy
forever. Mount the same file at /data/settings.js and point --settings there.
2026-09-30 18:28:05 +02:00
jschoubben 949f5f02c9 Merge pull request 'records: a phrase that wraps, and one under emphasis, is found' (#185) from fix/a-phrase-that-wraps into main 2026-09-30 16:13:47 +00:00
jschoubben 3b95d00afc records: a phrase that wraps, and one under emphasis, is found
The record is prose wrapped at a hundred columns; matched line by line, the first live search for a
sentence of ADR 0025 found nothing. A line is matched together with the next, emphasis marks are
ignored, and a hit still names the line it starts on.
2026-09-30 18:09:21 +02:00
mesh-admin cbf9e9b7a3 Merge pull request 'supabase: own secrets, and unique ids for its containers' (#184) from fix/supabase-own-secrets into main 2026-09-30 15:58:24 +00:00
jschoubben f476255284 supabase: own secrets, and unique ids for its containers
The manifest declared its secrets as secrets.secret.<name> and required a
"secret" provision, so the controller saw no own secrets and every accept
was refused (the influxdb defect of #180). The directories functions and
storage shared their ids with the containers of the same name, which the
host refuses as two resources with one identity. The containers are now
edge-functions and storage-api; the placed directories keep their ids and
paths.
2026-09-30 17:57:57 +02:00
jschoubben 6ad59540d4 Merge pull request 'records: the record is read where it is written' (#183) from feat/the-record-is-read into main
Reviewed-on: #183
2026-09-30 15:55:06 +00:00
jschoubben a4892d3ff6 Merge branch 'main' into feat/the-record-is-read 2026-09-30 15:54:54 +00:00
jschoubben 6512878eef records: the record is read where it is written
A module keeping a checkout of a repository of decisions, designs and issues from the git seat,
current on every announced merge and on a timer, answering records_search / records_read /
records_list / records_status / records_sync at the commit it read (novox/hq ADR 0025, ADR 0153).
The repository is a setting; it names no mesh.
2026-09-30 17:45:39 +02:00
mesh-admin 8a0ebe16a3 Merge pull request 'supabase: the self-hosted stack as one module, its secrets rendered into files' (#169) from feat/supabase-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 15:32:33 +00:00
mesh-admin 96fb441f30 Merge pull request 'baserow: placed directories, the database password from a file, and the build ace runs' (#170) from feat/baserow-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 15:32:13 +00:00
mesh-admin b8c701ec94 Merge pull request 'matrix: Conduit and Element, told their own name by the route' (#166) from feat/matrix-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 15:32:09 +00:00
mesh-admin 65ba4e6170 Merge pull request 'mosquitto, influxdb: the provisioner sees its grants where the mesh writes them' (#182) from fix/a-provisioner-sees-its-grants-where-the-mesh-writes-them into main 2026-09-30 15:19:37 +00:00
jschoubben 5b70ffd78f mosquitto, influxdb: the provisioner sees its grants where the mesh writes them
The received grants file names each pair secret by its HOST path. A sidecar
that mounts the placed grants directory at another path inside its
container sees mesh.json and not the secrets beside it — mosquitto's
provisioner reported ENOENT for a file that was there, and nodered's mqtt
step failed against a login that was never created. Mounted at its own
path now, as postgres does.
2026-09-30 17:19:33 +02:00
mesh-admin d3ebb01180 Merge pull request 'nodered: settings are files the mesh writes; editor locked with adminAuth; pin 5.0.7' (#149) from feat/nodered-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 15:06:39 +00:00
jschoubben 0020fa17cd Merge pull request 'mesh-console: the mesh's tools on the machine a person sits at' (#181) from feat/the-console into main
Reviewed-on: #181
2026-09-30 14:47:22 +00:00
jschoubben 22c6032144 Merge branch 'main' into feat/the-console 2026-09-30 14:47:11 +00:00
mesh-admin 36b35900a2 Merge pull request 'jackett: its config dir is placed, and its tools find their own key' (#150) from feat/jackett-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 14:40:49 +00:00
mesh-admin 9c97a8a134 Merge pull request 'icecast: its passwords are a file the mesh writes, not the image's environment' (#146) from feat/icecast-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 14:38:14 +00:00
mesh-admin 1bfedd2a9e Merge pull request 'unifi: placed data, mesh-assigned ports, an https route, its password as a file' (#148) from feat/unifi-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 14:38:12 +00:00
jschoubben 769f0724ca mesh-console: the mesh's tools on the machine a person sits at
The tool runtime's own client, mesh serve, started by the mesh on the credential it sealed to the
machine (novox/hq ADR 0152, design 34): invokes every tool, listens from the machine only, holds no
state. Checked with module check before it was ever registered (hq issue 148).
2026-09-30 16:20:06 +02:00
mesh-admin c227592e7c Merge pull request 'influxdb: its admin password and operator token are its own secrets' (#180) from fix/influxdb-admin-credentials-are-accepted into main 2026-09-30 14:19:02 +00:00
jschoubben 50ae89e718 influxdb: its admin password and operator token are its own secrets, so an existing instance's can be accepted
They came from `requires: secret`, minted by the vault — right for a fresh
setup (the image's INIT_* variables read them once), wrong for an instance
that already exists: setup is skipped, the minted values match nothing,
and the provisioner holds a token the server never issued (issue 100).
InfluxDB will not take a chosen token value, so the operator token must be
accepted from the instance (`secret accept ace influxdb admin-token`); the
password can be either. As own secrets both are minted for a fresh install
exactly as before, and accepted where the data already knows them.
Found migrating ace's influxdb.
2026-09-30 16:18:59 +02:00
mesh-admin 3ae63f10c5 Merge pull request 'mosquitto: its directories are placed, not stated, and it runs the build in use' (#144) from feat/mosquitto-placed into main 2026-09-30 14:14:13 +00:00
mesh-admin e7799529e4 Merge pull request 'influxdb: place its directories, hand secrets over as files, name its UI' (#152) from feat/influxdb-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 14:10:50 +00:00
mesh-admin b9068c67bc Merge pull request 'redis: place its directories and run the build in use' (#161) from feat/redis-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 14:10:48 +00:00
mesh-admin 4bf705fea7 Merge pull request 'mssql: place its directories and name the software's port, not a machine's' (#160) from feat/mssql-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 13:55:25 +00:00
mesh-admin 00893d4944 Merge pull request 'letta: placed state, a route, accepted keys, and a runtime that can log in' (#171) from feat/letta-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 13:55:23 +00:00
jschoubben a2b9a9a411 Merge pull request 'dnsmasq: pass the DNSSEC bit down from the validating upstreams' (#179) from fix/resolver-passes-the-dnssec-bit into main 2026-09-30 13:17:38 +00:00
jschoubben 9523105df4 dnsmasq: pass the DNSSEC bit down from the validating upstreams
A program that checks its resolver validates — Mailu's admin does, at
start — could not use the mesh's resolver, and the one it ships instead
knows no mesh name (novox/hq issue 171). proxy-dnssec copies the AD bit
from 1.1.1.1 and 8.8.8.8, both of which validate.
2026-09-30 15:17:34 +02:00
jschoubben 4449f44cf1 Merge pull request 'mailu: admin asks the machine's resolver, not Mailu's own' (#178) from fix/mailu-admin-asks-the-machines-resolver into main 2026-09-30 13:13:29 +00:00
jschoubben 47f6e7d78b mailu: admin asks the machine's resolver, not Mailu's own
admin is the one container here that reaches something by a mesh name:
the database, bound in database.env. A mesh name is answered by the
machine's resolver, which the runtime hands every container that does
not name its own (novox/hq ADR 0148); Mailu's unbound knows no mesh
name, and since the mesh stopped copying names into containers admin
could not find its database. The others keep unbound — rspamd needs a
validating resolver for DNSBL lookups and asks for no mesh name.
2026-09-30 15:13:25 +02:00
jschoubben 7ab522ba31 Merge pull request 'dnsmasq: answer a container's query, which arrives on the runtime's bridge' (#176) from fix/110-the-resolver-answers-a-container into main 2026-09-30 12:31:30 +00:00
jschoubben 204bfbbaf9 dnsmasq: answer a container's query, which arrives on the runtime's bridge
dnsmasq admits a query by the interface it arrives on when told interface=,
and by the address it is sent to when told listen-address=. A container's
query is sent to the machine's private address but arrives on docker0, so
interface=mesh0 dropped it silently on every machine (novox/hq issue 110).
Name the address, not the interface.
2026-09-30 14:31:26 +02:00
jschoubben e0c09f46b6 Merge pull request 'dnsmasq: the runtime is reloaded when its dns file changes, and may then be restarted safely' (#175) from fix/110-the-runtime-reads-its-dns into main 2026-09-30 12:22:10 +00:00
jschoubben e0faf012be dnsmasq: the runtime is reloaded when its dns file changes, and may then be restarted safely
novox/hq 04-ISSUES/110. The module writes the runtime's `dns` key and
deliberately ordered no restart, because a restart stops every container.
It also ordered no reload, and the key holds only for containers created
after the runtime next starts. On two of four machines the runtime
predated the file — one since August — so every container there was
handed a public resolver and no mesh name resolved, while everything read
as fine. The third machine works only because its runtime happened to
restart later.

The file now also sets live-restore, which the runtime reads on a reload,
and the module declares the runtime reloaded when the file changes (ADR
0102: reload, don't restart). A reload still does not make `dns` take
effect; what it does is make the one restart that key needs keep every
container running. That restart stays the operator's, once per machine,
and is harmless from the second time on.

The mesh restarts nothing here. Undeclared, the runtime's unit goes back
to the state it was found in (ADR 0118).
2026-09-30 14:22:03 +02:00
mesh-admin 1b19c79d63 Merge pull request 'postgres: the provisioner dials the port the mesh gave the store' (#174) from fix/postgres-provisioner-dials-the-port-it-was-given into main 2026-09-30 12:06:25 +00:00
jschoubben 4ec2ae1f7f postgres: the provisioner dials the port the mesh gave the store
MESH_PROVISION_POSTGRES named 127.0.0.1:5432 literally; the seat twin
(${seat:mesh-store:5432}) corrected it only on the machine holding the
mesh-store seat. On any other machine — ace, where the module provides
postgres-database without the seat — the twin is empty and the sidecar
would have dialled whatever else holds 5432 (HAL's postgres). ${port:5432}
is the machine port on every node; on novox the twin still says the same
6852, so nothing moves there.
2026-09-30 14:01:53 +02:00
jschoubben 9d716ed875 jackett: provide its Torznab API as jackett-api
sonarr, radarr, lidarr and bookshelf reached jackett as http://jackett:9117 (a HAL
container name) or https://indexers.zurag.be (its public route), typed into each app by
hand. The mesh has neither: an app now requires jackett-api and its downloads step writes
the bound address into the app.

Serves scheme, port and url-base; `at` and the machine port come from the binding. Mesh
scope, like sonarr-api: an indexer proxy shares no files with its consumers.

The pair credential is jackett's one API key. The mesh cannot mint it, so the operator
accepts it per consumer pair (ADR 0092), as #156 does for sonarr-api; a consumer's step
refuses a minted value and names the accept.
2026-09-30 13:05:36 +02:00
jschoubben 3c7aafdc21 nodered: its MQTT broker comes from the mesh
Node-RED's one broker node pointed at zurag.be:1884, where nothing listens. nodered now requires
mqtt-topic (asking for every topic: flows follow the devices' own) and a run-once `mqtt` step —
declared last, restarted when the binding, credential or settings change — points the mesh's broker
nodes at the bound broker through Node-RED's admin API with the module's api-token: the node the
step makes itself when none is named, or the ones an assignment names in `mqtt.brokers`. Only host,
port, TLS and the login change; the broker is asked first whether it takes the login; the deploy is
against the revision read ("nodes", so only that node restarts) and a digest makes a rerun a no-op.
A broker node nobody named is never touched. settings.js keeps `mqtt` and `topics` out of Node-RED.
2026-09-30 13:01:14 +02:00
jschoubben 1080f45012 mosquitto: a consumer's grant is the topics it asks for, and its binding says the port
mqtt-topic served nothing: with two listens the mesh could not say which port a consumer dials, so a
consumer had to type 1883 into its config. It now serves the MQTT listener's port (the machine's,
once assigned) and the scheme, so `${bound:mqtt-topic:port}` fills.

The provisioner confined every consumer to `<as>/#`, which leaves nothing for the consumers the
broker exists for: Home Assistant discovers under homeassistant/# and tasmota/discovery/#, and
Node-RED's flows follow the devices' own topics. A consumer now contributes `topics` (MQTT topic
filters) to its mqtt-topic requirement and is granted exactly those; with none, its own subtree as
before. Settings merge into contributions, so an operator narrows a grant per assignment. The role
is brought to exactly the wanted ACLs (stale ones removed), `holds` checks the ACLs too, and an
invalid list is refused, never quietly narrowed. Only the role named for the consumer is touched:
a client carried from the predecessor's password file keeps its own.
2026-09-30 13:01:14 +02:00
jschoubben 323ef9ec7e influxdb: provide influxdb-api, one mesh-made v1 credential per consumer
grafana's data source and Node-RED's influxdb nodes reached ace's
InfluxDB by a LAN IP or a public name nobody routes, with a credential
somebody made by hand. Now a consumer requires influxdb-api and is told
where it is, which org and default bucket it serves, and signs in with
the password the mesh minted for the pair.

The credential is a v1-compatibility authorization, made per grant by
the new provisioner: InfluxDB 2.x generates API tokens itself and
ignores one the caller sends, so a v2 token could only be accepted by
hand per pair; a v1 authorization takes a caller-chosen password (8-72
characters, the mesh mints 40) and reads/writes every bucket as a
database of its name over InfluxQL and line protocol. A consumer
contributes `access` (read, write, read-write) and, for writing, the
buckets; a missing bucket is made and never deleted. Only
authorizations named mesh_* and marked [mesh] are ever changed or
removed; anything else of that name is refused and left alone.

The org and default bucket are served facts the assignment's settings
set, reaching both the consumers and the provisioner's config.json.
2026-09-30 12:55:38 +02:00
jschoubben 8f459c7023 letta: placed state, a route, accepted keys, and a runtime that can log in
The module named /var/lib/letta, a layout no definition may carry (ADR
0112); state is now a placed directory holding the bindings and secrets.

letta had no route, while the server it replaces is reached by its public
name (a workflow calls it there). It now contributes one for its `web`
endpoint; reach is the assignment's.

The server needs an OpenAI key for agents on OpenAI models, and nothing
gave it one: `openai-api-key` is an own-secret, accepted from the
operator (a key someone chose, not one the mesh can mint). The
server-password is accepted the same way where a server already has
clients. Both, and the database password inside LETTA_PG_URI, stay in the
server's environment: letta 0.6.x reads settings from the environment
only, and its startup.sh starts an embedded PostgreSQL unless
LETTA_PG_URI is set - the declared reason now says so.

The runtime's tools never authenticated: the client sent only a Bearer
token, and 0.6.x's --secure mode checks X-BARE-PASSWORD ("password <it>")
and answers 401 otherwise. The client now sends both. Its password comes
from the runtime config file (the key client.ts reads first) instead of an
env-file, so the runtime container no longer carries a secret in its
environment.

Image: the same 0.6.8 image, now pinned by the index digest ace runs
rather than its amd64 manifest.

Verified: catalogue tests with MESH_CATALOGUE set; tsc -p tsconfig.json in
the mesh-tools build image. Throwaway containers: a fresh 0.6.8 with its
embedded PG and two blocks made through the API; stopped, copied, dumped
from the copy; restored (schema letta + vector pre-made by the superuser,
--no-owner --role, search_path set on the database as the original had
it) into a grant-shaped database on the postgres module's pgvector image
(PG17); started in this shape: alembic finds nothing to do, both blocks
are there, a wrong password is refused with 401, and the patched client
lists agents. Test containers and data removed.
2026-09-30 12:22:12 +02:00
jschoubben ac8556c590 baserow: placed directories, the database password from a file, and the build ace runs
The module named /var/lib/baserow and /services/baserow/data, a layout no
definition may carry (ADR 0112). State and data are now placed directories;
bindings and the grant's secret live in the placed state.

The all-in-one image's entrypoint honours DATABASE_PASSWORD_FILE (file_env
in /baserow.sh), so the grant's password is mounted rather than put in an
env-file, and "secrets-in-environment" is gone (ADR 0086). SECRET_KEY is no
longer minted: the image keeps it, and its JWT signing key, in the data
directory (.secret, .jwt_signing_key) and imports them on start, so a moved
data directory carries the keys its sessions and tokens were made with.
DISABLE_EMBEDDED_PSQL makes a missing grant fail loudly instead of starting
an empty embedded database.

BASEROW_PUBLIC_URL was http://localhost. Baserow answers only the host of
that URL - any other Host is looked up as a published builder site and gets
404, /api/_health/ included - so it is now https://${bound:route:name}
(depends on mesh-controller #149).

The runtime's tools could never have worked: its config was "{}", and the
client's Host override was silently dropped by Node's fetch, so calls by
container name would 404 even with credentials. The client now uses
node:http (which sends the Host it is given, with a Content-Length -
Baserow reads a chunked body as empty) and re-authenticates once when a
cached JWT is refused (access tokens last minutes, the runtime weeks). The
password is the accepted `admin` secret; the email is an assignment
setting merged into the same file, the host is the route's name.

Image pinned to the develop-latest build ace runs today (Baserow 2.3.4,
built 2026-09-18). The old pin (built 2026-09-04) is older than ace's data.

Verified: catalogue tests with MESH_CATALOGUE set; tsc -p tsconfig.json in
the mesh-tools build image. In throwaway containers of the pinned image: a
fresh embedded-PG instance with a user, workspace and 5-row table; stopped,
copied, dumped from the copy (start-only-db); restored with --no-owner
--role into a grant-shaped database on the pgvector image the postgres
module pins (PG17); started with this shape (root 0600 password file,
embedded PSQL disabled, copied data dir without postgres/): health 200,
the user logs in, the 5 rows are there, SECRET_KEY and the JWT key are
imported from the data dir. The patched client lists applications and rows
through the container name with the public Host, and recovers from a
refused token. Test containers and data removed.
2026-09-30 12:16:04 +02:00
jschoubben 62cecc8a2b supabase: the self-hosted stack as one module, its secrets rendered into files
ace runs Supabase under HAL as upstream's 13-container compose: a 2.2 GB
database (1.8 GB of it the dormant `novox` schema, 5.8 M rows in its largest
table), Kong at supabase.zurag.be, the pooler on 5433/6543. This is that stack
as a catalogue module, same images (the digests ace runs), same container
names so an assignment holds the running ones and a take replaces them.

The database stays inside the module. Supabase is a Postgres distribution: its
own image with pgsodium, pg_graphql, pg_net, vault and timescale preloaded, a
superuser (supabase_admin), a dozen reserved roles and a second database
(_supabase). A postgres-database grant - one database, one unprivileged role -
cannot hold it, so ace's data directory moves as a copy, not a dump/restore.

What HAL did by shell and environment the mesh now renders as files:
- kong.yml carries the anon/service keys and the dashboard login (owned by
  kong's uid 100), instead of an entrypoint that eval'd the environment;
- GoTrue reads a dotenv file (auth -c), PostgREST a config file, Vector its yml
  with the Logflare key in it, the database POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE and a
  jwt.sql rendered with the secret (owned by postgres, uid 105). None of these
  five containers has a secret in its environment.
- realtime, storage, meta, functions, analytics, studio and supavisor read
  their credentials from the environment only; each declares
  secrets-in-environment with the reason (ADR 0086).
- Upstreams are container names (supabase-db, supabase-kong, ...) instead of
  compose service names, which the mesh does not have.
- SITE_URL / API_EXTERNAL_URL / SUPABASE_PUBLIC_URL are
  https://${bound:route:name} (mesh-controller #149); on ace HAL rendered them
  as "https://supabase." - broken today.
- Vector reads the docker socket, as upstream does, but now includes only this
  module's containers instead of every container's logs on the machine.

Three things compose did that a declaration cannot, done as steps: a run-once
seed copies the image's /etc/postgresql-custom into the placed config
directory with cp -n (a named volume did that implicitly; never overwrites the
pgsodium root key), and two run-once gates wait for the database and for
Logflare, which compose expressed as depends_on: service_healthy.

The pooler bootstrap (pooler.exs) takes the tenant id and pool sizes from
settings.json, the module's one merge:json file, so ace keeps its tenant
"zurag"; and it repoints an existing tenant whose database host is not
supabase-db - HAL created ace's with host "db", which no longer resolves.

Secrets (vault, requires "secret"): postgres, jwt, anon-key,
service-role-key, dashboard-user, dashboard, logflare, pooler-vault,
key-base-a + key-base-b (concatenated: Phoenix wants 64+ bytes, a minted
secret is 40), openai. Three cannot be minted on any machine: anon-key and
service-role-key are JWTs signed with jwt, and pooler-vault must be exactly
32 bytes (AES-256-GCM, found in the bed). They are accepted. On ace every
secret the data already knows is accepted (all but key-base-a/b).

Not carried: Kong's 8443 and Logflare's 4000 on all interfaces (nothing
outside the module uses them); realtime's DB_ENC_KEY stays upstream's constant
(realtime deletes and re-seeds that tenant from its environment every start,
and the key must be exactly 16 bytes).

Verified: catalogue tests with MESH_CATALOGUE pointed here on mesh-controller
main and #149 (on main the render is refused for "name", never written
empty). The #149 resolution with stub providers, turned into a throwaway
stack of all 13 pinned digests with dummy secrets and the rendered files at
their owners and modes: the database initialised through the rendered scripts
(jwt setting applied, _analytics/_supavisor created, roles' password from
POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE); through Kong: REST 200 with the anon key and 401
without, auth health and settings 200, storage buckets 200, GraphQL 200, pg-meta
200, an edge function 200, Studio 401 without and 200 with the dashboard login,
realtime tenant health 200; the pooler in session and transaction mode as
postgres.zurag; a tenant set to host "db" was repointed to supabase-db by the
bootstrap and connections worked.
2026-09-30 12:12:27 +02:00
jschoubben 157fab5dc8 matrix: Conduit and Element, told their own name by the route
ace runs a Conduit homeserver (matrix.zurag.be, 5.4 GB of RocksDB, federating)
and Element Web under HAL, configured by environment with the domain
templated in, and Element's config.json carrying matrix.zurag.be literally.

A homeserver's server_name is its permanent identity - every user id, room id
and signature in the database carries it - and it is the name the module is
served under. So it comes from ${bound:route:name-homeserver} (mesh-controller
#149), rendered into a conduit.toml the container reads through CONDUIT_CONFIG,
and into Element's config.json (base_url, default_server_name, the room
directory). Without #149 the render is refused ("name-homeserver"), never
written empty. Two routes, one per endpoint: homeserver (label matrix, 6167)
and element (label element, 80).

Federation needs no 8448: Conduit answers /.well-known/matrix/server with
<name>:443, so peers federate through the route. HAL published 8448 on all
interfaces, but the router never forwarded it; checked from outside, the
well-known, federation version and client versions all answer on 443.

Registration defaults to off. HAL ran with CONDUIT_ALLOW_REGISTRATION=true,
which on ace means anyone on the internet can create an account with the
dummy flow (seen: /register offers m.login.dummy) - on 0.10.13, whose
successor 0.10.14 fixes an account-takeover by any local user. Existing
accounts are unaffected; the operator decides whether to reopen it.

Element's config.json is the one merge:json file (it tolerates `endpoints`),
so a machine can add keys. HAL's map_style_url is not carried: it embedded
a map-tile API key, which belongs in an assignment if wanted.

Images are the digests ace runs (Conduit 0.10.13, Element 1.12.28).

Verified: catalogue tests with MESH_CATALOGUE pointed here on mesh-controller
main and #149; a resolution on #149 renders both names (matrix.zurag.be,
element.zurag.be) into both files and both contributions; throwaway
containers of both pinned digests with the rendered files (root 0644, :ro):
client versions 200, well-known says matrix.zurag.be:443, register refused
M_FORBIDDEN, Element 200 serving the rendered config.json.
2026-09-30 11:59:56 +02:00
jschoubben 1247b8c27e redis: place its directories and run the build in use
The manifest stated /services/redis/data and /var/lib/redis-module - novox's
old layout, paths no definition may carry (ADR 0112). State is now the
assignment's root, grants and data are placed, and the config file, the
secret file, receives and grants all name them as ${dir:...}. Paths inside
the sidecar are its own view and are unchanged.

The data directory and config are owned 999:1000: the image's redis user is
uid 999 in gid 1000 (checked in both builds), which is who owns ace's data
today; 999:999 named a group the image does not use.

Image pinned to the 7.4.11-alpine build ace runs (2026-09-17); the old pin was
the same version, built in August. Older-than-running is never the pin.

Nothing is assigned it anywhere today, so no machine changes.

Verified: catalogue tests pass with MESH_CATALOGUE on this tree; the
declaration composes for ace with every path under /var/lib/redis. The pinned
image ran as a throwaway with a 0600 999:1000 config and a 0700 data dir:
unauthenticated PING is refused (NOAUTH), authenticated SET/GET works,
appendonly is on, the server runs as redis.
2026-09-30 11:57:46 +02:00
jschoubben 0fce3ebf5d mssql: place its directories and name the software's port, not a machine's
The manifest stated /var/lib/mssql, its grants and its SA file by path, and
declared it listens on 4848 - the port one machine's predecessor published,
which is an assignment's fact (ADR 0112, 0138). ace is moving its own
SQL Server (80 GB of work databases) onto the mesh, so the module has to be
the same on every machine.

- state is the assignment's root (place "."), grants is placed, and every
  reference (sa.env, the env-file, the SA and grants mounts, receives,
  grants, own-secrets) names them as ${dir:...}.
- the database endpoint listens on 1433, the port SQL Server uses; a machine
  that must keep an older number pins it in its assignment.
- the image pin is unchanged: it is the digest ace runs today (CU27,
  16.0.4295), the same as novox.

novox is untouched: rendered with novox's own setting ({"ports":{"1433":4848}})
through the controller's Declaration and Rules, every resource - paths,
container names, volumes, env-file, the 4848:1433 mapping, owners, modes - is
byte-identical to what main renders; the only difference is the firewall
rule's comment text (still port 4848, from the mesh).

Verified: catalogue tests pass with MESH_CATALOGUE on this tree. The pinned
image ran as a throwaway on a 0700 10001:0 data dir with a root-owned 0600
env-file (dummy SA), answered sqlcmd as sa; a scratch database stopped,
copied with cp -a, checksummed and started on the copy kept its rows and
CHECKSUM_AGG.
2026-09-30 11:57:45 +02:00
jschoubben c1a65e2354 nodered: the sidecar dials the port it was given
The sidecar runs on the host network and dialled 127.0.0.1:1880, the
software's port; the mesh publishes nodered on a machine port it assigns,
so the tools reached whatever else holds 1880, or nothing (hq 088).
2026-09-29 23:50:11 +02:00
jschoubben fe0ed3b74e influxdb: place its directories, hand secrets over as files, name its UI
The manifest named /services/influxdb and /var/lib/influxdb-module — one
machine's paths — and passed the admin password and token through the
environment. ace is moving its 2022 instance onto the mesh, so the module
has to be what it is on any machine.

- data, config and state are placed directories; the data keeps 1000:1000,
  the image's influxdb user, which is who owns ace's data today.
- the init secrets reach the image through its own
  DOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_{PASSWORD,ADMIN_TOKEN}_FILE; the vault's files are
  mounted read-only. secrets-in-environment is gone.
- the sidecar reads its token from the same file (MESH_INFLUXDB_TOKEN_FILE,
  added to client.ts) and reaches the server at its assigned machine port
  (${port:8086}) instead of assuming 8086. The unused config-dir mount,
  which held the CLI's copy of the admin token, is dropped.
- the api endpoint contributes a route: the web UI is how people use it,
  and reach is the assignment's to say.

Verified: catalogue tests pass with MESH_CATALOGUE pointed at this tree.
The pinned 2.9.1 image, run on a scratch copy of ace's 2.4.0 data, opens
it, runs its metadata migrations (backing up the pre-upgrade bolt/sqlite)
and hashes the two stored tokens; /health passes. A fresh setup through
the _FILE variables, with dummy secrets as root-owned 0600 files, accepts
the token (200 on /api/v2/buckets) and the password (204 on /signin).
client.ts typechecks strict and reads the token file, tolerating the
endpoints key in its config.
2026-09-29 23:42:18 +02:00
jschoubben 75eee9d4a0 jackett: its config dir is placed, and its tools find their own key
The manifest named /services/jackett/config and /var/lib/mesh/jackett/config.json — host
paths ADR 0112 takes out of definitions. The config dir is now a pathless directory
(${dir:config}) and the runtime's config and route binding live in a placed state dir, as
searxng does.

The image is pinned to v0.24.2627-ls34, the digest ace runs today; the old pin
(v0.24.2517-ls16) was older than the running version.

The runtime reached jackett at a fixed 127.0.0.1:9117; it now uses ${port:9117}, the
machine port the mesh actually assigned.

The tools never loaded: the client needed an API key nobody set. Like sonarr/radarr read
config.xml, it now reads APIKey from Jackett's own ServerConfig.json (the config dir is
already mounted read-only), so no secret goes into an assignment. jackett_indexers called
/api/v2.0/indexers, which is the web UI's endpoint and answers an API key with a redirect;
it now reads the Torznab t=indexers feed, and treats Torznab's 200-with-<error> as a
failure.

Verified: catalogue key tests (MESH_CATALOGUE set, not skipped); a throwaway container of
the pinned image on a fresh 0700 1000:1000 config dir serves its UI; the client discovers
the key from the generated ServerConfig.json, lists 617 indexers through the Torznab feed,
searches via /results, and a wrong key is refused; client.ts typechecks under --strict.
2026-09-29 23:41:21 +02:00
jschoubben 0c91e08bad nodered: its settings are files the mesh writes, and its editor is locked
The catalogue ran the image's defaults: no adminAuth, so a routed Node-RED
editor (which runs arbitrary code) was open to anyone who reached it, and
the module's own tools had no token to present to an install that was locked.

- settings.js (fixed, 0600, uid 1000) carries adminAuth: user admin checked
  against the admin secret -- a minted password, or the bcrypt hash an
  existing install held (accepted), so current logins keep working -- and a
  static bearer token (api-token) the sidecar presents. It loads settings.json
  beside it, the one mergeable file; endpoints is dropped there, and an
  optional timeZone sets process.env.TZ (assignments cannot set env).
- The sidecar's runtime config is no longer merged; it carries the token.
- Directories are placed (state, data), the route binds into state.
- Image pinned to 5.0.7 (a649dd71), what ace runs; the old pin was 5.0.6.
- deployFlows asks for API v2: v1 answers 204 with no body, which the client
  tried to parse as JSON.

Verified: catalogue tests pass against this tree. A throwaway 5.0.7 container
started with the generated files: anonymous /flows 401, bearer api-token 200,
bad token 401, password grant 200/403 with a minted password and with a
bcrypt-hash-accepted one; endpoints and timeZone do not reach /settings;
timeZone Europe/Brussels overrides TZ=Etc/UTC; v1 deploy 204, v2 deploy
answers {rev}.
2026-09-29 23:41:18 +02:00
jschoubben 37c212d5b4 unifi: placed data, mesh-assigned ports, an https route, and its password as a file
The module stated /services/unifi/data and fixed machine ports (8443:8443 and
eight more) — one installation's layout and numbers, which a definition may not
carry (ADR 0038, 0112). Data is now a placed directory (${dir:data}, 1000:1000,
0700), the container publishes its own ports and the mesh assigns the machine
side; an assignment pins them where devices already know them. The L2 endpoint
names the port the software uses (1900), not the one a machine published it on.

The sidecar dialled https://127.0.0.1:8443, true only while the machine port
equals the container's; it now asks for ${port:8443}. Its controller password
was a setting (plaintext in the mesh DB); it is now an own-secret written into
the one mergeable file (ADR 0086). The username stays a setting.

The web UI is contributed as a route to the "web" endpoint over https with
insecure upstream (the controller's own self-signed tls), as mailu's web-tls —
what HAL's hand-written traefik file for unifi does today.

Image pinned to the manifest list ace runs (8.0.24-ls221); the old pin was its
amd64 child, so the image is unchanged.

Verified: catalogue tests pass with MESH_CATALOGUE set; a throwaway container
of the pinned image on a fresh 1000:1000/0700 data dir answers /status (8.0.24,
up) and /inform; the sidecar client built from a config.json carrying site,
password, username and an endpoints key reaches it and is refused only on the
dummy credentials.
2026-09-29 23:39:50 +02:00
jschoubben 718fb12ef7 icecast: its passwords are a file the mesh writes, not the image's environment
The image seds ICECAST_*_PASSWORD from the environment into /etc/icecast.xml;
ADR 0086 wants secrets as files. icecast starts as root, reads its config, then
drops to uid 100, so a root-owned 0600 icecast.xml rendered with ${secret:...}
and mounted read-only works and the entrypoint's seds never fire (no env set).
The "secrets-in-environment" exemption and server.env are gone.

Also: directories are placed (state, logs owned 100:101 so the image's VOLUME
/var/log/icecast is not an anonymous volume per container, as HAL learned);
the server and sidecar share a module network, so the sidecar reaches
http://icecast:8000 instead of assuming machine port 8000 on the host; the
stream endpoint is routed (label "icecast"), as HAL served it via traefik.
Secrets remain mesh-vault grants (requires secret), now under ${dir:state}.

Verified: catalogue tests with MESH_CATALOGUE pointed at this tree; a
throwaway container of the pinned digest (the one ace runs) with the rendered
file (dummy secrets, root 0600, :ro): runs as icecast, status-json 200,
admin 401 without / 200 with the admin secret, a source PUT with the source
secret mounts, a listener receives it, a wrong source password gets 401, logs
land in the uid-100 directory.
2026-09-29 23:39:36 +02:00
jschoubben a32394ec22 mosquitto: its directories are placed, not stated, and it runs the build in use
The module stated /var/lib/mosquitto-module and /services/mosquitto/data —
novox's layout, a path no definition may carry (ADR 0112). State, grants and
data are now placed directories (${dir:state}, ${dir:grants}, ${dir:data}),
the admin secret lives beside the broker account under the mesh's own state,
and the receives/grants maps follow the grants directory. Paths inside the
sidecar are its own view and are unchanged.

Image pinned to the 2.1.2 build ace's predecessor runs (2026-09-17); the old
pin was the same version, built in June.

Found preparing ace, whose broker carries a password-file user (an IoT switch
and home-assistant). Carrying it is a data step, not a manifest one: the
migration repo has scripts/mosquitto-pwdfile-to-dynsec.py, which moves $7$
PBKDF2 entries into the dynsec store hash-for-hash (tested end to end).
2026-09-29 23:05:41 +02:00
mesh-admin 8064e5da8f Merge pull request 'searxng: its settings are a file the mesh writes, not the image's defaults' (#143) from feat/searxng-settings-as-a-file into main 2026-09-29 20:45:13 +00:00
jschoubben 63a255c5cb searxng: bind its route where its state now lives
The route binding still named /var/lib/searxng-module, the directory the
previous commit placed elsewhere — the host would have written it into a
directory nothing declares. Same shape as gitea and nextcloud.
2026-09-29 22:41:56 +02:00
jschoubben 7ad1fbd5c6 searxng: its settings are a file the mesh writes, not the image's defaults
The module ran searxng on the image's built-in settings, which serve html
only — so the module's own search tool (format=json) was refused by the
software it fronts. And there was no way to configure it per machine: the
only file settings reach was the sidecar's.

settings.yml is now the module's one mergeable file (JSON is YAML): generic
defaults in the manifest (json format on, limiter and image proxy off,
valkey wired), and whatever differs per machine — base_url, method,
autocomplete, suspended times — set as the assignment's settings. The
secret key is filled on the machine through ${secret:secret}, so the
secrets-in-environment exception and the env file go. Directories are
placed. Image pinned to 2026.9.20, what ace runs today (the old pin was
older, 2026.9.1).

The sidecar's config.json is no longer mergeable: settings merge into every
mergeable file of a module, and the sidecar would have received searxng's
keys. It only ever read an optional url, which its env already carries.

Verified on ace: the pinned image serves html and json from a read-only,
root-owned 0600 JSON settings.yml.
2026-09-29 22:33:38 +02:00
jschoubben 67f5f4cffd Merge pull request 'ca-trust: a machine trusts the mesh's authority because a module put its root there' (#142) from feat/ca-trust into main 2026-09-29 14:06:36 +00:00
jschoubben 8797335fbc ca-trust: a machine trusts the mesh's authority because a module put its root there
novox/hq ADR 0147, issue 129. Every internal HTTPS name fails verification
on every machine: the certificates are genuine and nothing on a machine has
ever been told what issued them. The proxy's fetch answers for the proxy and
for nothing else — a browser, git over HTTPS and every module calling another
by an internal name read the machine's own trust store.

The module requires internal-acme-ca, fetches the root over the mesh's own
network (no prior trust to have; that is what this establishes), installs it
among the machine's anchors and refreshes the extracted bundles. Being
unassigned stops the unit, and stopping it takes the anchor away and
refreshes them again.

Arch's layout is named out loud: a machine that keeps anchors elsewhere fails
visibly rather than writing a file nothing reads.
2026-09-29 15:07:40 +02:00
mesh-admin 53dc108603 Merge pull request 'Remove the network-checker module: it does not do what was decided' (#141) from chore/remove-the-network-checker-module into main 2026-09-29 12:43:34 +00:00
jschoubben ebf5ba2d4c Remove the network-checker module: it does not do what was decided
What was in the catalogue was the first thing I built, not the thing ADR 0146
describes. It dialled raw ports on machine addresses from one hosting form and
emitted nothing, so findings would have sat in a file on the machine — the exact
thing issue 145 is about. It was never registered, never assigned, and never ran.

0146 says names per hosting form, fetched over TLS with the certificate verified,
and machines discovered over the bus. That shares nothing with this but the word
checker, so it goes rather than being bent into shape. Recorded as work to be
analysed and built deliberately.

Connectivity is checked by hand in the meantime, against the services the mesh
already runs.
2026-09-29 14:43:25 +02:00
mesh-admin bbac08a7d2 Merge pull request 'A network-checker module: dial what the mesh claims, from where the callers are' (#140) from feat/a-network-checker-module into main 2026-09-29 11:44:37 +00:00
jschoubben 784a5a6514 A network-checker module: dial what the mesh claims, from where the callers are
The mesh asserts three things are callable (ADR 0144) — what runs on the same
machine, another machine's service exposed to the private network, and another
machine's service exposed publicly — and has never checked any of them. The first
was broken for eleven hours while the mesh reported every machine healthy.

This runs on every machine, on the cadence the mesh already has, in its own
container: the same position every other module calls from. Not the host and not
the control plane, both of which reach these addresses by paths no ordinary caller
uses and would have passed throughout that outage.

**Its probe is its own endpoint, and that is the point.** Declared reachable over
the private network like any other service, so it is admitted by exactly the rule
that governs every internally-exposed service and fails when that rule is wrong.
The tempting target is a service every machine has, and those are the ones never
closed — ssh above all — which would have passed while the thing that actually
broke was a service exposed to the private network.

It resolves before it dials and says which failed, because a name that does not
resolve and a port that does not answer have different owners. One failure is not
a fault: a machine rebooting is ordinary, so a path is broken after consecutive
runs and the count travels with the result. It reports and repairs nothing.

novox/hq ADR 0145. Eight tests; the consecutive-failure logic proved by reverting
it once. Not yet registered or assigned.
2026-09-29 13:44:16 +02:00
mesh-admin 0c31499fb0 Merge pull request 'Every module names its endpoints, and every route names the one it serves' (#139) from feat/modules-name-their-endpoints into main 2026-09-29 09:51:56 +00:00
jschoubben f118344246 Every module names its endpoints, and every route names the one it serves
75 endpoints across 50 modules, named from what each one is for rather than by a
rule: mail's seven protocol ports are smtp, imaps, submission and the rest; unifi's
nine are inform, stun, discovery, the two portal ports and syslog; minio's two are
s3 and console; the resolver's two are dns-udp and dns-tcp.

And 35 route contributions name the endpoint they serve instead of repeating its
port. A route and a listen both carried a port and nothing said they were the same
thing; now one of them does. gitea's path-level deny rule names neither, because it
is a rule about a name rather than an endpoint.

novox/hq ADR 0138. The words shipped a release ahead in mesh-controller #138 and
#139, and the control plane running today is built from that merge — checked before
this was written, because an unknown manifest key is refused and a catalogue using
one against an older control plane would stop resolving.
2026-09-29 11:51:39 +02:00
mesh-admin 822df220ab Merge pull request 'A routed module listens from the mesh, not from anywhere' (#138) from fix/a-routed-module-listens-from-the-mesh into main 2026-09-29 00:58:39 +00:00
jschoubben 9eb1265bc8 A routed module listens from the mesh, not from anywhere
umami declared its port reachable from anywhere, reasoning that the collection
endpoint tracked browsers POST to must be public. That is true of the name and
not of the port: both its surfaces are served through the proxy by name, so the
port is how the proxy reaches it and nothing else (ADR 0045).

Measured, which is how this was found: with the port open to the internet, the
dashboard's login page was served over plain HTTP directly on the machine's port,
bypassing every rule the proxy applies by path. The route stays exactly as it was,
so the collection endpoint keeps working.
2026-09-29 02:54:10 +02:00
mesh-admin 41cfc70b53 Merge pull request 'The resolver declares both protocols it answers on' (#137) from fix/the-resolver-declares-both-protocols into main 2026-09-28 22:04:19 +00:00
jschoubben acedc5d9d9 The resolver declares both protocols it answers on
It declared udp/53 only. The daemon listens on tcp/53 as well, and a resolver is
asked over tcp whenever an answer will not fit in a datagram — so on every
converged machine that port is closed while the service reports itself healthy
and the manifest reads as though the resolver were fully declared.

The same fault as issue 136 in miniature: the declaration covers part of what the
service does, and the gap is silent because nothing compares the two.
2026-09-28 23:53:03 +02:00
mesh-admin 521a8dd1e2 Merge pull request 'sshd: the daemon it owns starts at boot' (#136) from fix/sshd-declares-the-daemon-it-owns into main 2026-09-28 19:43:29 +00:00
jschoubben e145e2236c sshd: the daemon it owns starts at boot
The module said the service must be running and nothing about boot, so the
machine's own way back in was enabled only because something before the mesh
had enabled it. All four machines happen to be enabled today; none of them is
enabled because the mesh says so, and a machine adopted tomorrow would run ssh
until its first reboot.

Not `state: running` alone for the same reason the module exists: this is the
one daemon whose absence cannot be fixed remotely.
2026-09-28 21:43:27 +02:00
mesh-admin 4d7e37e319 Merge pull request 'fail2ban bans through an action every machine has' (#135) from fix/fail2ban-bans-through-what-every-machine-has into main 2026-09-28 18:48:26 +00:00
jschoubben 026421fd6e fail2ban: ban through an action every machine has
jail.local named ufw as the ban action. Two machines on this mesh have no ufw,
and fail2ban does not check: it starts, the jail reads the log, counts the
attempts, runs the ban command, gets 127 -- 'ufw: command not found' -- and
logs an error nobody reads. The service is active, the mesh reports the module
applied, and the machine is not protected. Proven by banning a documentation
address on such a machine today.

The replacement is this module's own dualchain action, already used by the
recidive jail on all four machines, so it is not a new dependency. It bans in
DOCKER-USER as well as INPUT, which ufw's action did not, and it bans all
ports, which ufw's action did.
2026-09-28 20:48:24 +02:00
mesh-admin af89bb11ff Merge pull request 'fail2ban declares the log its own recidive jail reads' (#134) from fix/fail2ban-declares-the-log-its-own-jail-reads into main 2026-09-28 18:45:34 +00:00
jschoubben 7c18cdbd39 fail2ban: declare the log its own recidive jail reads
The recidive jail bans whoever keeps coming back by reading fail2ban's own
log, and fail2ban checks every jail's log file while it configures itself --
before it has created that log. On a machine where the file is not there
already, no jail is found for recidive, configuration fails, and the whole
service refuses to start, taking the sshd jail with it. Two machines assigned
this module today came up failed for exactly that reason; the two where it
worked had a log from years of the service running.

Declared create-once: the mesh puts an empty file there when it is absent and
never touches it again, because what grows in it is fail2ban's, and the
logrotate file this module already ships is what keeps it small.

This also reverts the previous two commits' fail2ban.local. It declared a
logtarget that the package already sets to the same path on every machine
here -- pacman reports the config pristine -- so it fixed nothing and said
something untrue about why.
2026-09-28 20:45:32 +02:00
mesh-admin 4fb16b2e6b Merge pull request 'fail2ban restarts when the log declaration changes' (#133) from fix/fail2ban-restarts-on-its-log-target into main 2026-09-28 18:42:44 +00:00
jschoubben c5af8635c8 fail2ban: restart when the log declaration changes
The file that says where fail2ban logs was not in restart-on, so a change to
it would sit on disk with the running service unaware of it -- the same shape
as any other jail file this module already restarts for.
2026-09-28 20:42:42 +02:00
mesh-admin 87366c5f36 Merge pull request 'fail2ban declares where it logs, so the recidive jail has a file to read' (#132) from fix/fail2ban-declares-where-it-logs into main 2026-09-28 18:41:16 +00:00
jschoubben f8ca36aacf fail2ban: declare where it logs, so the recidive jail has a file to read
The recidive jail reads /var/log/fail2ban.log and this module ships the
logrotate file for it, but nothing ever told fail2ban to write there. Where
the package default stands, fail2ban logs to the journal, the recidive jail
finds no log file, and the whole service refuses to start -- taking the sshd
jail with it. Two machines assigned this module today came up failed; the two
where it worked had /etc/fail2ban/fail2ban.conf edited by hand, which a
package upgrade would have undone.

Declared in fail2ban.local, because fail2ban.conf belongs to the package.
2026-09-28 20:41:09 +02:00
mesh-admin 812355bf31 Merge pull request 'The catalogue hears what it missed' (#131) from feat/the-catalogue-hears-what-it-missed into main 2026-09-28 14:08:48 +00:00
jschoubben 016ddb2b3a The catalogue hears what it missed
It asks what it missed on every start and the answer never arrived: the control plane replayed each
build it held as a module's event from a module called "control-plane", which does not exist, so its
own account refused the publish and the graph kept the gap. The control plane now states those under
the seat it holds (novox/hq ADR 0134, mesh-controller #129), so this consumes that too — one handler,
because what a build means for the graph is the same whether the build machine says it as it happens
or the mesh says what it already held.
2026-09-28 16:08:46 +02:00
mesh-admin ea17bf46d2 Merge pull request 'The catalogue prepares its own schema instead of migrating at start' (#130) from feat/the-catalogue-prepares-its-own-schema into main 2026-09-28 13:40:30 +00:00
jschoubben 4258f01614 The catalogue prepares its own schema instead of migrating at start
It brought its schema up inside its runtime, on every start. That made a schema it could not reach a
crash loop rather than a stop, with the module graph keeping a gap and nothing saying so — which is
how a whole morning's builds went unrecorded. The mesh now prepares this module's state before it
starts this version and does not start it if that failed (novox/hq ADR 0135): the work moves to an
entrypoint the image names in MESH_PREPARE, beside the entrypoints it already names.

The reason it was at start — that a step blocking the apply would block the very apply bringing the
overlay up — stopped being true when a step's failure became its module's business rather than the
machine's (ADR 0136).
2026-09-28 15:40:28 +02:00
mesh-admin 4d9b4fdfa6 Merge pull request 'The catalogue declares the event it emits on starting' (#129) from fix/the-catalogue-declares-the-event-it-emits into main 2026-09-28 07:49:06 +00:00
jschoubben eff11b1d4d The catalogue declares the event it emits on starting
Its runtime announces that it has just started and may have missed builds — the event the control
plane follows to replay them — and its manifest did not declare it. A module's authority on the bus
is derived from what it declares, so the publish was refused and the runtime died on start, in a
loop, with the mesh's graph never catching up.
2026-09-28 09:49:03 +02:00
mesh-admin 4ead13d4d4 Merge pull request 'A merge says which files it changed' (#128) from feat/a-merge-rebuilds-what-it-changed into main 2026-09-28 07:20:05 +00:00
jschoubben 3b77dde666 A merge says which files it changed
Every module built from a repository was rebuilt for a change to any of them: one merge in this
repository meant twenty-six builds, which is what exhausted a public registry's pull limit. The
forge lists the files a merge changed and the event carries them, from the watcher and from the
merge tool alike; a merge that changed more files than were asked for says so, and the mesh then
treats the whole repository as changed rather than guessing.
2026-09-28 09:17:38 +02:00
mesh-admin 5ea4961980 Merge pull request 'A merge older than the watching is history, not news' (#127) from fix/a-merge-older-than-the-watching-is-history into main 2026-09-28 03:08:22 +00:00
jschoubben 2b8a668d06 A merge older than the watching is history, not news
An old merge past the first page of the forge's listing surfaced as newer pull requests were
updated, and was announced as if it had just happened; the mesh then rebuilt everything built from
that repository, once per old merge. The moment the watching began is kept with the record, and
only a merge made since is announced.
2026-09-28 05:08:20 +02:00
mesh-admin 719fb1e025 Merge pull request 'A merge the forge announces is said in its log' (#126) from fix/a-merge-announced-is-said into main 2026-09-28 02:44:19 +00:00
jschoubben ac5630bee2 A merge the forge announces is said in its log
A trigger that fires silently is indistinguishable from one that did not fire (novox/hq issue
131); the announcement is now one line an operator can read.
2026-09-28 04:44:17 +02:00
mesh-admin 1c995fa9fc Merge pull request 'The forge watches every repository, not the administrator's own' (#125) from fix/the-forge-watches-every-repository into main 2026-09-28 02:31:25 +00:00
jschoubben d70cb18ea0 The forge watches every repository, not the administrator's own
/user/repos lists what the token's user owns, which for the mesh's administrator is nothing — so
the forge module watched an empty list and never announced a merge. It reads the forge's whole
view through the search endpoint, every page.
2026-09-28 04:31:20 +02:00
mesh-admin 1d71787896 Merge pull request 'The forge announces every merge, whoever made it' (#124) from feat/the-forge-announces-every-merge into main 2026-09-28 01:03:48 +00:00
jschoubben eb62289f89 The forge announces every merge, whoever made it
The merge tool emitted at the instant it acted; a merge made in the forge's own
pages or over its API emitted nothing, and the mesh went on believing every module
current with its source (novox/hq 04-ISSUES/131). Merged pull requests are now
watched the way repositories are: what the forge holds, asked for on a tick,
announced once, with the merge commit and the clone URL a build needs. What has
been announced is kept beside the module's state, so a restart does not announce
the whole history again, and a first tick with no record announces nothing.
2026-09-28 02:54:48 +02:00
jschoubben f5969a2f9f Merge pull request 'nats declares the certificate directory it mounts' (#123) from feat/nats-serves-the-meshs-certificate into main 2026-09-27 22:31:20 +00:00
jschoubben 7f3d259cf5 nats: drop the access to a certificate directory it no longer mounts 2026-09-28 00:16:23 +02:00
jschoubben 721149eda1 nats declares the certificate directory it mounts
The mesh's broker certificate is the operator's, kept outside any module and
mounted read-only by whatever serves the bus; the controller declares that
access and now so does nats, the same way. A mount nothing declares is refused
at registration (ADR 0030), which is how this was found.
2026-09-28 00:15:59 +02:00
jschoubben 8e27bc1e36 Merge pull request 'nats serves the mesh's existing broker certificate' (#122) from feat/nats-serves-the-meshs-certificate into main 2026-09-27 22:07:29 +00:00
jschoubben f1212620e4 nats serves the mesh's existing broker certificate
The module mounted a TLS directory nothing fills, so the server could not start
on a mesh that was not raised by the genesis template. The mesh already has a
broker certificate every machine pins by fingerprint and the controller trusts;
serving the new bus with it means no pin changes when a machine moves and there
is no second certificate to be wrong about. No ca_file: the directory has none,
and a pinning client checks the leaf and nothing else.
2026-09-28 00:04:10 +02:00
jschoubben b1b18ae390 Merge pull request 'nats declares the upstream image it is built from' (#121) from fix/nats-declares-its-base into main 2026-09-27 21:40:50 +00:00
jschoubben 3f0a174392 nats declares the upstream image it is built from
The recipe started FROM the upstream server's digest directly, and the build machine
refuses that: every base is declared under build.on and copied into the mesh's own
store before a build, so a build never reaches out to a registry the mesh does not
run (novox/hq ADR 0097). Found the first time the module was built on a real mesh.

Same digest, now declared as NATS_BASE and arriving as a build argument; the
Dockerfile says where it comes from and why the digest is the index's.
2026-09-27 23:40:16 +02:00
jschoubben c0edebefb9 Merge pull request 'lavinmq, amqp-ping and amqp-email-forwarder leave the catalogue' (#120) from feat/amqp-leaves-the-catalogue into main 2026-09-27 21:30:19 +00:00
jschoubben b9605a6e3b lavinmq, amqp-ping and amqp-email-forwarder leave the catalogue
AMQP is not a provision (novox/hq ADR 0131, design 28 task 5.4). These were the
only three manifests that named it: the broker that provided it, a proof that a
grant worked end to end, and a forwarder reading mail off a queue. Removed, not
converted — a module that wants messaging wants the mesh's bus, reached through
the sdk and named by the mesh-broker seat, and either of the last two is re-done
against that if wanted, as a new module under the record.

The controller refuses a manifest naming amqp from its next release, so these
could not be re-registered anyway. Nothing else in the catalogue referenced them.
2026-09-27 23:27:24 +02:00
jschoubben dca84d3bb4 Merge pull request 'lavinmq holds mesh-broker again, now the check reads the store' (#119) from restore/broker-claim into main 2026-09-27 20:24:22 +00:00
jschoubben 9f9ce92d0f lavinmq holds mesh-broker again, now the check reads the store
The claim comes back for the third and last time. The store's row says the bus seat
answers for `amqp`, lavinmq provides `amqp`, and with mesh-controller#89 the check
that judges a claim reads that row instead of a copy compiled into the build
machine. So this is accepted for the reason it should have been all along.

Restores the holder the controller composes its own bus address through, which is
what ends tonight's crash loop. nats takes the seat over when the cutover is done
deliberately, not because the seat emptied itself.
2026-09-27 22:23:37 +02:00
jschoubben 6e5b2557ba Merge pull request 'Undo: claiming mesh-broker made lavinmq unbuildable' (#118) from revert/broker-seat-claim into main 2026-09-27 19:53:49 +00:00
jschoubben f97b7dd544 Undo: lavinmq cannot hold mesh-broker, and claiming it makes lavinmq unbuildable
Putting the claim back was wrong on its own terms. `mesh-broker` delivers
`mesh-bus`, and a seat that delivers a provision may only be held by a module that
provides it — so the claim is refused at registration:

  lavinmq claims mesh-broker, whose holder answers for "mesh-bus",
  and lavinmq does not provide "mesh-bus" at mesh scope

Which means the merged claim does not restore the holder, it stops lavinmq being
built at all. Removed again.

The seat being empty is still the live fault, and it has only one valid answer: the
holder must provide `mesh-bus`, and the module that does is nats. Recorded against
the rollout, because it moves a step that was optional into the critical path.
2026-09-27 21:27:55 +02:00
jschoubben 5f5798ec8a Merge pull request 'lavinmq keeps mesh-broker until something else can take it' (#117) from fix/broker-seat-must-stay-held into main 2026-09-27 19:17:45 +00:00
jschoubben 42550dbe43 lavinmq keeps mesh-broker until something else can take it
Taking the claim off made the seat unheld, and the controller dereferences that
seat to find its own bus (to-be 26, "the one exception is the controller itself").
Unheld, the composed address fell back to a default port nothing serves, and the
control plane crash-looped: "cannot reach the broker named in MESH_BROKER_AMQP:
dial tcp 127.0.0.1:5672". The broker itself never stopped — it is healthy on the
port the mesh actually assigned it.

lavinmq becoming an ordinary provider is right, and it is still a provider of amqp
here. What was wrong is the order: the seat has to pass from one holder to the next,
and it cannot be empty in between, because the thing that reads it is the thing that
would have to fix it.
2026-09-27 21:13:13 +02:00
jschoubben 51713dd631 Merge pull request 'The Go base has to be 1.26 for what compiles the controller's code' (#116) from fix/go-126-base into main 2026-09-27 19:00:38 +00:00
jschoubben 4cda964a43 The Go base has to be 1.26 for what compiles the controller's code
builder and route-proxy both build from the mesh-controller repository's context,
so its go.mod is theirs, and `nats.go v1.54.0` puts that at `go >= 1.26`. Pinned at
1.25.14 they cannot compile it: the build machine's own build failed with "go.mod
requires go >= 1.26.0 (running go 1.25.14)".

Each moves to the 1.26.8 digest of the flavour it already used — alpine for
builder, debian for route-proxy — so nothing changes but the compiler version.
2026-09-27 20:58:09 +02:00
jschoubben adb02da136 Merge pull request 'The nats module, and every manifest's event names made local' (#115) from feat/nats-genesis into main 2026-09-27 17:31:04 +00:00
jschoubben 06954b5a70 Merge main: the trunk's seat names, this branch's event names
Two lines of work renamed the same seats differently. The trunk named them for their
scope — node-scoped ones `node-*`, leaving `the-artifact-store`, `npm-package-registry`
and `git` as they were — and this branch had renamed ten of them to `mesh-*`. The trunk's
set is what the live controller loads and what the live seats were actually renamed to, so
a manifest claiming this branch's name is one the running mesh refuses. Three of them
needed reverting by hand: git had auto-merged this branch's names where the trunk had not
touched those lines, which is the quiet kind of merge result.

Event names are this branch's, because the trunk has not converted them and they are what
issue 127 was about.

Verdaccio goes with the trunk's removal of it. The template work on dnsmasq's roster fact
is the trunk's, sitting beside this branch's local event names in the same file — the one
hunk where both changes landed together.

75 manifests, all parsing, no claim outside the trunk's set and no event name left in the
old bus's form.
2026-09-27 18:25:57 +02:00
jschoubben 3d7d896014 Merge pull request 'fail2ban never bans a tunnel peer: ignoreip names the mesh range' (#113) from fix/fail2ban-ignores-the-mesh-range into main 2026-09-27 14:55:55 +00:00
jschoubben 278610c0c3 fail2ban never bans a tunnel peer: ignoreip names the mesh range
The jail.local [DEFAULT] gains ignoreip = 127.0.0.1/8 ::1 ${machine:mesh-range}
— localhost plus the mesh's own private range, named through the placeholder
rather than hardcoded (data is the mesh's, ADR 0112). Without it fail2ban could
ban the mesh's own nodes on 10.10.0.0/24; on novox that rule survived only in
memory from a now-deleted HAL file and would be lost on the next restart.
2026-09-27 16:55:34 +02:00
jschoubben b58a3b487d A build's outcome belongs to the role, not to the module holding it
ADR 0121. The builder declared `built` as its own event, so every consumer depended
on which module happens to be the build machine today. It is the build-machine
role's event now: the builder declares none of its own, and the catalogue listens
for `mesh-build-machine.built` rather than `builder.built`.

Nothing changes about what reaches the catalogue. What changes is that it survives
the build machine being a different module, which is the whole reason the mesh has a
word for a role.
2026-09-27 15:37:21 +02:00
jschoubben 7b06a7a408 Event names are local now, in the manifests and in the code
Every module named its events the way the old bus spelled a routing key —
`module.<module>.<verb>`. Design 29 says a module names an event locally and the
mesh works out where it lands, so all 37 were stale against a rule already
decided. On the new bus that derives into a namespace belonging to a module
called "module", so no cross-module subscription in the mesh matched anything:
nothing failed, nothing reacted (novox/hq 04-ISSUES/127).

36 manifests converted, and 43 files of module code with them. The code mattered
as much as the manifests: the runtime builds the subject from what `emit()` is
handed, so a converted manifest with unconverted code would have had the
permission and the subject disagree.

Three things the new check found on the way:

- `photos` emitted an event its manifest never declared, which the new bus refuses
  outright. Declared.
- `showcase` waited for an event nothing emits, so its demo could never be
  triggered — only `showcase` may publish under its own name. It emits both halves
  now.
- `distribution` declared an event named after a different module. It emits
  `image.pushed` under its own name. An event about a *role* belongs on the seat,
  where the name outlives whoever holds it, but the sdk has no way to publish on a
  seat yet, so that stays recorded rather than declared.

The audit logger's "everything" pattern is `**` rather than the old bus's `#`.
2026-09-27 14:42:28 +02:00
jschoubben f0a6ce8d4a Merge pull request 'Rename seat claims to mesh-*/node-*; retire verdaccio (ADR 0121)' (#112) from feat/system-seats-named-by-scope into main 2026-09-27 12:32:29 +00:00
jschoubben 6bedcd3f21 Rename seat claims to the mesh-*/node-* convention; retire verdaccio (ADR 0121)
Claims renamed to match the controller's seat set: node-dns-resolver (dnsmasq),
node-intrusion-prevention (fail2ban), node-packet-filter (nftables),
node-resolver-config (resolv-conf, resolved-split-dns), node-uplink
(networkmanager, systemd-networkd, dhcpcd), mesh-build-machine (builder, +mesh
scope), mesh-catalog (mesh-catalog). showcase now declares its own seat and
claims it. verdaccio removed — the mesh keeps distribution as its registry and
gitea already serves npm, so a second npm registry is redundant.
2026-09-27 14:30:56 +02:00
jschoubben a093c88c32 nats declares its own server settings, and where the mesh's users go
The split the controller now makes, from this side. The module's own
configuration — ports, TLS, JetStream — is a declared file resource, because those
are properties of this container and change when its image does. `bus-users` names
where the mesh writes every account and permission, in the same directory, and the
module's configuration includes it.

**Both files in one directory because they have to be.** An absolute include path
is resolved relative to the including file's directory: nats-server given
`include /etc/nats/accounts.conf` from /etc/nats-server/nats.conf looks for
/etc/nats-server/etc/nats/accounts.conf and refuses to start. Verified against the
server, and recorded in the configuration itself where somebody moving a file will
read it.

**`verify: true` is gone, and it was refusing every connection in the mesh.** It
makes the server demand a client certificate; a host pins this server's exact
certificate and authenticates with the password the mesh minted, and presents none.
Found by building this image and connecting to it as a host would.

The entrypoint now waits for both files and watches the mesh's half: the module's
own does not change without a new declaration, and that recreates the container
anyway. Verified end to end against this image — the mesh's user list rewritten,
the module noticing and reloading the server itself with no signal from outside,
and the connection the mesh already had still working afterwards.
2026-09-27 02:50:35 +02:00
jschoubben f67f0ca9bc Merge pull request 'dnsmasq owns its resolver format: node-zones is a template (ADR 0120)' (#111) from feat/roster-facts-are-templates into main 2026-09-26 23:51:29 +00:00
jschoubben 968473219a dnsmasq owns its resolver format: node-zones is a template, not a controller formatter (ADR 0120)
The node-zones fact was a path; the local=/address= syntax lived in the
control plane. It is dnsmasq's configuration language, so it moves into
dnsmasq's manifest as a template over the roster. The mesh renders it; it
reads none of it. Output is unchanged.

Lands with mesh-controller's ADR 0120 change — the two are one schema step.
2026-09-27 01:33:28 +02:00
jschoubben ad219beee2 Merge pull request 'The uplink's managers are modules: networkmanager, systemd-networkd, dhcpcd (hq ADR 0117)' (#110) from feat/the-uplink-modules into main 2026-09-26 23:00:30 +00:00
jochen fd09b1a50e review: the uplink managers are the machine's — no state on their services, none for dhcpcd; comments corrected 2026-09-27 00:07:27 +02:00
jochen 7aea08d6c3 dhcpcd's mesh block goes at the start: lines after an interface line are that interface's 2026-09-26 23:48:20 +02:00
jochen 23d735a0bf The uplink's managers are modules (hq ADR 0117)
networkmanager, systemd-networkd and dhcpcd each claim the-uplink and
declare only what keeps the machine's own network manager from
contradicting the mesh: the resolver file left to resolv-conf, mesh0
left alone. Never a link, profile or credential — the link is the
mesh's only channel to the machine, so NetworkManager and networkd are
reloaded on a change, never restarted, and dhcpcd (no reload; a restart
drops the address) takes its block at its next start.
2026-09-26 23:47:31 +02:00
jschoubben ae99204a8c Claim the renamed seats (novox/hq ADR 0118)
Ten manifests claim mesh-* names now. What they PROVIDE is unchanged: gitea
still provides git and npm-package-registry, and a consumer requires the
interface, not the seat.
2026-09-26 23:07:09 +02:00
jschoubben 226eab4c6f Merge pull request 'dnsmasq: the operator's own names have a home the mesh never rewrites' (#109) from feat/dnsmasq-has-a-home-for-operator-names into main 2026-09-26 20:43:53 +00:00
jschoubben bb8f2e76a9 dnsmasq: the operator's own names have a home the mesh never rewrites
A workstation's job includes names that are neither a mesh machine nor
a routed name (novox/hq 122): shanks carries 13 Mediahuis entries in
/etc/hosts, and mesh-wireguard replaces /etc/hosts whole when taken —
so without this they vanish, and the take gates the node. Two homes,
neither the mesh's to own: conf-dir=/etc/dnsmasq.d/,*.conf (drop-in
directives, HAL's dnsmasq-app used exactly this) and
addn-hosts=/etc/hosts.local (plain host lines). The mesh creates and
rewrites neither; a machine with none loses nothing. The migration
moves such names here BEFORE the /etc/hosts take, closing the window.
2026-09-26 22:43:29 +02:00
jschoubben 86882cacd4 nats provides mesh-bus (novox/hq ADR 0120) 2026-09-26 21:17:21 +02:00
jschoubben ea7f6796e8 lavinmq is a provider, not foundation
It claims no seat: mesh-broker is the NATS server's (novox/hq ADR 0119).
The amqp interface stays exactly as it is — a backing service a module may
require, like a database.
2026-09-26 21:08:40 +02:00
jschoubben 372450851f Merge pull request 'mssql: its data is placed — the last /services placement retires' (#108) from feat/mssql-data-is-placed into main 2026-09-26 18:36:16 +00:00
jschoubben f4e4e12c99 mssql: its data is placed — the last /services placement retires
The stated path was the adopted-data exception; with the take done and
the placement vocabulary live, the exception has no reason left. The
landing window renames the directory and recreates the container, since
a changed volume path does not do that by itself (hq 126).
2026-09-26 20:36:03 +02:00
jschoubben fd9be011c0 Merge pull request 'sshd: the operator's door is a module' (#107) from feat/sshd-module into main 2026-09-26 18:15:08 +00:00
jschoubben a85b0ee346 sshd: the operator's door is a module
The spec is the working system: HAL's 99-hal.conf, restated as
10-mesh.conf so lexical include order makes the mesh's answer the one
that wins while the predecessor's file is still on disk. Subsystem
stays the stock config's — first-set wins and it sits before the
Include. Port 22 from anywhere, said in listens with its reason: the
machines that need the door are exactly the ones not on the mesh yet,
and locking the operator out is the one failure a firewall must never
arrange.
2026-09-26 20:14:54 +02:00
jschoubben 34243c9e34 Merge pull request 'dnsmasq: the runtime's DNS is written into daemon.json, never over it' (#106) from fix/dnsmasq-writes-into-daemon-json into main 2026-09-26 18:12:20 +00:00
jschoubben 870a541072 dnsmasq: the runtime's DNS is written into daemon.json, never over it
The file is shared — the operator's insecure-registries for the mesh's
own store live there — and replacing it whole would break every pull
from that store the moment the module is taken (the 098 class, caught
in the pre-take diff this time). ADR 0102's verb is merge.
2026-09-26 20:12:06 +02:00
jschoubben 9b063a77b2 nats: the module, and an image that reloads in place
Step 1.1 and 1.2 of novox/hq ADR 0116. The server is a built artifact rather
than the upstream image directly, because it needs an entrypoint of its own:
the host can only recreate a container, and recreating the bus for every
permission change drops every connection and every in-flight ack. nats-server
reloads on SIGHUP by itself, so the config is mounted as a directory (not
digest-tracked, hq issue 103) and the entrypoint watches the one file.

Verified against the real server, not assumed: a user added to the config
connects, a revoked one is refused, both within one poll interval, with the
container's PID and restart count unchanged and "Reloaded: accounts" in its
log.

Two corrections found by checking rather than reading:
- the seat delivers nothing now (hq ADR 0117), and the controller's parser
  refused the manifest until it did — "nats claims mesh-broker, whose holder
  answers for amqp, and nats does not provide amqp"
- pinned to the multi-arch index digest; the first pin was the amd64
  manifest, which builds here and fails on any other architecture
2026-09-26 19:34:14 +02:00
jschoubben a59750fa28 Merge pull request 'mailu: the smtp provision serves the name its certificate answers to' (#105) from fix/smtp-serves-its-tls-name into main 2026-09-26 17:27:06 +00:00
jschoubben 81592a3b2c mailu: the smtp provision serves the name its certificate answers to
A consumer connecting by the binding's address meets a certificate for
mail.novox.be and refuses it — found live by the forwarder's cutover
proof, one send before production would have. The TLS name is mailu's
own fact (HOSTNAMES), so the binding carries it; consumers say
${bound:smtp:name} and verification holds.
2026-09-26 19:26:53 +02:00
jschoubben 705ceec1e7 Merge pull request 'Six modules name no /var/lib: the root is a place, the maps reference it' (#104) from feat/six-modules-name-no-var-lib into main 2026-09-26 16:21:00 +00:00
jschoubben afdd149ab7 Six modules name no /var/lib: the root is a place, the maps reference it
The state directories say place "." — the assignment's own root — and
every bind, secret, own-secret, receives and grants path references it
as ${dir:state}/…; grants directories that are their own resources are
placed by id. gitea's two coincidence strings from the first pass
(${dir:data}base.json — resolving correctly by pure concatenation) are
spelled honestly now. What still says /var/lib is inside containers —
the software's contract — or under /var/lib/mesh, the mesh's own
plumbing, which the requirements unification absorbs next. Every
resolved path is byte-identical to what runs; landing this is a no-op
on the node, and the converter checks its own boundaries this time.
2026-09-26 18:20:47 +02:00
jschoubben dde8b15483 Merge pull request 'mailu: seventeen data directories are placed, not stated' (#103) from feat/mailu-dirs-are-placed into main 2026-09-26 16:07:24 +00:00
jschoubben 8a046be198 mailu: seventeen data directories are placed, not stated
Each resolves to <root>/mailu/<id> — the maildir at
/var/lib/mailu/data-mail, certs at data-certs, and so on. Landing this
is a window, not an edit: seventeen renames on the node (the nested
data/ tree flattens to the ids), then the full stack recreated, because
a changed volume path does not recreate a container by itself (hq 126).
Ids are untouched on purpose — a renamed id orphans its held record,
and the mail spool is the wrong place to learn what a removal step does
with one.
2026-09-26 18:07:11 +02:00
jschoubben 668278bde4 Merge pull request 'nextcloud: it lives under its own name, and html is placed' (#102) from feat/nextcloud-lives-under-its-own-name into main 2026-09-26 16:05:41 +00:00
jschoubben 6761bb02a1 nextcloud: it lives under its own name, and html is placed
The module is nextcloud; its tree was /var/lib/nextcloud-module — a
historic spelling nothing depends on. The root moves to
/var/lib/nextcloud (a rename on the node, done in this change's
window), and html drops its path: the mesh resolves it to
<root>/nextcloud/html. Landing this requires the window: rename the
tree, push, recreate the container — a changed volume path does not
recreate one by itself (hq 126).
2026-09-26 18:05:28 +02:00
jschoubben f98c9859d2 Merge pull request 'gitea: its data and grants are placed, not stated' (#101) from feat/gitea-dirs-are-placed into main 2026-09-26 16:04:30 +00:00
jschoubben cac5eab7da gitea: its data and grants are placed, not stated
The mesh resolves both to <root>/gitea/<id> — where the 5.8G forge and
its grant files already sit, so the roll-out its upgrade policy makes
of this build changes no byte of the spec. The module root and the
mesh's plumbing stay stated.
2026-09-26 18:04:17 +02:00
jschoubben 770c9f6a78 Merge pull request 'mongodb: its data directory is placed, not stated' (#100) from feat/mongodb-dir-is-placed into main 2026-09-26 16:03:36 +00:00
jschoubben 5427118614 mongodb: its data directory is placed, not stated
The mesh resolves it to <root>/mongodb/data — where the granted
databases already sit. The provider's own state, grants and the mesh's
plumbing stay stated.
2026-09-26 18:03:25 +02:00
jschoubben 53765335cf Merge pull request 'portainer: its data directory is placed, not stated' (#99) from feat/portainer-dir-is-placed into main 2026-09-26 16:02:42 +00:00
jschoubben 5fd2ed9686 portainer: its data directory is placed, not stated
The mesh resolves it to <root>/portainer/data — where the 16M of
endpoints and users already sit. A textual no-op on this node.
2026-09-26 18:02:25 +02:00
jschoubben f7887d706d Merge pull request 'only-office: its directories are placed, not stated' (#98) from feat/only-office-dirs-are-placed into main 2026-09-26 16:01:43 +00:00
jschoubben d6dd21a091 only-office: its directories are placed, not stated
Seven data directories drop their paths; the mesh resolves each to
<root>/only-office/<id>, which is exactly where the data already sits —
a textual no-op on this node, and the first module speaking ADR 0112's
vocabulary. The module root and the mesh's own state stay stated.
2026-09-26 18:01:31 +02:00
jschoubben a844701577 Merge pull request 'Module data lives in /var/lib, now that nothing is mid-cutover' (#97) from feat/module-data-lives-in-var-lib into main 2026-09-26 14:47:37 +00:00
jschoubben 50a99f022c Module data lives in /var/lib, now that nothing is mid-cutover
The /services paths were the adopted-node pattern doing its job: take
replaced containers over the predecessor's data without moving a byte
(gitea set it — 'its data never moved'). With every cutover done the
exception has no reason left, and the operator called it: a nox
module's world is /var/lib/<module>, data included. Six modules
repathed; mssql keeps its /services path deliberately — it is still
held, HAL-run, and moves at its own take. Both trees are one
filesystem, so each move is a rename.
2026-09-26 16:47:24 +02:00
jschoubben 382a44621e Merge pull request 'A bucket is the one the mesh derives, and the photos module named another' (#96) from fix/a-bucket-is-the-one-the-mesh-derives into main 2026-09-26 14:46:30 +00:00
jochen ddb67fc095 A bucket is the one the mesh derives, and the photos module named another
The provisioner derives a consumer's bucket from the login the mesh minted — 'derived from the
login, so teardown recomputes it with nothing to persist' — and never reads the bucket a manifest
contributed. Three modules contributed one anyway, and the value was decorative in two and wrong in
the third: photos told its container MINIO_BUCKET=photos, the predecessor's bucket, while its minted
key is scoped to mesh-novox-photos. Deployed as it stood, it would have authenticated and then been
denied on every object.

photos now names the bucket the mesh actually provisions, and the contributed bucket is gone from
all three: a value nothing reads, that reads as though it decides.

Verified against the live store before changing anything: the derived names are the populated ones —
mesh-novox-ncloud (77,886 objects, 174.9 GiB), mesh-novox-photos and mesh-novox-invoice. Nothing has
to move.
2026-09-26 16:46:10 +02:00
jschoubben 78595e4db3 Merge pull request 'lavinmq: the broker TLS directory is the operator's, read by whoever needs it' (#95) from fix/the-broker-tls-directory-is-the-operators into main 2026-09-26 14:12:45 +00:00
jschoubben 37634de1e3 lavinmq: the broker TLS directory is the operator's, read by whoever needs it
The controller now accesses /var/lib/mesh-broker-tls (mesh-controller
#54) and the push refused whole: lavinmq declared the directory as an
owned resource, and shared data is the operator's, owned by no module
(ADR 0051). lavinmq only ever reads the certs — genesis laid them down
— so it declares a read access like the controller does, and the
directory belongs to nobody.
2026-09-26 16:12:29 +02:00
jschoubben 36c5f87130 Merge pull request 'route-adapter: write a body limit as the predecessor's buffering middleware' (#94) from feat/a-route-may-limit-the-body-it-carries into main 2026-09-26 14:02:03 +00:00
jochen b2e39eb2cd route-adapter: write a body limit as the predecessor's buffering middleware
The adapter skips what its one file shape cannot say. A body limit is the exception: the predecessor
has a buffering middleware and served its own registry name with exactly it, so this is written
rather than skipped, named after the router so the two halves cannot drift.

A limit that is not a whole positive number of bytes takes the route with it. Written without the
limit, the predecessor would carry what the module said not to carry and this module would report
success. Silence stays silence — no middleware, the predecessor's default.
2026-09-26 16:01:23 +02:00
jschoubben 3d73c9f54e Merge pull request 'nextcloud: real mesh module, MariaDB→PostgreSQL, S3 via _FILE secrets' (#59) from feat/nextcloud-module-postgres-migration into main 2026-09-26 13:06:32 +00:00
jschoubben fb95eb6e46 Merge main 2026-09-26 15:06:11 +02:00
jschoubben 4d715f8b73 Merge pull request 'minio: the real 4-node/8-drive erasure-coded cluster, both public routes, verified live on novox' (#58) from feat/minio-real-cluster-not-single-node into main 2026-09-26 13:05:57 +00:00
jochen afe8aae826 Merge main
# Conflicts:
#	modules/minio/module.json
2026-09-26 15:05:40 +02:00
jschoubben fa91be4941 Merge pull request 'postgres: declare the data directory's real owner; keycloak: use the port template' (#55) from fix/postgres-owner-and-keycloak-port-template into main 2026-09-26 13:05:10 +00:00
jschoubben 87f73dce6a Merge main 2026-09-26 15:04:47 +02:00
jschoubben fc5ccdfe2a Merge pull request 'mailu: one WEBMAIL_ADDRESS, the mesh's container name' (#93) from fix/one-webmail-address into main 2026-09-26 13:04:44 +00:00
jschoubben 4489e56935 mailu: one WEBMAIL_ADDRESS, the mesh's container name
The env block carried the key twice — mailu-webmail from #79's address
sweep, and a stray =webmail further down that survived it. Last write
wins in an env file, so the front resolved a name that answers nowhere
on the mesh's network and 502'd every logged-in webmail request. Latent
since the cutover: the SSO redirect the checks watched never touches
the upstream; the operator's first real login did.
2026-09-26 15:04:32 +02:00
jschoubben 08e947e4c8 Merge pull request 'The npm registry is a seat gitea holds, and gitea holds the git seat a build's source can live on' (#69) from feat/seats-are-a-closed-set into main 2026-09-26 12:31:10 +00:00
jschoubben 7fb9dd0254 Merge main 2026-09-26 14:29:28 +02:00
jschoubben 420d05e8dd Merge pull request 'mailu certifies itself, take two — the fall-through is now a behaviour' (#92) from fix/mailu-certifies-itself-take-two into main 2026-09-26 12:27:56 +00:00
jschoubben 6769e66c82 mailu certifies itself, take two — the fall-through is now a behaviour
Take one (#90) died on two real edge bugs, both fixed and pinned by
tests in mesh-controller (#66: autocert 404s unknown tokens itself;
#67: the internal authority 403s every public name before the token
lookup). The challenge path verified end to end reaching mailu's own
nginx before this flip.
2026-09-26 14:27:45 +02:00
jschoubben 15b35b53db Merge pull request 'mailu: back to the copied cert — the edge's fall-through is a belief, not a behaviour' (#91) from fix/mailu-back-to-cert-while-the-fallthrough-is-fixed into main 2026-09-26 12:19:17 +00:00
jschoubben 6177565741 mailu: back to the copied cert — the edge's fall-through is a belief, not a behaviour
The letsencrypt flavor served certbot's April-expired state to live IMAPS
users within minutes: autocert's HTTPHandler answers 404 itself for
tokens it does not hold and never consults the fallback for challenge
paths, so mailu's own client cannot answer through the path-scoped
route. cert flavor (valid to Nov 27) until route-proxy's handler
actually falls through.
2026-09-26 14:19:05 +02:00
jschoubben 6b2ea0972a Merge pull request 'mailu certifies itself: the edge passes unknown ACME tokens through now' (#90) from fix/mailu-certifies-itself into main 2026-09-26 12:15:24 +00:00
jschoubben a978b53d1c mailu certifies itself: the edge passes unknown ACME tokens through now
PR #82 set TLS_FLAVOR=cert as the honest interim while the predecessor's
proxy owned /.well-known/acme-challenge outright. route-proxy took port
80 today and its handler passes unknown tokens through to routed paths
by design — the one line #82 promised, made now. The copied cert (valid
to Nov 27) stays on disk untouched; mailu's own certbot takes over from
here.
2026-09-26 14:15:12 +02:00
jschoubben 7501c1db9e Merge pull request 'portainer: serve its public name, hold its real data, run the image the machine runs' (#89) from fix/portainer-serves-its-name into main 2026-09-26 01:46:24 +00:00
jschoubben 00ada1e9f7 portainer: serve its public name, hold its real data, run the image the machine runs
The manifest predated the working deployment on three axes: it declared a
data directory the running portainer never used (taking it would have
started empty), pinned an image digest the machine has moved past (issue
099), and contributed no route while portainer.novox.be rides a traefik
container label today. Now: the predecessor's portainer_data path, the
running image's digest, 9090:9000 kept as the predecessor's machine port
with the route contribution naming it, and 9443 kept for the runtime
sidecar's own TLS conversation.
2026-09-26 03:46:11 +02:00
jschoubben 67b443d5ad Merge pull request 'only-office: pin the machine side of its port' (#88) from fix/only-office-pins-its-machine-port into main 2026-09-26 01:44:59 +00:00
jschoubben a2da2e4910 only-office: pin the machine side of its port
A bare '80' tried to bind the node's port 80 — the edge's — instead of
auto-allocating. 9070 is the predecessor's number and the one the route
contribution already names.
2026-09-26 03:44:47 +02:00
jschoubben bcb9ca8f93 Merge pull request 'invoicing: MONGO_DB says the granted database's name' (#87) from fix/invoicing-names-its-database into main 2026-09-26 01:34:09 +00:00
jschoubben 2409afda60 invoicing: MONGO_DB says the granted database's name
The app reads MONGO_DB (default 'invoicing') for every operation and
uses the URL only to connect — listCollections ran against a database
the granted user cannot see. Same fault and same fix as photos' MONGO_DB,
found by the API's own logs at take.
2026-09-26 03:34:00 +02:00
jschoubben 511200ed9c Merge pull request 'invoicing: the photos lessons, applied before its window' (#86) from fix/invoicing-learns-the-photos-lessons into main 2026-09-26 01:15:38 +00:00
jschoubben b704bf5ad8 invoicing: the photos lessons, applied before its window
The mongo credential authenticates against its own database and the
database is the granted one (mesh_novox_invoice), not the contributed
name the provisioner ignores. Same for the store: the key is sealed to
the derived bucket (mesh-novox-invoice) — the data mirrors in during the
window, the ncloud/photos pattern. And the api gets the route
contribution it always needed: invoicing-api.novox.be is today a traefik
container label, invisible to every file survey, and it must be a grant
before the edge can ever flip.
2026-09-26 03:15:26 +02:00
jschoubben 142d65c52a Merge pull request 'mongodb: the server container is mongodb-server, not the predecessor's name' (#85) from fix/mongodb-coexists-with-the-predecessor into main 2026-09-26 00:37:51 +00:00
jschoubben ccb6e7500e mongodb: the server container is mongodb-server, not the predecessor's name
The adopted node still runs the predecessor's mongo container, and it must
keep running: invoicing points at novox.be:27017 and is not migrating in
this window. A module container named 'mongo' would be held at assign and
would replace the predecessor at take, cutting invoicing off its database.
The mesh's server coexists instead — fresh data directory, its own name,
auto-allocated machine port — and the predecessor retires with its last
consumer.
2026-09-26 01:37:41 +02:00
jschoubben bbda88c13b Merge pull request 'Every credential provider says whether it still holds a consumer (hq issue 120)' (#84) from fix/120-redis-says-what-it-holds into main 2026-09-25 23:31:28 +00:00
jochen 620b47d309 mssql remaps a user only when orphaned; mailu's operator tool no longer re-enables
ALTER USER ... WITH LOGIN runs only when the user's SID is not the
login's, so an already-mapped user is left alone. The provisioner
enables a mailbox through its own method; the password tool an
operator uses keeps changing the password only.
2026-09-26 01:30:15 +02:00
jochen 6fd93afc6c Review fixes: holds and create agree, and no password leaves a check
create re-enables what holds refuses (mssql login, mosquitto client,
mailu mailbox, gitea user) and clears an expired postgres password, so
no disabled account loops. mssql and mongodb checks take the password
from the environment, never argv; mosquitto_ctrl failures no longer
repeat -P. mosquitto reads 'could not ask' as an error, not absence.
mailu checks existence and enabled only: its imap passdb cannot verify
a password. mssql checks the user's SID; gitea pages teams at 50.
2026-09-26 01:24:32 +02:00
jochen 0cb0f814b4 Every credential provider says whether it still holds a consumer
holds() for postgres, mssql, mongodb, minio, lavinmq, mosquitto, mailu
and gitea, so the harness makes again a login the backend lost (hq issue
120). Each checks the mesh's password as the consumer presents it, or
compares it read-only, and returns false only when the backend says the
credential is absent or wrong; an unreachable backend throws.
2026-09-26 01:09:52 +02:00
jochen 3d271f72ea redis: say whether it still holds a consumer's ACL user
The server keeps ACL users in memory only, so a restart forgets every
consumer while the provisioner keeps running (hq issue 120). holds()
checks ACL GETUSER for the user, enabled, with the mesh's password, so
the harness makes a forgotten user again. Needs mesh-sdk 0.1.1.
2026-09-26 00:53:13 +02:00
jochen 45dd036623 The npm registry is a seat gitea holds, and gitea holds the git seat a build's source can live on
Implements novox/hq ADR 0109, 0110 and 0111 in the catalogue.

package-registry becomes npm-package-registry throughout (ADR 0109): gitea provides and serves it,
verdaccio provides it, the builder requires, binds and receives its secret under it. gitea's
contributions file is grants/npm.json, so a second ecosystem's file has an obvious name beside it.

gitea claims two mesh seats (ADR 0110): npm-package-registry, which it delivers, and git, which it
now provides with what a clone URL is composed from — http on the forge's web port (ADR 0111).
verdaccio provides npm-package-registry and claims nothing: it is the second provider the seat
exists to make harmless, since a consumer now resolves to the seat's holder without a pin.

No cargo or PyPI provision is added; ADR 0109 defers that. git mints no credential, so gitea's
provisioner registers nothing for it — the mesh's own repositories are public, and a clone
credential is undecided (ADR 0111).

The provisioner still reads where its contributions land from $MESH_RECEIVES, and names no path
itself. One variable carries one path, so a second registration in this module would need the mesh
to say where each provision's file is; that is not possible yet and is not faked here.

Verified: the controller's tests read this catalogue — every claim is a seat in the set, the forge
holds both seats and serves what a clone URL needs, the builder requires what the npm seat delivers
— and pass. Not verified here: a TypeScript build of gitea, whose dependencies resolve from the
private registry.
2026-09-25 20:48:10 +02:00
jschoubben 107090310d nextcloud: point S3 config at the bucket the mesh actually provisioned
OBJECTSTORE_S3_BUCKET=nextcloud was a leftover from before the module
existed — that bucket was created by hand during tonight's earlier HAL
credential stopgap. The mesh's own minio provisioner derives its own
bucket name from the consumer's access-key identity (bucketFor(as) in
minio/client.ts) rather than honouring contributes.s3-bucket.bucket — by
design, so teardown can recompute the name with nothing persisted — and
minted mesh-novox-ncloud, a different bucket. mesh_novox_ncloud's scoped
policy only covers that bucket, so every S3 write 403'd with AccessDenied
trying to touch the old one. Pointed both the request hint and the real
env var at the bucket that's actually there.
2026-09-25 14:42:57 +02:00
jschoubben 440e3e446e minio: set the region to eu-west, matching where this mesh actually runs
Left at MinIO's us-east-1 default. Novox is hosted in Germany, the team
is in Belgium -- eu-west is correct, and matters beyond labeling: it's
part of the SigV4 signature, so a client using the wrong region fails
auth even with valid credentials. Set on the server (MINIO_REGION),
the served provision value, and the runtime sidecar's own client.
2026-09-25 10:45:01 +02:00
jschoubben 20df40c949 minio: revert to single-node after measuring the real cost of sharding
The 4-node/8-drive erasure-coded cluster matched HAL's topology faithfully,
but real throughput testing against both showed why that costs more than
it's worth here: every write on the sharded cluster fans out across 4
processes over the internal network with erasure-coding overhead, capping
safe throughput around 1.3-2 MiB/s and breaking outright above ~256
concurrent transfers (IncompleteBody errors, confirmed via a controlled
512x test). The identical copy against a single-node instance sustained
23+ MiB/s at the same concurrency with zero errors — over 10x faster,
verified side-by-side, not assumed.

Trades away erasure-coded redundancy (no single-drive fault tolerance) for
that throughput. Deliberate, and reversible if it turns out to matter later
-- the data itself is migrated over the S3 API either way, so the storage
topology underneath isn't locked in by anything upstream of it.
2026-09-24 23:07:02 +02:00
jschoubben 6a6dd4a7dc minio: name the network minio-net, not minio
Collided with the LB container's own name. docker inspect minio resolved
to the network instead of the (not-yet-created) container, and mesh-host's
existence check crashed on the mismatched shape rather than reporting
absence -- a real mesh-host bug (fixed separately, mesh-host#25), but this
sidesteps it here without waiting on a host-level binary update.
2026-09-24 20:31:20 +02:00
jschoubben 973d80aaa2 minio: publish both public routes now that a module can answer route twice
files-api.novox.be (port 9000, the S3 data API) and files.novox.be (port
9001, the console) — same two names HAL routes today, via nginx's own
upstream split. Needed mesh-controller#55 (a module answering one
requirement several times) to exist first; it's merged and deployed.
2026-09-24 18:45:52 +02:00
jschoubben 945390e59a minio: run the real 4-node/8-drive erasure-coded cluster, not a single container
The single standalone instance from the first pass didn't match HAL's actual
topology: HAL runs minio1-4, two drives each, behind an nginx load balancer
on 9000 (S3) and 9001 (console). This rewrite mirrors that exactly — same
node count, same erasure-coding command, same LB config — so the migration
is a real like-for-like move, not a simplification.

Only the two images that had to change did: the minio server (dead upstream,
already fixed in the prior commit) and nginx (1.19.2-alpine is long EOL;
repinned to current stable-alpine by digest). Data still lands on a fresh,
empty, mesh-owned path, never HAL's live drives.

The OIDC-wait entrypoint wrapper HAL used is dropped: it's a no-op when
MINIO_IDENTITY_OPENID_CONFIG_URL is unset (it always is here — no OIDC
integration was ever wired to minio itself), and this catalogue has no
container resource field for overriding a container's entrypoint anyway —
every converted module relies on the image's own entrypoint plus args,
which is exactly what the original single-node version already did.
2026-09-24 18:31:38 +02:00
jschoubben ed0f4602a6 keycloak: use Hostname v2's actual config shape, not v1's deprecated flags
The previous commit on this branch used KC_PROXY=edge and
KC_HOSTNAME_STRICT_HTTPS=true, carried over from HAL's config -- but
HAL ran an older Keycloak using the v1 hostname provider. This image
(26.0.8) defaults to Hostname v2, which warned 'options [proxy,
hostname-strict-https] are still in use, please review your
configuration' and kept generating http:// URLs regardless -- verified
against /realms/Novox/.well-known/openid-configuration directly, not
just the login button, after the first fix deployed.

v2's actual shape (keycloak.org/server/hostname): KC_HOSTNAME is a full
URL, not a bare hostname -- the scheme in the URL is what tells Keycloak
to generate https, not a separate strict-https flag. KC_PROXY_HEADERS
replaces KC_PROXY: xforwarded to trust traefik's X-Forwarded-* headers,
which it sends by default.
2026-09-24 17:27:04 +02:00
jschoubben 13d0361640 keycloak: carry over HAL's hostname/proxy settings, dropped during conversion
Reported: files.novox.be's login button redirects to http://keycloak.novox.be,
not https. HAL's original config (/services/keycloak/docker-compose.yml) set
three settings the mesh's manifest never carried over:

  KC_HOSTNAME: keycloak.novox.be
  KC_HOSTNAME_STRICT_HTTPS: true
  KC_PROXY: edge

Without KC_PROXY: edge, Keycloak has no way to know it sits behind a
TLS-terminating reverse proxy (traefik) -- it generates URLs from what it
directly sees, which is plain HTTP from traefik's backend connection. Same
pattern as the named-volume conversion: the shape was rebuilt from general
knowledge of what a keycloak container needs, not from what this
installation's own working config actually had.
2026-09-24 17:25:16 +02:00
jschoubben 61eb201f8a postgres: declare the data directory's real owner; keycloak: use the port template
postgres: mesh-store's data directory has always had split ownership --
everything inside pgdata/ is owned by UID 999 (the pgvector image's real
runtime user), while only the top-level mount point happened to be 70:70.
Invisible while the directory's mode was 1777 (world-accessible, from the
named volume this replaced); broke the moment mode: 0700 was enforced,
locking out the actual owning process. mesh-store crash-looped on
Permission denied twice before this was found -- once at container
creation, once mid-session on a checkpoint, after ownership looked correct
by every check that didn't look inside pgdata/ specifically.

keycloak: MESH_KEYCLOAK_URL was hardcoded to :8080, but the module's own
port override (settings set keycloak {ports:{8080:28080}} on novox) means
the real published port is 28080. Same bug class as the postgres
connection-string fix earlier tonight -- now using the mesh's own
 template instead, which is exactly the mechanism
internal/catalogue/port_into.go describes for a sidecar dialling its own
server over the machine's loopback.
2026-09-24 16:39:11 +02:00
194 changed files with 5162 additions and 2105 deletions
-56
View File
@@ -1,56 +0,0 @@
{
"module": "amqp-email-forwarder",
"version": "1",
"slug": "emailfwd",
"capabilities": [
"container-runtime"
],
"requires": [
"amqp"
],
"contributes": {},
"binds": {
"amqp": "/var/lib/amqp-email-forwarder/amqp.json"
},
"secrets": {
"amqp": "/var/lib/amqp-email-forwarder/amqp.secret"
},
"own-secrets": {
"smtp-user": "/var/lib/amqp-email-forwarder/smtp-user.secret",
"smtp-password": "/var/lib/amqp-email-forwarder/smtp-password.secret"
},
"resources": [
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/amqp-email-forwarder",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "app-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/amqp-email-forwarder/app.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "AMQP_HOST=${bound:amqp:at}\nAMQP_PORT=${bound:amqp:port}\nAMQP_USER=${bound:amqp:as}\nAMQP_VHOST=EMAILDELIVERY_T\nAMQP_EXCHANGE=News.TransactionalEmailing.Command\nAMQP_QUEUE=email-forwarder\nAMQP_URL=amqp://${bound:amqp:as}:${secret:amqp}@${bound:amqp:at}:${bound:amqp:port}/EMAILDELIVERY_T\nSMTP_HOST=mail.novox.be\nSMTP_PORT=587\nSMTP_USER=${secret:smtp-user}\nSMTP_PASSWORD=${secret:smtp-password}\n"
},
{
"id": "net",
"type": "network",
"name": "amqp-email-forwarder"
},
{
"id": "app",
"type": "container",
"name": "amqp-email-forwarder",
"image": "registry-api.novox.be/novox/amqp-email-forwarder@sha256:f76d34646d9d3b2098c72688a63f6ae656f1888ffcb2f90a9c8dd2a44ad7f8af",
"network": "amqp-email-forwarder",
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/amqp-email-forwarder/app.env"
],
"restart-on": [
"app-env"
],
"secrets-in-environment": "the application's own code reads AMQP_URL, SMTP_USER and SMTP_PASSWORD from the environment (amqp-email-forwarder app.js); converting is that repository's change"
}
]
}
-31
View File
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
# amqp-ping's runtime: the tool runtime, carrying this module's compiled code.
#
# **Built from this module's own directory and nothing else.** The sdk and the tool runtime are not
# copied out of neighbouring checkouts — they are in the base image, which is published like any
# other artifact. That is what makes this buildable by the mesh from a repository and a path
# (novox/hq ADR 0069) rather than only on a workstation that happens to have the siblings.
#
# Two bases, named rather than pinned: the image this is COMPILED in, and the image it RUNS in.
# They are different images on purpose — the first carries a compiler and the second must not, or
# every running container would carry one it never invokes. The mesh answers both with the copies it
# holds, because a fingerprint written here would name one particular copy and no other mesh has it
# (novox/hq issue 044). Declared in module.json's `build.on`; deliberately no defaults, so a build
# nobody told stops here and says which module to build first.
ARG BUILD_BASE
ARG RUNTIME_BASE
FROM ${BUILD_BASE} AS build
# Compiled under /app/modules, so resolving `@novox/mesh-sdk` walks up to the base's own
# node_modules — the module is compiled against exactly the sdk it will run against.
WORKDIR /app/modules/amqp-ping
COPY . .
# The compiler is invoked by its real path, not through node_modules/.bin. Those are symlinks to
# a launcher that requires its library relatively, and the base image resolves them when copying —
# leaving a launcher whose relative require no longer points at anything.
RUN node /app/node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc client.ts index.ts \
--module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist
FROM ${RUNTIME_BASE}
COPY --from=build /app/modules/amqp-ping/dist /app/modules/amqp-ping/dist
# Declared rather than derived from which files happen to exist: the module knows what it serves.
ENV MESH_TOOL_MODULES=/app/modules/amqp-ping/dist/index.js
-191
View File
@@ -1,191 +0,0 @@
// amqp-ping's AMQP client — the demo consumer's own code (novox/hq ADR 0039). It speaks AMQP 0-9-1
// directly over a raw TCP socket (node:net), the way redis's client speaks RESP: the module carries
// NO npm dependency beyond @novox/mesh-sdk — no amqplib, no CLI in the image. It does exactly one
// thing, the round-trip that proves the grant works: connect, authenticate with PLAIN to the vhost
// the mesh named, declare a queue, publish one message and get it back.
//
// This is the consumer half of the `amqp` interface. It connects as the login the mesh derived
// (`${bound:amqp:as}`) with the password the mesh minted (`${secret:amqp}`) to a vhost of that SAME
// name — the provider named the vhost after the login, so the consumer must too. Nothing here is
// hardcoded: user AND vhost are both the bound login, and a wrong vhost is refused by the broker.
import { createConnection, type Socket } from "node:net";
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
const FRAME_END = 0xce;
const PROTOCOL_HEADER = Buffer.from([0x41, 0x4d, 0x51, 0x50, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09, 0x01]); // "AMQP" 0-9-1
export interface AmqpConn {
readonly host: string;
readonly port: number;
readonly user: string;
readonly password: string;
readonly vhost: string;
}
/** Build the connection facts from the environment the mesh's env-file set (see the module manifest). */
export function connFromEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): AmqpConn {
const host = env.MESH_AMQP_HOST ?? "";
const port = Number(env.MESH_AMQP_PORT ?? "5672") || 5672;
const user = env.MESH_AMQP_USER ?? "";
const vhost = env.MESH_AMQP_VHOST ?? user; // the provider names the vhost after the login
const password = env.MESH_AMQP_PASSWORD ?? readMaybe(env.MESH_AMQP_PASSWORD_FILE);
if (!host || !user || !password) {
throw new Error(`amqp-ping: connection is not fully set yet (host=${host} user=${user} password=${password ? "set" : "unset"})`);
}
return { host, port, user, password, vhost };
}
// --- wire helpers ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
function shortstr(s: string): Buffer {
const b = Buffer.from(s, "utf8");
const o = Buffer.alloc(1 + b.length);
o.writeUInt8(b.length, 0);
b.copy(o, 1);
return o;
}
function longstr(s: Buffer | string): Buffer {
const b = Buffer.isBuffer(s) ? s : Buffer.from(s, "utf8");
const o = Buffer.alloc(4 + b.length);
o.writeUInt32BE(b.length, 0);
b.copy(o, 4);
return o;
}
function u16(n: number): Buffer {
const o = Buffer.alloc(2);
o.writeUInt16BE(n, 0);
return o;
}
function u32(n: number): Buffer {
const o = Buffer.alloc(4);
o.writeUInt32BE(n, 0);
return o;
}
function frame(type: number, channel: number, payload: Buffer): Buffer {
const o = Buffer.alloc(7 + payload.length + 1);
o.writeUInt8(type, 0);
o.writeUInt16BE(channel, 1);
o.writeUInt32BE(payload.length, 3);
payload.copy(o, 7);
o.writeUInt8(FRAME_END, 7 + payload.length);
return o;
}
function method(channel: number, classId: number, methodId: number, ...parts: Buffer[]): Buffer {
return frame(1, channel, Buffer.concat([u16(classId), u16(methodId), ...parts]));
}
interface MethodWaiter {
classId: number;
methodId: number;
resolve: (args: Buffer) => void;
reject: (e: Error) => void;
}
/**
* Connect, authenticate to the vhost, declare a queue, publish one message and get it back. Returns
* the body that came back — the caller checks it equals what went out. Throws on any protocol error,
* including the broker's `NOT_ALLOWED` refusal of a vhost the login has no permission on (the
* isolation the provider builds, seen from the consumer's side).
*/
export function roundTrip(conn: AmqpConn, queue = "amqp-ping", payload?: string): Promise<string> {
const body = Buffer.from(payload ?? `ping-${Date.now()}`);
return new Promise<string>((resolve, reject) => {
const sock: Socket = createConnection({ host: conn.host, port: conn.port });
let buf = Buffer.alloc(0);
const waiters: MethodWaiter[] = [];
let lastBody: Buffer | null = null;
let done = false;
const fail = (e: Error): void => {
if (done) return;
done = true;
sock.destroy();
reject(e);
};
const expect = (classId: number, methodId: number): Promise<Buffer> =>
new Promise((res, rej) => waiters.push({ classId, methodId, resolve: res, reject: rej }));
sock.on("error", (e) => fail(e));
sock.on("close", () => fail(new Error("amqp connection closed before the round-trip completed")));
sock.on("data", (chunk: Buffer) => {
buf = Buffer.concat([buf, chunk]);
for (;;) {
if (buf.length < 7) return;
const type = buf.readUInt8(0);
const size = buf.readUInt32BE(3);
if (buf.length < 7 + size + 1) return;
const framePayload = buf.subarray(7, 7 + size);
buf = buf.subarray(7 + size + 1);
if (type === 1) {
const classId = framePayload.readUInt16BE(0);
const methodId = framePayload.readUInt16BE(2);
const args = framePayload.subarray(4);
const w = waiters.shift();
if (!w) continue;
if (w.classId === classId && w.methodId === methodId) w.resolve(args);
else w.reject(new Error(`expected method ${w.classId}/${w.methodId}, got ${classId}/${methodId}: ${args.toString("utf8")}`));
} else if (type === 3) {
lastBody = framePayload; // a content body frame
}
// type 2 (content header) and type 8 (heartbeat) need no handling for this round-trip.
}
});
sock.on("connect", () => {
void (async () => {
try {
sock.write(PROTOCOL_HEADER);
await expect(10, 10); // Connection.Start
const response = Buffer.concat([
Buffer.from([0]), Buffer.from(conn.user, "utf8"), Buffer.from([0]), Buffer.from(conn.password, "utf8"),
]);
// Connection.Start-Ok: empty client-properties table, PLAIN, the SASL response, locale.
sock.write(method(0, 10, 11, u32(0), shortstr("PLAIN"), longstr(response), shortstr("en_US")));
const tune = await expect(10, 30); // Connection.Tune
const frameMax = tune.readUInt32BE(2) || 131072;
sock.write(method(0, 10, 31, u16(tune.readUInt16BE(0)), u32(frameMax), u16(0))); // Tune-Ok, no heartbeat
sock.write(method(0, 10, 40, shortstr(conn.vhost), shortstr(""), Buffer.from([0]))); // Connection.Open
await expect(10, 41); // Open-Ok — authenticated and into the vhost
sock.write(method(1, 20, 10, shortstr(""))); // Channel.Open
await expect(20, 11);
// Queue.Declare: reserved, queue, bits(auto-delete=1), empty arguments table.
sock.write(method(1, 50, 10, u16(0), shortstr(queue), Buffer.from([0b00001000]), u32(0)));
await expect(50, 11);
// Basic.Publish to the default exchange, routing-key = queue; then content header + body.
sock.write(method(1, 60, 40, u16(0), shortstr(""), shortstr(queue), Buffer.from([0])));
const bodySize = Buffer.alloc(8);
bodySize.writeBigUInt64BE(BigInt(body.length), 0);
sock.write(frame(2, 1, Buffer.concat([u16(60), u16(0), bodySize, u16(0)]))); // content header, no properties
sock.write(frame(3, 1, body)); // content body
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 200));
lastBody = null;
sock.write(method(1, 60, 70, u16(0), shortstr(queue), Buffer.from([1]))); // Basic.Get, no-ack
await expect(60, 71); // Get-Ok (a Get-Empty would arrive as 60/72 and reject the expect)
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 200));
const received = lastBody ? (lastBody as Buffer).toString("utf8") : "";
sock.write(method(0, 10, 50, u16(200), shortstr("bye"), u16(0), u16(0))); // Connection.Close
await expect(10, 51).catch(() => undefined);
done = true;
sock.end();
resolve(received);
} catch (e) {
fail(e instanceof Error ? e : new Error(String(e)));
}
})();
});
});
}
function readMaybe(path: string | undefined): string {
if (!path) return "";
try {
return readFileSync(path, "utf8").replace(/\n$/, "");
} catch {
return "";
}
}
-53
View File
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
// amqp-ping — a tiny demo consumer of the mesh `amqp` interface, run as a long-lived container by
// `mesh-tools run` (it never returns, so the container stays up). It exists to PROVE the grant end to
// end: the mesh gave it a scoped login and a vhost of that name on the lavinmq provider, and this
// connects with exactly those and round-trips a message.
//
// The connection facts arrive the way every consumer's do — the mesh writes them into an env-file the
// container reads (novox/hq ADR 0048): MESH_AMQP_HOST/PORT from the binding, MESH_AMQP_USER and
// MESH_AMQP_VHOST both from `${bound:amqp:as}` (the provider named the vhost after the login, so the
// consumer uses the login for both — the db-name lesson applied to AMQP), and MESH_AMQP_PASSWORD from
// `${secret:amqp}`.
//
// It retries: on first boot the provider may not have provisioned this consumer yet (the reconcile is
// asynchronous and cross-container), so a refused or unreachable connection is a "not yet", not a
// failure — it waits and tries again until the round-trip succeeds, then holds the connection idle
// and re-pings on a slow cadence so the container is a stable, running proof.
import { connFromEnv, roundTrip } from "./client.js";
async function sleep(ms: number): Promise<void> {
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, ms));
}
async function pingOnce(): Promise<boolean> {
try {
const conn = connFromEnv();
const sent = `ping-${Date.now()}`;
const got = await roundTrip(conn, "amqp-ping", sent);
if (got === sent) {
console.log(`[amqp-ping] round-trip ok as ${conn.user} on vhost ${conn.vhost} (${conn.host}:${conn.port})`);
return true;
}
console.error(`[amqp-ping] round-trip mismatch: sent ${sent}, got ${got}`);
return false;
} catch (err) {
console.error(`[amqp-ping] not ready yet: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : err}`);
return false;
}
}
// Wait for the first successful round-trip — the proof this consumer's grant works — then stay up.
let first = false;
for (let i = 0; !first; i++) {
first = await pingOnce();
if (!first) await sleep(3000);
}
console.log("[amqp-ping] connected and round-tripped; holding steady");
for (;;) {
await sleep(30000);
await pingOnce();
}
// changed by the one-node test at build 66e54af151df
// changed by the one-node test at build 4fb41636cffd
// changed by the one-node test at build a69f083bf6a6
-89
View File
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
{
"module": "amqp-ping",
"slug": "ping",
"version": "1",
"capabilities": [
"container-runtime"
],
"requires": [
"amqp"
],
"contributes": {},
"binds": {
"amqp": "/var/lib/amqp-ping/amqp.json"
},
"secrets": {
"amqp": "/var/lib/amqp-ping/amqp.secret"
},
"own-secrets": {
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/amqp-ping/broker"
},
"resources": [
{
"id": "mesh-state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/amqp-ping",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/amqp-ping",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "amqp-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/amqp-ping/amqp.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "MESH_AMQP_HOST=${bound:amqp:at}\nMESH_AMQP_PORT=${bound:amqp:port}\nMESH_AMQP_USER=${bound:amqp:as}\nMESH_AMQP_VHOST=${bound:amqp:as}\n"
},
{
"id": "net",
"type": "network",
"name": "amqp-ping"
},
{
"id": "runtime",
"type": "container",
"name": "amqp-ping",
"network": "amqp-ping",
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/amqp-ping/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/amqp-ping/amqp.secret:/run/secrets/amqp:ro"
],
"env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_AMQP_PASSWORD_FILE": "/run/secrets/amqp"
},
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/amqp-ping/amqp.env"
],
"restart-on": [
"amqp-env"
],
"artifact": "runtime"
}
],
"build": {
"on": [
{
"arg": "BUILD_BASE",
"module": "mesh-tools",
"artifact": "build"
},
{
"arg": "RUNTIME_BASE",
"module": "mesh-tools",
"artifact": "runtime"
}
],
"artifacts": [
{
"name": "runtime",
"kind": "image",
"from": "Dockerfile"
}
]
}
}
-14
View File
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
{
"name": "@novox/module-amqp-ping",
"version": "0.1.0",
"description": "amqp-ping — a demo consumer of the mesh amqp interface. Connects with its scoped grant and round-trips one message to prove the broker the mesh gave it (novox/hq ADR 0039).",
"type": "module",
"private": true,
"dependencies": {
"@novox/mesh-sdk": "^0.1.0"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@types/node": "^22.0.0",
"typescript": "^5.6.0"
}
}
-12
View File
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
{
"compilerOptions": {
"target": "ES2022",
"module": "NodeNext",
"moduleResolution": "NodeNext",
"strict": true,
"esModuleInterop": true,
"skipLibCheck": true,
"noEmit": true
},
"include": ["client.ts", "index.ts"]
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/anthropic-consumer/broker" "broker": "/var/lib/mesh/anthropic-consumer/broker"
}, },
"emits": [ "emits": [
"module.anthropic-consumer.usage.session" "usage.session"
], ],
"resources": [ "resources": [
{ {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ async function emitUsage(body: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<void> {
await new Promise<void>((resolve) => { await new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
const child = spawn( const child = spawn(
process.execPath, process.execPath,
[main, "emit", "module.anthropic-consumer.usage.session", JSON.stringify(body)], [main, "emit", "usage.session", JSON.stringify(body)],
{ stdio: "inherit" }, { stdio: "inherit" },
); );
child.on("exit", () => resolve()); child.on("exit", () => resolve());
+1 -1
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/broker" "broker": "/var/lib/mesh/anthropic-manager/broker"
}, },
"emits": [ "emits": [
"module.anthropic-manager.usage.read" "usage.read"
], ],
"resources": [ "resources": [
{ {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ async function emitUsage(body: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<void> {
const main = process.env.MESH_TOOLS_MAIN ?? "/app/dist/main.js"; const main = process.env.MESH_TOOLS_MAIN ?? "/app/dist/main.js";
const { spawn } = await import("node:child_process"); const { spawn } = await import("node:child_process");
await new Promise<void>((resolve) => { await new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
const child = spawn(process.execPath, [main, "emit", "module.anthropic-manager.usage.read", JSON.stringify(body)], { const child = spawn(process.execPath, [main, "emit", "usage.read", JSON.stringify(body)], {
stdio: "inherit", stdio: "inherit",
}); });
child.on("exit", () => resolve()); child.on("exit", () => resolve());
+1 -1
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
"version": "1", "version": "1",
"slug": "audit", "slug": "audit",
"consumes": [ "consumes": [
"#" "**"
], ],
"own-secrets": { "own-secrets": {
"broker": "/var/lib/audit-logger/broker" "broker": "/var/lib/audit-logger/broker"
+3 -3
View File
@@ -15,16 +15,16 @@ test("audit-logger records every event to the trail as one line each", async ()
const path = join(dir, "audit.log"); const path = join(dir, "audit.log");
// The audit-logger's whole behaviour: consume everything, record it. // The audit-logger's whole behaviour: consume everything, record it.
await on("#", async (event) => record(event, path)); await on("**", async (event) => record(event, path));
process.env.MESH_MODULE = "umami"; process.env.MESH_MODULE = "umami";
process.env.MESH_NODE = "anchor"; process.env.MESH_NODE = "anchor";
await emit("module.umami.site.created", { domain: "my-app" }); await emit("site.created", { domain: "my-app" });
await emit("node.anchor.joined", { role: "worker" }); // a node event, not a module one await emit("node.anchor.joined", { role: "worker" }); // a node event, not a module one
const lines = (await readFile(path, "utf8")).trim().split("\n").map((l) => JSON.parse(l)); const lines = (await readFile(path, "utf8")).trim().split("\n").map((l) => JSON.parse(l));
assert.equal(lines.length, 2); assert.equal(lines.length, 2);
assert.deepEqual(lines.map((l) => l.type), ["module.umami.site.created", "node.anchor.joined"]); assert.deepEqual(lines.map((l) => l.type), ["umami.site.created", "node.anchor.joined"]);
assert.equal(lines[0].source, "umami"); assert.equal(lines[0].source, "umami");
assert.equal(lines[0].node, "anchor"); assert.equal(lines[0].node, "anchor");
assert.equal(lines[0].body.domain, "my-app"); assert.equal(lines[0].body.domain, "my-app");
+55 -24
View File
@@ -2,12 +2,15 @@
// module's tools and anything else baserow-specific import it; nothing outside baserow does. // module's tools and anything else baserow-specific import it; nothing outside baserow does.
// //
// Baserow authenticates a person with email + password, exchanged for a JWT at /api/user/token-auth/. // Baserow authenticates a person with email + password, exchanged for a JWT at /api/user/token-auth/.
// Those credentials are the mesh's own: a person signs up in Baserow (the standard image creates no // The standard image creates no admin from env, so the account is one a person made in Baserow: its
// admin from env), and the credential is placed in the runtime config file the mesh mounts. Until // password is the module's `admin` secret, accepted from the operator, and its email and the public
// that happens fromEnv throws and the module simply exposes no tools — the same dormant-until- // host Baserow answers to reach the runtime config file the mesh mounts (the email from the
// configured shape gitea uses for its token. // assignment's settings). Until both are there fromEnv throws and the module exposes no tools — the
// same dormant-until-configured shape gitea uses for its token.
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { request as httpRequest } from "node:http";
import { request as httpsRequest } from "node:https";
export interface BaserowApplication { export interface BaserowApplication {
id: number; id: number;
@@ -68,35 +71,63 @@ export class BaserowClient {
return h; return h;
} }
/** Exchange email + password for a JWT, caching it for the client's lifetime. Handles both the /**
* One HTTP exchange. Not `fetch`: Node's fetch drops a caller's Host header and sends the URL's
* own, and Baserow answers only the host of its BASEROW_PUBLIC_URL — any other Host is looked up
* as a published builder site and gets 404, `/api/_health/` included. A co-located caller reaching
* it by container name must present the public host, so the request is made with node:http, which
* sends the Host it is given.
*/
private send(path: string, method: string, headers: Record<string, string>, body?: string): Promise<{ status: number; text: string }> {
const url = new URL(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`);
const request = url.protocol === "https:" ? httpsRequest : httpRequest;
// A length, never chunked: Baserow's server reads a chunked body as empty.
const sent = body === undefined ? headers : { ...headers, "Content-Length": String(Buffer.byteLength(body)) };
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const req = request(url, { method, headers: sent }, (res) => {
let text = "";
res.setEncoding("utf8");
res.on("data", (chunk: string) => (text += chunk));
res.on("end", () => resolve({ status: res.statusCode ?? 0, text }));
res.on("error", reject);
});
req.on("error", reject);
if (body !== undefined) req.write(body);
req.end();
});
}
/** Exchange email + password for a JWT, caching it until Baserow refuses it. Handles both the
* older `{ token }` and the newer `{ access_token }` response shapes. */ * older `{ token }` and the newer `{ access_token }` response shapes. */
async authenticate(): Promise<string> { async authenticate(): Promise<string> {
if (this.token) return this.token; if (this.token) return this.token;
const res = await fetch(`${this.baseUrl}/api/user/token-auth/`, { const res = await this.send(
method: "POST", "/api/user/token-auth/",
headers: this.headers(), "POST",
body: JSON.stringify({ email: this.email, password: this.password }), this.headers(),
}); JSON.stringify({ email: this.email, password: this.password }),
if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`baserow auth failed: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`); );
const data = (await res.json()) as { token?: string; access_token?: string }; if (res.status < 200 || res.status >= 300) throw new Error(`baserow auth failed: ${res.status} ${res.text}`);
const data = JSON.parse(res.text) as { token?: string; access_token?: string };
const token = data.access_token ?? data.token; const token = data.access_token ?? data.token;
if (!token) throw new Error("baserow auth returned no token"); if (!token) throw new Error("baserow auth returned no token");
this.token = token; this.token = token;
return token; return token;
} }
private async authed<T>(path: string, options: RequestInit = {}): Promise<T> { /** An authenticated GET. A refused token is dropped and the call made once more with a fresh one:
const token = await this.authenticate(); * Baserow's access tokens expire after minutes, and the runtime lives for weeks. */
const res = await fetch(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`, { private async authed<T>(path: string): Promise<T> {
...options, for (let attempt = 0; ; attempt++) {
headers: this.headers({ const token = await this.authenticate();
Authorization: `JWT ${token}`, const res = await this.send(path, "GET", this.headers({ Authorization: `JWT ${token}` }));
...(options.headers as Record<string, string> | undefined), if (res.status === 401 && attempt === 0) {
}), this.token = null;
}); continue;
if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`baserow ${path}: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`); }
const text = await res.text(); if (res.status < 200 || res.status >= 300) throw new Error(`baserow ${path}: ${res.status} ${res.text}`);
return (text ? JSON.parse(text) : null) as T; return (res.text ? JSON.parse(res.text) : null) as T;
}
} }
/** The applications (databases) the account can see, across all its workspaces. */ /** The applications (databases) the account can see, across all its workspaces. */
+17 -17
View File
@@ -14,26 +14,27 @@
}, },
"route": { "route": {
"label": "baserow", "label": "baserow",
"port": 80 "endpoint": "web"
} }
}, },
"binds": { "binds": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/baserow/database.json", "postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.json",
"route": "/var/lib/baserow/route.json" "route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
}, },
"secrets": { "secrets": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/baserow/database.secret" "postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.secret"
}, },
"own-secrets": { "own-secrets": {
"secret-key": "/var/lib/baserow/secret-key.secret", "admin": "${dir:state}/admin.secret",
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/baserow/broker" "broker": "/var/lib/mesh/baserow/broker"
}, },
"listens": [ "listens": [
{ {
"name": "web",
"port": 80, "port": 80,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
"why": "the Baserow web UI and REST API; a public name is a route grant later" "why": "the Baserow web UI and REST API, served by the image's own Caddy; a public name is the route's"
} }
], ],
"resources": [ "resources": [
@@ -46,22 +47,21 @@
{ {
"id": "state", "id": "state",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/baserow", "mode": "0700",
"mode": "0700" "place": "."
}, },
{ {
"id": "data", "id": "data",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/baserow/data",
"mode": "0755", "mode": "0755",
"owner": "9999:9999" "owner": "9999:9999"
}, },
{ {
"id": "server-env", "id": "server-env",
"type": "file", "type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/baserow/server.env", "path": "${dir:state}/server.env",
"mode": "0600", "mode": "0600",
"content": "DATABASE_HOST=${bound:postgres-database:at}\nDATABASE_PORT=${bound:postgres-database:port}\nDATABASE_NAME=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nDATABASE_USER=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nDATABASE_PASSWORD=${secret:postgres-database}\nSECRET_KEY=${secret:secret-key}\nBASEROW_PUBLIC_URL=http://localhost\n" "content": "DATABASE_HOST=${bound:postgres-database:at}\nDATABASE_PORT=${bound:postgres-database:port}\nDATABASE_NAME=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nDATABASE_USER=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nDATABASE_PASSWORD_FILE=/run/secrets/database\nDISABLE_EMBEDDED_PSQL=true\nBASEROW_PUBLIC_URL=https://${bound:route:name}\n"
}, },
{ {
"id": "net", "id": "net",
@@ -72,25 +72,25 @@
"id": "server", "id": "server",
"type": "container", "type": "container",
"name": "baserow", "name": "baserow",
"image": "baserow/baserow@sha256:834424a10413798567f76428f255dc259445b7f8dcec56598c05b4073bb2a124", "image": "baserow/baserow@sha256:263ea6c4b72c9eccabcd975ffe9fdebf23913a293a514bec6a3897a5e0a5a080",
"network": "baserow", "network": "baserow",
"env-file": [ "env-file": [
"/var/lib/baserow/server.env" "${dir:state}/server.env"
], ],
"ports": [ "ports": [
"80" "80"
], ],
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/services/baserow/data:/baserow/data" "${dir:data}:/baserow/data",
], "${dir:state}/database.secret:/run/secrets/database:ro"
"secrets-in-environment": "baserow reads DATABASE_PASSWORD and SECRET_KEY with os.getenv and has no _FILE twin (settings/base.py); not convertible" ]
}, },
{ {
"id": "runtime-config", "id": "runtime-config",
"type": "file", "type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/baserow/config.json", "path": "/var/lib/mesh/baserow/config.json",
"mode": "0600", "mode": "0600",
"content": "{}\n", "content": "{\n \"password\": \"${secret:admin}\",\n \"host\": \"${bound:route:name}\"\n}\n",
"merge": "json" "merge": "json"
}, },
{ {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ async function pollHistory(): Promise<void> {
for (const entry of entries) { for (const entry of entries) {
if (seen.has(entry.id)) continue; if (seen.has(entry.id)) continue;
if (primed) { if (primed) {
await emit("module.bazarr.subtitle.downloaded", { await emit("subtitle.downloaded", {
kind: entry.kind, kind: entry.kind,
title: entry.title, title: entry.title,
language: entry.language, language: entry.language,
+3 -2
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"container-runtime" "container-runtime"
], ],
"emits": [ "emits": [
"module.bazarr.subtitle.downloaded" "subtitle.downloaded"
], ],
"own-secrets": { "own-secrets": {
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/bazarr/broker", "broker": "/var/lib/mesh/bazarr/broker",
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
}, },
"listens": [ "listens": [
{ {
"name": "web",
"port": 6767, "port": 6767,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
@@ -110,7 +111,7 @@
"contributes": { "contributes": {
"route": { "route": {
"label": "subs", "label": "subs",
"port": 6767 "endpoint": "web"
} }
}, },
"binds": { "binds": {
+2 -2
View File
@@ -45,12 +45,12 @@ async function pollQueue(bookshelf: BookshelfClient): Promise<void> {
if (primed) { if (primed) {
// Entered the queue since last look — Bookshelf grabbed a release. // Entered the queue since last look — Bookshelf grabbed a release.
for (const [id, item] of now) { for (const [id, item] of now) {
if (!inQueue.has(id)) await emit("module.bookshelf.book.grabbed", { title: item.title, status: item.status }); if (!inQueue.has(id)) await emit("book.grabbed", { title: item.title, status: item.status });
} }
// Left the queue — imported and done, unless it was last seen failing. // Left the queue — imported and done, unless it was last seen failing.
for (const [id, item] of inQueue) { for (const [id, item] of inQueue) {
if (!now.has(id) && !FAILED_STATUSES.has(item.status)) { if (!now.has(id) && !FAILED_STATUSES.has(item.status)) {
await emit("module.bookshelf.download.completed", { title: item.title }); await emit("download.completed", { title: item.title });
} }
} }
} }
+4 -3
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@
"container-runtime" "container-runtime"
], ],
"emits": [ "emits": [
"module.bookshelf.book.grabbed", "book.grabbed",
"module.bookshelf.download.completed" "download.completed"
], ],
"consumes": [], "consumes": [],
"own-secrets": { "own-secrets": {
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
}, },
"listens": [ "listens": [
{ {
"name": "web",
"port": 8787, "port": 8787,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
@@ -87,7 +88,7 @@
"contributes": { "contributes": {
"route": { "route": {
"label": "books", "label": "books",
"port": 8787 "endpoint": "web"
} }
}, },
"binds": { "binds": {
+6 -9
View File
@@ -6,23 +6,20 @@
], ],
"claims": [ "claims": [
{ {
"name": "the-build-machine", "name": "mesh-build-machine",
"scope": "node" "scope": "mesh"
} }
], ],
"requires": [ "requires": [
"artifact-store", "artifact-store",
"package-registry" "npm-package-registry"
], ],
"binds": { "binds": {
"package-registry": "/var/lib/mesh/builder/package-registry.json" "npm-package-registry": "/var/lib/mesh/builder/package-registry.json"
}, },
"secrets": { "secrets": {
"package-registry": "/var/lib/mesh/builder/package-registry.secret" "npm-package-registry": "/var/lib/mesh/builder/package-registry.secret"
}, },
"emits": [
"module.builder.built"
],
"own-secrets": { "own-secrets": {
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/builder/broker" "broker": "/var/lib/mesh/builder/broker"
}, },
@@ -80,7 +77,7 @@
"on": [ "on": [
{ {
"arg": "GO_BASE", "arg": "GO_BASE",
"image": "golang@sha256:1ae0735f00daffa3aaf1363a5184c0d2dc55c78e3db4ec70241cdac97bf84b59" "image": "golang@sha256:8ac98ca534ac3f51e1f420a1dd2c15e74c75cfa0f23f3ad27eb5d7236c349a0c"
}, },
{ {
"arg": "ALPINE_BASE", "arg": "ALPINE_BASE",
+56
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
{
"module": "ca-trust",
"version": "1",
"slug": "catrust",
"capabilities": [
"service-manager"
],
"requires": [
"internal-acme-ca"
],
"seats": [
{
"name": "the-mesh-trust-anchor",
"scope": "node"
}
],
"claims": [
{
"name": "the-mesh-trust-anchor",
"scope": "node"
}
],
"resources": [
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "anchor",
"type": "file",
"path": "${dir:state}/anchor",
"mode": "0755",
"content": "#!/bin/sh\n# The mesh's internal certificate authority, trusted by this machine.\n#\n# Written by the mesh from the ca-trust module's manifest (novox/hq ADR 0147).\n# Editing it here lasts until the next apply.\n#\n# There is no prior trust to verify the fetch against \u2014 this is the thing that\n# establishes it \u2014 so it is made over the mesh's own private network, which is\n# what authenticates it (novox/hq ADR 0098, the same reasoning that lets the\n# route proxy fetch this root for itself). What comes back is checked here: a\n# body that is not a certificate is refused now, rather than believed and then\n# failed by whatever reads the trust store next.\nset -eu\n\nROOTS='https://${bound:internal-acme-ca:at}:${bound:internal-acme-ca:port}${bound:internal-acme-ca:roots}'\nANCHORS=/etc/ca-certificates/trust-source/anchors\nANCHOR=\"$ANCHORS/mesh-internal-ca.crt\"\n\n# Arch's layout, said out loud rather than assumed: a machine that keeps its\n# anchors elsewhere fails here, visibly, instead of writing a file nothing\n# reads. That failure is the signal that this belongs in the host, where one\n# operating system's difference lives (novox/hq ADR 0147, option 2).\n[ -d \"$ANCHORS\" ] || {\n\techo \"this machine keeps no trust anchors in $ANCHORS; ca-trust is written for that layout\" >&2\n\texit 1\n}\n\ncase \"${1:-}\" in\ninstall)\n\ttmp=$(mktemp)\n\ttrap 'rm -f \"$tmp\"' EXIT\n\t# The authority may still be starting, or this machine may have come up\n\t# before it: two minutes of asking, then an honest failure.\n\tn=0\n\twhile [ \"$n\" -lt 60 ]; do\n\t\tif curl --fail --silent --show-error --insecure --max-time 10 \\\n\t\t\t--output \"$tmp\" \"$ROOTS\" &&\n\t\t\tgrep -q 'BEGIN CERTIFICATE' \"$tmp\"; then\n\t\t\tinstall -m 0644 \"$tmp\" \"$ANCHOR\"\n\t\t\tupdate-ca-trust\n\t\t\texit 0\n\t\tfi\n\t\tn=$((n + 1))\n\t\tsleep 2\n\tdone\n\techo \"the authority at $ROOTS did not serve a certificate within two minutes\" >&2\n\texit 1\n\t;;\nremove)\n\t# What stopping the unit does, and therefore what being unassigned does.\n\trm -f \"$ANCHOR\"\n\tupdate-ca-trust\n\t;;\n*)\n\techo \"usage: $(basename \"$0\") install|remove\" >&2\n\texit 2\n\t;;\nesac\n"
},
{
"id": "unit",
"type": "file",
"path": "/etc/systemd/system/mesh-ca-trust.service",
"mode": "0644",
"content": "[Unit]\nDescription=The mesh's internal certificate authority, trusted by this machine\n# novox/hq ADR 0147. Starting this unit places the mesh's root among this\n# machine's trust anchors; stopping it takes the root away again, which is what\n# the host does when the module is no longer assigned here.\nWants=network-online.target\nAfter=network-online.target\n\n[Service]\nType=oneshot\nRemainAfterExit=yes\nExecStart=${dir:state}/anchor install\nExecStop=${dir:state}/anchor remove\n\n[Install]\nWantedBy=multi-user.target\n"
},
{
"id": "trust",
"type": "service",
"unit": "mesh-ca-trust.service",
"state": "running",
"boot": "enabled",
"restart-on": [
"anchor",
"unit"
]
}
]
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/cloudflare-dns/broker" "broker": "/var/lib/mesh/cloudflare-dns/broker"
}, },
"emits": [ "emits": [
"module.cloudflare-dns.record.created", "record.created",
"module.cloudflare-dns.record.removed" "record.removed"
], ],
"resources": [ "resources": [
{ {
+2 -2
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ runProvisioner("public-dns", {
async create(p: Provision): Promise<void> { async create(p: Provision): Promise<void> {
const fqdn = cloudflare.nameFor(p.as); const fqdn = cloudflare.nameFor(p.as);
await cloudflare.upsert(fqdn); await cloudflare.upsert(fqdn);
await announce("module.cloudflare-dns.record.created", { await announce("record.created", {
name: fqdn, name: fqdn,
target: cloudflare.ingress, target: cloudflare.ingress,
consumer: p.consumer ?? "", consumer: p.consumer ?? "",
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ runProvisioner("public-dns", {
async remove(p: { as: string }): Promise<void> { async remove(p: { as: string }): Promise<void> {
const fqdn = cloudflare.nameFor(p.as); const fqdn = cloudflare.nameFor(p.as);
await cloudflare.remove(fqdn); await cloudflare.remove(fqdn);
await announce("module.cloudflare-dns.record.removed", { name: fqdn, consumer: p.as }); await announce("record.removed", { name: fqdn, consumer: p.as });
}, },
}); });
+2 -1
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
"contributes": { "contributes": {
"route": { "route": {
"label": "de-spiegel", "label": "de-spiegel",
"port": 35621 "endpoint": "web"
} }
}, },
"binds": { "binds": {
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
}, },
"listens": [ "listens": [
{ {
"name": "web",
"port": 35621, "port": 35621,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
+43
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
# dhcpcd
The uplink seat's module for a machine whose own network is dhcpcd's (novox/hq ADR 0117). It
asks two things of dhcpcd, and nothing else: leave the resolver file to the mesh, and leave the
private network's interface alone. It never declares an interface, an address, a route, a
wireless network or its credentials — the link dhcpcd keeps is the only channel the mesh reaches
the machine over.
## What it writes
Two lines into `/etc/dhcpcd.conf`, as the mesh's marked region (`into: block`) — dhcpcd reads no
drop-in directory, so the mesh writes into its one file rather than over it (ADR 0102):
- `nohook resolv.conf` — dhcpcd's resolv.conf hook rewrites `/etc/resolv.conf` on every lease it
takes or renews, which would silently replace the resolver `resolv-conf` names.
- `denyinterfaces mesh0` — dhcpcd never asks for a lease on the private network's interface, and
never takes it down. dhcpcd leaves a point-to-point interface alone by default; this says so
rather than relying on it.
**At the start of the file** (`at: start`). Both are global options, and dhcpcd reads every line
after an `interface` or `ssid` line as that interface's own. A configured machine's file ends in
exactly such a block (the interface, its static address), so appended at the end these two would
quietly apply to one interface only.
## Why it declares no service
dhcpcd is the machine's, not the mesh's. The mesh never starts, stops or enables it: stopping it
drops the address the machine is reached at, and a module unassigned by mistake must not be able
to do that. And there is nothing to reload it with — `dhcpcd.service` reports `CanReload=no`, and
a restart drops the lease. So the two lines take effect at **dhcpcd's next start**.
On an adopted machine that is normally no gap: the predecessor wrote the same `nohook` line, and
it is already in force. **On a machine that was not adopted, it is one:** until dhcpcd next
starts (a reboot, or the operator restarting it in a window of their choosing), a lease renewal
still rewrites `/etc/resolv.conf`, and `resolv-conf` puts it back at the next push. Assign this
module before `resolv-conf` on such a machine, and restart dhcpcd once, by hand, when losing the
link for a moment is acceptable.
## One manager per machine
It claims `the-uplink`: a machine runs one network manager, and assigning a second module that
claims the seat is refused. Assigning this one to a machine whose network is NetworkManager's
installs the package and writes the two lines, and starts nothing.
+30
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
{
"module": "dhcpcd",
"version": "1",
"capabilities": [
"package-manager",
"service-manager"
],
"claims": [
{
"name": "node-uplink",
"scope": "node"
}
],
"resources": [
{
"id": "package",
"type": "package",
"package": "dhcpcd"
},
{
"id": "config",
"type": "file",
"path": "/etc/dhcpcd.conf",
"mode": "0644",
"into": "block",
"at": "start",
"content": "# The mesh's two lines (module dhcpcd, novox/hq ADR 0117). Global options, so\n# kept above any interface line; read at dhcpcd's next start.\nnohook resolv.conf\ndenyinterfaces mesh0\n"
}
]
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ async function pollCatalog(): Promise<void> {
for (const tag of tags) { for (const tag of tags) {
const id = `${repo}:${tag}`; const id = `${repo}:${tag}`;
if (!seen.has(id)) { if (!seen.has(id)) {
if (primed) await emit("module.registry.image.pushed", { repo, tag }); if (primed) await emit("image.pushed", { repo, tag });
seen.add(id); seen.add(id);
} }
} }
+2 -1
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
"container-runtime" "container-runtime"
], ],
"emits": [ "emits": [
"module.registry.image.pushed" "image.pushed"
], ],
"own-secrets": { "own-secrets": {
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/registry/broker" "broker": "/var/lib/mesh/registry/broker"
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
}, },
"listens": [ "listens": [
{ {
"name": "registry",
"port": 5000, "port": 5000,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
+2 -2
View File
@@ -20,10 +20,10 @@ async function poll(): Promise<void> {
const now = new Map((await dnsmasq.answeredNames()).map((a) => [a.name, a.address])); const now = new Map((await dnsmasq.answeredNames()).map((a) => [a.name, a.address]));
if (primed) { if (primed) {
for (const [name, address] of now) { for (const [name, address] of now) {
if (!known.has(name)) await emit("module.dnsmasq.name.added", { name, address }); if (!known.has(name)) await emit("name.added", { name, address });
} }
for (const [name] of known) { for (const [name] of known) {
if (!now.has(name)) await emit("module.dnsmasq.name.removed", { name }); if (!now.has(name)) await emit("name.removed", { name });
} }
} }
known.clear(); known.clear();
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+10 -2
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
], ],
"claims": [ "claims": [
{ {
"name": "the-intrusion-prevention", "name": "node-intrusion-prevention",
"scope": "node" "scope": "node"
} }
], ],
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
"type": "file", "type": "file",
"path": "/etc/fail2ban/jail.local", "path": "/etc/fail2ban/jail.local",
"mode": "0644", "mode": "0644",
"content": "[INCLUDES]\n\nbefore = paths-arch.conf\n\n[DEFAULT]\n\nbantime = 10m\nfindtime = 10m\nmaxretry = 5\n\nbanaction = ufw\nbanaction_allports = iptables-allports\n\n[sshd]\nenabled = true\nport = ssh\nlogpath = %(sshd_log)s\nbackend = %(sshd_backend)s\n" "content": "[INCLUDES]\n\nbefore = paths-arch.conf\n\n[DEFAULT]\n\n# Never act on the machine itself or on a tunnel peer: the mesh's private range is\n# ${machine:mesh-range}, named here rather than written as a value the module cannot\n# know (novox/hq ADR 0112). Without this, fail2ban could ban the mesh's own nodes.\nignoreip = 127.0.0.1/8 ::1 ${machine:mesh-range}\n\nbantime = 10m\nfindtime = 10m\nmaxretry = 5\n\n# Ban through iptables, not through a firewall front-end the machine may not have. ufw is\n# installed on two of this mesh's machines and absent on the other two, and fail2ban finds out\n# only at ban time: the service reports healthy, the jail counts the attempt, the ban command\n# exits 127, and nothing is blocked. Proven on 2026-09-28 -- 'ufw: command not found' on a\n# machine the mesh reported as protected.\n#\n# The action below is this module's own, already used by the recidive jail on every machine\n# here, and it bans in DOCKER-USER as well as INPUT, so a container's published port is\n# covered too.\nbanaction = iptables-allports-dualchain\nbanaction_allports = iptables-allports-dualchain\n\n[sshd]\nenabled = true\nport = ssh\nlogpath = %(sshd_log)s\nbackend = %(sshd_backend)s\n"
}, },
{ {
"id": "jail-sshd", "id": "jail-sshd",
@@ -42,6 +42,14 @@
"mode": "0644", "mode": "0644",
"content": "[sshd]\nenabled = true\nport = ssh\nlogpath = %(sshd_log)s\nbackend = %(sshd_backend)s\nmaxretry = 5\n" "content": "[sshd]\nenabled = true\nport = ssh\nlogpath = %(sshd_log)s\nbackend = %(sshd_backend)s\nmaxretry = 5\n"
}, },
{
"id": "log",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/log/fail2ban.log",
"mode": "0640",
"create-once": true,
"content": ""
},
{ {
"id": "jail-recidive", "id": "jail-recidive",
"type": "file", "type": "file",
+62 -4
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ import { ConfiguredToken, MintedToken, type TokenSource } from "./token.js";
/** A repository, trimmed to what the mesh cares about. */ /** A repository, trimmed to what the mesh cares about. */
export interface GiteaRepo { export interface GiteaRepo {
full_name: string; full_name: string;
/** The URL a build clones — what a module records as its source. */
clone_url?: string;
name: string; name: string;
owner: string; owner: string;
private: boolean; private: boolean;
@@ -34,6 +36,9 @@ export interface GiteaPull {
title: string; title: string;
state: string; state: string;
merged: boolean; merged: boolean;
/** The commit the merge produced — what a build of the base branch is made from. */
merge_commit_sha?: string;
merged_at?: string;
user?: string; user?: string;
head?: string; head?: string;
base?: string; base?: string;
@@ -116,9 +121,23 @@ export class GiteaClient {
// ---- Repositories ---- // ---- Repositories ----
/** Every repository this token can see, one page. `/user/repos` is only what the token's own
* user owns — for the mesh's administrator that is nothing, which is how the forge watched an
* empty list and announced no merge (2026-09-28). The search endpoint is the forge's whole view. */
async listRepos(page = 1, limit = 20): Promise<GiteaRepo[]> { async listRepos(page = 1, limit = 20): Promise<GiteaRepo[]> {
const repos = await this.request<any[]>(`/user/repos?page=${page}&limit=${limit}`); const found = await this.request<{ data?: any[] }>(`/repos/search?page=${page}&limit=${limit}`);
return (repos ?? []).map(GiteaClient.mapRepo); return (found?.data ?? []).map(GiteaClient.mapRepo);
}
/** Every repository, all pages. */
async listAllRepos(): Promise<GiteaRepo[]> {
const all: GiteaRepo[] = [];
for (let page = 1; page < 100; page++) {
const batch = await this.listRepos(page, 50);
all.push(...batch);
if (batch.length < 50) break;
}
return all;
} }
async createRepo(data: { async createRepo(data: {
@@ -210,6 +229,17 @@ export class GiteaClient {
return GiteaClient.mapPull(await this.request<any>(`/repos/${owner}/${repo}/pulls/${index}`)); return GiteaClient.mapPull(await this.request<any>(`/repos/${owner}/${repo}/pulls/${index}`));
} }
/** The files a merged pull request changed, as paths from the repository's root.
*
* `limit` is what is asked for, and a merge that changed more says so rather than being read
* page by page: what the mesh does with a partial list is treat the whole repository as changed,
* so more pages would buy nothing. */
async listPullFiles(owner: string, repo: string, index: number, limit = 100): Promise<{ paths: string[]; truncated: boolean }> {
const files = await this.request<any[]>(`/repos/${owner}/${repo}/pulls/${index}/files?limit=${limit}`);
const paths = (files ?? []).map((f) => String(f?.filename ?? "")).filter((p) => p !== "");
return { paths, truncated: paths.length >= limit };
}
async createPullRequest( async createPullRequest(
owner: string, owner: string,
repo: string, repo: string,
@@ -232,6 +262,7 @@ export class GiteaClient {
private static mapRepo(r: any): GiteaRepo { private static mapRepo(r: any): GiteaRepo {
return { return {
full_name: r.full_name, full_name: r.full_name,
clone_url: r.clone_url ?? undefined,
name: r.name, name: r.name,
owner: r.owner?.login ?? r.full_name?.split("/")[0] ?? "unknown", owner: r.owner?.login ?? r.full_name?.split("/")[0] ?? "unknown",
private: Boolean(r.private), private: Boolean(r.private),
@@ -259,6 +290,8 @@ export class GiteaClient {
title: p.title, title: p.title,
state: p.state, state: p.state,
merged: Boolean(p.merged), merged: Boolean(p.merged),
merge_commit_sha: p.merge_commit_sha ?? undefined,
merged_at: p.merged_at ?? undefined,
user: p.user?.login, user: p.user?.login,
head: p.head?.ref, head: p.head?.ref,
base: p.base?.ref, base: p.base?.ref,
@@ -390,7 +423,7 @@ export class GiteaAdmin {
} }
private async findTeam(org: string, team: string): Promise<number | null> { private async findTeam(org: string, team: string): Promise<number | null> {
const res = await this.request(`/orgs/${encodeURIComponent(org)}/teams`); const res = await this.request(`/orgs/${encodeURIComponent(org)}/teams?limit=50`);
if (res.status !== 200) return null; if (res.status !== 200) return null;
const match = (res.body as any[] | null)?.find((t) => t?.name === team); const match = (res.body as any[] | null)?.find((t) => t?.name === team);
return match ? Number(match.id) : null; return match ? Number(match.id) : null;
@@ -414,7 +447,9 @@ export class GiteaAdmin {
const patch = await this.request(`/admin/users/${encodeURIComponent(username)}`, { const patch = await this.request(`/admin/users/${encodeURIComponent(username)}`, {
method: "PATCH", method: "PATCH",
// login_name is required by the admin edit endpoint; for a local user it is the username. // login_name is required by the admin edit endpoint; for a local user it is the username.
body: JSON.stringify({ login_name: username, password, must_change_password: false }), // active and prohibit_login: a deactivated or login-prohibited user is refused like a wrong
// password, so the provisioner's check reports it lost; applying again must undo both.
body: JSON.stringify({ login_name: username, password, must_change_password: false, active: true, prohibit_login: false }),
}); });
if (patch.status === 200) return; if (patch.status === 200) return;
GiteaAdmin.fail(`/admin/users/${username}`, patch); GiteaAdmin.fail(`/admin/users/${username}`, patch);
@@ -433,6 +468,29 @@ export class GiteaAdmin {
GiteaAdmin.fail(`/teams/${teamId}/members/${username}`, res); GiteaAdmin.fail(`/teams/${teamId}/members/${username}`, res);
} }
/**
* Whether a consumer's user logs in with exactly this password and is still a member of the
* package team. Read-only: the password is checked as the consumer presents it, basic auth on the
* API, and membership through the admin API. `false` for a refused login or a missing member; any
* other answer rejects (novox/hq issue 120).
*/
async holdsTeamMember(org: string, team: string, username: string, password: string): Promise<boolean> {
const me = await fetch(`${this.baseUrl}/api/v1/user`, {
headers: { Authorization: "Basic " + Buffer.from(`${username}:${password}`).toString("base64") },
});
if (me.status === 401 || me.status === 403) return false;
if (me.status !== 200) throw new Error(`Gitea GET /user as ${username}: ${me.status}`);
const teams = await this.request(`/orgs/${encodeURIComponent(org)}/teams?limit=50`);
if (teams.status === 404) return false;
if (teams.status !== 200) GiteaAdmin.fail(`/orgs/${org}/teams`, teams);
const found = (teams.body as { id: number; name: string }[]).find((t) => t.name === team);
if (!found) return false;
const member = await this.request(`/teams/${found.id}/members/${encodeURIComponent(username)}`);
if (member.status === 200 || member.status === 204) return true;
if (member.status === 404) return false;
GiteaAdmin.fail(`/teams/${found.id}/members/${username}`, member);
}
/** Delete a user, purging what they own. A 404 means the mesh already withdrew them — success, not /** Delete a user, purging what they own. A 404 means the mesh already withdrew them — success, not
* an error, so a re-run of remove is safe. */ * an error, so a re-run of remove is safe. */
async deleteUser(username: string): Promise<void> { async deleteUser(username: string): Promise<void> {
+81 -3
View File
@@ -31,11 +31,11 @@ try {
const seen = new Set<string>(); const seen = new Set<string>();
let primed = false; let primed = false;
async function pollRepos(client: GiteaClient): Promise<void> { async function pollRepos(client: GiteaClient): Promise<void> {
const repos = await client.listRepos(1, 50); const repos = await client.listAllRepos();
for (const repo of repos) { for (const repo of repos) {
if (!seen.has(repo.full_name)) { if (!seen.has(repo.full_name)) {
if (primed) { if (primed) {
await emit("module.gitea.repo.created", { await emit("repo.created", {
full_name: repo.full_name, full_name: repo.full_name,
owner: repo.owner, owner: repo.owner,
name: repo.name, name: repo.name,
@@ -49,6 +49,83 @@ async function pollRepos(client: GiteaClient): Promise<void> {
primed = true; primed = true;
} }
// **A merge is announced whoever made it.** The merge tool below emits at the instant it acts; a
// merge made in the forge's own pages or over its API would emit nothing, and the mesh would go on
// believing every module current with its source (novox/hq 04-ISSUES/131). So merged pull requests
// are watched the way repositories are: what the forge holds, asked for on a tick, announced once.
// What has been announced is kept beside the module's state, so a restart does not announce the
// whole history again — and the first tick on a machine with no record announces nothing, because
// everything it sees then predates the watching.
import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, renameSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { join } from "node:path";
const mergedRecord = process.env.MESH_GITEA_STATE_DIR ? join(process.env.MESH_GITEA_STATE_DIR, "merged-announced.json") : null;
const announced = new Set<string>();
let primedMerges = false;
// since is the moment the watching began: a merge made before it is history, whatever page of the
// forge's listing it surfaces on. Without it, an old merge past the first page — pushed into view
// as newer pull requests were updated — was announced as if it had just happened, and the mesh
// rebuilt everything built from that repository, once per old merge (2026-09-28).
let since = "";
if (mergedRecord && existsSync(mergedRecord)) {
try {
const kept = JSON.parse(readFileSync(mergedRecord, "utf8")) as string[] | { announced: string[]; since: string };
const list = Array.isArray(kept) ? kept : kept.announced;
for (const sha of list) announced.add(sha);
since = Array.isArray(kept) ? new Date().toISOString() : kept.since;
primedMerges = true;
} catch {
// An unreadable record is treated as no record: prime again rather than re-announce history.
}
}
function keepAnnounced(): void {
if (!mergedRecord) return;
mkdirSync(join(mergedRecord, ".."), { recursive: true });
const tmp = mergedRecord + ".tmp";
writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify({ announced: [...announced].slice(-2000), since }));
renameSync(tmp, mergedRecord);
}
async function pollMerged(client: GiteaClient): Promise<void> {
const repos = await client.listAllRepos();
let changed = false;
for (const repo of repos) {
const pulls = await client.listPullRequests(repo.owner, repo.name, { state: "closed", sort: "recentupdate", limit: "20" });
for (const pull of pulls) {
if (!pull.merged || !pull.merge_commit_sha || announced.has(pull.merge_commit_sha)) continue;
// Announced only if merged since the watching began; recorded either way, so it is looked
// at once.
const fresh = !!pull.merged_at && !!since && pull.merged_at > since;
if (primedMerges && fresh) {
// What it changed, asked for only now: a module is rebuilt because a file inside its own
// directory moved, and without this every module built from a repository is rebuilt for a
// change to any of them (novox/hq 04-ISSUES/131).
const changed = await client.listPullFiles(repo.owner, repo.name, pull.number);
await emit("pull.merged", {
owner: repo.owner,
repo: repo.name,
number: pull.number,
title: pull.title,
head: pull.head,
base: pull.base,
merge_commit_sha: pull.merge_commit_sha,
merged_at: pull.merged_at,
clone_url: repo.clone_url,
html_url: pull.html_url,
paths: changed.paths,
paths_truncated: changed.truncated,
});
// Said, because a trigger that fires silently is indistinguishable from one that did not
// fire (novox/hq 04-ISSUES/131) — this line is how an operator knows the mesh was told.
console.log(`[gitea] announced merge ${repo.full_name}#${pull.number} (${pull.merge_commit_sha.slice(0, 8)}) into ${pull.base}`);
}
announced.add(pull.merge_commit_sha);
changed = true;
}
}
if (!primedMerges) since = new Date().toISOString();
if (!primedMerges || changed) keepAnnounced();
primedMerges = true;
}
if (gitea) { if (gitea) {
const client = gitea; const client = gitea;
// A poll that fails says so once, not once a minute: the same reason repeating (the forge not up // A poll that fails says so once, not once a minute: the same reason repeating (the forge not up
@@ -70,5 +147,6 @@ if (gitea) {
run(); run();
}; };
tick(() => pollRepos(client), 60_000); tick(() => pollRepos(client), 60_000);
console.log("[gitea] watching for new repositories"); tick(() => pollMerged(client), 30_000);
console.log("[gitea] watching for new repositories and merged pull requests");
} }
+45 -27
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
"route": { "route": {
"web": { "web": {
"label": "git", "label": "git",
"port": 3000 "endpoint": "web"
}, },
"internal-api-refused": { "internal-api-refused": {
"label": "git", "label": "git",
@@ -24,51 +24,67 @@
} }
}, },
"binds": { "binds": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/gitea/database.json", "postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.json",
"route": "/var/lib/gitea/route.json" "route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
}, },
"secrets": { "secrets": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/gitea/database.secret", "postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.secret",
"secret": { "secret": {
"internal-token": "/var/lib/gitea/internal-token.secret", "internal-token": "${dir:state}/internal-token.secret",
"admin": "/var/lib/gitea/admin.secret" "admin": "${dir:state}/admin.secret"
} }
}, },
"capabilities": [ "capabilities": [
"container-runtime" "container-runtime"
], ],
"emits": [ "emits": [
"module.gitea.repo.created", "repo.created",
"module.gitea.issue.opened", "issue.opened",
"module.gitea.pull.merged" "pull.merged"
], ],
"listens": [ "listens": [
{ {
"name": "web",
"port": 3000, "port": 3000,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
"why": "the forge, over http" "why": "the forge, over http"
}, },
{ {
"name": "ssh",
"port": 22, "port": 22,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
"why": "git over ssh, gitea's own unmodified sshd. Published on the machine's own side at 222, the mesh's fixed public convention — not 22, which the machine's own daemon holds and a module does not take" "why": "git over ssh, gitea's own unmodified sshd. Published on the machine's own side at 222, the mesh's fixed public convention \u2014 not 22, which the machine's own daemon holds and a module does not take"
} }
], ],
"serves": { "serves": {
"package-registry": { "npm-package-registry": {
"scheme": "http", "scheme": "http",
"port": 3000, "port": 3000,
"npm-path": "/api/packages/novox/npm/" "npm-path": "/api/packages/novox/npm/"
},
"git": {
"scheme": "http",
"port": 3000
} }
}, },
"receives": { "receives": {
"package-registry": "/var/lib/gitea/grants/mesh.json" "npm-package-registry": "${dir:grants}/npm.json"
}, },
"grants": { "grants": {
"package-registry": "/var/lib/gitea/grants" "npm-package-registry": "${dir:grants}"
}, },
"claims": [
{
"name": "npm-package-registry",
"scope": "mesh"
},
{
"name": "git",
"scope": "mesh"
}
],
"own-secrets": { "own-secrets": {
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/gitea/broker" "broker": "/var/lib/mesh/gitea/broker"
}, },
@@ -88,26 +104,24 @@
{ {
"id": "state", "id": "state",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/gitea", "mode": "0700",
"mode": "0700" "place": "."
}, },
{ {
"id": "grants", "id": "grants",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/gitea/grants",
"mode": "0700" "mode": "0700"
}, },
{ {
"id": "server-env", "id": "server-env",
"type": "file", "type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/gitea/server.env", "path": "${dir:state}/server.env",
"mode": "0600", "mode": "0600",
"content": "GITEA__security__INTERNAL_TOKEN=${secret:internal-token}\nGITEA__database__DB_TYPE=postgres\nGITEA__database__HOST=${bound:postgres-database:at}:${bound:postgres-database:port}\nGITEA__database__NAME=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nGITEA__database__USER=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nGITEA__database__PASSWD=${secret:postgres-database}\n" "content": "GITEA__security__INTERNAL_TOKEN=${secret:internal-token}\nGITEA__database__DB_TYPE=postgres\nGITEA__database__HOST=${bound:postgres-database:at}:${bound:postgres-database:port}\nGITEA__database__NAME=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nGITEA__database__USER=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nGITEA__database__PASSWD=${secret:postgres-database}\n"
}, },
{ {
"id": "data", "id": "data",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/gitea/gitea",
"mode": "0700", "mode": "0700",
"owner": "1000:1000" "owner": "1000:1000"
}, },
@@ -122,14 +136,14 @@
"USER_GID": "1000" "USER_GID": "1000"
}, },
"env-file": [ "env-file": [
"/var/lib/gitea/server.env" "${dir:state}/server.env"
], ],
"ports": [ "ports": [
"3000", "3000",
"222:22" "222:22"
], ],
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/services/gitea/gitea:/data" "${dir:data}:/data"
], ],
"secrets-in-environment": "gitea honours GITEA__database__PASSWD__FILE and GITEA__security__INTERNAL_TOKEN__FILE; convertible, awaiting a bed that proves it" "secrets-in-environment": "gitea honours GITEA__database__PASSWD__FILE and GITEA__security__INTERNAL_TOKEN__FILE; convertible, awaiting a bed that proves it"
}, },
@@ -145,11 +159,11 @@
"MESH_GITEA_ADMIN_USER": "mesh-admin" "MESH_GITEA_ADMIN_USER": "mesh-admin"
}, },
"env-file": [ "env-file": [
"/var/lib/gitea/server.env" "${dir:state}/server.env"
], ],
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/services/gitea/gitea:/data", "${dir:data}:/data",
"/var/lib/gitea/admin.secret:/run/secrets/admin:ro" "${dir:state}/admin.secret:/run/secrets/admin:ro"
], ],
"args": [ "args": [
"/bin/sh", "/bin/sh",
@@ -174,8 +188,8 @@
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/gitea/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro", "/var/lib/mesh/gitea/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/mesh/gitea/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro", "/var/lib/mesh/gitea/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro",
"/var/lib/gitea/grants:/var/lib/gitea/grants:ro", "${dir:grants}:${dir:grants}:ro",
"/var/lib/gitea/admin.secret:/run/secrets/admin:ro", "${dir:state}/admin.secret:/run/secrets/admin:ro",
"/var/lib/mesh/gitea/state:/run/state" "/var/lib/mesh/gitea/state:/run/state"
], ],
"env": { "env": {
@@ -185,7 +199,7 @@
"MESH_GITEA_ADMIN_USER": "mesh-admin", "MESH_GITEA_ADMIN_USER": "mesh-admin",
"MESH_GITEA_ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE": "/run/secrets/admin", "MESH_GITEA_ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE": "/run/secrets/admin",
"MESH_GITEA_STATE_DIR": "/run/state", "MESH_GITEA_STATE_DIR": "/run/state",
"MESH_RECEIVES": "/var/lib/gitea/grants/mesh.json" "MESH_RECEIVES": "${dir:grants}/npm.json"
}, },
"artifact": "runtime", "artifact": "runtime",
"restart-on": [ "restart-on": [
@@ -195,7 +209,11 @@
], ],
"provides": [ "provides": [
{ {
"name": "package-registry", "name": "npm-package-registry",
"scope": "mesh"
},
{
"name": "git",
"scope": "mesh" "scope": "mesh"
} }
], ],
+1 -1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
"test": "npm run build && node --test --experimental-strip-types 'test/*.test.ts'" "test": "npm run build && node --test --experimental-strip-types 'test/*.test.ts'"
}, },
"dependencies": { "dependencies": {
"@novox/mesh-sdk": "^0.1.0" "@novox/mesh-sdk": "^0.1.1"
}, },
"devDependencies": { "devDependencies": {
"@types/node": "^22.0.0", "@types/node": "^22.0.0",
+21 -6
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,15 @@
// gitea's provisioner — the adapter that makes gitea a provider of the mesh `package-registry` // gitea's provisioner — the adapter that makes gitea a provider of the mesh
// interface. The reconcile loop, the contributions file, and reading the mesh's minted password are // `npm-package-registry` interface. The reconcile loop, the contributions file, and reading the
// the sdk harness's; this writes only the per-service half: how gitea creates and removes a // mesh's minted password are the sdk harness's; this writes only the per-service half: how gitea
// consumer's npm credential (novox/hq ADR 0048/0076). // creates and removes a consumer's npm credential (novox/hq ADR 0048/0076).
// //
// The `package-registry` interface: a consumer authenticates to the npm registry at // **A package registry seat is one per ecosystem (novox/hq ADR 0109).** gitea holds the npm seat
// (ADR 0110). Adding cargo or PyPI is adding a provision — another `provides` entry, another
// `receives` path and another registration below — not widening this one. `git`, which gitea also
// provides, mints nothing and so registers nothing here: the mesh's own repositories are public,
// and a clone credential is not yet decided (ADR 0111).
//
// The `npm-package-registry` interface: a consumer authenticates to the npm registry at
// `/api/packages/novox/npm/` with basic auth, as `as` with the password the mesh minted, and can // `/api/packages/novox/npm/` with basic auth, as `as` with the password the mesh minted, and can
// read and write packages under the `@novox` scope. The registry's npm owner is the gitea org // read and write packages under the `@novox` scope. The registry's npm owner is the gitea org
// `novox`; a consumer is a gitea *user* placed on that org's package team. // `novox`; a consumer is a gitea *user* placed on that org's package team.
@@ -26,7 +32,11 @@ const PACKAGE_TEAM = "packages";
const gitea = GiteaAdmin.fromEnv(); const gitea = GiteaAdmin.fromEnv();
runProvisioner("package-registry", { // Where this registration's contributions land comes from $MESH_RECEIVES, never a path written
// here: the mesh writes the file where the manifest's `receives` says, and a second copy of that
// path in code would drift from it. One variable carries one path, so a second registration in this
// module needs the mesh to say where each provision's file is — not yet possible, and not faked.
runProvisioner("npm-package-registry", {
async create(p: Provision): Promise<void> { async create(p: Provision): Promise<void> {
// The org and its package team are the same for every consumer; ensuring them per-create is // The org and its package team are the same for every consumer; ensuring them per-create is
// idempotent and needs no separate bootstrap step. // idempotent and needs no separate bootstrap step.
@@ -46,4 +56,9 @@ runProvisioner("package-registry", {
async remove(p: { as: string }): Promise<void> { async remove(p: { as: string }): Promise<void> {
await gitea.deleteUser(p.as); await gitea.deleteUser(p.as);
}, },
// Asked every minute by the harness: whether the backend still holds this consumer exactly as
// the mesh gave it, so a login lost behind the provisioner's back is made again (novox/hq issue 120).
async holds(p: Provision): Promise<boolean> {
return gitea.holdsTeamMember(ORG, PACKAGE_TEAM, p.as, p.password);
},
}); });
+11 -2
View File
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ export function getGiteaTools(gitea: GiteaClient): ToolDefinition[] {
labels: labelIds, labels: labelIds,
}); });
// The mesh just opened an issue — announce it the moment it exists. // The mesh just opened an issue — announce it the moment it exists.
await emit("module.gitea.issue.opened", { await emit("issue.opened", {
owner, owner,
repo, repo,
number: issue.number, number: issue.number,
@@ -231,15 +231,24 @@ export function getGiteaTools(gitea: GiteaClient): ToolDefinition[] {
// Read the PR first, so the merged event carries a title and branches, not just a number. // Read the PR first, so the merged event carries a title and branches, not just a number.
const pull = await gitea.getPullRequest(owner, repo, number); const pull = await gitea.getPullRequest(owner, repo, number);
await gitea.mergePullRequest(owner, repo, number, method, deleteBranch); await gitea.mergePullRequest(owner, repo, number, method, deleteBranch);
await emit("module.gitea.pull.merged", { // Read it again: the merge commit only exists now, and it is what a build is made from.
const merged = await gitea.getPullRequest(owner, repo, number);
// And what it changed, so the mesh rebuilds the modules whose own files moved rather than
// every module built from the repository (novox/hq 04-ISSUES/131).
const changed = await gitea.listPullFiles(owner, repo, number);
await emit("pull.merged", {
owner, owner,
repo, repo,
number, number,
title: pull.title, title: pull.title,
head: pull.head, head: pull.head,
base: pull.base, base: pull.base,
merge_commit_sha: merged.merge_commit_sha,
merged_at: merged.merged_at,
method, method,
html_url: pull.html_url, html_url: pull.html_url,
paths: changed.paths,
paths_truncated: changed.truncated,
}); });
return { merged: true, number, method, deleted_branch: deleteBranch }; return { merged: true, number, method, deleted_branch: deleteBranch };
}, },
+1 -1
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ async function pollAlerts(client: GrafanaClient): Promise<void> {
for (const key of now) { for (const key of now) {
if (!firing.has(key)) { if (!firing.has(key)) {
const a = byKey.get(key)!; const a = byKey.get(key)!;
await emit("module.grafana.alert.firing", { name: a.name, labels: a.labels, activeAt: a.activeAt }); await emit("alert.firing", { name: a.name, labels: a.labels, activeAt: a.activeAt });
} }
} }
} }
+3 -2
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
"module": "grafana", "module": "grafana",
"version": "1", "version": "1",
"emits": [ "emits": [
"module.grafana.alert.firing" "alert.firing"
], ],
"own-secrets": { "own-secrets": {
"admin": "/var/lib/grafana-module/admin.secret", "admin": "/var/lib/grafana-module/admin.secret",
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
], ],
"listens": [ "listens": [
{ {
"name": "web",
"port": 3000, "port": 3000,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
@@ -96,7 +97,7 @@
"contributes": { "contributes": {
"route": { "route": {
"label": "grafana", "label": "grafana",
"port": 3000 "endpoint": "web"
} }
}, },
"binds": { "binds": {
+2 -1
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
"contributes": { "contributes": {
"route": { "route": {
"label": "hello", "label": "hello",
"port": 8080 "endpoint": "web"
} }
}, },
"binds": { "binds": {
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
}, },
"listens": [ "listens": [
{ {
"name": "web",
"port": 8080, "port": 8080,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
+1 -1
View File
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ async function pollStates(): Promise<void> {
for (const s of states) { for (const s of states) {
const prev = lastState.get(s.entity_id); const prev = lastState.get(s.entity_id);
if (primed && prev !== undefined && prev !== s.state) { if (primed && prev !== undefined && prev !== s.state) {
await emit("module.home-assistant.state.changed", { await emit("state.changed", {
entity: s.entity_id, entity: s.entity_id,
name: nameOf(s), name: nameOf(s),
from: prev, from: prev,
+3 -2
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
"container-runtime" "container-runtime"
], ],
"emits": [ "emits": [
"module.home-assistant.state.changed" "state.changed"
], ],
"own-secrets": { "own-secrets": {
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/home-assistant/broker", "broker": "/var/lib/mesh/home-assistant/broker",
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
}, },
"listens": [ "listens": [
{ {
"name": "web",
"port": 8123, "port": 8123,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
@@ -85,7 +86,7 @@
"contributes": { "contributes": {
"route": { "route": {
"label": "home-assistant", "label": "home-assistant",
"port": 8123 "endpoint": "web"
} }
}, },
"binds": { "binds": {
+2 -2
View File
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ async function pollMounts(): Promise<void> {
if (primed) { if (primed) {
for (const [mount, m] of now) { for (const [mount, m] of now) {
if (!live.has(mount)) { if (!live.has(mount)) {
await emit("module.icecast.stream.started", { await emit("stream.started", {
mount, mount,
name: m.name, name: m.name,
description: m.description, description: m.description,
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ async function pollMounts(): Promise<void> {
} }
for (const [mount, m] of live) { for (const [mount, m] of live) {
if (!now.has(mount)) { if (!now.has(mount)) {
await emit("module.icecast.stream.stopped", { mount, name: m.name }); await emit("stream.stopped", { mount, name: m.name });
} }
} }
} }
+50 -24
View File
@@ -1,22 +1,43 @@
{ {
"module": "icecast", "module": "icecast",
"version": "1", "version": "1",
"requires": [
"route",
"secret"
],
"contributes": {
"route": {
"label": "icecast",
"endpoint": "stream"
}
},
"binds": {
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
},
"secrets": {
"secret": {
"source": "${dir:state}/source.secret",
"admin": "${dir:state}/admin.secret",
"relay": "${dir:state}/relay.secret"
}
},
"capabilities": [ "capabilities": [
"container-runtime" "container-runtime"
], ],
"emits": [ "emits": [
"module.icecast.stream.started", "stream.started",
"module.icecast.stream.stopped" "stream.stopped"
], ],
"own-secrets": { "own-secrets": {
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/icecast/broker" "broker": "/var/lib/mesh/icecast/broker"
}, },
"listens": [ "listens": [
{ {
"name": "stream",
"port": 8000, "port": 8000,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
"why": "streams in from sources and out to listeners" "why": "streams in from sources (HTTP PUT) and out to listeners, plus the status and admin pages; a public name is its route"
} }
], ],
"resources": [ "resources": [
@@ -29,28 +50,43 @@
{ {
"id": "state", "id": "state",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/icecast-module", "mode": "0700",
"mode": "0700" "place": "."
}, },
{ {
"id": "server-env", "id": "logs",
"type": "directory",
"mode": "0700",
"owner": "100:101"
},
{
"id": "server-conf",
"type": "file", "type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/icecast-module/server.env", "path": "${dir:state}/icecast.xml",
"mode": "0600", "mode": "0600",
"content": "ICECAST_SOURCE_PASSWORD=${secret:source}\nICECAST_ADMIN_PASSWORD=${secret:admin}\nICECAST_RELAY_PASSWORD=${secret:relay}\nICECAST_ADMIN_USERNAME=admin\n" "content": "<icecast>\n <!-- Written by the mesh (modules/icecast). Passwords arrive as secrets rendered into this file,\n never as environment: the image's entrypoint seds ICECAST_* variables into the file only\n when they are set, and none are. -->\n <location>Earth</location>\n <admin>icemaster@localhost</admin>\n <limits>\n <clients>100</clients>\n <sources>2</sources>\n <queue-size>524288</queue-size>\n <client-timeout>30</client-timeout>\n <header-timeout>15</header-timeout>\n <source-timeout>10</source-timeout>\n <burst-on-connect>1</burst-on-connect>\n <burst-size>65535</burst-size>\n </limits>\n <authentication>\n <source-password>${secret:source}</source-password>\n <relay-password>${secret:relay}</relay-password>\n <admin-user>admin</admin-user>\n <admin-password>${secret:admin}</admin-password>\n </authentication>\n <!-- The name icecast writes into playlists (.m3u/.xspf: http://<hostname>:<port>/<mount>) and\n would announce to YP (none configured). A machine's own name belongs to its assignment, and\n an assignment merges only into JSON; this XML cannot take it, so the neutral default stays. -->\n <hostname>localhost</hostname>\n <listen-socket>\n <port>8000</port>\n </listen-socket>\n <http-headers>\n <header name=\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\" value=\"*\" />\n </http-headers>\n <fileserve>1</fileserve>\n <paths>\n <basedir>/usr/share/icecast</basedir>\n <logdir>/var/log/icecast</logdir>\n <webroot>/usr/share/icecast/web</webroot>\n <adminroot>/usr/share/icecast/admin</adminroot>\n <alias source=\"/\" destination=\"/status.xsl\"/>\n </paths>\n <logging>\n <accesslog>access.log</accesslog>\n <errorlog>error.log</errorlog>\n <loglevel>3</loglevel>\n <logsize>10000</logsize>\n </logging>\n <security>\n <chroot>0</chroot>\n <!-- Starts as root, reads this 0600 root-owned file, then drops to the image's icecast user\n (uid 100, group icecast 101) before serving. -->\n <changeowner>\n <user>icecast</user>\n <group>icecast</group>\n </changeowner>\n </security>\n</icecast>\n"
},
{
"id": "net",
"type": "network",
"name": "icecast"
}, },
{ {
"id": "server", "id": "server",
"type": "container", "type": "container",
"name": "icecast", "name": "icecast",
"image": "infiniteproject/icecast@sha256:cd506cf3dfe31ce05fd37d7e672dbd1213e7255cc93d28ecf5a3b547af4e162c", "image": "infiniteproject/icecast@sha256:cd506cf3dfe31ce05fd37d7e672dbd1213e7255cc93d28ecf5a3b547af4e162c",
"env-file": [ "network": "icecast",
"/var/lib/icecast-module/server.env"
],
"ports": [ "ports": [
"8000" "8000"
], ],
"secrets-in-environment": "the image seds ICECAST_*_PASSWORD into icecast.xml and has no _FILE; convertible by mounting a generated icecast.xml, not yet done" "volumes": [
"${dir:state}/icecast.xml:/etc/icecast.xml:ro",
"${dir:logs}:/var/log/icecast"
],
"restart-on": [
"server-conf"
]
}, },
{ {
"id": "runtime-config", "id": "runtime-config",
@@ -64,14 +100,14 @@
"id": "runtime", "id": "runtime",
"type": "container", "type": "container",
"name": "mesh-icecast", "name": "mesh-icecast",
"network": "host", "network": "icecast",
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/icecast/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro", "/var/lib/mesh/icecast/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/mesh/icecast/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro" "/var/lib/mesh/icecast/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro"
], ],
"env": { "env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker", "MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_ICECAST_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:8000", "MESH_ICECAST_URL": "http://icecast:8000",
"MESH_ICECAST_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json" "MESH_ICECAST_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json"
}, },
"restart-on": [ "restart-on": [
@@ -100,15 +136,5 @@
"from": "Dockerfile" "from": "Dockerfile"
} }
] ]
},
"requires": [
"secret"
],
"secrets": {
"secret": {
"source": "/var/lib/icecast-module/source.secret",
"admin": "/var/lib/icecast-module/admin.secret",
"relay": "/var/lib/icecast-module/relay.secret"
}
} }
} }
+2 -2
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ ARG RUNTIME_BASE
FROM ${BUILD_BASE} AS build FROM ${BUILD_BASE} AS build
WORKDIR /app/modules/influxdb WORKDIR /app/modules/influxdb
COPY . . COPY . .
RUN node /app/node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc client.ts tools/index.ts \ RUN node /app/node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc client.ts grants.ts provisioner/index.ts tools/index.ts \
--module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist --module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist
FROM ${RUNTIME_BASE} FROM ${RUNTIME_BASE}
@@ -21,4 +21,4 @@ COPY --from=build /app/modules/influxdb/dist /app/modules/influxdb/dist
# Every serve-time entrypoint, loaded by the runtime in serve mode: tools and events serve, and a # Every serve-time entrypoint, loaded by the runtime in serve mode: tools and events serve, and a
# provider's provisioner runs its reconcile loop in the same process, with the broker connected — # provider's provisioner runs its reconcile loop in the same process, with the broker connected —
# the convention novox/hq issues 060/061 settled. # the convention novox/hq issues 060/061 settled.
ENV MESH_TOOL_MODULES=/app/modules/influxdb/dist/tools/index.js ENV MESH_TOOL_MODULES=/app/modules/influxdb/dist/tools/index.js,/app/modules/influxdb/dist/provisioner/index.js
+118 -3
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,25 @@ export interface InfluxBucket {
retentionSeconds?: number; retentionSeconds?: number;
} }
/** One permission of an authorization, as InfluxDB represents it: an action on a resource type,
* in one org, optionally narrowed to one resource by id (no id = every resource of that type). */
export interface InfluxPermission {
action: "read" | "write";
resource: { type: string; orgID?: string; id?: string; name?: string; org?: string };
}
/** A v1-compatibility ("legacy") authorization: a username (InfluxDB calls it `token`) and a
* password the caller chooses, scoped by permissions. The one credential InfluxDB 2.x lets a
* caller set to a value it did not generate — which is what a mesh-minted password needs. */
export interface LegacyAuthorization {
id: string;
token: string;
orgID: string;
status?: "active" | "inactive";
description?: string;
permissions: InfluxPermission[];
}
/** The settings-merged config the mesh delivers (novox/hq ADR 0046): { url, apiKey, token, password, user, ... }. */ /** The settings-merged config the mesh delivers (novox/hq ADR 0046): { url, apiKey, token, password, user, ... }. */
function meshConfig(file?: string): Record<string, string> { function meshConfig(file?: string): Record<string, string> {
if (!file) return {}; if (!file) return {};
@@ -24,13 +43,20 @@ function meshConfig(file?: string): Record<string, string> {
catch { return {}; } catch { return {}; }
} }
/** A secret delivered as a file, trimmed; undefined when there is none, so the caller can fall back. */
function tokenFromFile(file?: string): string | undefined {
if (!file) return undefined;
try { return readFileSync(file, "utf8").trim() || undefined; }
catch { return undefined; }
}
export class InfluxDBClient { export class InfluxDBClient {
readonly baseUrl: string; readonly baseUrl: string;
constructor( constructor(
url: string, url: string,
private readonly token: string, private readonly token: string,
private readonly org: string, readonly org: string,
) { ) {
this.baseUrl = url.replace(/\/$/, ""); this.baseUrl = url.replace(/\/$/, "");
} }
@@ -43,8 +69,10 @@ export class InfluxDBClient {
static fromEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): InfluxDBClient { static fromEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): InfluxDBClient {
const cfg = meshConfig(env.MESH_INFLUXDB_CONFIG_FILE); const cfg = meshConfig(env.MESH_INFLUXDB_CONFIG_FILE);
const url = cfg.url ?? env.MESH_INFLUXDB_URL ?? `http://127.0.0.1:${env.INFLUXDB_PORT ?? "8086"}`; const url = cfg.url ?? env.MESH_INFLUXDB_URL ?? `http://127.0.0.1:${env.INFLUXDB_PORT ?? "8086"}`;
const token = cfg.token ?? env.MESH_INFLUXDB_TOKEN; // The token reaches the process as a file (novox/hq ADR 0086); the environment variable stays
if (!token) throw new Error("no InfluxDB token — set MESH_INFLUXDB_TOKEN"); // only for a workstation running the tools by hand.
const token = cfg.token ?? tokenFromFile(env.MESH_INFLUXDB_TOKEN_FILE) ?? env.MESH_INFLUXDB_TOKEN;
if (!token) throw new Error("no InfluxDB token — set MESH_INFLUXDB_TOKEN_FILE");
const org = cfg.org ?? env.MESH_INFLUXDB_ORG ?? "mesh"; const org = cfg.org ?? env.MESH_INFLUXDB_ORG ?? "mesh";
return new InfluxDBClient(url, token, org); return new InfluxDBClient(url, token, org);
} }
@@ -61,6 +89,93 @@ export class InfluxDBClient {
return res; return res;
} }
/** Like request, but the answer is returned whatever its status, for the caller to read. */
private async raw(path: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response> {
return fetch(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`, {
...init,
headers: { Authorization: `Token ${this.token}`, ...(init?.headers ?? {}) },
});
}
private async send(path: string, method: string, body?: unknown): Promise<Response> {
return this.request(path, {
method,
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body),
});
}
/** The id of the org of this name, or undefined when there is none. */
async orgID(name: string): Promise<string | undefined> {
const res = await this.raw(`/api/v2/orgs?org=${encodeURIComponent(name)}`);
if (res.status === 404) return undefined;
if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`InfluxDB API /api/v2/orgs: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`);
const body = (await res.json()) as { orgs?: { id: string; name: string }[] };
return body.orgs?.find((o) => o.name === name)?.id;
}
/** The bucket of exactly this name in the org, or undefined. */
async findBucket(orgID: string, name: string): Promise<InfluxBucket | undefined> {
const res = await this.raw(`/api/v2/buckets?orgID=${encodeURIComponent(orgID)}&name=${encodeURIComponent(name)}`);
if (res.status === 404) return undefined;
if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`InfluxDB API /api/v2/buckets: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`);
const body = (await res.json()) as { buckets?: { id: string; name: string; orgID?: string }[] };
const b = body.buckets?.find((x) => x.name === name);
return b ? { id: b.id, name: b.name, orgID: b.orgID } : undefined;
}
/** Create a bucket that keeps its data for ever — retention is the operator's choice, never the mesh's. */
async createBucket(orgID: string, name: string, description: string): Promise<InfluxBucket> {
const b = (await (await this.send("/api/v2/buckets", "POST", {
orgID, name, description, retentionRules: [],
})).json()) as { id: string; name: string; orgID?: string };
return { id: b.id, name: b.name, orgID: b.orgID };
}
/** The v1 authorization whose username is exactly this, or undefined. */
async findLegacy(username: string): Promise<LegacyAuthorization | undefined> {
const path = `/private/legacy/authorizations?token=${encodeURIComponent(username)}`;
const res = await this.raw(path);
// InfluxDB answers a filter matching nothing with 404, not an empty list.
if (res.status === 404) return undefined;
if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`InfluxDB API ${path}: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`);
const body = (await res.json()) as { authorizations?: LegacyAuthorization[] };
return body.authorizations?.find((a) => a.token === username);
}
async createLegacy(a: Omit<LegacyAuthorization, "id">): Promise<LegacyAuthorization> {
return (await (await this.send("/private/legacy/authorizations", "POST", a)).json()) as LegacyAuthorization;
}
/** Set a v1 authorization's password. InfluxDB keeps only a hash of it, so it can be set, never read. */
async setLegacyPassword(id: string, password: string): Promise<void> {
await this.send(`/private/legacy/authorizations/${encodeURIComponent(id)}/password`, "POST", { password });
}
async updateLegacy(id: string, patch: { status?: "active" | "inactive"; description?: string }): Promise<void> {
await this.send(`/private/legacy/authorizations/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`, "PATCH", patch);
}
async deleteLegacy(id: string): Promise<void> {
await this.send(`/private/legacy/authorizations/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`, "DELETE");
}
/**
* Whether this username and password sign in on the v1 API — the consumer's own view. Asked with
* a statement that reads nothing (`SHOW DATABASES` lists only what the credential may read), sent
* with Basic auth so the password is never in a URL. 401 is a wrong password or no such user;
* anything else that is not a server error means InfluxDB knew who was asking.
*/
async legacySignsIn(username: string, password: string): Promise<boolean> {
const res = await fetch(`${this.baseUrl}/query?q=${encodeURIComponent("SHOW DATABASES")}`, {
headers: { Authorization: `Basic ${Buffer.from(`${username}:${password}`).toString("base64")}` },
});
await res.arrayBuffer();
if (res.status === 401) return false;
if (res.status >= 500) throw new Error(`InfluxDB v1 /query: ${res.status}`);
return true;
}
/** Server health — the one endpoint that needs no token, but we send it anyway. */ /** Server health — the one endpoint that needs no token, but we send it anyway. */
async health(): Promise<InfluxHealth> { async health(): Promise<InfluxHealth> {
return (await (await this.request("/health")).json()) as InfluxHealth; return (await (await this.request("/health")).json()) as InfluxHealth;
+186
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
// What the `influxdb-api` provision means in InfluxDB: one v1-compatibility authorization per
// consumer, in the org this module serves, under the username and password the mesh gave both ends,
// allowed exactly the access the consumer contributed. The provisioner (provisioner/index.ts) is the
// sdk harness calling these; they are here, apart from it, so they can be exercised against a fake
// InfluxDB without a broker or a contributions file.
//
// **Why a v1 authorization and not a v2 API token.** The mesh mints the consumer's password and
// hands it to both ends (novox/hq ADR 0048); the provider sets it, and never hands one back. An
// InfluxDB 2.x API token is generated by the server — `POST /api/v2/authorizations` ignores a token
// the caller sends — so a token could only ever be the operator's to accept, one per pair, by hand.
// A v1 authorization is a username and a password the caller chooses (8–72 characters; the mesh
// mints 40), stored hashed, and it reads and writes through InfluxQL (`/query`) and line protocol
// (`/write`), which every bucket answers under its own name as a database (InfluxDB maps each
// bucket to a database of the same name by itself). That is what grafana's InfluxDB data source
// speaks, and what Node-RED's influxdb nodes speak in their 1.x mode — so the mesh can make every
// consumer's credential, rotate it and withdraw it, with no person in the loop.
//
// **What a consumer contributes.** `access`: "read" (the default), "write" or "read-write".
// `buckets`: the buckets it may use, by name. A reader that names none may read every bucket of the
// org — a dashboard is pointed at data, it does not own it. A writer must name its buckets: writing
// everywhere, the org's system buckets included, is never what a consumer means. A named bucket
// that does not exist is created, keeping its data for ever; the mesh never deletes a bucket.
//
// **Only what the mesh made is touched.** An authorization this module creates is named with the
// mesh's identity prefix and its description starts with MARK. One with the same username that
// lacks the mark is somebody else's: it is refused, never adopted, never updated, never deleted.
// Every other authorization, token, user and bucket in the instance is left exactly as it was.
import type { InfluxDBClient, InfluxPermission, LegacyAuthorization } from "./client.js";
/** How a description marks an authorization as the mesh's own work. */
export const MARK = "[mesh]";
/** The prefix the mesh gives every consumer identity (novox/hq ADR 0049). */
const IDENTITY_PREFIX = "mesh_";
/** One consumer, as the harness hands it over. */
export interface ApiGrant {
readonly as: string;
readonly password: string;
readonly values: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;
readonly consumer?: string;
}
export type Access = "read" | "write" | "read-write";
/** What a contribution asks for, checked. Refused when it cannot be served as asked. */
export function askedFor(values: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>): { access: Access; buckets: string[] } {
const access = values.access ?? "read";
if (access !== "read" && access !== "write" && access !== "read-write") {
throw new Error(`contributes an access of ${JSON.stringify(access)} — it is "read", "write" or "read-write"`);
}
const raw = values.buckets ?? [];
if (!Array.isArray(raw) || raw.some((b) => typeof b !== "string" || b.trim() === "")) {
throw new Error(`contributes buckets of ${JSON.stringify(raw)} — a list of bucket names`);
}
const buckets = [...new Set((raw as string[]).map((b) => b.trim()))].sort();
if (access !== "read" && buckets.length === 0) {
throw new Error(`asks to write and names no bucket (\`buckets\`) — a writer names what it writes to`);
}
if (buckets.some((b) => b.startsWith("_"))) {
throw new Error(`names a system bucket (${buckets.filter((b) => b.startsWith("_")).join(", ")}) — those are InfluxDB's own`);
}
return { access: access as Access, buckets };
}
/** The permissions a grant resolves to, given each named bucket's id. */
export function permissionsFor(orgID: string, access: Access, bucketIDs: string[]): InfluxPermission[] {
const actions: ("read" | "write")[] = access === "read-write" ? ["read", "write"] : [access];
const out: InfluxPermission[] = [];
for (const action of actions) {
if (bucketIDs.length === 0) {
out.push({ action, resource: { type: "buckets", orgID } });
continue;
}
for (const id of bucketIDs) out.push({ action, resource: { type: "buckets", orgID, id } });
}
return out;
}
/** A permission as a comparable string: what InfluxDB answers carries names and links besides. */
function key(p: InfluxPermission): string {
return `${p.action}:${p.resource.type}:${p.resource.orgID ?? ""}:${p.resource.id ?? "*"}`;
}
function samePermissions(a: readonly InfluxPermission[], b: readonly InfluxPermission[]): boolean {
const x = a.map(key).sort();
const y = b.map(key).sort();
return x.length === y.length && x.every((v, i) => v === y[i]);
}
export function marked(a: Pick<LegacyAuthorization, "token" | "description">): boolean {
return a.token.startsWith(IDENTITY_PREFIX) && (a.description ?? "").startsWith(MARK);
}
function describe(g: ApiGrant): string {
return `${MARK} made by the mesh for ${g.consumer ? `a module on ${g.consumer}` : "a consumer"} — do not edit; it is reset`;
}
export class ApiGrants {
constructor(private readonly influx: InfluxDBClient, readonly org: string) {}
private async orgID(): Promise<string> {
const id = await this.influx.orgID(this.org);
if (!id) throw new Error(`InfluxDB has no org ${JSON.stringify(this.org)} — the org this module serves must exist`);
return id;
}
/** The ids of the named buckets, creating any that are missing when `create` says so. Undefined
* when one is missing and may not be created (a read-only question). */
private async bucketIDs(orgID: string, names: string[], create: ApiGrant | undefined): Promise<string[] | undefined> {
const ids: string[] = [];
for (const name of names) {
let b = await this.influx.findBucket(orgID, name);
if (!b) {
if (!create) return undefined;
b = await this.influx.createBucket(orgID, name, `${MARK} made by the mesh for ${create.as}; the mesh never deletes it`);
}
ids.push(b.id);
}
return ids.sort();
}
/** Create the consumer's authorization, or bring the mesh's existing one back to what the grant
* says. Idempotent: a second apply of the same grant changes nothing beyond re-asserting the
* password, which InfluxDB can be told but never asked. */
async ensure(g: ApiGrant): Promise<"created" | "updated" | "unchanged"> {
if (!g.as.startsWith(IDENTITY_PREFIX)) {
throw new Error(`${g.as} is not a mesh identity — the mesh names every consumer ${IDENTITY_PREFIX}<node>_<module>`);
}
const { access, buckets } = askedFor(g.values);
const orgID = await this.orgID();
const found = await this.influx.findLegacy(g.as);
if (found && !marked(found)) {
throw new Error(
`InfluxDB already has a v1 authorization ${g.as} the mesh did not make — left alone; ` +
`delete it if the mesh should own that name`);
}
const want = permissionsFor(orgID, access, (await this.bucketIDs(orgID, buckets, g))!);
if (found && found.orgID === orgID && samePermissions(found.permissions, want)) {
// Only what differs is written. The password cannot be read back, so it is tried instead.
let changed = false;
if (found.status === "inactive") {
await this.influx.updateLegacy(found.id, { status: "active" });
changed = true;
}
if (!(await this.influx.legacySignsIn(g.as, g.password))) {
await this.influx.setLegacyPassword(found.id, g.password);
changed = true;
}
return changed ? "updated" : "unchanged";
}
// InfluxDB cannot change an authorization's permissions in place, so the mesh's own is made
// again. Only ever one the mesh made: a foreign one was refused above.
if (found) await this.influx.deleteLegacy(found.id);
const made = await this.influx.createLegacy({
token: g.as, orgID, status: "active", description: describe(g), permissions: want,
});
await this.influx.setLegacyPassword(made.id, g.password);
return found ? "updated" : "created";
}
/** Whether InfluxDB still holds this consumer's authorization exactly as the grant says: present,
* the mesh's, active, allowed what was asked and nothing more, and signing in with the mesh's
* password. Reads only — a missing bucket is "not held", never created here. */
async holds(g: ApiGrant): Promise<boolean> {
const { access, buckets } = askedFor(g.values);
const orgID = await this.influx.orgID(this.org);
if (!orgID) return false;
const found = await this.influx.findLegacy(g.as);
if (!found || !marked(found) || found.status === "inactive" || found.orgID !== orgID) return false;
const ids = await this.bucketIDs(orgID, buckets, undefined);
if (!ids || !samePermissions(found.permissions, permissionsFor(orgID, access, ids))) return false;
return this.influx.legacySignsIn(g.as, g.password);
}
/** Withdraw a consumer's authorization — only one the mesh made. Its buckets and their data stay. */
async remove(as: string): Promise<"removed" | "absent" | "not ours"> {
const found = await this.influx.findLegacy(as);
if (!found) return "absent";
if (!marked(found)) return "not ours";
await this.influx.deleteLegacy(found.id);
return "removed";
}
}
+59 -30
View File
@@ -1,20 +1,43 @@
{ {
"module": "influxdb", "module": "influxdb",
"version": "1", "version": "1",
"provides": [
{
"name": "influxdb-api",
"scope": "mesh"
}
],
"capabilities": [ "capabilities": [
"container-runtime" "container-runtime"
], ],
"own-secrets": { "own-secrets": {
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/influxdb/broker" "broker": "/var/lib/mesh/influxdb/broker",
"admin": "${dir:state}/admin.secret",
"admin-token": "${dir:state}/admin-token.secret"
}, },
"listens": [ "listens": [
{ {
"name": "api",
"port": 8086, "port": 8086,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
"why": "queries and writes, over http" "why": "queries, writes and the web UI, over http; consumers granted influxdb-api sign in with the mesh's credential, and a name is a route grant"
} }
], ],
"serves": {
"influxdb-api": {
"scheme": "http",
"port": 8086,
"org": "mesh",
"bucket": "default"
}
},
"receives": {
"influxdb-api": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
},
"grants": {
"influxdb-api": "${dir:grants}"
},
"resources": [ "resources": [
{ {
"id": "mesh-state", "id": "mesh-state",
@@ -25,46 +48,50 @@
{ {
"id": "state", "id": "state",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/influxdb-module", "mode": "0700",
"mode": "0700" "place": "."
},
{
"id": "server-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/influxdb-module/server.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "DOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_MODE=setup\nDOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_USERNAME=admin\nDOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_PASSWORD=${secret:admin}\nDOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_ADMIN_TOKEN=${secret:admin-token}\nDOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_ORG=mesh\nDOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_BUCKET=default\n"
}, },
{ {
"id": "data", "id": "data",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/influxdb/data",
"mode": "0700", "mode": "0700",
"owner": "1000:1000" "owner": "1000:1000"
}, },
{ {
"id": "config", "id": "config",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/influxdb/config",
"mode": "0700", "mode": "0700",
"owner": "1000:1000" "owner": "1000:1000"
}, },
{
"id": "grants",
"type": "directory",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "server-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "${dir:state}/server.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "DOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_MODE=setup\nDOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_USERNAME=admin\nDOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_PASSWORD_FILE=/run/secrets/admin\nDOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_ADMIN_TOKEN_FILE=/run/secrets/admin-token\nDOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_ORG=mesh\nDOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_BUCKET=default\n"
},
{ {
"id": "server", "id": "server",
"type": "container", "type": "container",
"name": "influxdb", "name": "influxdb",
"image": "influxdb@sha256:f75e48af0598e8aec7986e991a848d19a119101a7d563a2e5db1dfaac9c45daa", "image": "influxdb@sha256:f75e48af0598e8aec7986e991a848d19a119101a7d563a2e5db1dfaac9c45daa",
"env-file": [ "env-file": [
"/var/lib/influxdb-module/server.env" "${dir:state}/server.env"
], ],
"ports": [ "ports": [
"8086" "8086"
], ],
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/services/influxdb/data:/var/lib/influxdb2", "${dir:data}:/var/lib/influxdb2",
"/services/influxdb/config:/etc/influxdb2" "${dir:config}:/etc/influxdb2",
], "${dir:state}/admin.secret:/run/secrets/admin:ro",
"secrets-in-environment": "the image honours DOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_PASSWORD_FILE and _ADMIN_TOKEN_FILE; convertible, awaiting a bed that proves it" "${dir:state}/admin-token.secret:/run/secrets/admin-token:ro"
]
}, },
{ {
"id": "runtime-config", "id": "runtime-config",
@@ -82,13 +109,15 @@
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/influxdb/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro", "/var/lib/mesh/influxdb/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/mesh/influxdb/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro", "/var/lib/mesh/influxdb/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro",
"/services/influxdb/config:/var/lib/influxdb/config:ro" "${dir:state}/admin-token.secret:/run/secrets/admin-token:ro",
"${dir:grants}:${dir:grants}:ro"
], ],
"env": { "env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker", "MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_INFLUXDB_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:8086", "MESH_INFLUXDB_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:${port:8086}",
"MESH_INFLUXDB_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json", "MESH_INFLUXDB_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json",
"MESH_INFLUXDB_CONFIG_DIR": "/var/lib/influxdb/config" "MESH_INFLUXDB_TOKEN_FILE": "/run/secrets/admin-token",
"MESH_RECEIVES": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
}, },
"restart-on": [ "restart-on": [
"runtime-config" "runtime-config"
@@ -96,6 +125,15 @@
"artifact": "runtime" "artifact": "runtime"
} }
], ],
"requires": [
"route"
],
"contributes": {
"route": {
"label": "influxdb",
"endpoint": "api"
}
},
"build": { "build": {
"on": [ "on": [
{ {
@@ -116,14 +154,5 @@
"from": "Dockerfile" "from": "Dockerfile"
} }
] ]
},
"requires": [
"secret"
],
"secrets": {
"secret": {
"admin": "/var/lib/influxdb-module/admin.secret",
"admin-token": "/var/lib/influxdb-module/admin-token.secret"
}
} }
} }
+6 -1
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,14 @@
{ {
"name": "@novox/module-influxdb", "name": "@novox/module-influxdb",
"version": "0.1.0", "version": "0.1.0",
"description": "influxdb — time-series database. Its API client and tools live here (novox/hq ADR 0039).", "description": "influxdb — time-series database; provides the mesh influxdb-api interface. Its API client, provisioner and tools live here (novox/hq ADR 0039).",
"type": "module", "type": "module",
"private": true, "private": true,
"scripts": {
"build": "tsc client.ts grants.ts provisioner/index.ts tools/index.ts --module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist",
"typecheck": "tsc -p tsconfig.json",
"test": "npm run build && node --test --experimental-strip-types 'test/*.test.ts'"
},
"dependencies": { "dependencies": {
"@novox/mesh-sdk": "^0.1.0" "@novox/mesh-sdk": "^0.1.0"
}, },
+54
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
// influxdb's provisioner — the adapter that makes influxdb a provider of the mesh `influxdb-api`
// interface. The reconcile loop, the contributions file and reading the mesh's minted secret are the
// sdk harness's; this writes only the per-service half: how InfluxDB creates, checks and removes a
// consumer's credential (novox/hq ADR 0039/0040/0048). What that credential is, and why it is a v1
// authorization, is in ../grants.ts.
//
// The `influxdb-api` interface: a consumer reaches `${bound:influxdb-api:scheme}://…:at:…:port`,
// signs in as `${bound:influxdb-api:as}` with the password the mesh minted for the pair, and reads
// or writes the org's buckets as databases of the same name — `${bound:influxdb-api:bucket}` being
// the one this instance serves by default. The org and the default bucket are the assignment's
// settings, which reach both what is served and this module's config.json, so the org a consumer is
// told and the org its credential is made in cannot disagree.
import { runProvisioner, type Provision } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/provisioner";
import { InfluxDBClient } from "../client.js";
import { ApiGrants } from "../grants.js";
let grants: ApiGrants | undefined;
try {
const influx = InfluxDBClient.fromEnv();
grants = new ApiGrants(influx, influx.org);
} catch (err) {
// No admin token: nothing can be provisioned, and the tools loaded beside this must still serve.
console.error(`[provisioner:influxdb-api] not started: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : err}`);
}
if (grants) serve(grants);
function serve(grants: ApiGrants): void {
runProvisioner("influxdb-api", {
async create(p: Provision): Promise<void> {
const done = await grants.ensure(p);
if (done !== "unchanged") {
console.log(`[provisioner:influxdb-api] ${done} v1 authorization ${p.as} in org ${grants.org}`);
}
},
async remove(p: { as: string }): Promise<void> {
const done = await grants.remove(p.as);
if (done === "not ours") {
console.error(`[provisioner:influxdb-api] ${p.as}: an authorization of that name exists that the mesh did not make — left alone`);
} else if (done === "removed") {
console.log(`[provisioner:influxdb-api] removed v1 authorization ${p.as}; its buckets and their data stay`);
}
},
// Asked every minute by the harness: whether InfluxDB still holds this consumer's authorization
// exactly as the mesh gave it, so one deleted, disabled or re-passworded behind the mesh's back is
// made whole again (hq issue 120).
async holds(p: Provision): Promise<boolean> {
return grants.holds(p);
},
});
}
+246
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
// What holds influxdb to the `influxdb-api` provision (grants.ts): one v1 authorization per consumer,
// under the username and password the mesh gave, allowed only what the consumer contributed; made
// once and brought back on every apply; buckets created when missing and never deleted; and an
// authorization the mesh did not make — same name or not — never adopted, changed or deleted.
//
// InfluxDB is a fake: the routes the module touches, answering with the status codes and shapes
// InfluxDB 2.9 gives (a filter matching nothing is a 404, a password outside 8–72 characters a 400,
// an inactive authorization or a wrong password a 401 on /query). Run against the compiled module
// (npm test builds first), the way the runtime loads it.
import { test, after, beforeEach } from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import { createServer, type IncomingMessage, type ServerResponse } from "node:http";
import { InfluxDBClient } from "../dist/client.js";
import { ApiGrants, MARK, askedFor, marked } from "../dist/grants.js";
type Rec = Record<string, any>;
const ADMIN = "operator-token";
const orgs = new Map<string, string>([["zurag", "org1"]]);
let buckets: Rec[] = [];
let auths: Rec[] = [];
let calls: string[] = [];
let seq = 0;
function body(req: IncomingMessage): Promise<any> {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
let raw = "";
req.on("data", (c) => (raw += c));
req.on("end", () => resolve(raw ? JSON.parse(raw) : undefined));
});
}
function send(res: ServerResponse, status: number, value?: unknown): void {
res.writeHead(status, { "Content-Type": "application/json" });
res.end(value === undefined ? "" : JSON.stringify(value));
}
const server = createServer(async (req, res) => {
const url = new URL(req.url!, "http://fake");
const p = url.pathname;
calls.push(`${req.method} ${p}`);
if (p === "/query") {
const basic = (req.headers.authorization ?? "").replace(/^Basic /, "");
const [u, pw] = Buffer.from(basic, "base64").toString().split(":");
const a = auths.find((x) => x.token === u);
if (!a || a.status !== "active" || a.password === undefined || a.password !== pw) {
return send(res, 401, { code: "unauthorized", message: "Unauthorized" });
}
return send(res, 200, { results: [{ statement_id: 0 }] });
}
if (req.headers.authorization !== `Token ${ADMIN}`) return send(res, 401, { code: "unauthorized" });
if (p === "/api/v2/orgs") {
const id = orgs.get(url.searchParams.get("org") ?? "");
if (!id) return send(res, 404, { code: "not found", message: "organization name not found" });
return send(res, 200, { orgs: [{ id, name: url.searchParams.get("org") }] });
}
if (p === "/api/v2/buckets" && req.method === "GET") {
const found = buckets.filter((b) => b.orgID === url.searchParams.get("orgID") && b.name === url.searchParams.get("name"));
if (found.length === 0) return send(res, 404, { code: "not found", message: "bucket not found" });
return send(res, 200, { buckets: found });
}
if (p === "/api/v2/buckets" && req.method === "POST") {
const b = { ...(await body(req)), id: `b${++seq}` };
buckets.push(b);
return send(res, 201, b);
}
if (p === "/private/legacy/authorizations" && req.method === "GET") {
const found = auths.filter((a) => a.token === url.searchParams.get("token"));
if (found.length === 0) return send(res, 404, { code: "not found", message: "authorization not found" });
// Never answers with the password: InfluxDB keeps only its hash.
return send(res, 200, { authorizations: found.map(({ password, ...a }) => ({ ...a, links: {} })) });
}
if (p === "/private/legacy/authorizations" && req.method === "POST") {
const a = await body(req);
if (auths.some((x) => x.token === a.token)) return send(res, 409, { code: "conflict", message: "token already exists" });
const made = { ...a, id: `a${++seq}`, status: a.status ?? "active" };
auths.push(made);
return send(res, 201, made);
}
const m = /^\/private\/legacy\/authorizations\/([^/]+)(\/password)?$/.exec(p);
const a = m && auths.find((x) => x.id === m[1]);
if (!a) return send(res, 404, { code: "not found" });
if (m![2] && req.method === "POST") {
const { password } = await body(req);
if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length < 8 || password.length > 72) {
return send(res, 400, { code: "invalid", message: "passwords must be between 8 and 72 characters long" });
}
a.password = password;
return send(res, 204);
}
if (req.method === "PATCH") {
Object.assign(a, await body(req));
return send(res, 200, a);
}
if (req.method === "DELETE") {
auths = auths.filter((x) => x !== a);
return send(res, 204);
}
send(res, 405);
});
await new Promise<void>((r) => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", r));
after(() => server.close());
const port = (server.address() as { port: number }).port;
const grants = new ApiGrants(new InfluxDBClient(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}`, ADMIN, "zurag"), "zurag");
const PW = "mesh-minted-password-of-forty-characters";
/** Grafana on ace, as the mesh hands it to the provisioner. */
function grafana(password = PW, values: Record<string, unknown> = { access: "read" }) {
return { as: "mesh_ace_grafana", password, consumer: "ace", values };
}
/** Node-RED on ace: writes one bucket. */
function nodered(password = PW, values: Record<string, unknown> = { access: "write", buckets: ["zurag"] }) {
return { as: "mesh_ace_nodered", password, consumer: "ace", values };
}
function only(token: string): Rec {
const found = auths.filter((a) => a.token === token);
assert.equal(found.length, 1, `exactly one authorization ${token}, found ${found.length}`);
return found[0];
}
function perms(a: Rec): string[] {
return a.permissions.map((p: Rec) => `${p.action}:${p.resource.type}:${p.resource.id ?? "*"}`).sort();
}
beforeEach(() => {
buckets = [{ id: "zb", orgID: "org1", name: "zurag" }];
auths = [];
calls = [];
});
test("what a contribution may ask for, and what is refused", () => {
assert.deepEqual(askedFor({}), { access: "read", buckets: [] });
assert.deepEqual(askedFor({ access: "read-write", buckets: ["b", "a", "a"] }), { access: "read-write", buckets: ["a", "b"] });
assert.throws(() => askedFor({ access: "admin" }), /access/);
assert.throws(() => askedFor({ access: "write" }), /names no bucket/);
assert.throws(() => askedFor({ buckets: "zurag" }), /list of bucket names/);
assert.throws(() => askedFor({ access: "write", buckets: ["_monitoring"] }), /system bucket/);
});
test("a reader is given one authorization, reading every bucket of the org, under the mesh's password", async () => {
assert.equal(await grants.ensure(grafana()), "created");
const a = only("mesh_ace_grafana");
assert.equal(a.orgID, "org1");
assert.equal(a.status, "active");
assert.ok(a.description.startsWith(MARK));
assert.deepEqual(perms(a), ["read:buckets:*"]);
assert.equal(a.password, PW);
assert.equal(await grants.holds(grafana()), true);
});
test("a writer is allowed its own buckets only, and a missing one is made — never deleted", async () => {
assert.equal(await grants.ensure(nodered(PW, { access: "write", buckets: ["zurag", "printer"] })), "created");
const made = buckets.find((b) => b.name === "printer");
assert.ok(made, "the missing bucket was created");
assert.deepEqual(made!.retentionRules, [], "kept for ever: retention is the operator's choice");
assert.deepEqual(perms(only("mesh_ace_nodered")), [`write:buckets:${made!.id}`, "write:buckets:zb"]);
assert.equal(await grants.remove("mesh_ace_nodered"), "removed");
assert.equal(buckets.length, 2, "withdrawing the consumer leaves every bucket and its data");
});
test("applying the same grant again writes nothing", async () => {
await grants.ensure(grafana());
calls = [];
assert.equal(await grants.ensure(grafana()), "unchanged");
assert.ok(calls.every((c) => c.startsWith("GET")), `only reads: ${calls.join(", ")}`);
only("mesh_ace_grafana");
});
test("a rotated password is set in place; a changed access remakes only the mesh's own", async () => {
await grants.ensure(nodered());
const id = only("mesh_ace_nodered").id;
assert.equal(await grants.holds(nodered("rotated-password-0123456789")), false);
assert.equal(await grants.ensure(nodered("rotated-password-0123456789")), "updated");
assert.equal(only("mesh_ace_nodered").id, id, "updated, not replaced");
assert.equal(await grants.holds(nodered("rotated-password-0123456789")), true);
await grants.ensure(nodered(PW, { access: "read-write", buckets: ["zurag"] }));
assert.deepEqual(perms(only("mesh_ace_nodered")), ["read:buckets:zb", "write:buckets:zb"]);
assert.equal(await grants.holds(nodered(PW, { access: "read-write", buckets: ["zurag"] })), true);
});
test("an authorization disabled, re-passworded or deleted behind the mesh's back is not held, and is made whole", async () => {
await grants.ensure(grafana());
only("mesh_ace_grafana").status = "inactive";
assert.equal(await grants.holds(grafana()), false);
assert.equal(await grants.ensure(grafana()), "updated");
assert.equal(await grants.holds(grafana()), true);
only("mesh_ace_grafana").password = "somebody-else-set-this";
assert.equal(await grants.holds(grafana()), false);
await grants.ensure(grafana());
assert.equal(await grants.holds(grafana()), true);
auths = [];
assert.equal(await grants.holds(grafana()), false);
assert.equal(await grants.ensure(grafana()), "created");
});
test("holds only reads, and a bucket gone missing is not held rather than made", async () => {
await grants.ensure(nodered());
buckets = [];
calls = [];
assert.equal(await grants.holds(nodered()), false);
assert.ok(calls.every((c) => c.startsWith("GET")), `only reads: ${calls.join(", ")}`);
assert.equal(buckets.length, 0);
});
test("an authorization of the same name the mesh did not make is refused, and left exactly as it was", async () => {
auths = [{ id: "theirs", token: "mesh_ace_grafana", orgID: "org1", status: "active", description: "hand-made",
permissions: [{ action: "write", resource: { type: "buckets", orgID: "org1" } }], password: "their-password" }];
const before = JSON.stringify(auths);
await assert.rejects(grants.ensure(grafana()), /did not make/);
assert.equal(JSON.stringify(auths), before);
assert.ok(calls.every((c) => c.startsWith("GET")), `only reads: ${calls.join(", ")}`);
assert.equal(await grants.holds(grafana()), false);
assert.equal(await grants.remove("mesh_ace_grafana"), "not ours");
assert.equal(auths.length, 1, "never deleted");
});
test("the predecessor's own v1 users and tokens are never touched", async () => {
auths = [{ id: "hal", token: "grafana", orgID: "org1", status: "active", description: "",
permissions: [{ action: "read", resource: { type: "buckets", orgID: "org1" } }], password: "old-password" }];
await grants.ensure(grafana());
assert.equal(auths.find((a) => a.id === "hal")!.password, "old-password");
assert.equal(await grants.remove("grafana"), "not ours");
assert.equal(marked({ token: "grafana", description: `${MARK} x` }), false, "the mark needs the mesh's name too");
});
test("an org the instance does not have, or a non-mesh name, makes nothing", async () => {
const elsewhere = new ApiGrants(new InfluxDBClient(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}`, ADMIN, "nope"), "nope");
await assert.rejects(elsewhere.ensure(grafana()), /no org "nope"/);
await assert.rejects(grants.ensure({ ...grafana(), as: "grafana" }), /not a mesh identity/);
assert.equal(auths.length, 0);
});
test("a withdrawn consumer's authorization is removed, and an absent one is not an error", async () => {
await grants.ensure(grafana());
assert.equal(await grants.remove("mesh_ace_grafana"), "removed");
assert.equal(auths.length, 0);
assert.equal(await grants.remove("mesh_ace_grafana"), "absent");
});
+6 -1
View File
@@ -8,5 +8,10 @@
"skipLibCheck": true, "skipLibCheck": true,
"noEmit": true "noEmit": true
}, },
"include": ["client.ts", "tools/index.ts"] "include": [
"client.ts",
"grants.ts",
"provisioner/index.ts",
"tools/index.ts"
]
} }
+11 -6
View File
@@ -14,12 +14,15 @@
"mongodb-database": { "mongodb-database": {
"name": "invoicing" "name": "invoicing"
}, },
"s3-bucket": {
"bucket": "invoicing"
},
"route": { "route": {
"label": "invoicing", "site": {
"port": 80 "label": "invoicing",
"endpoint": "web"
},
"api": {
"label": "invoicing-api",
"endpoint": "api"
}
} }
}, },
"binds": { "binds": {
@@ -33,12 +36,14 @@
}, },
"listens": [ "listens": [
{ {
"name": "web",
"port": 80, "port": 80,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
"why": "the invoicing web frontend; a public name is a route grant later" "why": "the invoicing web frontend; a public name is a route grant later"
}, },
{ {
"name": "api",
"port": 9000, "port": 9000,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
@@ -63,7 +68,7 @@
"type": "file", "type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/invoicing/api.env", "path": "/var/lib/invoicing/api.env",
"mode": "0600", "mode": "0600",
"content": "NODE_ENV=production\nPORT=9000\nMONGO_URL=mongodb://${bound:mongodb-database:as}:${secret:mongodb-database}@${bound:mongodb-database:at}:${bound:mongodb-database:port}/invoicing?authSource=admin\nMINIO_BUCKET=invoicing\nMINIO_ENDPOINT=${bound:s3-bucket:at}\nMINIO_PORT=${bound:s3-bucket:port}\nMINIO_ACCESSKEY=${bound:s3-bucket:as}\nMINIO_SECRET=${secret:s3-bucket}\n" "content": "NODE_ENV=production\nPORT=9000\nMONGO_URL=mongodb://${bound:mongodb-database:as}:${secret:mongodb-database}@${bound:mongodb-database:at}:${bound:mongodb-database:port}/${bound:mongodb-database:as}?authSource=${bound:mongodb-database:as}\nMONGO_DB=${bound:mongodb-database:as}\nMINIO_BUCKET=mesh-novox-invoice\nMINIO_ENDPOINT=${bound:s3-bucket:at}\nMINIO_PORT=${bound:s3-bucket:port}\nMINIO_ACCESSKEY=${bound:s3-bucket:as}\nMINIO_SECRET=${secret:s3-bucket}\n"
}, },
{ {
"id": "net", "id": "net",
+53 -16
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
// an indexer proxy: it normalises many torrent trackers behind one Torznab surface. This client // an indexer proxy: it normalises many torrent trackers behind one Torznab surface. This client
// talks its /api/v2.0 REST API, and only jackett's tools import it. // talks its /api/v2.0 REST API, and only jackett's tools import it.
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { join } from "node:path";
export interface JackettIndexer { export interface JackettIndexer {
id: string; id: string;
@@ -43,18 +44,36 @@ export class JackettClient {
/** /**
* Build from the module's resolved environment. Jackett's REST API is keyed, so both the URL and * Build from the module's resolved environment. Jackett's REST API is keyed, so both the URL and
* the key must be present — without them there is nothing to talk to, so this throws and the * the key must be present. The key is read from the settings-merged config or MESH_JACKETT_API_KEY,
* module contributes no tools rather than failing half-configured. * or, failing those, discovered from Jackett's own ServerConfig.json under MESH_JACKETT_CONFIG_DIR
* — the file Jackett writes it to, as sonarr/radarr read theirs from config.xml — so a running
* server needs no key configured by hand and no secret has to be put in an assignment. Without a
* URL or key there is nothing to talk to, so this throws and the module contributes no tools
* rather than failing half-configured.
*/ */
static fromEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): JackettClient { static fromEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): JackettClient {
const cfg = meshConfig(env.MESH_JACKETT_CONFIG_FILE); const cfg = meshConfig(env.MESH_JACKETT_CONFIG_FILE);
const url = cfg.url ?? env.MESH_JACKETT_URL; const url = cfg.url ?? env.MESH_JACKETT_URL;
const apiKey = cfg.apiKey ?? env.MESH_JACKETT_API_KEY; const apiKey = cfg.apiKey ?? env.MESH_JACKETT_API_KEY
?? JackettClient.detectApiKey(env.MESH_JACKETT_CONFIG_DIR ?? "/config");
if (!url) throw new Error("no Jackett URL — set MESH_JACKETT_URL"); if (!url) throw new Error("no Jackett URL — set MESH_JACKETT_URL");
if (!apiKey) throw new Error("no Jackett API key — set MESH_JACKETT_API_KEY"); if (!apiKey) throw new Error("no Jackett API key — set MESH_JACKETT_API_KEY or make the config dir readable");
return new JackettClient(url, apiKey); return new JackettClient(url, apiKey);
} }
/** Discover the API key from Jackett's ServerConfig.json (the linuxserver image keeps it at
* <config>/Jackett/ServerConfig.json), falling back to null. */
static detectApiKey(configDir: string): string | null {
for (const file of [join(configDir, "Jackett", "ServerConfig.json"), join(configDir, "ServerConfig.json")]) {
if (!existsSync(file)) continue;
try {
const key = (JSON.parse(readFileSync(file, "utf8")) as { APIKey?: unknown }).APIKey;
if (typeof key === "string" && key) return key;
} catch { /* unreadable or mid-write: try the next, then give up */ }
}
return null;
}
private async get(path: string, params: Record<string, string> = {}): Promise<any> { private async get(path: string, params: Record<string, string> = {}): Promise<any> {
const url = new URL(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`); const url = new URL(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`);
url.searchParams.set("apikey", this.apiKey); url.searchParams.set("apikey", this.apiKey);
@@ -64,18 +83,36 @@ export class JackettClient {
return res.json(); return res.json();
} }
/** The configured indexers Jackett proxies. `configured=false` also lists the ones not set up. */ /**
* The configured indexers Jackett proxies. `configured=false` also lists the ones not set up.
* Read from the Torznab `t=indexers` feed, not /api/v2.0/indexers: that one is the web UI's and
* wants a login cookie (it answers an API-key request with a redirect), while the Torznab feed is
* what the key is for. The feed carries no last error, so `lastError` stays unset.
*/
async getIndexers(configuredOnly = true): Promise<JackettIndexer[]> { async getIndexers(configuredOnly = true): Promise<JackettIndexer[]> {
const raw = await this.get("/api/v2.0/indexers", { configured: configuredOnly ? "true" : "false" }); const url = new URL(`${this.baseUrl}/api/v2.0/indexers/all/results/torznab/api`);
const list = Array.isArray(raw) ? raw : []; url.searchParams.set("apikey", this.apiKey);
return list.map((i: any) => ({ url.searchParams.set("t", "indexers");
id: i.id, url.searchParams.set("configured", configuredOnly ? "true" : "false");
name: i.name, const res = await fetch(url.toString(), { headers: { Accept: "application/xml" } });
type: i.type, if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`Jackett API torznab t=indexers: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`);
configured: i.configured ?? false, const xml = await res.text();
siteLink: i.site_link, // Torznab reports failures (a wrong key among them) as 200 with an <error> body.
lastError: i.last_error || undefined, const err = xml.match(/<error code="(\d+)" description="([^"]*)"/);
})); if (err) throw new Error(`Jackett API torznab t=indexers: error ${err[1]} ${err[2]}`);
const text = (block: string, tag: string) =>
block.match(new RegExp(`<${tag}>([^<]*)</${tag}>`))?.[1];
const out: JackettIndexer[] = [];
for (const m of xml.matchAll(/<indexer id="([^"]+)" configured="([^"]+)">([\s\S]*?)<\/indexer>/g)) {
out.push({
id: m[1],
name: text(m[3], "title") ?? m[1],
type: text(m[3], "type") ?? "unknown",
configured: m[2] === "true",
siteLink: text(m[3], "link"),
});
}
return out;
} }
/** /**
+29 -10
View File
@@ -1,15 +1,29 @@
{ {
"module": "jackett", "module": "jackett",
"version": "1", "version": "1",
"provides": [
{
"name": "jackett-api",
"scope": "mesh"
}
],
"serves": {
"jackett-api": {
"scheme": "http",
"port": 9117,
"url-base": ""
}
},
"capabilities": [ "capabilities": [
"container-runtime" "container-runtime"
], ],
"listens": [ "listens": [
{ {
"name": "web",
"port": 9117, "port": 9117,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
"why": "the indexer proxy" "why": "the indexer proxy: its web UI, and the Torznab feeds the *arr apps search through, which other modules reach as jackett-api"
} }
], ],
"resources": [ "resources": [
@@ -19,10 +33,15 @@
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/jackett", "path": "/var/lib/mesh/jackett",
"mode": "0700" "mode": "0700"
}, },
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{ {
"id": "config", "id": "config",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/jackett/config",
"mode": "0700", "mode": "0700",
"owner": "1000:1000" "owner": "1000:1000"
}, },
@@ -30,7 +49,7 @@
"id": "server", "id": "server",
"type": "container", "type": "container",
"name": "jackett", "name": "jackett",
"image": "lscr.io/linuxserver/jackett@sha256:fd72d42b731ebf750b5de9711127251cf3b3f609419c32083ea8b3b3ee840b77", "image": "lscr.io/linuxserver/jackett@sha256:7b19f4f6ac33d855ca9226600ecbd096ee678f66da28b13a7c09980b035ff583",
"env": { "env": {
"PUID": "1000", "PUID": "1000",
"PGID": "1000", "PGID": "1000",
@@ -40,13 +59,13 @@
"9117" "9117"
], ],
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/services/jackett/config:/config" "${dir:config}:/config"
] ]
}, },
{ {
"id": "runtime-config", "id": "runtime-config",
"type": "file", "type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/jackett/config.json", "path": "${dir:state}/config.json",
"mode": "0600", "mode": "0600",
"content": "{}\n", "content": "{}\n",
"merge": "json" "merge": "json"
@@ -58,12 +77,12 @@
"network": "host", "network": "host",
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/jackett/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro", "/var/lib/mesh/jackett/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/mesh/jackett/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro", "${dir:state}/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro",
"/services/jackett/config:/var/lib/jackett/config:ro" "${dir:config}:/var/lib/jackett/config:ro"
], ],
"env": { "env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker", "MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_JACKETT_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:9117", "MESH_JACKETT_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:${port:9117}",
"MESH_JACKETT_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json", "MESH_JACKETT_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json",
"MESH_JACKETT_CONFIG_DIR": "/var/lib/jackett/config" "MESH_JACKETT_CONFIG_DIR": "/var/lib/jackett/config"
}, },
@@ -82,11 +101,11 @@
"contributes": { "contributes": {
"route": { "route": {
"label": "indexers", "label": "indexers",
"port": 9117 "endpoint": "web"
} }
}, },
"binds": { "binds": {
"route": "/var/lib/mesh/jackett/route.json" "route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
}, },
"build": { "build": {
"on": [ "on": [
+1 -1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ export function getJackettTools(jackett: JackettClient): ToolDefinition[] {
return [ return [
{ {
name: "jackett_indexers", name: "jackett_indexers",
description: "List the indexers Jackett proxies, with their type and any last error.", description: "List the indexers Jackett proxies, with their type and site.",
input: { all: { type: "boolean", description: "include indexers not yet configured (default false)" } }, input: { all: { type: "boolean", description: "include indexers not yet configured (default false)" } },
run: async (args) => { run: async (args) => {
const indexers = await jackett.getIndexers(!args.all); const indexers = await jackett.getIndexers(!args.all);
+6 -6
View File
@@ -28,17 +28,17 @@ async function announce(type: string, body: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<vo
export const events = { export const events = {
userCreated: (realm: string, username: string, email?: string) => userCreated: (realm: string, username: string, email?: string) =>
announce("module.keycloak.user.created", { realm, username, ...(email ? { email } : {}) }), announce("user.created", { realm, username, ...(email ? { email } : {}) }),
userDeleted: (realm: string, userId: string) => userDeleted: (realm: string, userId: string) =>
announce("module.keycloak.user.deleted", { realm, userId }), announce("user.deleted", { realm, userId }),
passwordReset: (realm: string, userId: string) => passwordReset: (realm: string, userId: string) =>
announce("module.keycloak.password.reset", { realm, userId }), announce("password.reset", { realm, userId }),
clientCreated: (realm: string, clientId: string, name?: string) => clientCreated: (realm: string, clientId: string, name?: string) =>
announce("module.keycloak.client.created", { realm, clientId, ...(name ? { name } : {}) }), announce("client.created", { realm, clientId, ...(name ? { name } : {}) }),
groupCreated: (realm: string, name: string) => groupCreated: (realm: string, name: string) =>
announce("module.keycloak.group.created", { realm, name }), announce("group.created", { realm, name }),
roleCreated: (realm: string, name: string) => roleCreated: (realm: string, name: string) =>
announce("module.keycloak.role.created", { realm, name }), announce("role.created", { realm, name }),
}; };
console.log("[keycloak] event surface ready — identity, client, group and role changes are announced"); console.log("[keycloak] event surface ready — identity, client, group and role changes are announced");
+12 -9
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
}, },
"route": { "route": {
"label": "keycloak", "label": "keycloak",
"port": 8080 "endpoint": "web"
} }
}, },
"binds": { "binds": {
@@ -25,15 +25,16 @@
"container-runtime" "container-runtime"
], ],
"emits": [ "emits": [
"module.keycloak.user.created", "user.created",
"module.keycloak.user.deleted", "user.deleted",
"module.keycloak.password.reset", "password.reset",
"module.keycloak.client.created", "client.created",
"module.keycloak.group.created", "group.created",
"module.keycloak.role.created" "role.created"
], ],
"listens": [ "listens": [
{ {
"name": "web",
"port": 8080, "port": 8080,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
@@ -88,7 +89,9 @@
"env": { "env": {
"KC_DB": "postgres", "KC_DB": "postgres",
"KC_HTTP_ENABLED": "true", "KC_HTTP_ENABLED": "true",
"KC_HEALTH_ENABLED": "true" "KC_HEALTH_ENABLED": "true",
"KC_HOSTNAME": "https://keycloak.novox.be",
"KC_PROXY_HEADERS": "xforwarded"
}, },
"env-file": [ "env-file": [
"/var/lib/keycloak/admin.env", "/var/lib/keycloak/admin.env",
@@ -118,7 +121,7 @@
], ],
"env": { "env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker", "MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_KEYCLOAK_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:8080", "MESH_KEYCLOAK_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:${port:8080}",
"MESH_KEYCLOAK_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json" "MESH_KEYCLOAK_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json"
}, },
"restart-on": [ "restart-on": [
-42
View File
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
# lavinmq's runtime: the tool runtime, carrying this module's compiled bootstrap, provisioner,
# tools and event consumer.
#
# **Built from this module's own directory and nothing else.** The sdk is in the base image, so
# nothing is copied out of a neighbouring checkout — which is what lets the mesh build this from a
# repository and a path (novox/hq ADR 0069) rather than only on a workstation that happens to have
# the siblings.
#
# Two bases, named rather than pinned: the image this is COMPILED in, and the image it RUNS in.
# They are different images on purpose — the first carries a compiler and the second must not, or
# every running container would carry one it never invokes. The mesh answers both with the copies it
# holds, because a fingerprint written here would name one particular copy and no other mesh has it
# (novox/hq issue 044). Declared in module.json's `build.on`; deliberately no defaults, so a build
# nobody told stops here and says which module to build first.
ARG BUILD_BASE
ARG RUNTIME_BASE
FROM ${BUILD_BASE} AS build
# Compiled under /app/modules so `@novox/mesh-sdk` resolves upward into the base's own
# node_modules — the module is compiled against exactly the sdk it will run against.
WORKDIR /app/modules/lavinmq
COPY . .
# The compiler is invoked by its real path rather than through node_modules/.bin, whose entries are
# symlinks to a launcher that requires its library relatively — resolved away when the base image
# was assembled.
#
# Four entrypoints and a client, because this module is four things: a run-once bootstrap that
# writes the broker's configuration before it first starts, a provisioner that grants consumers
# their own vhost and user, a set of tools, and an event consumer.
RUN node /app/node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc \
client.ts index.ts bootstrap/index.ts provisioner/index.ts tools/index.ts \
--module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist
FROM ${RUNTIME_BASE}
COPY --from=build /app/modules/lavinmq/dist /app/modules/lavinmq/dist
# What the runtime loads from this module in serve mode: its event consumer, its tools, and its
# provisioner — all three in one process, so the provisioner's reconcile loop runs with the broker
# connected (novox/hq issues 060/061; the provisioner used to be run as a separate container `args`
# command, which meant it served no tools and, once, ran nowhere at all). The run-once bootstrap is
# NOT listed here — it is named in its own container's `args`, because it runs to completion before
# the broker starts rather than serving. One image, because they are one module and share a client.
ENV MESH_TOOL_MODULES=/app/modules/lavinmq/dist/index.js,/app/modules/lavinmq/dist/tools/index.js,/app/modules/lavinmq/dist/provisioner/index.js
-45
View File
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
// lavinmq's run-once bootstrap — lavinmq's own code (novox/hq ADR 0039), run once before the broker
// first starts (ADR 0052). lavinmq's default admin is set at first boot from a config file's
// `default_password_hash`, and that value is a HASH of the mesh-minted admin password, not the
// password itself — a form the mesh's plain-secret delivery cannot produce and no `${secret:...}`
// placeholder can compute. So this step computes it: it reads the admin password the mesh minted and
// the host unsealed, hashes it the way lavinmq expects (see client.rabbitHash), and writes the config
// file the broker container reads with `--config`. The host runs it to completion and only then
// starts the broker the manifest places after it — so the broker's first boot finds a config with an
// admin it can authenticate, and the provisioner (which reaches the management API as that admin)
// can do its work.
//
// It runs in the module's own runtime image, under the module's own account, as `mesh-tools run`
// imports it — no broker connection, because writing a config file is an offline operation and there
// is no broker to reach yet.
//
// lavinmq consults `default_user`/`default_password_hash` only on a first boot with an empty data
// dir; a later boot uses the persisted user database and ignores them. So this seeds the admin once,
// and a rotation of the admin secret does not re-key an already-initialised broker — the same
// first-boot-only shape the RabbitMQ-compatible default user has always had.
import { writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { rabbitHash } from "../client.js";
const adminUser = process.env.MESH_PROVISION_ADMIN_USER ?? process.env.MESH_LAVINMQ_ADMIN_USER ?? "mesh-admin";
const passwordFile = process.env.MESH_PROVISION_PASSWORD_FILE ?? process.env.MESH_LAVINMQ_ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE ?? "/run/secrets/default";
const configOut = process.env.MESH_LAVINMQ_CONFIG_OUT ?? "/var/lib/lavinmq-module/lavinmq.ini";
const dataDir = process.env.MESH_LAVINMQ_DATA_DIR ?? "/var/lib/lavinmq";
const password = readFileSync(passwordFile, "utf8").replace(/\n$/, "");
if (!password) {
throw new Error(`[lavinmq:bootstrap] admin password file ${passwordFile} is empty — cannot seed the admin`);
}
// The broker reads only what it needs to authenticate its admin on first boot; bind/ports come from
// the container's entrypoint (`-b 0.0.0.0`), so this file names the admin and nothing else about the
// network.
const ini =
"[main]\n" +
`data_dir = ${dataDir}\n` +
`default_user = ${adminUser}\n` +
`default_password_hash = ${rabbitHash(password)}\n`;
writeFileSync(configOut, ini, { mode: 0o600 });
console.log(`[lavinmq:bootstrap] wrote ${configOut} with admin '${adminUser}' (password hashed for lavinmq)`);
-150
View File
@@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
// lavinmq's admin client — lavinmq's own code, living in the module (novox/hq ADR 0039). Both this
// module's tools and its provisioner import it, and nothing outside lavinmq does.
//
// It drives lavinmq through its HTTP management API (the RabbitMQ-compatible surface lavinmq serves
// on 15672), not a hand-rolled AMQP admin stack: the module may take NO npm dependency beyond
// @novox/mesh-sdk, and the management API is exactly the admin surface — create/remove a vhost, a
// user, and its permissions — reached with `fetch` (global on node 22) and HTTP Basic auth. One
// boundary, `api()`, and every method is built on it. This is the module's one impure seam, the way
// postgres's is `psql` and redis's is a RESP socket.
//
// **The login and password are the mesh's, not the provisioner's (novox/hq ADR 0048).** The mesh
// derives the login and hands it to both ends so they agree, and mints the password and delivers a
// copy to each. lavinmq creates exactly that user with exactly that password on a vhost of the same
// name — a name or password the provisioner invented is one the consumer could never present.
import { createHash, randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
export interface LavinmqConn {
/** Base URL of the management API, e.g. http://lavinmq:15672 (no trailing /api). */
readonly base: string;
readonly adminUser: string;
readonly adminPassword: string;
}
export class LavinmqClient {
constructor(private readonly conn: LavinmqConn) {}
/**
* Build from the module's resolved environment. Reads MESH_LAVINMQ_* first (the documented
* names), falling back to the MESH_PROVISION_* keys the manifest already sets on the provisioner
* container so the module runs unchanged there. Throws if it cannot find a management endpoint and
* an admin password — the right failure, because without them nothing it does can work.
*/
static fromEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): LavinmqClient {
const base = (env.MESH_LAVINMQ_MANAGEMENT ?? env.MESH_PROVISION_LAVINMQ ?? "").replace(/\/+$/, "");
const adminUser = env.MESH_LAVINMQ_ADMIN_USER ?? env.MESH_PROVISION_ADMIN_USER ?? "mesh-admin";
const adminPassword = env.MESH_LAVINMQ_ADMIN_PASSWORD ?? readSecretFile(env.MESH_PROVISION_PASSWORD_FILE);
if (!base || !adminPassword) {
throw new Error("lavinmq management endpoint or admin password is not set — lavinmq's own code cannot reach the server");
}
return new LavinmqClient({ base, adminUser, adminPassword });
}
/** One request against the management API. A non-2xx reply rejects, carrying the body for the log. */
async api(method: string, path: string, body?: unknown): Promise<unknown> {
const headers: Record<string, string> = {
Authorization: "Basic " + Buffer.from(`${this.conn.adminUser}:${this.conn.adminPassword}`).toString("base64"),
};
if (body !== undefined) headers["Content-Type"] = "application/json";
const resp = await fetch(`${this.conn.base}/api${path}`, {
method,
headers,
body: body !== undefined ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined,
});
if (!resp.ok) {
throw new Error(`lavinmq management API ${method} ${path} -> ${resp.status}: ${await resp.text()}`);
}
const text = await resp.text();
return text ? JSON.parse(text) : null;
}
/** True once the management API answers — the server has finished starting. */
async ready(): Promise<boolean> {
try {
await this.api("GET", "/overview");
return true;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
/** Block until the management API answers, or throw once the budget is spent. */
async waitReady(retries = 30, delayMs = 1000): Promise<void> {
for (let i = 0; i < retries; i++) {
if (await this.ready()) return;
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, delayMs));
}
throw new Error("lavinmq management API did not become ready");
}
/**
* Create (or reset to a known state) one consumer's broker: a vhost and a user both named for the
* consumer's login, with the login owning full permissions on exactly that vhost. Idempotent — a
* PUT of a vhost or user that exists is a no-op or a password reset, so a reconcile can call it
* again without harm. The consumer connects as `<login>` to vhost `<login>` and can reach nothing
* else (novox/hq ADR 0048).
*/
async createConsumer(login: string, password: string): Promise<void> {
const v = encodeURIComponent(login);
const u = encodeURIComponent(login);
await this.api("PUT", `/vhosts/${v}`);
await this.api("PUT", `/users/${u}`, { password, tags: "" });
await this.api("PUT", `/permissions/${v}/${u}`, { configure: ".*", write: ".*", read: ".*" });
}
/** Remove a consumer's vhost and user, idempotently. A DELETE of what is already gone is tolerated. */
async removeConsumer(login: string): Promise<void> {
const v = encodeURIComponent(login);
const u = encodeURIComponent(login);
try {
await this.api("DELETE", `/vhosts/${v}`);
} catch (err) {
console.error(`[lavinmq] delete vhost ${login} failed (continuing): ${err}`);
}
try {
await this.api("DELETE", `/users/${u}`);
} catch (err) {
console.error(`[lavinmq] delete user ${login} failed (continuing): ${err}`);
}
}
/** The vhosts, for the amqp_list_vhosts tool. */
async listVhosts(): Promise<{ name: string; messages: number }[]> {
const vhosts = (await this.api("GET", "/vhosts")) as { name: string; messages?: number }[];
return vhosts.map((v) => ({ name: v.name, messages: v.messages ?? 0 }));
}
/** The queues on one vhost (default the root vhost), for the amqp_list_queues tool. */
async listQueues(vhost = "/"): Promise<{ name: string; messages: number; consumers: number }[]> {
const queues = (await this.api("GET", `/queues/${encodeURIComponent(vhost)}`)) as
{ name: string; messages?: number; consumers?: number }[];
return queues.map((q) => ({ name: q.name, messages: q.messages ?? 0, consumers: q.consumers ?? 0 }));
}
}
/**
* The RabbitMQ-compatible SHA-256 password hash lavinmq's `default_password_hash` expects:
* base64( salt[4] || sha256( salt || utf8(password) ) ). The salt is any four bytes — random here,
* because a fixed salt buys nothing and a fresh one is free. Verified against `lavinmqctl
* hash_password`: a hash produced here is accepted by the server unchanged.
*/
export function rabbitHash(password: string, salt: Buffer = randomBytes(4)): string {
const digest = createHash("sha256").update(Buffer.concat([salt, Buffer.from(password, "utf8")])).digest();
return Buffer.concat([salt, digest]).toString("base64");
}
/** Generate a URL-safe password. */
export function generatePassword(): string {
return randomBytes(24).toString("base64url");
}
function readSecretFile(path: string | undefined): string | undefined {
if (!path) return undefined;
try {
return readFileSync(path, "utf8").trim();
} catch {
return undefined;
}
}
-25
View File
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
// lavinmq's events entrypoint, loaded by the per-node tool host (the provisioner container runs
// ./provisioner separately). The broker lifecycle events are EMITTED from the provisioner, where the
// lifecycle actually happens (novox/hq ADR 0041/0042):
// module.lavinmq.amqp.provisioned — a consumer's vhost + user was created
// module.lavinmq.amqp.deprovisioned — that vhost + user was removed
// Here in the tool host we react to them, keeping a lightweight audit trail of who was granted a
// broker and who lost one — observability the provider itself is best placed to log.
import { on } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/events";
interface AmqpEvent {
consumer?: string;
user: string;
vhost?: string;
}
await on<AmqpEvent>("module.lavinmq.amqp.provisioned", async (e) => {
console.log(`[lavinmq] broker provisioned for ${e.body.consumer ?? "?"} (user ${e.body.user}, vhost ${e.body.vhost})`);
});
await on<AmqpEvent>("module.lavinmq.amqp.deprovisioned", async (e) => {
console.log(`[lavinmq] broker deprovisioned (user ${e.body.user})`);
});
console.log("[lavinmq] auditing broker lifecycle events");
-151
View File
@@ -1,151 +0,0 @@
{
"module": "lavinmq",
"version": "1",
"provides": [
{
"name": "amqp",
"scope": "mesh"
}
],
"claims": [
{
"name": "mesh-broker",
"scope": "mesh"
}
],
"capabilities": [
"container-runtime"
],
"emits": [
"module.lavinmq.amqp.provisioned",
"module.lavinmq.amqp.deprovisioned"
],
"consumes": [
"module.lavinmq.amqp.provisioned",
"module.lavinmq.amqp.deprovisioned"
],
"serves": {
"amqp": {
"port": 5672
}
},
"receives": {
"amqp": "/var/lib/lavinmq-module/grants/mesh.json"
},
"grants": {
"amqp": "/var/lib/lavinmq-module/grants"
},
"own-secrets": {
"admin": "/var/lib/lavinmq-module/admin.secret",
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/lavinmq/broker"
},
"listens": [
{
"port": 5671,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "the mesh bus \u2014 amqps, every module's events and the control plane, reached over the overlay"
},
{
"port": 5672,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "modules on any machine that were granted a queue"
}
],
"guards": [
15672
],
"resources": [
{
"id": "mesh-state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/lavinmq",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/lavinmq-module",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "grants-dir",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/lavinmq-module/grants",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "broker-data",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh-broker",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "broker-tls",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh-broker-tls",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "server",
"type": "container",
"name": "mesh-broker",
"image": "cloudamqp/lavinmq@sha256:3eb54c12916d700a978c2ea86e6362cd4974b0e3189508718006d4e6d341246b",
"ports": [
"5671:5671",
"5672:5672",
"127.0.0.1:15672:15672"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh-broker:/var/lib/lavinmq",
"/var/lib/mesh-broker-tls:/tls:ro"
],
"args": [
"--amqps-port=5671",
"--cert=/tls/tls.crt",
"--key=/tls/tls.key"
]
},
{
"id": "runtime",
"type": "container",
"name": "mesh-lavinmq",
"artifact": "runtime",
"network": "host",
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/lavinmq/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/lavinmq-module/grants:/var/lib/lavinmq-module/grants:ro",
"/var/lib/lavinmq-module/admin.secret:/run/secrets/admin:ro"
],
"env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_RECEIVES": "/var/lib/lavinmq-module/grants/mesh.json",
"MESH_PROVISION_LAVINMQ": "http://127.0.0.1:15672",
"MESH_PROVISION_ADMIN_USER": "guest",
"MESH_PROVISION_PASSWORD_FILE": "/run/secrets/admin"
}
}
],
"build": {
"on": [
{
"arg": "BUILD_BASE",
"module": "mesh-tools",
"artifact": "build"
},
{
"arg": "RUNTIME_BASE",
"module": "mesh-tools",
"artifact": "runtime"
}
],
"artifacts": [
{
"name": "runtime",
"kind": "image",
"from": "Dockerfile"
}
]
}
}
-14
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@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
{
"name": "@novox/module-lavinmq",
"version": "0.1.0",
"description": "lavinmq — provides the mesh amqp interface (a per-consumer AMQP message broker). Its management client, provisioner, run-once bootstrap, tools and events live here (novox/hq ADR 0039).",
"type": "module",
"private": true,
"dependencies": {
"@novox/mesh-sdk": "^0.1.0"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@types/node": "^22.0.0",
"typescript": "^5.6.0"
}
}
-51
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@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
// lavinmq's provisioner — the adapter that makes lavinmq a provider of the mesh `amqp` interface.
// The reconcile loop, the contributions file, and reading the mesh's minted password are the sdk
// harness's; this writes only the per-service half: how lavinmq creates and removes a consumer's own
// broker (novox/hq ADR 0039/0040/0048).
//
// The `amqp` interface: a consumer connects as `as` with the password the mesh minted, to a vhost
// named for that same login — its own message broker, isolated from every other consumer's by the
// vhost boundary. It is a broker of its own, not a shared account on the mesh's control-plane broker.
//
// **The login and password are the mesh's, not the provisioner's (novox/hq ADR 0048).** The mesh
// derives the login and hands it to both ends so they agree, and mints the password and delivers a
// copy to each. lavinmq creates exactly that user with exactly that password — a name or password the
// provisioner invented is one the consumer could never present.
//
// Vhost-per-login is the isolation model, the exact analog of postgres's database-per-login: the
// consumer owns one vhost, named for its login, and a user with full rights on that vhost and no
// rights anywhere else. lavinmq enforces it — a user with no permission on `/` is refused the moment
// it opens that vhost (`NOT_ALLOWED`), so a login is a broker the consumer alone can reach.
import { runProvisioner, type Provision } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/provisioner";
import { emit } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/events";
import { LavinmqClient } from "../client.js";
const lavinmq = LavinmqClient.fromEnv();
/** Emit a lifecycle event without letting a broker hiccup fail the provisioning itself. */
async function announce(type: string, body: Record<string, string>): Promise<void> {
try {
await emit(type, body);
} catch (err) {
console.error(`[provisioner:amqp] emit ${type} failed: ${err}`);
}
}
runProvisioner("amqp", {
async create(p: Provision): Promise<void> {
// The vhost and the user share the consumer's login, so one cannot reach another's broker.
await lavinmq.waitReady();
await lavinmq.createConsumer(p.as, p.password);
await announce("module.lavinmq.amqp.provisioned", {
consumer: p.consumer ?? "",
user: p.as,
vhost: p.as,
});
},
async remove(p: { as: string }): Promise<void> {
await lavinmq.removeConsumer(p.as);
await announce("module.lavinmq.amqp.deprovisioned", { user: p.as, vhost: p.as });
},
});
-32
View File
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
// lavinmq's tools — lavinmq's own code (novox/hq ADR 0039), importing lavinmq's own management
// client. They return structured data; the mesh serves them through the sdk's tool harness.
import { registerModuleTools, type ToolDefinition } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/tools";
import { LavinmqClient } from "../client.js";
export function getLavinmqTools(lavinmq: LavinmqClient): ToolDefinition[] {
return [
{
name: "amqp_list_vhosts",
description: "List the lavinmq virtual hosts — one per consumer that was granted a broker.",
input: {},
run: async () => ({ vhosts: await lavinmq.listVhosts() }),
},
{
name: "amqp_list_queues",
description: "List the queues on a vhost with message and consumer counts. Omit vhost for the root '/'.",
input: { vhost: { type: "string", description: "the vhost to list, e.g. a consumer's login; defaults to '/'" } },
run: async (args) => ({ queues: await lavinmq.listQueues(args.vhost ? String(args.vhost) : undefined) }),
},
];
}
// The tools exist only when the server can be reached from the environment; without it, lavinmq
// contributes none rather than failing the whole tool runtime.
registerModuleTools("lavinmq", (env) => {
try {
return getLavinmqTools(LavinmqClient.fromEnv(env));
} catch {
return [];
}
});
-12
View File
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
{
"compilerOptions": {
"target": "ES2022",
"module": "NodeNext",
"moduleResolution": "NodeNext",
"strict": true,
"esModuleInterop": true,
"skipLibCheck": true,
"noEmit": true
},
"include": ["client.ts", "index.ts", "provisioner/index.ts", "tools/index.ts", "bootstrap/index.ts"]
}
+8 -4
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
// The Letta API client — letta's own code, living in the module (novox/hq ADR 0039). Its tools // The Letta API client — letta's own code, living in the module (novox/hq ADR 0039). Its tools
// import it; nothing outside letta does. // import it; nothing outside letta does.
// //
// Letta authenticates with a single server password, presented as a Bearer token. That password is // Letta authenticates with a single server password. That password is a mesh own-secret handed to
// a mesh own-secret, minted once and handed to both the server (LETTA_SERVER_PASSWORD) and this // both the server (LETTA_SERVER_PASSWORD) and this client, through the runtime config file the mesh
// client (MESH_LETTA_PASSWORD) — so the module's tools are live without anything configured by hand. // mounts (its `password` key) — so the module's tools are live without anything configured by hand.
// The runtime config file may still override the URL or password. // Where a server already has clients, the password is accepted rather than minted.
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs"; import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
@@ -58,6 +58,10 @@ export class LettaClient {
...options, ...options,
headers: { headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json", "Content-Type": "application/json",
// The server's --secure mode checks X-BARE-PASSWORD ("password <it>") and answers a Bearer
// token alone with 401 (letta/server/rest_api/app.py, 0.6.x). Both are sent: Bearer is what
// later servers read.
"X-BARE-PASSWORD": `password ${this.password}`,
Authorization: `Bearer ${this.password}`, Authorization: `Bearer ${this.password}`,
...(options.headers as Record<string, string> | undefined), ...(options.headers as Record<string, string> | undefined),
}, },
+22 -25
View File
@@ -5,29 +5,37 @@
"container-runtime" "container-runtime"
], ],
"requires": [ "requires": [
"postgres-database" "postgres-database",
"route"
], ],
"contributes": { "contributes": {
"postgres-database": { "postgres-database": {
"name": "letta" "name": "letta"
},
"route": {
"label": "letta",
"endpoint": "web"
} }
}, },
"binds": { "binds": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/letta/database.json" "postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.json",
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
}, },
"secrets": { "secrets": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/letta/database.secret" "postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.secret"
}, },
"own-secrets": { "own-secrets": {
"server-password": "/var/lib/letta/server-password.secret", "server-password": "${dir:state}/server-password.secret",
"openai-api-key": "${dir:state}/openai-api-key.secret",
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/letta/broker" "broker": "/var/lib/mesh/letta/broker"
}, },
"listens": [ "listens": [
{ {
"name": "web",
"port": 8283, "port": 8283,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
"why": "the Letta agent server REST API and web UI; a public name is a route grant later" "why": "the Letta agent server REST API and web UI, password-protected (--secure); a public name is the route's"
} }
], ],
"resources": [ "resources": [
@@ -40,15 +48,15 @@
{ {
"id": "state", "id": "state",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/letta", "mode": "0700",
"mode": "0700" "place": "."
}, },
{ {
"id": "server-env", "id": "server-env",
"type": "file", "type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/letta/server.env", "path": "${dir:state}/server.env",
"mode": "0600", "mode": "0600",
"content": "LETTA_PG_URI=postgresql://${bound:postgres-database:as}:${secret:postgres-database}@${bound:postgres-database:at}:${bound:postgres-database:port}/${bound:postgres-database:as}\nLETTA_SERVER_PASSWORD=${secret:server-password}\nSECURE=true\nTZ=Europe/Brussels\n" "content": "LETTA_PG_URI=postgresql://${bound:postgres-database:as}:${secret:postgres-database}@${bound:postgres-database:at}:${bound:postgres-database:port}/${bound:postgres-database:as}\nLETTA_SERVER_PASSWORD=${secret:server-password}\nOPENAI_API_KEY=${secret:openai-api-key}\nSECURE=true\nTZ=Europe/Brussels\n"
}, },
{ {
"id": "net", "id": "net",
@@ -59,31 +67,24 @@
"id": "server", "id": "server",
"type": "container", "type": "container",
"name": "letta", "name": "letta",
"image": "letta/letta@sha256:1d2e0692514287c5ed1a483e14e16ed945f8632d315539f5e66373bb7d7c471b", "image": "letta/letta@sha256:bfd1e49ce45b9a208c941e832c1d1d194017ff210a3784b0ca6c323aed767a29",
"network": "letta", "network": "letta",
"env-file": [ "env-file": [
"/var/lib/letta/server.env" "${dir:state}/server.env"
], ],
"ports": [ "ports": [
"8283" "8283"
], ],
"secrets-in-environment": "the letta image is env-driven and its file-source support could not be verified; the mesh runtime can take its password from config.json (client.ts) \u2014 not yet converted" "secrets-in-environment": "letta 0.6.x reads its settings from the environment only (pydantic settings, no secrets_dir or _FILE twin), and its startup.sh starts an embedded PostgreSQL unless LETTA_PG_URI is set - so the database password travels inside that URI (startup.sh also echoes it to the log); LETTA_SERVER_PASSWORD and OPENAI_API_KEY have no file source either"
}, },
{ {
"id": "runtime-config", "id": "runtime-config",
"type": "file", "type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/letta/config.json", "path": "/var/lib/mesh/letta/config.json",
"mode": "0600", "mode": "0600",
"content": "{}\n", "content": "{\n \"password\": \"${secret:server-password}\"\n}\n",
"merge": "json" "merge": "json"
}, },
{
"id": "runtime-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/letta/runtime.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "MESH_LETTA_PASSWORD=${secret:server-password}\n"
},
{ {
"id": "runtime", "id": "runtime",
"type": "container", "type": "container",
@@ -98,14 +99,10 @@
"MESH_LETTA_URL": "http://letta:8283", "MESH_LETTA_URL": "http://letta:8283",
"MESH_LETTA_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json" "MESH_LETTA_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json"
}, },
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/letta/runtime.env"
],
"restart-on": [ "restart-on": [
"runtime-config" "runtime-config"
], ],
"artifact": "runtime", "artifact": "runtime"
"secrets-in-environment": "the letta image is env-driven and its file-source support could not be verified; the mesh runtime can take its password from config.json (client.ts) \u2014 not yet converted"
} }
], ],
"build": { "build": {
+2 -2
View File
@@ -40,12 +40,12 @@ async function pollQueue(lidarr: LidarrClient): Promise<void> {
if (primed) { if (primed) {
// Entered the queue since last look — Lidarr grabbed a release. // Entered the queue since last look — Lidarr grabbed a release.
for (const [id, item] of now) { for (const [id, item] of now) {
if (!inQueue.has(id)) await emit("module.lidarr.album.grabbed", { title: item.title, status: item.status }); if (!inQueue.has(id)) await emit("album.grabbed", { title: item.title, status: item.status });
} }
// Left the queue — imported and done, unless it was last seen failing. // Left the queue — imported and done, unless it was last seen failing.
for (const [id, item] of inQueue) { for (const [id, item] of inQueue) {
if (!now.has(id) && !FAILED_STATUSES.has(item.status)) { if (!now.has(id) && !FAILED_STATUSES.has(item.status)) {
await emit("module.lidarr.download.completed", { title: item.title }); await emit("download.completed", { title: item.title });
} }
} }
} }
+4 -3
View File
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@
"container-runtime" "container-runtime"
], ],
"emits": [ "emits": [
"module.lidarr.album.grabbed", "album.grabbed",
"module.lidarr.download.completed" "download.completed"
], ],
"consumes": [], "consumes": [],
"own-secrets": { "own-secrets": {
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
}, },
"listens": [ "listens": [
{ {
"name": "web",
"port": 8686, "port": 8686,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
@@ -86,7 +87,7 @@
"contributes": { "contributes": {
"route": { "route": {
"label": "lidarr", "label": "lidarr",
"port": 8686 "endpoint": "web"
} }
}, },
"binds": { "binds": {
+29
View File
@@ -130,10 +130,39 @@ export class MailuClient {
await this.api("PATCH", `/user/${encodeURIComponent(email)}`, { raw_password: password }); await this.api("PATCH", `/user/${encodeURIComponent(email)}`, { raw_password: password });
} }
/**
* Set the mesh's password on a mailbox the mesh provisions, and enable it. A disabled mailbox is
* what the provisioner's check reports as lost, so applying again must enable it, or the two would
* disagree for ever. Separate from changePassword, which an operator's tool uses and which must
* not re-enable a mailbox someone disabled.
*/
async applyProvisioned(email: string, password: string): Promise<void> {
await this.api("PATCH", `/user/${encodeURIComponent(email)}`, { raw_password: password, enabled: true });
}
async deleteUser(email: string): Promise<void> { async deleteUser(email: string): Promise<void> {
await this.api("DELETE", `/user/${encodeURIComponent(email)}`); await this.api("DELETE", `/user/${encodeURIComponent(email)}`);
} }
/**
* Whether a mailbox exists and is enabled. Read-only, through the admin API.
*
* **The password is not checked.** Mailu authenticates in its admin service, behind the front;
* the imap server's own password database accepts any password from Mailu's subnet, so asking it
* (`doveadm auth test`) proves nothing, or refuses everyone. A lost or disabled mailbox is caught;
* a password changed by hand is not (novox/hq issue 120).
*/
async holdsUser(email: string): Promise<boolean> {
const res = await fetch(`${this.baseUrl}/user/${encodeURIComponent(email)}`, {
headers: { Authorization: this.apiKey, Accept: "application/json" },
});
if (res.status === 404) return false;
if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`Mailu API GET /user/${email}: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`);
const user = (await res.json()) as { enabled?: boolean };
return user.enabled !== false;
}
async listAliases(): Promise<MailuAlias[]> { async listAliases(): Promise<MailuAlias[]> {
const aliases = await this.api<any[]>("GET", "/alias"); const aliases = await this.api<any[]>("GET", "/alias");
return (aliases ?? []).map((a) => ({ return (aliases ?? []).map((a) => ({
+2 -2
View File
@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ function watcher(created: string, deleted: string): (keys: string[]) => Promise<
}; };
} }
const watchUsers = watcher("module.mailu.user.created", "module.mailu.user.deleted"); const watchUsers = watcher("user.created", "user.deleted");
const watchAliases = watcher("module.mailu.alias.created", "module.mailu.alias.deleted"); const watchAliases = watcher("alias.created", "alias.deleted");
async function pollUsers(): Promise<void> { async function pollUsers(): Promise<void> {
await watchUsers((await mailu.listUsers()).map((u) => u.email)); await watchUsers((await mailu.listUsers()).map((u) => u.email));
+75 -85
View File
@@ -16,50 +16,51 @@
"route": { "route": {
"web": { "web": {
"label": "mail", "label": "mail",
"port": 7443, "endpoint": "web-tls",
"scheme": "https", "scheme": "https",
"insecure": true "insecure": true
}, },
"acme": { "acme": {
"label": "mail", "label": "mail",
"path": "/.well-known/acme-challenge", "path": "/.well-known/acme-challenge",
"port": 7080, "endpoint": "web",
"priority": 100 "priority": 100
}, },
"autoconfig": { "autoconfig": {
"label": "autoconfig", "label": "autoconfig",
"port": 4243 "endpoint": "autoconfig"
}, },
"autodiscover": { "autodiscover": {
"label": "autodiscover", "label": "autodiscover",
"port": 4243 "endpoint": "autoconfig"
}, },
"automx": { "automx": {
"label": "automx", "label": "automx",
"port": 4243 "endpoint": "autoconfig"
} }
} }
}, },
"binds": { "binds": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/mailu/database.json", "postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.json",
"route": "/var/lib/mailu/route.json" "route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
}, },
"secrets": { "secrets": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/mailu/database.secret", "postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.secret",
"secret": { "secret": {
"secret-key": "/var/lib/mailu/secret-key.secret", "secret-key": "${dir:state}/secret-key.secret",
"admin": "/var/lib/mailu/admin.secret", "admin": "${dir:state}/admin.secret",
"api-token": "/var/lib/mailu/api-token.secret" "api-token": "${dir:state}/api-token.secret"
} }
}, },
"emits": [ "emits": [
"module.mailu.user.created", "user.created",
"module.mailu.user.deleted", "user.deleted",
"module.mailu.alias.created", "alias.created",
"module.mailu.alias.deleted" "alias.deleted"
], ],
"listens": [ "listens": [
{ {
"name": "smtp",
"port": 25, "port": 25,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "anywhere", "from": "anywhere",
@@ -67,6 +68,7 @@
"fixed": true "fixed": true
}, },
{ {
"name": "pop3",
"port": 110, "port": 110,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "anywhere", "from": "anywhere",
@@ -74,6 +76,7 @@
"fixed": true "fixed": true
}, },
{ {
"name": "imap",
"port": 143, "port": 143,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "anywhere", "from": "anywhere",
@@ -81,6 +84,7 @@
"fixed": true "fixed": true
}, },
{ {
"name": "smtps",
"port": 465, "port": 465,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "anywhere", "from": "anywhere",
@@ -88,6 +92,7 @@
"fixed": true "fixed": true
}, },
{ {
"name": "submission",
"port": 587, "port": 587,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "anywhere", "from": "anywhere",
@@ -95,6 +100,7 @@
"fixed": true "fixed": true
}, },
{ {
"name": "imaps",
"port": 993, "port": 993,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "anywhere", "from": "anywhere",
@@ -102,6 +108,7 @@
"fixed": true "fixed": true
}, },
{ {
"name": "pop3s",
"port": 995, "port": 995,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "anywhere", "from": "anywhere",
@@ -109,18 +116,21 @@
"fixed": true "fixed": true
}, },
{ {
"name": "web",
"port": 7080, "port": 7080,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
"why": "the web front over http; only the ACME HTTP-01 passthrough is routed here \u2014 everything else 301s to https and would loop a proxy" "why": "the web front over http; only the ACME HTTP-01 passthrough is routed here — everything else 301s to https and would loop a proxy"
}, },
{ {
"name": "web-tls",
"port": 7443, "port": 7443,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
"why": "the web front over its own TLS (admin, webmail, API); the public name mail.novox.be is a route grant reaching it here" "why": "the web front over its own TLS (admin, webmail, API); the public name mail.novox.be is a route grant reaching it here"
}, },
{ {
"name": "autoconfig",
"port": 4243, "port": 4243,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
@@ -140,143 +150,125 @@
{ {
"id": "state", "id": "state",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mailu", "mode": "0700",
"mode": "0700" "place": "."
}, },
{ {
"id": "grants", "id": "grants",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mailu/grants",
"mode": "0700" "mode": "0700"
}, },
{ {
"id": "data-automx", "id": "data-automx",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/mailu/data/automx",
"mode": "0700" "mode": "0700"
}, },
{ {
"id": "config-env", "id": "config-env",
"type": "file", "type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mailu/mailu.env", "path": "${dir:state}/mailu.env",
"mode": "0644", "mode": "0644",
"content": "ADMIN_ADDRESS=mailu-admin\nANTISPAM_ADDRESS=mailu-antispam\nANTIVIRUS_ADDRESS=mailu-antivirus\nIMAP_ADDRESS=mailu-imap\nSMTP_ADDRESS=mailu-smtp\nFRONT_ADDRESS=mailu-front\nWEBMAIL_ADDRESS=mailu-webmail\nWEBDAV_ADDRESS=mailu-webdav\nREDIS_ADDRESS=mailu-redis\nPORTS=25,80,443,465,993,995,4190,110,143,587\nDOMAIN=novox.be\nHOSTNAMES=mail.novox.be\nPOSTMASTER=admin\nSITENAME=Novox\nWEBSITE=https://novox.be\nTLS_FLAVOR=cert\nSUBNET=192.168.203.0/24\nCOMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME=mailu\nANTIVIRUS=clamav\nWEBMAIL=roundcube\nWEBDAV=radicale\nFETCHMAIL_ENABLED=True\nFETCHMAIL_DELAY=600\nADMIN=true\nWEB_ADMIN=/admin\nWEB_WEBMAIL=/webmail\nWEBROOT_REDIRECT=/webmail\nWEBMAIL_ADDRESS=webmail\nAPI=true\nWEB_API=/api\nAUTH_RATELIMIT_IP=6000/hour\nAUTH_RATELIMIT_USER=1000/day\nCREDENTIAL_ROUNDS=12\nPASSWORD_SCHEME=PBKDF2\nDISABLE_STATISTICS=True\nMESSAGE_SIZE_LIMIT=50000000\nMESSAGE_RATELIMIT=200/day\nRECIPIENT_DELIMITER=+\nPOSTFIX_MYNETWORKS=127.0.0.0/8 [::1]/128\nRELAYNETS=\nRELAYHOST=\nREJECT_UNLISTED_RECIPIENT=\nDB_FLAVOR=postgresql\nINITIAL_ADMIN_ACCOUNT=admin\nINITIAL_ADMIN_DOMAIN=novox.be\nINITIAL_ADMIN_MODE=ifmissing\nSMTP_PORT=25\nSMTPS_PORT=465\nSUBMISSION_PORT=587\nPOP3_PORT=110\nPOP3S_PORT=995\nIMAP_PORT=143\nIMAPS_PORT=993\nHTTP_PORT=7080\nHTTPS_PORT=7443\nAUTOMX_PORT=4243\nAMX_SMTP_ADDRESS=mail.novox.be\nAMX_SMTP_PORT=587\nAMX_IMAP_ADDRESS=mail.novox.be\nAMX_IMAP_PORT=143\nAMX_MAIL_DOMAINS=novox.be\nDMARC_RUA=admin\nDMARC_RUF=admin\nLETSENCRYPT_SHORTCHAIN=True\nTZ=Etc/UTC\nLOG_LEVEL=INFO\nWELCOME=false\nREAL_IP_HEADER=X-Real-IP\nREAL_IP_FROM=142.132.152.141\nCOMPRESSION=\nCOMPRESS_LEVEL=\nCOMPRESSION_LEVEL=\nBIND_ADDRESS4=127.0.0.1\nBIND_ADDRESS6=::1\nMAILU_VERSION=1.9\nDOCKER_ORG=mailu\nDOCKER_PREFIX=\nWELCOME_SUBJECT=Welcome to your new email account\nWELCOME_BODY=Welcome to your new email account, if you can read this, then it is configured properly!\n" "content": "ADMIN_ADDRESS=mailu-admin\nANTISPAM_ADDRESS=mailu-antispam\nANTIVIRUS_ADDRESS=mailu-antivirus\nIMAP_ADDRESS=mailu-imap\nSMTP_ADDRESS=mailu-smtp\nFRONT_ADDRESS=mailu-front\nWEBMAIL_ADDRESS=mailu-webmail\nWEBDAV_ADDRESS=mailu-webdav\nREDIS_ADDRESS=mailu-redis\nPORTS=25,80,443,465,993,995,4190,110,143,587\nDOMAIN=novox.be\nHOSTNAMES=mail.novox.be\nPOSTMASTER=admin\nSITENAME=Novox\nWEBSITE=https://novox.be\nTLS_FLAVOR=letsencrypt\nSUBNET=192.168.203.0/24\nCOMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME=mailu\nANTIVIRUS=clamav\nWEBMAIL=roundcube\nWEBDAV=radicale\nFETCHMAIL_ENABLED=True\nFETCHMAIL_DELAY=600\nADMIN=true\nWEB_ADMIN=/admin\nWEB_WEBMAIL=/webmail\nWEBROOT_REDIRECT=/webmail\nAPI=true\nWEB_API=/api\nAUTH_RATELIMIT_IP=6000/hour\nAUTH_RATELIMIT_USER=1000/day\nCREDENTIAL_ROUNDS=12\nPASSWORD_SCHEME=PBKDF2\nDISABLE_STATISTICS=True\nMESSAGE_SIZE_LIMIT=50000000\nMESSAGE_RATELIMIT=200/day\nRECIPIENT_DELIMITER=+\nPOSTFIX_MYNETWORKS=127.0.0.0/8 [::1]/128\nRELAYNETS=\nRELAYHOST=\nREJECT_UNLISTED_RECIPIENT=\nDB_FLAVOR=postgresql\nINITIAL_ADMIN_ACCOUNT=admin\nINITIAL_ADMIN_DOMAIN=novox.be\nINITIAL_ADMIN_MODE=ifmissing\nSMTP_PORT=25\nSMTPS_PORT=465\nSUBMISSION_PORT=587\nPOP3_PORT=110\nPOP3S_PORT=995\nIMAP_PORT=143\nIMAPS_PORT=993\nHTTP_PORT=7080\nHTTPS_PORT=7443\nAUTOMX_PORT=4243\nAMX_SMTP_ADDRESS=mail.novox.be\nAMX_SMTP_PORT=587\nAMX_IMAP_ADDRESS=mail.novox.be\nAMX_IMAP_PORT=143\nAMX_MAIL_DOMAINS=novox.be\nDMARC_RUA=admin\nDMARC_RUF=admin\nLETSENCRYPT_SHORTCHAIN=True\nTZ=Etc/UTC\nLOG_LEVEL=INFO\nWELCOME=false\nREAL_IP_HEADER=X-Real-IP\nREAL_IP_FROM=142.132.152.141\nCOMPRESSION=\nCOMPRESS_LEVEL=\nCOMPRESSION_LEVEL=\nBIND_ADDRESS4=127.0.0.1\nBIND_ADDRESS6=::1\nMAILU_VERSION=1.9\nDOCKER_ORG=mailu\nDOCKER_PREFIX=\nWELCOME_SUBJECT=Welcome to your new email account\nWELCOME_BODY=Welcome to your new email account, if you can read this, then it is configured properly!\n"
}, },
{ {
"id": "secret-env", "id": "secret-env",
"type": "file", "type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mailu/secret.env", "path": "${dir:state}/secret.env",
"mode": "0600", "mode": "0600",
"content": "SECRET_KEY=${secret:secret-key}\n" "content": "SECRET_KEY=${secret:secret-key}\n"
}, },
{ {
"id": "database-env", "id": "database-env",
"type": "file", "type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mailu/database.env", "path": "${dir:state}/database.env",
"mode": "0600", "mode": "0600",
"content": "DB_FLAVOR=postgresql\nDB_HOST=${bound:postgres-database:at}:${bound:postgres-database:port}\nDB_USER=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nDB_NAME=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nDB_PW=${secret:postgres-database}\n" "content": "DB_FLAVOR=postgresql\nDB_HOST=${bound:postgres-database:at}:${bound:postgres-database:port}\nDB_USER=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nDB_NAME=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nDB_PW=${secret:postgres-database}\n"
}, },
{ {
"id": "admin-env", "id": "admin-env",
"type": "file", "type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mailu/admin.env", "path": "${dir:state}/admin.env",
"mode": "0600", "mode": "0600",
"content": "INITIAL_ADMIN_PW=${secret:admin}\nAPI_TOKEN=${secret:api-token}\n" "content": "INITIAL_ADMIN_PW=${secret:admin}\nAPI_TOKEN=${secret:api-token}\n"
}, },
{ {
"id": "data-certs", "id": "data-certs",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/mailu/data/certs",
"mode": "0700" "mode": "0700"
}, },
{ {
"id": "data-data", "id": "data-data",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/mailu/data/data",
"mode": "0700" "mode": "0700"
}, },
{ {
"id": "data-dkim", "id": "data-dkim",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/mailu/data/dkim",
"mode": "0700" "mode": "0700"
}, },
{ {
"id": "data-mail", "id": "data-mail",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/mailu/data/mail",
"mode": "0700" "mode": "0700"
}, },
{ {
"id": "data-mailqueue", "id": "data-mailqueue",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/mailu/data/mailqueue",
"mode": "0755" "mode": "0755"
}, },
{ {
"id": "data-filter", "id": "data-filter",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/mailu/data/filter",
"mode": "0700" "mode": "0700"
}, },
{ {
"id": "data-clamav", "id": "data-clamav",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/mailu/data/clamav",
"mode": "0700" "mode": "0700"
}, },
{ {
"id": "data-redis", "id": "data-redis",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/mailu/data/redis",
"mode": "0700" "mode": "0700"
}, },
{ {
"id": "data-webmail", "id": "data-webmail",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/mailu/data/webmail",
"mode": "0700" "mode": "0700"
}, },
{ {
"id": "data-dav", "id": "data-dav",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/mailu/data/dav",
"mode": "0700" "mode": "0700"
}, },
{ {
"id": "data-fetchmail", "id": "data-fetchmail",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/mailu/data/data/fetchmail",
"mode": "0700" "mode": "0700"
}, },
{ {
"id": "data-overrides-nginx", "id": "data-overrides-nginx",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/mailu/data/overrides/nginx",
"mode": "0700" "mode": "0700"
}, },
{ {
"id": "data-overrides-dovecot", "id": "data-overrides-dovecot",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/mailu/data/overrides/dovecot",
"mode": "0700" "mode": "0700"
}, },
{ {
"id": "data-overrides-postfix", "id": "data-overrides-postfix",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/mailu/data/overrides/postfix",
"mode": "0700" "mode": "0700"
}, },
{ {
"id": "data-overrides-rspamd", "id": "data-overrides-rspamd",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/mailu/data/overrides/rspamd",
"mode": "0700" "mode": "0700"
}, },
{ {
"id": "data-overrides-roundcube", "id": "data-overrides-roundcube",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/mailu/data/overrides/roundcube",
"mode": "0700" "mode": "0700"
}, },
{ {
@@ -291,8 +283,8 @@
"image": "ghcr.io/mailu/unbound@sha256:3a0fdfb364a63f4f9259526e013c1ef40f5f14de3621ce1560804b3a5909584a", "image": "ghcr.io/mailu/unbound@sha256:3a0fdfb364a63f4f9259526e013c1ef40f5f14de3621ce1560804b3a5909584a",
"network": "mailu", "network": "mailu",
"env-file": [ "env-file": [
"/var/lib/mailu/mailu.env", "${dir:state}/mailu.env",
"/var/lib/mailu/secret.env" "${dir:state}/secret.env"
], ],
"secrets-in-environment": "mailu-admin honours SECRET_KEY_FILE, DB_PW_FILE and API_TOKEN_FILE (configuration.py) but INITIAL_ADMIN_PW is env-only (start.py); the remaining containers' need for SECRET_KEY is unverified", "secrets-in-environment": "mailu-admin honours SECRET_KEY_FILE, DB_PW_FILE and API_TOKEN_FILE (configuration.py) but INITIAL_ADMIN_PW is env-only (start.py); the remaining containers' need for SECRET_KEY is unverified",
"ip": "192.168.203.254" "ip": "192.168.203.254"
@@ -304,7 +296,7 @@
"image": "redis@sha256:4bed291aa5efb9f0d77b76ff7d4ab71eee410962965d052552db1fb80576431d", "image": "redis@sha256:4bed291aa5efb9f0d77b76ff7d4ab71eee410962965d052552db1fb80576431d",
"network": "mailu", "network": "mailu",
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/services/mailu/data/redis:/data" "${dir:data-redis}:/data"
] ]
}, },
{ {
@@ -314,19 +306,16 @@
"image": "ghcr.io/mailu/admin@sha256:6dbfdadc4a9590dcb7652357b505200115b689b74008653bbf369e4599a3be5a", "image": "ghcr.io/mailu/admin@sha256:6dbfdadc4a9590dcb7652357b505200115b689b74008653bbf369e4599a3be5a",
"network": "mailu", "network": "mailu",
"env-file": [ "env-file": [
"/var/lib/mailu/mailu.env", "${dir:state}/mailu.env",
"/var/lib/mailu/secret.env", "${dir:state}/secret.env",
"/var/lib/mailu/database.env", "${dir:state}/database.env",
"/var/lib/mailu/admin.env" "${dir:state}/admin.env"
], ],
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/services/mailu/data/data:/data", "${dir:data-data}:/data",
"/services/mailu/data/dkim:/dkim" "${dir:data-dkim}:/dkim"
], ],
"secrets-in-environment": "mailu-admin honours SECRET_KEY_FILE, DB_PW_FILE and API_TOKEN_FILE (configuration.py) but INITIAL_ADMIN_PW is env-only (start.py); the remaining containers' need for SECRET_KEY is unverified", "secrets-in-environment": "mailu-admin honours SECRET_KEY_FILE, DB_PW_FILE and API_TOKEN_FILE (configuration.py) but INITIAL_ADMIN_PW is env-only (start.py); the remaining containers' need for SECRET_KEY is unverified"
"dns": [
"192.168.203.254"
]
}, },
{ {
"id": "imap", "id": "imap",
@@ -335,11 +324,11 @@
"image": "ghcr.io/mailu/dovecot@sha256:7f0ed5db996fbdc00adc5c5e38a08492e04f7eb4a9fbd66a03aa9a28ddf23993", "image": "ghcr.io/mailu/dovecot@sha256:7f0ed5db996fbdc00adc5c5e38a08492e04f7eb4a9fbd66a03aa9a28ddf23993",
"network": "mailu", "network": "mailu",
"env-file": [ "env-file": [
"/var/lib/mailu/mailu.env" "${dir:state}/mailu.env"
], ],
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/services/mailu/data/mail:/mail", "${dir:data-mail}:/mail",
"/services/mailu/data/overrides/dovecot:/overrides:ro" "${dir:data-overrides-dovecot}:/overrides:ro"
], ],
"dns": [ "dns": [
"192.168.203.254" "192.168.203.254"
@@ -352,11 +341,11 @@
"image": "ghcr.io/mailu/postfix@sha256:e2e49f39e53b80eac9e7a2f18d9df11edeb4914fd62dbba89b3155e8e034f62e", "image": "ghcr.io/mailu/postfix@sha256:e2e49f39e53b80eac9e7a2f18d9df11edeb4914fd62dbba89b3155e8e034f62e",
"network": "mailu", "network": "mailu",
"env-file": [ "env-file": [
"/var/lib/mailu/mailu.env" "${dir:state}/mailu.env"
], ],
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/services/mailu/data/mailqueue:/queue", "${dir:data-mailqueue}:/queue",
"/services/mailu/data/overrides/postfix:/overrides:ro" "${dir:data-overrides-postfix}:/overrides:ro"
], ],
"dns": [ "dns": [
"192.168.203.254" "192.168.203.254"
@@ -369,11 +358,11 @@
"image": "ghcr.io/mailu/rspamd@sha256:ff3666d8a61f17d309c5c6f6bcf4d40470b82299ca706ac650301175bb1a079d", "image": "ghcr.io/mailu/rspamd@sha256:ff3666d8a61f17d309c5c6f6bcf4d40470b82299ca706ac650301175bb1a079d",
"network": "mailu", "network": "mailu",
"env-file": [ "env-file": [
"/var/lib/mailu/mailu.env" "${dir:state}/mailu.env"
], ],
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/services/mailu/data/filter:/var/lib/rspamd", "${dir:data-filter}:/var/lib/rspamd",
"/services/mailu/data/overrides/rspamd:/etc/rspamd/override.d:ro" "${dir:data-overrides-rspamd}:/etc/rspamd/override.d:ro"
], ],
"dns": [ "dns": [
"192.168.203.254" "192.168.203.254"
@@ -386,7 +375,7 @@
"image": "clamav/clamav-debian@sha256:b12ef8fefddbba7d88de59bea8a32622f365339154adf02d38fd089112e6745a", "image": "clamav/clamav-debian@sha256:b12ef8fefddbba7d88de59bea8a32622f365339154adf02d38fd089112e6745a",
"network": "mailu", "network": "mailu",
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/services/mailu/data/clamav:/var/lib/clamav" "${dir:data-clamav}:/var/lib/clamav"
], ],
"dns": [ "dns": [
"192.168.203.254" "192.168.203.254"
@@ -399,12 +388,12 @@
"image": "ghcr.io/mailu/webmail@sha256:bdbee44cdb05a4658f0e3b62cc448de55ca8f8aea172279fda594826144c04f6", "image": "ghcr.io/mailu/webmail@sha256:bdbee44cdb05a4658f0e3b62cc448de55ca8f8aea172279fda594826144c04f6",
"network": "mailu", "network": "mailu",
"env-file": [ "env-file": [
"/var/lib/mailu/mailu.env", "${dir:state}/mailu.env",
"/var/lib/mailu/secret.env" "${dir:state}/secret.env"
], ],
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/services/mailu/data/webmail:/data", "${dir:data-webmail}:/data",
"/services/mailu/data/overrides/roundcube:/overrides:ro" "${dir:data-overrides-roundcube}:/overrides:ro"
], ],
"secrets-in-environment": "mailu-admin honours SECRET_KEY_FILE, DB_PW_FILE and API_TOKEN_FILE (configuration.py) but INITIAL_ADMIN_PW is env-only (start.py); the remaining containers' need for SECRET_KEY is unverified", "secrets-in-environment": "mailu-admin honours SECRET_KEY_FILE, DB_PW_FILE and API_TOKEN_FILE (configuration.py) but INITIAL_ADMIN_PW is env-only (start.py); the remaining containers' need for SECRET_KEY is unverified",
"dns": [ "dns": [
@@ -418,11 +407,11 @@
"image": "ghcr.io/mailu/radicale@sha256:690ed6edf189dfef100a5a8b37c195ebf5d9241ac5f23f2f44b8b7b75726e3de", "image": "ghcr.io/mailu/radicale@sha256:690ed6edf189dfef100a5a8b37c195ebf5d9241ac5f23f2f44b8b7b75726e3de",
"network": "mailu", "network": "mailu",
"env-file": [ "env-file": [
"/var/lib/mailu/mailu.env", "${dir:state}/mailu.env",
"/var/lib/mailu/secret.env" "${dir:state}/secret.env"
], ],
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/services/mailu/data/dav:/data" "${dir:data-dav}:/data"
], ],
"secrets-in-environment": "mailu-admin honours SECRET_KEY_FILE, DB_PW_FILE and API_TOKEN_FILE (configuration.py) but INITIAL_ADMIN_PW is env-only (start.py); the remaining containers' need for SECRET_KEY is unverified", "secrets-in-environment": "mailu-admin honours SECRET_KEY_FILE, DB_PW_FILE and API_TOKEN_FILE (configuration.py) but INITIAL_ADMIN_PW is env-only (start.py); the remaining containers' need for SECRET_KEY is unverified",
"dns": [ "dns": [
@@ -436,11 +425,11 @@
"image": "ghcr.io/mailu/fetchmail@sha256:f881c8412d3bbe73d638469b48321558d6403a9d45bfa043c1e52c752103d42d", "image": "ghcr.io/mailu/fetchmail@sha256:f881c8412d3bbe73d638469b48321558d6403a9d45bfa043c1e52c752103d42d",
"network": "mailu", "network": "mailu",
"env-file": [ "env-file": [
"/var/lib/mailu/mailu.env", "${dir:state}/mailu.env",
"/var/lib/mailu/secret.env" "${dir:state}/secret.env"
], ],
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/services/mailu/data/data/fetchmail:/data" "${dir:data-fetchmail}:/data"
], ],
"secrets-in-environment": "mailu-admin honours SECRET_KEY_FILE, DB_PW_FILE and API_TOKEN_FILE (configuration.py) but INITIAL_ADMIN_PW is env-only (start.py); the remaining containers' need for SECRET_KEY is unverified", "secrets-in-environment": "mailu-admin honours SECRET_KEY_FILE, DB_PW_FILE and API_TOKEN_FILE (configuration.py) but INITIAL_ADMIN_PW is env-only (start.py); the remaining containers' need for SECRET_KEY is unverified",
"dns": [ "dns": [
@@ -454,7 +443,7 @@
"image": "ghcr.io/mailu/nginx@sha256:36f98897cd1bc9d27628bbb4e04bdf60147af2ec7507d6da77f002c4f256896d", "image": "ghcr.io/mailu/nginx@sha256:36f98897cd1bc9d27628bbb4e04bdf60147af2ec7507d6da77f002c4f256896d",
"network": "mailu", "network": "mailu",
"env-file": [ "env-file": [
"/var/lib/mailu/mailu.env" "${dir:state}/mailu.env"
], ],
"ports": [ "ports": [
"25", "25",
@@ -468,8 +457,8 @@
"7443:443" "7443:443"
], ],
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/services/mailu/data/certs:/certs", "${dir:data-certs}:/certs",
"/services/mailu/data/overrides/nginx:/overrides:ro" "${dir:data-overrides-nginx}:/overrides:ro"
], ],
"dns": [ "dns": [
"192.168.203.254" "192.168.203.254"
@@ -490,8 +479,8 @@
"network": "mailu", "network": "mailu",
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/mailu/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro", "/var/lib/mesh/mailu/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/mailu/api-token.secret:/run/secrets/api-token:ro", "${dir:state}/api-token.secret:/run/secrets/api-token:ro",
"/var/lib/mailu/grants:/var/lib/mailu/grants:ro", "${dir:grants}:${dir:grants}:ro",
"/var/lib/mesh/mailu/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro", "/var/lib/mesh/mailu/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro",
"/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock" "/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock"
], ],
@@ -502,7 +491,7 @@
"MESH_MAILU_IMAP_CONTAINER": "mailu-imap", "MESH_MAILU_IMAP_CONTAINER": "mailu-imap",
"MESH_MAILU_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json", "MESH_MAILU_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json",
"MESH_MAILU_DOMAIN": "novox.be", "MESH_MAILU_DOMAIN": "novox.be",
"MESH_RECEIVES": "/var/lib/mailu/grants/mesh.json" "MESH_RECEIVES": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
}, },
"restart-on": [ "restart-on": [
"runtime-config" "runtime-config"
@@ -516,13 +505,13 @@
"artifact": "automx", "artifact": "automx",
"network": "mailu", "network": "mailu",
"env-file": [ "env-file": [
"/var/lib/mailu/mailu.env" "${dir:state}/mailu.env"
], ],
"ports": [ "ports": [
"4243" "4243"
], ],
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/services/mailu/data/automx:/data" "${dir:data-automx}:/data"
] ]
} }
], ],
@@ -565,13 +554,14 @@
"serves": { "serves": {
"smtp": { "smtp": {
"port": 587, "port": 587,
"domain": "novox.be" "domain": "novox.be",
"name": "mail.novox.be"
} }
}, },
"receives": { "receives": {
"smtp": "/var/lib/mailu/grants/mesh.json" "smtp": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
}, },
"grants": { "grants": {
"smtp": "/var/lib/mailu/grants" "smtp": "${dir:grants}"
} }
} }
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"type": "module", "type": "module",
"private": true, "private": true,
"dependencies": { "dependencies": {
"@novox/mesh-sdk": "^0.1.0" "@novox/mesh-sdk": "^0.1.1"
}, },
"devDependencies": { "devDependencies": {
"@types/node": "^22.0.0", "@types/node": "^22.0.0",
+6 -1
View File
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ runProvisioner("smtp", {
try { try {
await mailu.createUser(email, p.password); await mailu.createUser(email, p.password);
} catch { } catch {
await mailu.changePassword(email, p.password); await mailu.applyProvisioned(email, p.password);
} }
}, },
@@ -62,4 +62,9 @@ runProvisioner("smtp", {
// named-account consumer is an operator action until the harness carries values here. // named-account consumer is an operator action until the harness carries values here.
await mailu.deleteUser(`${p.as}@${domain()}`).catch(() => {}); await mailu.deleteUser(`${p.as}@${domain()}`).catch(() => {});
}, },
// Asked every minute by the harness: whether the backend still holds this consumer exactly as
// the mesh gave it, so a login lost behind the provisioner's back is made again (novox/hq issue 120).
async holds(p: Provision): Promise<boolean> {
return mailu.holdsUser(addressOf(p));
},
}); });
+1
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
], ],
"listens": [ "listens": [
{ {
"name": "api",
"port": 59125, "port": 59125,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
+110
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
{
"module": "matrix",
"version": "1",
"capabilities": [
"container-runtime"
],
"listens": [
{
"name": "client",
"port": 6167,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "Conduit's client-server and federation APIs over plain HTTP. Both arrive through the route on 443: Conduit answers /.well-known/matrix/server with <its name>:443, so other homeservers federate through the proxy and nothing needs the traditional 8448"
},
{
"name": "web",
"port": 80,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "Element Web, the static browser client, served by the image's nginx; reached through its route"
}
],
"requires": [
"route"
],
"contributes": {
"route": {
"homeserver": {
"label": "matrix",
"endpoint": "client"
},
"element": {
"label": "element",
"endpoint": "web"
}
}
},
"binds": {
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
},
"resources": [
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "db",
"type": "directory",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "conduit-conf",
"type": "file",
"path": "${dir:state}/conduit.toml",
"mode": "0644",
"content": "# Written by the mesh (modules/matrix). Conduit reads this file (CONDUIT_CONFIG); nothing comes\n# from the environment. server_name is the homeserver's permanent identity: every user id, room id\n# and signature in the database carries it, so it is the name this module is served under\n# (${bound:route:name-homeserver}) and never changes once a database exists.\n[global]\nserver_name = \"${bound:route:name-homeserver}\"\ndatabase_backend = \"rocksdb\"\ndatabase_path = \"/var/lib/matrix-conduit/\"\naddress = \"0.0.0.0\"\nport = 6167\nmax_request_size = 20000000\nallow_registration = false\nallow_federation = true\nallow_check_for_updates = true\ntrusted_servers = [\"matrix.org\"]\n"
},
{
"id": "element-conf",
"type": "file",
"path": "${dir:state}/element.json",
"mode": "0644",
"merge": "json",
"content": "{\n \"default_server_name\": \"${bound:route:name-homeserver}\",\n \"default_server_config\": {\n \"m.homeserver\": {\n \"base_url\": \"https://${bound:route:name-homeserver}\"\n },\n \"m.identity_server\": {\n \"base_url\": \"https://vector.im\"\n }\n },\n \"brand\": \"Element\",\n \"integrations_ui_url\": \"https://scalar.vector.im/\",\n \"integrations_rest_url\": \"https://scalar.vector.im/api\",\n \"integrations_widgets_urls\": [\n \"https://scalar.vector.im/_matrix/integrations/v1\",\n \"https://scalar.vector.im/api\",\n \"https://scalar-staging.vector.im/_matrix/integrations/v1\",\n \"https://scalar-staging.vector.im/api\",\n \"https://scalar-staging.riot.im/scalar/api\"\n ],\n \"bug_report_endpoint_url\": \"https://element.io/bugreports/submit\",\n \"uisi_autorageshake_app\": \"element-auto-uisi\",\n \"show_labs_settings\": true,\n \"room_directory\": {\n \"servers\": [\n \"${bound:route:name-homeserver}\",\n \"matrix.org\",\n \"gitter.im\",\n \"libera.chat\"\n ]\n },\n \"enable_presence_by_hs_url\": {\n \"https://matrix.org\": false,\n \"https://matrix-client.matrix.org\": false\n },\n \"terms_and_conditions_links\": [\n {\n \"url\": \"https://element.io/privacy\",\n \"text\": \"Privacy Policy\"\n },\n {\n \"url\": \"https://element.io/cookie-policy\",\n \"text\": \"Cookie Policy\"\n }\n ],\n \"features\": {\n \"feature_video_rooms\": true,\n \"feature_rust_crypto\": true\n },\n \"element_call\": {\n \"url\": \"https://call.element.dev\"\n }\n}\n"
},
{
"id": "net",
"type": "network",
"name": "matrix"
},
{
"id": "homeserver",
"type": "container",
"name": "matrix",
"image": "matrixconduit/matrix-conduit@sha256:b0d24248e94f944ca49f90f10c429e3d65f4472bdde25661ecea9840134fb133",
"network": "matrix",
"env": {
"CONDUIT_CONFIG": "/etc/conduit/conduit.toml"
},
"ports": [
"6167"
],
"volumes": [
"${dir:db}:/var/lib/matrix-conduit",
"${dir:state}/conduit.toml:/etc/conduit/conduit.toml:ro"
],
"restart-on": [
"conduit-conf"
]
},
{
"id": "element",
"type": "container",
"name": "element-web",
"image": "vectorim/element-web@sha256:a8f415462ab8d2600a592ba1b92bea51efe5a4d10eb738aab9bed769f7099613",
"network": "matrix",
"ports": [
"80"
],
"volumes": [
"${dir:state}/element.json:/app/config.json:ro"
],
"restart-on": [
"element-conf"
]
}
]
}
+6 -1
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ COPY . .
# The compiler is invoked by its real path rather than through node_modules/.bin, whose entries are # The compiler is invoked by its real path rather than through node_modules/.bin, whose entries are
# symlinks to a launcher that requires its library relatively — resolved away when the base image # symlinks to a launcher that requires its library relatively — resolved away when the base image
# was assembled. # was assembled.
RUN node /app/node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc pg.d.ts store.ts index.ts tools/index.ts \ RUN node /app/node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc pg.d.ts store.ts index.ts tools/index.ts prepare/index.ts \
--module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist --module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist
# **A module may need something the base image does not carry.** The base holds what every module # **A module may need something the base image does not carry.** The base holds what every module
@@ -48,3 +48,8 @@ COPY --from=build /deps/node_modules /app/modules/mesh-catalog/node_modules
# to listen for what the builder announces. Serve binds the broker first, then imports these, so # to listen for what the builder announces. Serve binds the broker first, then imports these, so
# `on()` has something to subscribe to. # `on()` has something to subscribe to.
ENV MESH_TOOL_MODULES=/app/modules/mesh-catalog/dist/index.js,/app/modules/mesh-catalog/dist/tools/index.js ENV MESH_TOOL_MODULES=/app/modules/mesh-catalog/dist/index.js,/app/modules/mesh-catalog/dist/tools/index.js
# And what prepares this module's state, for the runtime's `prepare` mode (novox/hq ADR 0135). Named
# here, beside the entrypoints above, because the module knows which of its files prepares its state
# and nothing else could: the mesh asks one word and this says what answers it.
ENV MESH_PREPARE=/app/modules/mesh-catalog/dist/prepare/index.js
+25 -11
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
// mesh-catalog's entrypoint — the module graph's consumer (novox/hq ADR 0070, ADR 0072). // mesh-catalog's entrypoint — the module graph's consumer (novox/hq ADR 0070, ADR 0072).
// //
// The builder announces what it built; this places it in the graph and announces what that means. // The build-machine role announces what it built; this places it in the graph and announces what that means.
// The control plane hooks the *meaning* — a module was upgraded — rather than the build output, so // The control plane hooks the *meaning* — a module was upgraded — rather than the build output, so
// it never has to interpret an artifact or ask this module anything. // it never has to interpret an artifact or ask this module anything.
// //
@@ -14,10 +14,12 @@ import { Graph, type Made } from "./store.js";
const graph = Graph.fromEnv(); const graph = Graph.fromEnv();
// Before subscribing, and idempotent. The runtime is restarted until its store is reachable, which // The schema is not brought up here. The mesh prepares this module's state before it starts this
// is the same arrangement model-usage uses: a schema step that had to reach the provider over the // version, and does not start it if that failed (novox/hq ADR 0135) — see prepare/index.ts. Doing it
// overlay would block the very apply that brings the overlay up. // at start made a schema that could not be reached a crash loop instead of a stop, with the graph
await graph.migrate(); // keeping a gap and nothing saying so. The reason it used to be here — that a step blocking the apply
// would block the very apply that brings the overlay up — stopped being true when a step's failure
// became this module's business and not the machine's (ADR 0136).
/** What the builder says when it has built something. */ /** What the builder says when it has built something. */
interface Built { interface Built {
@@ -47,7 +49,15 @@ interface Built {
replay?: boolean; replay?: boolean;
} }
await on("module.builder.built", async (event) => { /**
* What a build means for the graph, wherever it came from.
*
* Two emitters say the same thing and neither is a mistake: the build machine says it as it happens,
* and the control plane says what it already held when this module asks what it missed
* (novox/hq ADR 0134). A replay is marked as one in its body, so nothing acts on a module that moved
* months ago — see `replay` above.
*/
const placeTheBuild = async (event: { body: unknown }): Promise<void> => {
const body = event.body as Built; const body = event.body as Built;
if (!body.module || !body.commit) { if (!body.module || !body.commit) {
// Said rather than dropped: a build that announced itself without saying what it built is a // Said rather than dropped: a build that announced itself without saying what it built is a
@@ -69,7 +79,7 @@ await on("module.builder.built", async (event) => {
// it was missing, and the mesh is told nothing happened, because nothing did. // it was missing, and the mesh is told nothing happened, because nothing did.
if (body.replay) return; if (body.replay) return;
await emit("module.mesh-catalog.registered", { await emit("registered", {
module: body.module, commit: body.commit, upgraded, module: body.module, commit: body.commit, upgraded,
}); });
@@ -77,19 +87,23 @@ await on("module.builder.built", async (event) => {
// through modules that did not change, forever (ADR 0072). // through modules that did not change, forever (ADR 0072).
if (!upgraded) return; if (!upgraded) return;
await emit("module.mesh-catalog.upgraded", { await emit("upgraded", {
module: body.module, commit: body.commit, previous, module: body.module, commit: body.commit, previous,
}); });
// What can be built now — stale, and waiting on nothing that is itself stale. // What can be built now — stale, and waiting on nothing that is itself stale.
for (const next of await graph.buildable()) { for (const next of await graph.buildable()) {
await emit("module.mesh-catalog.rebuild-needed", { await emit("rebuild-needed", {
module: next.module, module: next.module,
builtAt: next.commit, builtAt: next.commit,
because: next.because, because: next.because,
}); });
} }
}); };
// As it happens, and what the mesh already held when this module asked what it missed.
await on("mesh-build-machine.built", placeTheBuild);
await on("mesh-controller.built-before", placeTheBuild);
// **And ask for what was built before this catalogue existed** (novox/hq 04-ISSUES/050). // **And ask for what was built before this catalogue existed** (novox/hq 04-ISSUES/050).
// //
@@ -101,4 +115,4 @@ await on("module.builder.built", async (event) => {
// Asked on every start, not only the first. A catalogue cannot tell whether it has a gap, and the // Asked on every start, not only the first. A catalogue cannot tell whether it has a gap, and the
// answer is idempotent: registering a build already held changes nothing and announces nothing. // answer is idempotent: registering a build already held changes nothing and announces nothing.
// Asked AFTER subscribing, so a build arriving during the replay is not lost between the two. // Asked AFTER subscribing, so a build arriving during the replay is not lost between the two.
await emit("module.mesh-catalog.catching-up", {}); await emit("catching-up", {});
+8 -5
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
], ],
"claims": [ "claims": [
{ {
"name": "the-catalogue", "name": "mesh-catalog",
"scope": "mesh" "scope": "mesh"
} }
], ],
@@ -29,13 +29,16 @@
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/mesh-catalog/broker" "broker": "/var/lib/mesh/mesh-catalog/broker"
}, },
"consumes": [ "consumes": [
"module.builder.built" "mesh-build-machine.built",
"mesh-controller.built-before"
], ],
"emits": [ "emits": [
"module.mesh-catalog.registered", "registered",
"module.mesh-catalog.upgraded", "upgraded",
"module.mesh-catalog.rebuild-needed" "rebuild-needed",
"catching-up"
], ],
"prepares": true,
"resources": [ "resources": [
{ {
"id": "mesh-state", "id": "mesh-state",
+17
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
// The catalogue's state, brought to the shape this version needs (novox/hq ADR 0135).
//
// **The mesh runs this before the version that needs it, and does not start that version if it
// fails** — and the refusal reaches this module and nothing else on the machine
// (novox/hq ADR 0136). That is the whole difference from where this used to happen: at start, inside
// the runtime, a schema that could not be brought up was a crash loop, the graph kept a gap, and
// nothing anywhere said so.
//
// Nothing here connects to the broker. Preparation runs before the version that would use it, so
// there is nothing yet to talk to; the runtime's `prepare` mode imports this and awaits it, and this
// process exiting non-zero is how the host knows not to start the runtime.
import { Graph } from "../store.js";
const graph = Graph.fromEnv();
await graph.migrate();
console.log("[mesh-catalog] the module graph's schema is what this version needs");
await graph.close();
+2 -1
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
"pg.d.ts", "pg.d.ts",
"store.ts", "store.ts",
"index.ts", "index.ts",
"tools/index.ts" "tools/index.ts",
"prepare/index.ts"
] ]
} }
+13
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
# The console (novox/hq ADR 0152, design 34): the mesh's tools for whoever is on a machine, served
# over MCP on that machine's loopback.
#
# **Nothing is compiled here.** The console is the tool runtime's own client — `mesh serve` — which
# the runtime image already carries beside the runtime it runs modules with. This recipe changes the
# program the image starts and nothing else, so the console is exactly the client a person can run by
# hand, started by the mesh instead, on the credential the mesh sealed to the machine.
#
# One base, named rather than pinned: the mesh answers with the copy it holds (novox/hq issue 044).
ARG RUNTIME_BASE
FROM ${RUNTIME_BASE}
ENTRYPOINT ["node", "dist/mesh.js"]
+38
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
# mesh-console
The mesh's tools, on the machine a person sits at, served by a module the mesh assigned there
(novox/hq [ADR 0152](https://git.novox.be/novox/hq), design 34).
Assign it to a machine and an agent on that machine has the mesh's tools at
`http://127.0.0.1:<port>/mcp` — MCP over HTTP, `initialize`, `tools/list`, `tools/call`. A person at
a terminal reaches the same endpoint with `mesh tools --console http://127.0.0.1:<port>` and
`mesh call <module>.<tool> --console …`, with no credential of their own: the console holds it.
## What it is
The tool runtime's own client, `mesh serve`, started by the mesh on the credential it sealed to the
machine for `<node>.mesh-console`. The manifest says three things nothing else in the catalogue says
together:
- `invokes: ["*"]` — it calls every tool on the mesh, and the bus grants exactly that publish side;
- a listener `from: machine` — loopback only, and the filter opens nothing for it;
- no `emits`, no `consumes`, no `tools` — nothing on the bus can address it.
**Loopback is the authority boundary.** Whoever can connect is on the machine, and whoever is on the
machine is the account that owns the mesh there (ADR 0034, ADR 0144). There is no token and no login,
and `mesh serve` refuses to bind anything but a loopback address.
## What it lists
What the running modules answer: every tool runtime serves a `tools` verb for its module, and the
console asks the catalogue which modules the mesh holds and each module what it serves. A module that
did not answer — not assigned, not up, or built before the runtime answered `tools` — is named in the
list's `_meta.notAnswering` and can still be called by `<module>.<tool>`.
The mesh's own verbs (`status`, `push`, `assign`) are the `mesh-controller` seat's tools under
ADR 0132 and are not served on the bus yet; they appear here when they are.
## Port
The manifest declares port 4270 and the mesh assigns the machine port as it does for any listener;
the console binds `127.0.0.1:${port:4270}`. `node show <machine>` says which port a machine was given.
+64
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
{
"module": "mesh-console",
"version": "1",
"slug": "console",
"capabilities": [
"container-runtime"
],
"invokes": [
"*"
],
"own-secrets": {
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/mesh-console/broker"
},
"listens": [
{
"name": "mcp",
"port": 4270,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "machine",
"why": "the mesh's tools for whoever is on this machine, over MCP on loopback; the machine's login is the authority (novox/hq ADR 0152)"
}
],
"resources": [
{
"id": "mesh-state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/mesh-console",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "server",
"type": "container",
"name": "mesh-console",
"network": "host",
"args": [
"serve"
],
"env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_CONSOLE_LISTEN": "127.0.0.1:${port:4270}"
},
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/mesh-console/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro"
],
"artifact": "runtime"
}
],
"build": {
"on": [
{
"arg": "RUNTIME_BASE",
"module": "mesh-tools",
"artifact": "runtime"
}
],
"artifacts": [
{
"name": "runtime",
"kind": "image",
"from": "Dockerfile"
}
]
}
}
+3 -3
View File
@@ -16,15 +16,15 @@ interface SecretEvent {
rotations?: number; rotations?: number;
} }
await on<SecretEvent>("module.mesh-vault.secret.provisioned", async (e) => { await on<SecretEvent>("secret.provisioned", async (e) => {
console.log(`[mesh-vault] secret provisioned for ${e.body.as} on ${e.body.consumer} (${e.body.fingerprint})`); console.log(`[mesh-vault] secret provisioned for ${e.body.as} on ${e.body.consumer} (${e.body.fingerprint})`);
}); });
await on<SecretEvent>("module.mesh-vault.secret.rotated", async (e) => { await on<SecretEvent>("secret.rotated", async (e) => {
console.log(`[mesh-vault] secret rotated for ${e.body.as} — rotation ${e.body.rotations} (${e.body.fingerprint})`); console.log(`[mesh-vault] secret rotated for ${e.body.as} — rotation ${e.body.rotations} (${e.body.fingerprint})`);
}); });
await on<SecretEvent>("module.mesh-vault.secret.deprovisioned", async (e) => { await on<SecretEvent>("secret.deprovisioned", async (e) => {
console.log(`[mesh-vault] secret withdrawn from ${e.body.as}`); console.log(`[mesh-vault] secret withdrawn from ${e.body.as}`);
}); });
+6 -6
View File
@@ -11,14 +11,14 @@
"container-runtime" "container-runtime"
], ],
"emits": [ "emits": [
"module.mesh-vault.secret.provisioned", "secret.provisioned",
"module.mesh-vault.secret.rotated", "secret.rotated",
"module.mesh-vault.secret.deprovisioned" "secret.deprovisioned"
], ],
"consumes": [ "consumes": [
"module.mesh-vault.secret.provisioned", "mesh-vault.secret.provisioned",
"module.mesh-vault.secret.rotated", "mesh-vault.secret.rotated",
"module.mesh-vault.secret.deprovisioned" "mesh-vault.secret.deprovisioned"
], ],
"receives": { "receives": {
"secret": "/var/lib/mesh-vault/grants/mesh.json" "secret": "/var/lib/mesh-vault/grants/mesh.json"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -43,6 +43,6 @@ runProvisioner("secret", {
async remove(p: { as: string }): Promise<void> { async remove(p: { as: string }): Promise<void> {
if (!ledger.withdraw(p.as)) return; if (!ledger.withdraw(p.as)) return;
console.log(`[mesh-vault] withdrawn: ${p.as}`); console.log(`[mesh-vault] withdrawn: ${p.as}`);
await announce("module.mesh-vault.secret.deprovisioned", { as: p.as }); await announce("secret.deprovisioned", { as: p.as });
}, },
}); });
+17 -4
View File
@@ -125,6 +125,18 @@ export class MinioClient {
throw new Error(`minio bucketExists ${bucket}: ${status}`); throw new Error(`minio bucketExists ${bucket}: ${status}`);
} }
/**
* Whether a consumer's access key, with exactly this secret, reaches its bucket: a HEAD of the
* bucket signed as the consumer, the way it signs. Read-only. `false` when the key is unknown, the
* secret wrong, access denied or the bucket gone; any other answer rejects (novox/hq issue 120).
*/
async canReachAs(bucket: string, accessKey: string, secretKey: string): Promise<boolean> {
const { status } = await this.request("HEAD", `/${bucket}`, {}, { accessKey, secretKey });
if (status === 200) return true;
if (status === 403 || status === 404) return false;
throw new Error(`minio HEAD ${bucket} as ${accessKey}: ${status}`);
}
async createBucket(bucket: string): Promise<void> { async createBucket(bucket: string): Promise<void> {
const { status, text } = await this.request("PUT", `/${bucket}`); const { status, text } = await this.request("PUT", `/${bucket}`);
// 200 created; 409 BucketAlreadyOwnedByYou — idempotent, a re-provision must not fail. // 200 created; 409 BucketAlreadyOwnedByYou — idempotent, a re-provision must not fail.
@@ -251,6 +263,7 @@ export class MinioClient {
method: string, method: string,
path: string, path: string,
query: Record<string, string> = {}, query: Record<string, string> = {},
as: { accessKey: string; secretKey: string } = { accessKey: this.rootUser, secretKey: this.rootPassword },
): Promise<{ status: number; headers: Headers; text: string }> { ): Promise<{ status: number; headers: Headers; text: string }> {
const { amzDate, dateStamp } = this.stamp(); const { amzDate, dateStamp } = this.stamp();
const host = new URL(this.baseUrl).host; const host = new URL(this.baseUrl).host;
@@ -262,8 +275,8 @@ export class MinioClient {
const canonicalRequest = [method, encodedPath, canonicalQuery, canonicalHeaders, signedHeaders, payloadHash].join("\n"); const canonicalRequest = [method, encodedPath, canonicalQuery, canonicalHeaders, signedHeaders, payloadHash].join("\n");
const scope = `${dateStamp}/${this.region}/s3/aws4_request`; const scope = `${dateStamp}/${this.region}/s3/aws4_request`;
const stringToSign = ["AWS4-HMAC-SHA256", amzDate, scope, sha256hex(canonicalRequest)].join("\n"); const stringToSign = ["AWS4-HMAC-SHA256", amzDate, scope, sha256hex(canonicalRequest)].join("\n");
const signature = hmac(this.signingKey(dateStamp), stringToSign).toString("hex"); const signature = hmac(this.signingKey(dateStamp, as.secretKey), stringToSign).toString("hex");
const authorization = `AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=${this.rootUser}/${scope}, SignedHeaders=${signedHeaders}, Signature=${signature}`; const authorization = `AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=${as.accessKey}/${scope}, SignedHeaders=${signedHeaders}, Signature=${signature}`;
const url = `${this.baseUrl}${encodedPath}${canonicalQuery ? `?${canonicalQuery}` : ""}`; const url = `${this.baseUrl}${encodedPath}${canonicalQuery ? `?${canonicalQuery}` : ""}`;
const res = await fetch(url, { const res = await fetch(url, {
@@ -275,8 +288,8 @@ export class MinioClient {
return { status: res.status, headers: res.headers, text }; return { status: res.status, headers: res.headers, text };
} }
private signingKey(dateStamp: string): Buffer { private signingKey(dateStamp: string, secretKey: string = this.rootPassword): Buffer {
const kDate = hmac(`AWS4${this.rootPassword}`, dateStamp); const kDate = hmac(`AWS4${secretKey}`, dateStamp);
const kRegion = hmac(kDate, this.region); const kRegion = hmac(kDate, this.region);
const kService = hmac(kRegion, "s3"); const kService = hmac(kRegion, "s3");
return hmac(kService, "aws4_request"); return hmac(kService, "aws4_request");
+10 -7
View File
@@ -14,11 +14,11 @@
"route": { "route": {
"api": { "api": {
"label": "files-api", "label": "files-api",
"port": 9000 "endpoint": "s3"
}, },
"console": { "console": {
"label": "files", "label": "files",
"port": 9001 "endpoint": "console"
} }
} }
}, },
@@ -26,17 +26,19 @@
"container-runtime" "container-runtime"
], ],
"emits": [ "emits": [
"module.minio.bucket.created", "bucket.created",
"module.minio.bucket.removed" "bucket.removed"
], ],
"listens": [ "listens": [
{ {
"name": "s3",
"port": 9000, "port": 9000,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
"why": "the S3 endpoint" "why": "the S3 endpoint"
}, },
{ {
"name": "console",
"port": 9001, "port": 9001,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
@@ -95,14 +97,14 @@
{ {
"id": "net", "id": "net",
"type": "network", "type": "network",
"name": "minio" "name": "minio-net"
}, },
{ {
"id": "server", "id": "server",
"type": "container", "type": "container",
"name": "minio", "name": "minio",
"image": "docker.io/pgsty/minio@sha256:b6bfe7239bfc83fb90d31612d9704d86039dd714f7904b3f1ad68f211e602372", "image": "docker.io/pgsty/minio@sha256:b6bfe7239bfc83fb90d31612d9704d86039dd714f7904b3f1ad68f211e602372",
"network": "minio", "network": "minio-net",
"args": [ "args": [
"server", "server",
"/data", "/data",
@@ -122,6 +124,7 @@
], ],
"env": { "env": {
"MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE": "/run/secrets/root", "MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE": "/run/secrets/root",
"MINIO_BROWSER_REDIRECT_URL": "https://files.novox.be",
"MINIO_REGION": "eu-west" "MINIO_REGION": "eu-west"
} }
}, },
@@ -129,7 +132,7 @@
"id": "runtime", "id": "runtime",
"type": "container", "type": "container",
"name": "mesh-minio", "name": "mesh-minio",
"network": "minio", "network": "minio-net",
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/minio/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro", "/var/lib/mesh/minio/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/minio/grants:/var/lib/minio/grants:ro", "/var/lib/minio/grants:/var/lib/minio/grants:ro",
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"type": "module", "type": "module",
"private": true, "private": true,
"dependencies": { "dependencies": {
"@novox/mesh-sdk": "^0.1.0" "@novox/mesh-sdk": "^0.1.1"
}, },
"devDependencies": { "devDependencies": {
"@types/node": "^22.0.0", "@types/node": "^22.0.0",
+8 -2
View File
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ runProvisioner("s3-bucket", {
try { await minio.removeAccessKey(accessKeyId); } catch { /* none yet — first provision */ } try { await minio.removeAccessKey(accessKeyId); } catch { /* none yet — first provision */ }
await minio.createAccessKey(bucket, accessKeyId, p.password); await minio.createAccessKey(bucket, accessKeyId, p.password);
await announce("module.minio.bucket.created", { await announce("bucket.created", {
bucket, bucket,
consumer: p.consumer ?? "", consumer: p.consumer ?? "",
accessKey: accessKeyId, accessKey: accessKeyId,
@@ -51,7 +51,13 @@ runProvisioner("s3-bucket", {
console.error(`[minio] bucket ${bucket} not removed (likely non-empty), access revoked: ${err}`); console.error(`[minio] bucket ${bucket} not removed (likely non-empty), access revoked: ${err}`);
} }
await announce("module.minio.bucket.removed", { bucket, accessKey: p.as }); await announce("bucket.removed", { bucket, accessKey: p.as });
},
// Asked every minute by the harness: whether the backend still holds this consumer exactly as
// the mesh gave it, so a login lost behind the provisioner's back is made again (novox/hq issue 120).
async holds(p: Provision): Promise<boolean> {
return minio.canReachAs(bucketFor(p.as), p.as, p.password);
}, },
}); });
+1 -1
View File
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ const store = UsageStore.fromEnv();
// to reach the provider over the overlay would block the very apply that brings the overlay up. // to reach the provider over the overlay would block the very apply that brings the overlay up.
await store.migrate(); await store.migrate();
await on("module.*.usage.*", async (event) => { await on("*.usage.*", async (event) => {
const body = event.body as { rows?: UsageRow[]; raw?: unknown }; const body = event.body as { rows?: UsageRow[]; raw?: unknown };
for (const row of body.rows ?? []) { for (const row of body.rows ?? []) {
try { try {
+1 -1
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/model-usage/database.secret" "postgres-database": "/var/lib/model-usage/database.secret"
}, },
"consumes": [ "consumes": [
"module.*.usage.*" "*.usage.*"
], ],
"own-secrets": { "own-secrets": {
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/model-usage/broker" "broker": "/var/lib/mesh/model-usage/broker"
+28
View File
@@ -109,6 +109,34 @@ print(EJSON.stringify({ ok: 1 }));
await this.evalJs<{ ok: number }>(js); await this.evalJs<{ ok: number }>(js);
} }
/**
* Whether `user` authenticates against `database` with exactly `password` and holds `dbOwner`
* there: checked by connecting as the consumer, the way it connects. Read-only. `false` only on an
* authentication failure or a missing role; an unreachable server rejects (novox/hq issue 120).
*/
async canAuthenticateAs(database: string, user: string, password: string): Promise<boolean> {
// Connected without credentials, then authenticated inside the eval from the environment, so
// the consumer's password is neither on argv nor in the message of a failed command.
const uri = `mongodb://${this.conn.host}:${this.conn.port}/?serverSelectionTimeoutMS=10000`;
const js =
"const t = db.getSiblingDB(process.env.MESH_HOLDS_DB);" +
"t.auth(process.env.MESH_HOLDS_USER, process.env.MESH_HOLDS_PW);" +
"print(EJSON.stringify(t.runCommand({ connectionStatus: 1 }).authInfo.authenticatedUserRoles))";
let stdout: string;
try {
({ stdout } = await run("mongosh", [uri, "--quiet", "--eval", js], {
env: { ...process.env, MESH_HOLDS_DB: database, MESH_HOLDS_USER: user, MESH_HOLDS_PW: password },
timeout: 30_000,
}));
} catch (err) {
const text = `${(err as { stderr?: string }).stderr ?? ""}${(err as { stdout?: string }).stdout ?? ""}`;
if (/Authentication failed|AuthenticationFailed/i.test(text)) return false;
throw new Error(`mongosh could not check ${user}: ${text.trim().slice(0, 500) || String((err as Error).message).split("\n")[0]}`);
}
const roles = JSON.parse(stdout.trim()) as { role: string; db: string }[];
return roles.some((r) => r.role === "dbOwner" && r.db === database);
}
/** Drop a database and its owning user, idempotently. Dropping the database evicts its data; the /** Drop a database and its owning user, idempotently. Dropping the database evicts its data; the
* user is removed first so a re-grant of the same login starts clean. */ * user is removed first so a re-grant of the same login starts clean. */
async dropDatabaseAndUser(database: string, user: string): Promise<void> { async dropDatabaseAndUser(database: string, user: string): Promise<void> {
+2 -2
View File
@@ -14,11 +14,11 @@ interface DatabaseEvent {
user?: string; user?: string;
} }
await on<DatabaseEvent>("module.mongodb.database.provisioned", async (e) => { await on<DatabaseEvent>("database.provisioned", async (e) => {
console.log(`[mongodb] database provisioned for ${e.body.consumer} (db ${e.body.database})`); console.log(`[mongodb] database provisioned for ${e.body.consumer} (db ${e.body.database})`);
}); });
await on<DatabaseEvent>("module.mongodb.database.deprovisioned", async (e) => { await on<DatabaseEvent>("database.deprovisioned", async (e) => {
console.log(`[mongodb] database deprovisioned for ${e.body.consumer} (db ${e.body.database})`); console.log(`[mongodb] database deprovisioned for ${e.body.consumer} (db ${e.body.database})`);
}); });
+15 -16
View File
@@ -11,15 +11,16 @@
"container-runtime" "container-runtime"
], ],
"emits": [ "emits": [
"module.mongodb.database.provisioned", "database.provisioned",
"module.mongodb.database.deprovisioned" "database.deprovisioned"
], ],
"consumes": [ "consumes": [
"module.mongodb.database.provisioned", "mongodb.database.provisioned",
"module.mongodb.database.deprovisioned" "mongodb.database.deprovisioned"
], ],
"listens": [ "listens": [
{ {
"name": "database",
"port": 27017, "port": 27017,
"protocol": "tcp", "protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh", "from": "mesh",
@@ -32,13 +33,13 @@
} }
}, },
"receives": { "receives": {
"mongodb-database": "/var/lib/mongodb/grants/mesh.json" "mongodb-database": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
}, },
"grants": { "grants": {
"mongodb-database": "/var/lib/mongodb/grants" "mongodb-database": "${dir:grants}"
}, },
"own-secrets": { "own-secrets": {
"root": "/var/lib/mongodb/root.secret", "root": "${dir:state}/root.secret",
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/mongodb/broker" "broker": "/var/lib/mesh/mongodb/broker"
}, },
"secrets-owner": "999:999", "secrets-owner": "999:999",
@@ -52,19 +53,17 @@
{ {
"id": "state", "id": "state",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mongodb", "mode": "0700",
"mode": "0700" "place": "."
}, },
{ {
"id": "grants", "id": "grants",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mongodb/grants",
"mode": "0700" "mode": "0700"
}, },
{ {
"id": "data", "id": "data",
"type": "directory", "type": "directory",
"path": "/services/mongodb/db-data",
"mode": "0700" "mode": "0700"
}, },
{ {
@@ -86,8 +85,8 @@
"27017" "27017"
], ],
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/services/mongodb/db-data:/data/db", "${dir:data}:/data/db",
"/var/lib/mongodb/root.secret:/run/secrets/root:ro" "${dir:state}/root.secret:/run/secrets/root:ro"
] ]
}, },
{ {
@@ -97,14 +96,14 @@
"network": "mongodb", "network": "mongodb",
"volumes": [ "volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/mongodb/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro", "/var/lib/mesh/mongodb/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/mongodb/grants:/var/lib/mongodb/grants:ro", "${dir:grants}:${dir:grants}:ro",
"/var/lib/mongodb/root.secret:/run/secrets/root:ro" "${dir:state}/root.secret:/run/secrets/root:ro"
], ],
"env": { "env": {
"MESH_PROVISION_MONGODB": "mongodb://root@mongodb-server:27017/admin?authSource=admin", "MESH_PROVISION_MONGODB": "mongodb://root@mongodb-server:27017/admin?authSource=admin",
"MESH_PROVISION_PASSWORD_FILE": "/run/secrets/root", "MESH_PROVISION_PASSWORD_FILE": "/run/secrets/root",
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker", "MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_RECEIVES": "/var/lib/mongodb/grants/mesh.json" "MESH_RECEIVES": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
}, },
"artifact": "runtime" "artifact": "runtime"
} }
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"type": "module", "type": "module",
"private": true, "private": true,
"dependencies": { "dependencies": {
"@novox/mesh-sdk": "^0.1.0" "@novox/mesh-sdk": "^0.1.1"
}, },
"devDependencies": { "devDependencies": {
"@types/node": "^22.0.0", "@types/node": "^22.0.0",
+7 -2
View File
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ runProvisioner("mongodb-database", {
// Database and owning user share the consumer's login, so the consumer owns exactly its own. // Database and owning user share the consumer's login, so the consumer owns exactly its own.
const database = p.as; const database = p.as;
await mongo.createDatabaseAndUser(database, p.as, p.password); await mongo.createDatabaseAndUser(database, p.as, p.password);
await announce("module.mongodb.database.provisioned", { await announce("database.provisioned", {
consumer: p.consumer ?? "", consumer: p.consumer ?? "",
database, database,
user: p.as, user: p.as,
@@ -43,6 +43,11 @@ runProvisioner("mongodb-database", {
async remove(p: { as: string }): Promise<void> { async remove(p: { as: string }): Promise<void> {
await mongo.dropDatabaseAndUser(p.as, p.as); await mongo.dropDatabaseAndUser(p.as, p.as);
await announce("module.mongodb.database.deprovisioned", { database: p.as }); await announce("database.deprovisioned", { database: p.as });
},
// Asked every minute by the harness: whether the backend still holds this consumer exactly as
// the mesh gave it, so a login lost behind the provisioner's back is made again (novox/hq issue 120).
async holds(p: Provision): Promise<boolean> {
return mongo.canAuthenticateAs(p.as, p.as, p.password);
}, },
}); });

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