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Author SHA1 Message Date
jschoubben 1080f45012 mosquitto: a consumer's grant is the topics it asks for, and its binding says the port
mqtt-topic served nothing: with two listens the mesh could not say which port a consumer dials, so a
consumer had to type 1883 into its config. It now serves the MQTT listener's port (the machine's,
once assigned) and the scheme, so `${bound:mqtt-topic:port}` fills.

The provisioner confined every consumer to `<as>/#`, which leaves nothing for the consumers the
broker exists for: Home Assistant discovers under homeassistant/# and tasmota/discovery/#, and
Node-RED's flows follow the devices' own topics. A consumer now contributes `topics` (MQTT topic
filters) to its mqtt-topic requirement and is granted exactly those; with none, its own subtree as
before. Settings merge into contributions, so an operator narrows a grant per assignment. The role
is brought to exactly the wanted ACLs (stale ones removed), `holds` checks the ACLs too, and an
invalid list is refused, never quietly narrowed. Only the role named for the consumer is touched:
a client carried from the predecessor's password file keeps its own.
2026-09-30 13:01:14 +02:00
jschoubben a32394ec22 mosquitto: its directories are placed, not stated, and it runs the build in use
The module stated /var/lib/mosquitto-module and /services/mosquitto/data —
novox's layout, a path no definition may carry (ADR 0112). State, grants and
data are now placed directories (${dir:state}, ${dir:grants}, ${dir:data}),
the admin secret lives beside the broker account under the mesh's own state,
and the receives/grants maps follow the grants directory. Paths inside the
sidecar are its own view and are unchanged.

Image pinned to the 2.1.2 build ace's predecessor runs (2026-09-17); the old
pin was the same version, built in June.

Found preparing ace, whose broker carries a password-file user (an IoT switch
and home-assistant). Carrying it is a data step, not a manifest one: the
migration repo has scripts/mosquitto-pwdfile-to-dynsec.py, which moves $7$
PBKDF2 entries into the dynsec store hash-for-hash (tested end to end).
2026-09-29 23:05:41 +02:00
10 changed files with 307 additions and 120 deletions
+24 -55
View File
@@ -2,15 +2,12 @@
// module's tools and anything else baserow-specific import it; nothing outside baserow does.
//
// Baserow authenticates a person with email + password, exchanged for a JWT at /api/user/token-auth/.
// The standard image creates no admin from env, so the account is one a person made in Baserow: its
// password is the module's `admin` secret, accepted from the operator, and its email and the public
// host Baserow answers to reach the runtime config file the mesh mounts (the email from the
// assignment's settings). Until both are there fromEnv throws and the module exposes no tools — the
// same dormant-until-configured shape gitea uses for its token.
// Those credentials are the mesh's own: a person signs up in Baserow (the standard image creates no
// admin from env), and the credential is placed in the runtime config file the mesh mounts. Until
// that happens fromEnv throws and the module simply exposes no tools — the same dormant-until-
// configured shape gitea uses for its token.
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { request as httpRequest } from "node:http";
import { request as httpsRequest } from "node:https";
export interface BaserowApplication {
id: number;
@@ -71,63 +68,35 @@ export class BaserowClient {
return h;
}
/**
* One HTTP exchange. Not `fetch`: Node's fetch drops a caller's Host header and sends the URL's
* own, and Baserow answers only the host of its BASEROW_PUBLIC_URL — any other Host is looked up
* as a published builder site and gets 404, `/api/_health/` included. A co-located caller reaching
* it by container name must present the public host, so the request is made with node:http, which
* sends the Host it is given.
*/
private send(path: string, method: string, headers: Record<string, string>, body?: string): Promise<{ status: number; text: string }> {
const url = new URL(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`);
const request = url.protocol === "https:" ? httpsRequest : httpRequest;
// A length, never chunked: Baserow's server reads a chunked body as empty.
const sent = body === undefined ? headers : { ...headers, "Content-Length": String(Buffer.byteLength(body)) };
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const req = request(url, { method, headers: sent }, (res) => {
let text = "";
res.setEncoding("utf8");
res.on("data", (chunk: string) => (text += chunk));
res.on("end", () => resolve({ status: res.statusCode ?? 0, text }));
res.on("error", reject);
});
req.on("error", reject);
if (body !== undefined) req.write(body);
req.end();
});
}
/** Exchange email + password for a JWT, caching it until Baserow refuses it. Handles both the
/** Exchange email + password for a JWT, caching it for the client's lifetime. Handles both the
* older `{ token }` and the newer `{ access_token }` response shapes. */
async authenticate(): Promise<string> {
if (this.token) return this.token;
const res = await this.send(
"/api/user/token-auth/",
"POST",
this.headers(),
JSON.stringify({ email: this.email, password: this.password }),
);
if (res.status < 200 || res.status >= 300) throw new Error(`baserow auth failed: ${res.status} ${res.text}`);
const data = JSON.parse(res.text) as { token?: string; access_token?: string };
const res = await fetch(`${this.baseUrl}/api/user/token-auth/`, {
method: "POST",
headers: this.headers(),
body: JSON.stringify({ email: this.email, password: this.password }),
});
if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`baserow auth failed: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`);
const data = (await res.json()) as { token?: string; access_token?: string };
const token = data.access_token ?? data.token;
if (!token) throw new Error("baserow auth returned no token");
this.token = token;
return token;
}
/** An authenticated GET. A refused token is dropped and the call made once more with a fresh one:
* Baserow's access tokens expire after minutes, and the runtime lives for weeks. */
private async authed<T>(path: string): Promise<T> {
for (let attempt = 0; ; attempt++) {
const token = await this.authenticate();
const res = await this.send(path, "GET", this.headers({ Authorization: `JWT ${token}` }));
if (res.status === 401 && attempt === 0) {
this.token = null;
continue;
}
if (res.status < 200 || res.status >= 300) throw new Error(`baserow ${path}: ${res.status} ${res.text}`);
return (res.text ? JSON.parse(res.text) : null) as T;
}
private async authed<T>(path: string, options: RequestInit = {}): Promise<T> {
const token = await this.authenticate();
const res = await fetch(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`, {
...options,
headers: this.headers({
Authorization: `JWT ${token}`,
...(options.headers as Record<string, string> | undefined),
}),
});
if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`baserow ${path}: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`);
const text = await res.text();
return (text ? JSON.parse(text) : null) as T;
}
/** The applications (databases) the account can see, across all its workspaces. */
+16 -15
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@@ -18,14 +18,14 @@
}
},
"binds": {
"postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.json",
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/baserow/database.json",
"route": "/var/lib/baserow/route.json"
},
"secrets": {
"postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.secret"
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/baserow/database.secret"
},
"own-secrets": {
"admin": "${dir:state}/admin.secret",
"secret-key": "/var/lib/baserow/secret-key.secret",
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/baserow/broker"
},
"listens": [
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
"port": 80,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "the Baserow web UI and REST API, served by the image's own Caddy; a public name is the route's"
"why": "the Baserow web UI and REST API; a public name is a route grant later"
}
],
"resources": [
@@ -47,21 +47,22 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
"path": "/var/lib/baserow",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "data",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/services/baserow/data",
"mode": "0755",
"owner": "9999:9999"
},
{
"id": "server-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "${dir:state}/server.env",
"path": "/var/lib/baserow/server.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "DATABASE_HOST=${bound:postgres-database:at}\nDATABASE_PORT=${bound:postgres-database:port}\nDATABASE_NAME=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nDATABASE_USER=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nDATABASE_PASSWORD_FILE=/run/secrets/database\nDISABLE_EMBEDDED_PSQL=true\nBASEROW_PUBLIC_URL=https://${bound:route:name}\n"
"content": "DATABASE_HOST=${bound:postgres-database:at}\nDATABASE_PORT=${bound:postgres-database:port}\nDATABASE_NAME=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nDATABASE_USER=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nDATABASE_PASSWORD=${secret:postgres-database}\nSECRET_KEY=${secret:secret-key}\nBASEROW_PUBLIC_URL=http://localhost\n"
},
{
"id": "net",
@@ -72,25 +73,25 @@
"id": "server",
"type": "container",
"name": "baserow",
"image": "baserow/baserow@sha256:263ea6c4b72c9eccabcd975ffe9fdebf23913a293a514bec6a3897a5e0a5a080",
"image": "baserow/baserow@sha256:834424a10413798567f76428f255dc259445b7f8dcec56598c05b4073bb2a124",
"network": "baserow",
"env-file": [
"${dir:state}/server.env"
"/var/lib/baserow/server.env"
],
"ports": [
"80"
],
"volumes": [
"${dir:data}:/baserow/data",
"${dir:state}/database.secret:/run/secrets/database:ro"
]
"/services/baserow/data:/baserow/data"
],
"secrets-in-environment": "baserow reads DATABASE_PASSWORD and SECRET_KEY with os.getenv and has no _FILE twin (settings/base.py); not convertible"
},
{
"id": "runtime-config",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/baserow/config.json",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "{\n \"password\": \"${secret:admin}\",\n \"host\": \"${bound:route:name}\"\n}\n",
"content": "{}\n",
"merge": "json"
},
{
+1 -1
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@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ ARG RUNTIME_BASE
FROM ${BUILD_BASE} AS build
WORKDIR /app/modules/mosquitto
COPY . .
RUN node /app/node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc client.ts index.ts tools/index.ts provisioner/index.ts bootstrap/index.ts \
RUN node /app/node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc topics.ts client.ts index.ts tools/index.ts provisioner/index.ts bootstrap/index.ts \
--module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist
FROM ${RUNTIME_BASE}
+38 -24
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@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
import { promisify } from "node:util";
import { missingAcls, parseRoleAcls, staleAcls, wantedAcls } from "./topics.js";
const run = promisify(execFile);
export interface MqttConn {
@@ -141,14 +143,19 @@ export class MosquittoClient {
}
/**
* Create (or reset to a known state) a client scoped to one topic namespace, idempotently. The
* client is confined to `<prefix>/#` by a same-named role: it may publish to, subscribe to and
* receive on exactly its own subtree and nothing else — the MQTT analog of redis's keyspace-scoped
* ACL user. Called again for an existing client, it resets the password and re-asserts the ACLs.
* Create (or reset to a known state) a client granted exactly these topic filters, idempotently.
* The grant is a same-named role carrying, for every filter, publish, receive and subscribe — and
* nothing else: an ACL the role carries that the filters no longer name is removed, so narrowing a
* consumer's `topics` narrows what it may do. By default the filters are the consumer's own
* subtree, `<as>/#` (see topics.ts). Called again for an existing client, it resets the password
* and re-asserts the ACLs.
*
* Only the role named for this client is ever changed. A client or role the mesh did not make —
* a device carried from the predecessor's password file, its `legacy-full-access` role — is never
* read, changed or removed here.
*/
async createScopedClient(username: string, password: string, topicPrefix: string): Promise<void> {
async createScopedClient(username: string, password: string, filters: readonly string[]): Promise<void> {
const role = username; // one role per client, named for it
const pattern = `${topicPrefix}/#`;
if (await this.clientExists(username)) {
await this.ctl("setClientPassword", username, password);
@@ -161,17 +168,18 @@ export class MosquittoClient {
await this.ctl("createClient", username, "-p", password);
}
// A role carrying exactly this client's topic ACLs. createRole, addRoleACL and addClientRole are
// all one-shot: each rejects with an "already exists" when re-run against a role/ACL/binding it
// created on a previous reconcile. That rejection is the intended terminal state — the ACL is
// deterministic (`<prefix>/#`, allow), so re-adding the identical entry is a no-op — so it is
// swallowed. (Until the exit code was fixed this was invisible: the tool returned 0 and the
// rejection was lost; now it surfaces, and each of these adds must tolerate its own idempotent
// re-run explicitly.)
// createRole and addRoleACL are one-shot: each rejects with an "already exists" when re-run
// against a role/ACL it created on a previous reconcile. That rejection is the intended terminal
// state, so it is swallowed.
await ignoreExisting(this.ctl("createRole", role));
for (const acl of ["publishClientSend", "publishClientReceive", "subscribePattern"]) {
// allow (1) this client to send to, receive on, and subscribe under its own subtree.
await ignoreExisting(this.ctl("addRoleACL", role, acl, pattern, "allow"));
const wanted = wantedAcls(filters);
const current = parseRoleAcls(await this.ctl("getRole", role));
for (const acl of missingAcls(current, wanted)) {
await ignoreExisting(this.ctl("addRoleACL", role, acl.type, acl.topic, "allow"));
}
// What the consumer no longer asks for — added before it narrowed its topics — is taken away.
for (const acl of staleAcls(current, wanted)) {
await ignoreMissing(this.ctl("removeRoleACL", role, acl.type, acl.topic));
}
// Bind the role only when it is not already bound — addClientRole is the one call whose
// idempotent re-run cannot be recognised by message (see clientHasRole).
@@ -181,25 +189,31 @@ export class MosquittoClient {
}
/**
* Whether a consumer's client accepts exactly this password and still carries its own role.
* Read-only. The password is checked the way the consumer is checked, by an MQTT CONNECT as it,
* and the broker's CONNACK code is the answer: 0 accepted, 4 bad credentials, 5 not authorised.
* Nothing rides on argv. An unreachable broker rejects (novox/hq issue 120).
* Whether a consumer's client accepts exactly this password, still carries its own role, and that
* role grants exactly these filters. Read-only. The password is checked the way the consumer is
* checked, by an MQTT CONNECT as it, and the broker's CONNACK code is the answer: 0 accepted,
* 4 bad credentials, 5 not authorised. Nothing rides on argv. An unreachable broker rejects
* (novox/hq issue 120).
*/
async holdsClient(username: string, password: string): Promise<boolean> {
async holdsClient(username: string, password: string, filters: readonly string[]): Promise<boolean> {
const code = await mqttConnack(this.conn.host, this.conn.port, username, password);
if (code === 4 || code === 5) return false;
if (code !== 0) throw new Error(`mosquitto refused ${username} with CONNACK ${code}`);
// The role, asked directly: only "not found" means absent. Any other failure to ask rejects,
// unlike clientHasRole, which reads every failure as "no role".
let out: string;
let client: string;
let role: string;
try {
out = await this.ctl("getClient", username);
client = await this.ctl("getClient", username);
role = await this.ctl("getRole", username);
} catch (err) {
if (/not\s*found|does not exist|no such/i.test(String(err))) return false;
throw err;
}
return new RegExp(`(^|\\s)${escapeRegExp(username)}\\s+\\(priority`, "m").test(out);
if (!new RegExp(`(^|\\s)${escapeRegExp(username)}\\s+\\(priority`, "m").test(client)) return false;
const current = parseRoleAcls(role);
const wanted = wantedAcls(filters);
return missingAcls(current, wanted).length === 0 && staleAcls(current, wanted).length === 0;
}
/** Remove a client and the per-client role created for it, idempotently. */
+18 -17
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@@ -20,16 +20,19 @@
"mosquitto.topic.deprovisioned"
],
"serves": {
"mqtt-topic": {}
"mqtt-topic": {
"scheme": "mqtt",
"port": 1883
}
},
"receives": {
"mqtt-topic": "/var/lib/mosquitto-module/grants/mesh.json"
"mqtt-topic": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
},
"grants": {
"mqtt-topic": "/var/lib/mosquitto-module/grants"
"mqtt-topic": "${dir:grants}"
},
"own-secrets": {
"admin": "/var/lib/mosquitto-module/admin.secret",
"admin": "/var/lib/mesh/mosquitto/admin",
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/mosquitto/broker"
},
"listens": [
@@ -58,26 +61,24 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mosquitto-module",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "grants-dir",
"id": "grants",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mosquitto-module/grants",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "data",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/services/mosquitto/data",
"mode": "0700",
"owner": "1883:1883"
},
{
"id": "server-conf",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mosquitto-module/mosquitto.conf",
"path": "${dir:state}/mosquitto.conf",
"mode": "0600",
"owner": "1883:1883",
"content": "persistence true\npersistence_location /mosquitto/data\n\nlog_dest stdout\nlog_type warning\nlog_type error\nlog_type notice\n\n# Every client authenticates; identities and their per-topic ACLs are managed\n# at runtime by the dynamic security plugin, whose store the plugin itself owns.\nallow_anonymous false\nplugin /usr/lib/mosquitto_dynamic_security.so\nplugin_opt_config_file /mosquitto/data/dynamic-security.json\n\n# MQTT listener\nlistener 1883\n\n# MQTT-over-WebSockets listener\nlistener 8081\nprotocol websockets\n"
@@ -93,8 +94,8 @@
"name": "mosquitto-bootstrap",
"run-once": true,
"volumes": [
"/services/mosquitto/data:/mosquitto/data",
"/var/lib/mosquitto-module/admin.secret:/run/secrets/admin:ro"
"${dir:data}:/mosquitto/data",
"/var/lib/mesh/mosquitto/admin:/run/secrets/admin:ro"
],
"env": {
"MESH_PROVISION_MQTT": "mosquitto:1883",
@@ -112,15 +113,15 @@
"id": "server",
"type": "container",
"name": "mosquitto",
"image": "eclipse-mosquitto@sha256:6f8d8a947c506f8a2290ec65cd4bd2bc7cb4d43fb5f6271f861cb013e2ef9797",
"image": "eclipse-mosquitto@sha256:38c0da4f2ef84284d47b3b3eeea1cb3bdeabe81ee10caf0cd5c5ff61ee3ea408",
"network": "mosquitto",
"ports": [
"1883",
"8081"
],
"volumes": [
"/services/mosquitto/data:/mosquitto/data",
"/var/lib/mosquitto-module/mosquitto.conf:/mosquitto/config/mosquitto.conf:ro"
"${dir:data}:/mosquitto/data",
"${dir:state}/mosquitto.conf:/mosquitto/config/mosquitto.conf:ro"
]
},
{
@@ -130,8 +131,8 @@
"network": "mosquitto",
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/mosquitto/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/mosquitto-module/grants:/var/lib/mosquitto-module/grants:ro",
"/var/lib/mosquitto-module/admin.secret:/run/secrets/admin:ro"
"${dir:grants}:/var/lib/mosquitto-module/grants:ro",
"/var/lib/mesh/mosquitto/admin:/run/secrets/admin:ro"
],
"env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
+6 -1
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,14 @@
{
"name": "@novox/module-mosquitto",
"version": "0.1.0",
"description": "mosquitto — provides the mesh mqtt-topic interface. Its admin client, provisioner, tools and events live here (novox/hq ADR 0039).",
"description": "mosquitto \u2014 provides the mesh mqtt-topic interface. Its admin client, provisioner, tools and events live here (novox/hq ADR 0039).",
"type": "module",
"private": true,
"scripts": {
"build": "tsc topics.ts client.ts index.ts tools/index.ts provisioner/index.ts bootstrap/index.ts --module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist",
"typecheck": "tsc -p tsconfig.json",
"test": "node --test --experimental-strip-types 'test/*.test.ts'"
},
"dependencies": {
"@novox/mesh-sdk": "^0.1.1"
},
+24 -6
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,14 @@
//
// The `mqtt-topic` interface: a consumer connects as `as` with the password the mesh minted, and
// publishes and subscribes under `<as>/#`, isolated from every other consumer by a Dynamic Security
// role scoped to exactly that subtree.
// role scoped to exactly that subtree — unless it contributed `topics`, the MQTT topic filters its
// work needs (a home-automation hub needs the devices' topics); then the role grants exactly those
// (topics.ts). A list that is not valid topic filters is refused, and the consumer is not created
// or changed until it is fixed.
//
// What a consumer is told (its binding): `at` — the broker's machine — and `port`, the machine port
// of the MQTT listener (the manifest's `serves`); `as` is its login, and its copy of the password is
// the pair credential the mesh delivers to it.
//
// **The login and password are the mesh's, not the provisioner's (ADR 0048).** The mesh derives the
// login and hands it to both ends so they agree, and mints the password and delivers a copy to each.
@@ -15,6 +22,7 @@
import { runProvisioner, type Provision } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/provisioner";
import { emit } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/events";
import { MosquittoClient } from "../client.js";
import { topicFilters } from "../topics.js";
const mosquitto = MosquittoClient.fromEnv();
@@ -29,13 +37,20 @@ async function announce(type: string, body: Record<string, string>): Promise<voi
runProvisioner("mqtt-topic", {
async create(p: Provision): Promise<void> {
// The topic subtree is scoped to the consumer's own login, so one cannot read another's topics.
const topicPrefix = p.as;
await mosquitto.createScopedClient(p.as, p.password, topicPrefix);
// By default the consumer's own subtree, so one cannot read another's topics; what it
// contributed as `topics` otherwise.
const granted = topicFilters(p.values, p.as);
if ("problem" in granted) {
// Thrown, so the harness logs it and retries: the consumer stays as it was (or absent) until
// its contribution is valid, rather than being given a grant it did not ask for.
throw new Error(`${p.as}: ${granted.problem}`);
}
await mosquitto.createScopedClient(p.as, p.password, granted.filters);
await announce("topic.provisioned", {
consumer: p.consumer ?? "",
username: p.as,
topicPrefix,
topicPrefix: granted.own ? p.as : "",
topics: granted.filters.join(" "),
});
},
@@ -46,6 +61,9 @@ runProvisioner("mqtt-topic", {
// Asked every minute by the harness: whether the backend still holds this consumer exactly as
// the mesh gave it, so a login lost behind the provisioner's back is made again (novox/hq issue 120).
async holds(p: Provision): Promise<boolean> {
return mosquitto.holdsClient(p.as, p.password);
const granted = topicFilters(p.values, p.as);
// An invalid list was never applied; create refuses it again, loudly, on every pass.
if ("problem" in granted) return false;
return mosquitto.holdsClient(p.as, p.password, granted.filters);
},
});
+72
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@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
// What a consumer of mqtt-topic is granted (topics.ts): its own subtree unless it contributed
// `topics`; a contributed list is granted exactly, refused whole when it is not topic filters; and
// the role is brought to exactly the wanted ACLs — missing ones added, stale ones removed — read from
// `mosquitto_ctrl dynsec getRole` as eclipse-mosquitto 2.1.2 prints it.
import { test } from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import { filterProblem, missingAcls, parseRoleAcls, staleAcls, topicFilters, wantedAcls } from "../topics.ts";
test("a consumer that contributed nothing gets its own subtree", () => {
assert.deepEqual(topicFilters({}, "mesh_ace_hass"), { ok: true, filters: ["mesh_ace_hass/#"], own: true });
assert.deepEqual(topicFilters(undefined, "x"), { ok: true, filters: ["x/#"], own: true });
// Settings merge into every contribution: keys that are not `topics` change nothing.
assert.deepEqual(topicFilters({ endpoints: { web: {} } }, "x"), { ok: true, filters: ["x/#"], own: true });
});
test("a contributed list is granted exactly, duplicates once", () => {
assert.deepEqual(topicFilters({ topics: ["#"] }, "x"), { ok: true, filters: ["#"], own: false });
assert.deepEqual(topicFilters({ topics: ["stat/+/POWER", "tele/#", "tele/#", "/octoprint/x"] }, "x"), {
ok: true,
filters: ["stat/+/POWER", "tele/#", "/octoprint/x"],
own: false,
});
});
test("a list that is not topic filters is refused whole", () => {
for (const topics of [[], "#", [""], ["a/#/b"], ["a#"], ["a/b+"], [42], ["a\u0000b"], {}]) {
const out = topicFilters({ topics } as Record<string, unknown>, "x");
assert.equal(out.ok, false, JSON.stringify(topics));
}
assert.equal(filterProblem("+/+/#"), undefined);
assert.equal(filterProblem("#"), undefined);
});
const GET_ROLE = `Warning: You are running mosquitto_ctrl without encryption.
This means all of the configuration changes you are making are visible on the network, including passwords.
Rolename: u1
ACLs: publishClientSend : allow : # (priority: 0)
subscribePattern : allow : u1/# (priority: 0)
publishClientReceive : deny : secret topic/with space (priority: -1)
`;
test("getRole's ACL lines are read, the warning and headings are not", () => {
assert.deepEqual(parseRoleAcls(GET_ROLE), [
{ type: "publishClientSend", allow: true, topic: "#" },
{ type: "subscribePattern", allow: true, topic: "u1/#" },
{ type: "publishClientReceive", allow: false, topic: "secret topic/with space" },
]);
assert.deepEqual(parseRoleAcls("Rolename: empty\nACLs:\n"), []);
});
test("the role is brought to exactly the wanted ACLs", () => {
const current = parseRoleAcls(GET_ROLE);
const wanted = wantedAcls(["u1/#"]);
assert.deepEqual(wanted, [
{ type: "publishClientSend", allow: true, topic: "u1/#" },
{ type: "publishClientReceive", allow: true, topic: "u1/#" },
{ type: "subscribePattern", allow: true, topic: "u1/#" },
]);
assert.deepEqual(missingAcls(current, wanted), [
{ type: "publishClientSend", allow: true, topic: "u1/#" },
{ type: "publishClientReceive", allow: true, topic: "u1/#" },
]);
assert.deepEqual(staleAcls(current, wanted), [
{ type: "publishClientSend", allow: true, topic: "#" },
{ type: "publishClientReceive", allow: false, topic: "secret topic/with space" },
]);
assert.deepEqual(staleAcls(wanted, wanted), []);
assert.deepEqual(missingAcls(wanted, wanted), []);
});
+107
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@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
// Which topics a consumer of `mqtt-topic` may use — the one choice a consumer makes about its grant.
//
// **By default, its own subtree and nothing else.** A consumer connects as the login the mesh derived
// (`as`) and may publish, receive and subscribe under `<as>/#` — isolated from every other consumer,
// which is the point of a per-consumer client (novox/hq ADR 0039/0048).
//
// **A consumer whose work IS the shared topic space says so.** Home Assistant discovers devices
// under `homeassistant/#` and `tasmota/discovery/#` and follows whatever state topics they announce;
// Node-RED's flows subscribe to the topics devices publish on (`stat/<device>/POWER`, …). Confined
// to `<as>/#` neither could do its job. So a consumer contributes `topics` to its `mqtt-topic`
// requirement — a list of MQTT topic filters — and the provisioner grants exactly those, both ways.
// Because assignment settings merge into every contribution, an operator narrows (or widens) the
// list per machine with the same key, without editing a manifest.
//
// Pure, so it is tested without a broker (test/topics.test.ts).
/** The dynsec ACL types a granted filter carries: send to it, receive from it, subscribe to it. */
export const GRANTED_ACL_TYPES = ["publishClientSend", "publishClientReceive", "subscribePattern"] as const;
/** One ACL on a role, as `mosquitto_ctrl dynsec getRole` reports it. */
export interface Acl {
type: string;
allow: boolean;
topic: string;
}
export type Filters = { ok: true; filters: string[]; own: boolean } | { ok: false; problem: string };
/**
* The topic filters a consumer is granted: what it contributed as `topics`, or its own subtree when
* it contributed nothing. Refused — never silently narrowed or widened — when the list is not a
* list of valid MQTT topic filters: a grant that quietly differs from what was asked is a consumer
* that fails somewhere far from the cause.
*/
export function topicFilters(values: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>> | undefined, as: string): Filters {
const given = values?.topics;
if (given === undefined || given === null) {
return { ok: true, filters: [`${as}/#`], own: true };
}
if (!Array.isArray(given) || given.length === 0) {
return { ok: false, problem: `topics must be a non-empty list of MQTT topic filters, not ${JSON.stringify(given)}` };
}
const out: string[] = [];
for (const f of given) {
if (typeof f !== "string") {
return { ok: false, problem: `topics holds ${JSON.stringify(f)}, which is not a topic filter` };
}
const problem = filterProblem(f);
if (problem) return { ok: false, problem: `topic filter ${JSON.stringify(f)}: ${problem}` };
if (!out.includes(f)) out.push(f);
}
return { ok: true, filters: out, own: out.length === 1 && out[0] === `${as}/#` };
}
/** Why a string is not a valid MQTT topic filter (MQTT 3.1.1 §4.7), or undefined when it is one. */
export function filterProblem(filter: string): string | undefined {
if (filter.length === 0) return "it is empty";
if (Buffer.byteLength(filter, "utf8") > 65535) return "it is longer than MQTT allows";
if (filter.includes("\u0000")) return "it contains a NUL character";
const levels = filter.split("/");
for (let i = 0; i < levels.length; i++) {
const level = levels[i];
if (level.includes("#") && (level !== "#" || i !== levels.length - 1)) {
return "'#' must be a whole level, and the last one";
}
if (level.includes("+") && level !== "+") return "'+' must be a whole level";
}
return undefined;
}
/** The ACLs a role must carry to grant these filters: every granted type, allowed, on every filter. */
export function wantedAcls(filters: readonly string[]): Acl[] {
const out: Acl[] = [];
for (const topic of filters) {
for (const type of GRANTED_ACL_TYPES) out.push({ type, allow: true, topic });
}
return out;
}
/**
* The ACLs `mosquitto_ctrl dynsec getRole` lists, one per line under its "ACLs:" heading:
* `ACLs: publishClientSend : allow : # (priority: 0)`
* ` subscribePattern : allow : u1/# (priority: 0)`
*/
export function parseRoleAcls(output: string): Acl[] {
const out: Acl[] = [];
const line = /^(?:ACLs:)?\s*([A-Za-z]+)\s*:\s*(allow|deny)\s*:\s*(.*?)\s+\(priority:\s*-?\d+\)\s*$/;
for (const raw of output.split(/\r?\n/)) {
const m = raw.match(line);
if (m) out.push({ type: m[1], allow: m[2] === "allow", topic: m[3] });
}
return out;
}
const key = (a: Acl): string => `${a.type}\u0000${a.allow ? "allow" : "deny"}\u0000${a.topic}`;
/** ACLs a role carries that it should not: in `current` and not in `wanted`. */
export function staleAcls(current: readonly Acl[], wanted: readonly Acl[]): Acl[] {
const want = new Set(wanted.map(key));
return current.filter((a) => !want.has(key(a)));
}
/** ACLs a role should carry and does not. */
export function missingAcls(current: readonly Acl[], wanted: readonly Acl[]): Acl[] {
const have = new Set(current.map(key));
return wanted.filter((a) => !have.has(key(a)));
}
+1 -1
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@@ -8,5 +8,5 @@
"skipLibCheck": true,
"noEmit": true
},
"include": ["client.ts", "index.ts", "provisioner/index.ts", "tools/index.ts", "bootstrap/index.ts"]
"include": ["topics.ts", "client.ts", "index.ts", "provisioner/index.ts", "tools/index.ts", "bootstrap/index.ts"]
}