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Author SHA1 Message Date
jschoubben b2df040896 Merge pull request 'distribution claims mesh-artifact-store' (#194) from feat/the-artifact-store-seat-is-named-for-its-scope into main
Reviewed-on: #194
2026-09-30 19:17:47 +00:00
jschoubben af069dd667 Merge pull request 'A definition names no host path for its own data' (#193) from feat/definitions-place-their-directories into main
Reviewed-on: #193
2026-09-30 19:17:00 +00:00
jschoubben 13e13734c5 distribution claims mesh-artifact-store, the seat's name for its scope (novox/hq ADR 0156) 2026-09-30 21:14:40 +02:00
jschoubben eed5e8958a A definition names no host path for its own data
Twenty-eight modules' data directories are placed: the root as place ".", a sub-directory named by
its id, and every host-side reference — binds, secrets, own secrets, grants, receives, file paths,
mounts, env-files — as ${dir:<id>}. Resolved on the default root every path is the one the manifest
named before, which the controller's TestPlacedDirectoriesKeepTheirPaths proves over both checkouts;
so no data moves and no machine sees a change. Five directories whose id is not their last segment
keep their path as a placement (novox/hq issue 119, ADR 0112, design 27).
2026-09-30 21:10:18 +02:00
mesh-admin 12bbcafacf Merge pull request 'gitea: the tools' token carries write:admin; a kept token is re-minted when it lacks a scope' (#192) from feat/gitea-token-write-admin into main 2026-09-30 19:06:05 +00:00
jschoubben d58ed21367 gitea: the tools' token carries write:admin, and a kept token is re-minted when it lacks a scope
The forge's own users are the mesh's to settle — making the builder's login
a site admin so private repos build (hq 229) — and the tools' token had no
write:admin. A token kept from before a scope was added lacks it, so the
client now treats the forge's 403 "required scope" like a 401: the source
re-mints by name with the whole list and retries once. The fake forge in the
tests learns /repos/search, which the client has used since 2026-09-28 and
which had left 9 of the 11 token tests failing on main.
2026-09-30 21:05:52 +02:00
jschoubben 20d8487515 Merge pull request 'website: it listens on the port its container publishes' (#191) from fix/website-listens-its-own-port into main 2026-09-30 19:01:49 +00:00
jschoubben aab40c6e9d website: it listens on the port its container publishes
listens said 4000 while the container publishes 8080; the old assignment's port setting hid it, and
the rename lost the setting, so the proxy dialled a port nothing answered (2026-09-30).
2026-09-30 21:01:47 +02:00
jschoubben ad2aac7bb9 Merge pull request 'website: the container joins the network the module declares' (#190) from fix/website-network into main 2026-09-30 18:56:26 +00:00
jschoubben 202672ee7d website: the container joins the network the module declares
The rename changed the network resource's name and not the container's network, so the container
looked for a network that no longer exists and the site answered 502 (2026-09-30).
2026-09-30 20:56:23 +02:00
mesh-admin ac7a9f2ca8 Merge pull request 'portainer: publish its software ports; the machine side is the mesh's to assign' (#189) from fix/portainer-software-ports into main 2026-09-30 18:54:41 +00:00
jschoubben 80d9e9a7e7 portainer: publish its software ports; the machine side is the mesh's to assign
9090:9000 and 9443:9443 were the predecessor's machine numbers written into the
definition. The manifest now says 9000 and 9443 and the mesh assigns the
machine ports on each node (the portainer slice of #173, which is stale).
2026-09-30 20:54:29 +02:00
jschoubben e0c5acd547 Merge pull request 'No definition names this installation' (#188) from feat/a-definition-names-no-installation into main 2026-09-30 18:49:38 +00:00
jschoubben 3476f1ebec No definition names this installation
keycloak, minio and n8n are told their names from their route bindings; mailu takes its domain, site
name, website and proxy address as settings and its front's name from its route, and the provisioner
reads the domain from the merged config; builder and route-proxy package the controller from the git
seat; the applications built outside the mesh say so per container; matrix says which of the world's
servers it means; the site module is named website, and the why prose no longer names a name (novox/hq
ADR 0155, issues 122 and 134). module check passes over all 77.
2026-09-30 20:49:21 +02:00
mesh-admin 1eb8fa367b Merge pull request 'oidc-client: keycloak makes each consumer its client; grafana logs in through it' (#155) from feat/oidc-client-provision into main 2026-09-30 17:03:32 +00:00
mesh-admin f0c4db843e Merge pull request 'grafana: its directories are placed, its admin password is a file, and it runs the build in use' (#153) from feat/grafana-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 17:03:30 +00:00
mesh-admin ec909d3542 Merge pull request 'nodered: settings.json sits beside settings.js' (#187) from fix/nodered-settings-json-beside-settings-js into main 2026-09-30 16:32:15 +00:00
jschoubben 409fe7ef06 nodered: settings.json sits beside settings.js, which reads it from its own directory
#186 moved settings.js to /data for the image's health check but left
settings.json at /config; settings.js requires ./settings.json, so node-red
crashed at start. Both now mount under /data.
2026-09-30 18:32:11 +02:00
mesh-admin c91d12a11d Merge pull request 'nodered: mount its settings where the image's health check reads them' (#186) from fix/nodered-healthcheck-settings-path into main 2026-09-30 16:28:09 +00:00
jschoubben 82686e44f3 nodered: mount its settings where the image's health check reads them
The image's /healthcheck.js requires /data/settings.js, so with the mesh's
settings mounted at /config the container ran fine but reported unhealthy
forever. Mount the same file at /data/settings.js and point --settings there.
2026-09-30 18:28:05 +02:00
jschoubben 949f5f02c9 Merge pull request 'records: a phrase that wraps, and one under emphasis, is found' (#185) from fix/a-phrase-that-wraps into main 2026-09-30 16:13:47 +00:00
jschoubben 3b95d00afc records: a phrase that wraps, and one under emphasis, is found
The record is prose wrapped at a hundred columns; matched line by line, the first live search for a
sentence of ADR 0025 found nothing. A line is matched together with the next, emphasis marks are
ignored, and a hit still names the line it starts on.
2026-09-30 18:09:21 +02:00
mesh-admin cbf9e9b7a3 Merge pull request 'supabase: own secrets, and unique ids for its containers' (#184) from fix/supabase-own-secrets into main 2026-09-30 15:58:24 +00:00
jschoubben f476255284 supabase: own secrets, and unique ids for its containers
The manifest declared its secrets as secrets.secret.<name> and required a
"secret" provision, so the controller saw no own secrets and every accept
was refused (the influxdb defect of #180). The directories functions and
storage shared their ids with the containers of the same name, which the
host refuses as two resources with one identity. The containers are now
edge-functions and storage-api; the placed directories keep their ids and
paths.
2026-09-30 17:57:57 +02:00
jschoubben 6ad59540d4 Merge pull request 'records: the record is read where it is written' (#183) from feat/the-record-is-read into main
Reviewed-on: #183
2026-09-30 15:55:06 +00:00
jschoubben a4892d3ff6 Merge branch 'main' into feat/the-record-is-read 2026-09-30 15:54:54 +00:00
jschoubben 6512878eef records: the record is read where it is written
A module keeping a checkout of a repository of decisions, designs and issues from the git seat,
current on every announced merge and on a timer, answering records_search / records_read /
records_list / records_status / records_sync at the commit it read (novox/hq ADR 0025, ADR 0153).
The repository is a setting; it names no mesh.
2026-09-30 17:45:39 +02:00
mesh-admin 8a0ebe16a3 Merge pull request 'supabase: the self-hosted stack as one module, its secrets rendered into files' (#169) from feat/supabase-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 15:32:33 +00:00
mesh-admin 96fb441f30 Merge pull request 'baserow: placed directories, the database password from a file, and the build ace runs' (#170) from feat/baserow-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 15:32:13 +00:00
mesh-admin b8c701ec94 Merge pull request 'matrix: Conduit and Element, told their own name by the route' (#166) from feat/matrix-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 15:32:09 +00:00
mesh-admin 65ba4e6170 Merge pull request 'mosquitto, influxdb: the provisioner sees its grants where the mesh writes them' (#182) from fix/a-provisioner-sees-its-grants-where-the-mesh-writes-them into main 2026-09-30 15:19:37 +00:00
jschoubben 5b70ffd78f mosquitto, influxdb: the provisioner sees its grants where the mesh writes them
The received grants file names each pair secret by its HOST path. A sidecar
that mounts the placed grants directory at another path inside its
container sees mesh.json and not the secrets beside it — mosquitto's
provisioner reported ENOENT for a file that was there, and nodered's mqtt
step failed against a login that was never created. Mounted at its own
path now, as postgres does.
2026-09-30 17:19:33 +02:00
mesh-admin d3ebb01180 Merge pull request 'nodered: settings are files the mesh writes; editor locked with adminAuth; pin 5.0.7' (#149) from feat/nodered-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 15:06:39 +00:00
jschoubben 0020fa17cd Merge pull request 'mesh-console: the mesh's tools on the machine a person sits at' (#181) from feat/the-console into main
Reviewed-on: #181
2026-09-30 14:47:22 +00:00
jschoubben 22c6032144 Merge branch 'main' into feat/the-console 2026-09-30 14:47:11 +00:00
mesh-admin 36b35900a2 Merge pull request 'jackett: its config dir is placed, and its tools find their own key' (#150) from feat/jackett-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 14:40:49 +00:00
mesh-admin 9c97a8a134 Merge pull request 'icecast: its passwords are a file the mesh writes, not the image's environment' (#146) from feat/icecast-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 14:38:14 +00:00
mesh-admin 1bfedd2a9e Merge pull request 'unifi: placed data, mesh-assigned ports, an https route, its password as a file' (#148) from feat/unifi-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 14:38:12 +00:00
jschoubben 769f0724ca mesh-console: the mesh's tools on the machine a person sits at
The tool runtime's own client, mesh serve, started by the mesh on the credential it sealed to the
machine (novox/hq ADR 0152, design 34): invokes every tool, listens from the machine only, holds no
state. Checked with module check before it was ever registered (hq issue 148).
2026-09-30 16:20:06 +02:00
mesh-admin c227592e7c Merge pull request 'influxdb: its admin password and operator token are its own secrets' (#180) from fix/influxdb-admin-credentials-are-accepted into main 2026-09-30 14:19:02 +00:00
jschoubben 50ae89e718 influxdb: its admin password and operator token are its own secrets, so an existing instance's can be accepted
They came from `requires: secret`, minted by the vault — right for a fresh
setup (the image's INIT_* variables read them once), wrong for an instance
that already exists: setup is skipped, the minted values match nothing,
and the provisioner holds a token the server never issued (issue 100).
InfluxDB will not take a chosen token value, so the operator token must be
accepted from the instance (`secret accept ace influxdb admin-token`); the
password can be either. As own secrets both are minted for a fresh install
exactly as before, and accepted where the data already knows them.
Found migrating ace's influxdb.
2026-09-30 16:18:59 +02:00
mesh-admin 3ae63f10c5 Merge pull request 'mosquitto: its directories are placed, not stated, and it runs the build in use' (#144) from feat/mosquitto-placed into main 2026-09-30 14:14:13 +00:00
mesh-admin e7799529e4 Merge pull request 'influxdb: place its directories, hand secrets over as files, name its UI' (#152) from feat/influxdb-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 14:10:50 +00:00
mesh-admin b9068c67bc Merge pull request 'redis: place its directories and run the build in use' (#161) from feat/redis-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 14:10:48 +00:00
mesh-admin 4bf705fea7 Merge pull request 'mssql: place its directories and name the software's port, not a machine's' (#160) from feat/mssql-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 13:55:25 +00:00
mesh-admin 00893d4944 Merge pull request 'letta: placed state, a route, accepted keys, and a runtime that can log in' (#171) from feat/letta-for-ace into main 2026-09-30 13:55:23 +00:00
jschoubben a2b9a9a411 Merge pull request 'dnsmasq: pass the DNSSEC bit down from the validating upstreams' (#179) from fix/resolver-passes-the-dnssec-bit into main 2026-09-30 13:17:38 +00:00
jschoubben 9523105df4 dnsmasq: pass the DNSSEC bit down from the validating upstreams
A program that checks its resolver validates — Mailu's admin does, at
start — could not use the mesh's resolver, and the one it ships instead
knows no mesh name (novox/hq issue 171). proxy-dnssec copies the AD bit
from 1.1.1.1 and 8.8.8.8, both of which validate.
2026-09-30 15:17:34 +02:00
jschoubben 4449f44cf1 Merge pull request 'mailu: admin asks the machine's resolver, not Mailu's own' (#178) from fix/mailu-admin-asks-the-machines-resolver into main 2026-09-30 13:13:29 +00:00
jschoubben 47f6e7d78b mailu: admin asks the machine's resolver, not Mailu's own
admin is the one container here that reaches something by a mesh name:
the database, bound in database.env. A mesh name is answered by the
machine's resolver, which the runtime hands every container that does
not name its own (novox/hq ADR 0148); Mailu's unbound knows no mesh
name, and since the mesh stopped copying names into containers admin
could not find its database. The others keep unbound — rspamd needs a
validating resolver for DNSBL lookups and asks for no mesh name.
2026-09-30 15:13:25 +02:00
jschoubben 7ab522ba31 Merge pull request 'dnsmasq: answer a container's query, which arrives on the runtime's bridge' (#176) from fix/110-the-resolver-answers-a-container into main 2026-09-30 12:31:30 +00:00
jschoubben 204bfbbaf9 dnsmasq: answer a container's query, which arrives on the runtime's bridge
dnsmasq admits a query by the interface it arrives on when told interface=,
and by the address it is sent to when told listen-address=. A container's
query is sent to the machine's private address but arrives on docker0, so
interface=mesh0 dropped it silently on every machine (novox/hq issue 110).
Name the address, not the interface.
2026-09-30 14:31:26 +02:00
jschoubben e0c09f46b6 Merge pull request 'dnsmasq: the runtime is reloaded when its dns file changes, and may then be restarted safely' (#175) from fix/110-the-runtime-reads-its-dns into main 2026-09-30 12:22:10 +00:00
jschoubben e0faf012be dnsmasq: the runtime is reloaded when its dns file changes, and may then be restarted safely
novox/hq 04-ISSUES/110. The module writes the runtime's `dns` key and
deliberately ordered no restart, because a restart stops every container.
It also ordered no reload, and the key holds only for containers created
after the runtime next starts. On two of four machines the runtime
predated the file — one since August — so every container there was
handed a public resolver and no mesh name resolved, while everything read
as fine. The third machine works only because its runtime happened to
restart later.

The file now also sets live-restore, which the runtime reads on a reload,
and the module declares the runtime reloaded when the file changes (ADR
0102: reload, don't restart). A reload still does not make `dns` take
effect; what it does is make the one restart that key needs keep every
container running. That restart stays the operator's, once per machine,
and is harmless from the second time on.

The mesh restarts nothing here. Undeclared, the runtime's unit goes back
to the state it was found in (ADR 0118).
2026-09-30 14:22:03 +02:00
mesh-admin 1b19c79d63 Merge pull request 'postgres: the provisioner dials the port the mesh gave the store' (#174) from fix/postgres-provisioner-dials-the-port-it-was-given into main 2026-09-30 12:06:25 +00:00
jschoubben 4ec2ae1f7f postgres: the provisioner dials the port the mesh gave the store
MESH_PROVISION_POSTGRES named 127.0.0.1:5432 literally; the seat twin
(${seat:mesh-store:5432}) corrected it only on the machine holding the
mesh-store seat. On any other machine — ace, where the module provides
postgres-database without the seat — the twin is empty and the sidecar
would have dialled whatever else holds 5432 (HAL's postgres). ${port:5432}
is the machine port on every node; on novox the twin still says the same
6852, so nothing moves there.
2026-09-30 14:01:53 +02:00
jschoubben 9d716ed875 jackett: provide its Torznab API as jackett-api
sonarr, radarr, lidarr and bookshelf reached jackett as http://jackett:9117 (a HAL
container name) or https://indexers.zurag.be (its public route), typed into each app by
hand. The mesh has neither: an app now requires jackett-api and its downloads step writes
the bound address into the app.

Serves scheme, port and url-base; `at` and the machine port come from the binding. Mesh
scope, like sonarr-api: an indexer proxy shares no files with its consumers.

The pair credential is jackett's one API key. The mesh cannot mint it, so the operator
accepts it per consumer pair (ADR 0092), as #156 does for sonarr-api; a consumer's step
refuses a minted value and names the accept.
2026-09-30 13:05:36 +02:00
jschoubben d2f03736fa grafana: its InfluxDB data source comes from the influxdb-api provision
ace's grafana reads InfluxDB through a data source somebody typed into
its database: a LAN address, a database InfluxDB 2 does not have, and a
password for a v1 user of an earlier instance. Nothing in the mesh knew
it existed, so migrating influxdb could only break it further.

grafana now requires influxdb-api, contributes read access, and the mesh
renders a provisioning file grafana reads at start: the address, port,
org's default bucket (as the InfluxQL database) and its own login from
the binding, the password by $__file from the pair credential the mesh
delivers, 0400 for grafana's uid 472. It is a data source of its own
name and uid, read-only in the UI and not the default, so the data
source a person made is never overwritten; a changed binding or a
rotated password restarts grafana, which re-reads the file.

Includes #152 (merged into this branch): influxdb provides influxdb-api.
2026-09-30 13:02:11 +02:00
jschoubben 3c7aafdc21 nodered: its MQTT broker comes from the mesh
Node-RED's one broker node pointed at zurag.be:1884, where nothing listens. nodered now requires
mqtt-topic (asking for every topic: flows follow the devices' own) and a run-once `mqtt` step —
declared last, restarted when the binding, credential or settings change — points the mesh's broker
nodes at the bound broker through Node-RED's admin API with the module's api-token: the node the
step makes itself when none is named, or the ones an assignment names in `mqtt.brokers`. Only host,
port, TLS and the login change; the broker is asked first whether it takes the login; the deploy is
against the revision read ("nodes", so only that node restarts) and a digest makes a rerun a no-op.
A broker node nobody named is never touched. settings.js keeps `mqtt` and `topics` out of Node-RED.
2026-09-30 13:01:14 +02:00
jschoubben 1080f45012 mosquitto: a consumer's grant is the topics it asks for, and its binding says the port
mqtt-topic served nothing: with two listens the mesh could not say which port a consumer dials, so a
consumer had to type 1883 into its config. It now serves the MQTT listener's port (the machine's,
once assigned) and the scheme, so `${bound:mqtt-topic:port}` fills.

The provisioner confined every consumer to `<as>/#`, which leaves nothing for the consumers the
broker exists for: Home Assistant discovers under homeassistant/# and tasmota/discovery/#, and
Node-RED's flows follow the devices' own topics. A consumer now contributes `topics` (MQTT topic
filters) to its mqtt-topic requirement and is granted exactly those; with none, its own subtree as
before. Settings merge into contributions, so an operator narrows a grant per assignment. The role
is brought to exactly the wanted ACLs (stale ones removed), `holds` checks the ACLs too, and an
invalid list is refused, never quietly narrowed. Only the role named for the consumer is touched:
a client carried from the predecessor's password file keeps its own.
2026-09-30 13:01:14 +02:00
jschoubben c5e273e232 Merge feat/influxdb-for-ace (#152) into feat/oidc-client-provision
grafana's data source requires influxdb-api, which influxdb provides only
on #152's branch; merged so this branch's catalogue has the provider of
everything grafana requires. #152 should merge first.
2026-09-30 12:55:43 +02:00
jschoubben 323ef9ec7e influxdb: provide influxdb-api, one mesh-made v1 credential per consumer
grafana's data source and Node-RED's influxdb nodes reached ace's
InfluxDB by a LAN IP or a public name nobody routes, with a credential
somebody made by hand. Now a consumer requires influxdb-api and is told
where it is, which org and default bucket it serves, and signs in with
the password the mesh minted for the pair.

The credential is a v1-compatibility authorization, made per grant by
the new provisioner: InfluxDB 2.x generates API tokens itself and
ignores one the caller sends, so a v2 token could only be accepted by
hand per pair; a v1 authorization takes a caller-chosen password (8-72
characters, the mesh mints 40) and reads/writes every bucket as a
database of its name over InfluxQL and line protocol. A consumer
contributes `access` (read, write, read-write) and, for writing, the
buckets; a missing bucket is made and never deleted. Only
authorizations named mesh_* and marked [mesh] are ever changed or
removed; anything else of that name is refused and left alone.

The org and default bucket are served facts the assignment's settings
set, reaching both the consumers and the provisioner's config.json.
2026-09-30 12:55:38 +02:00
jschoubben 8f459c7023 letta: placed state, a route, accepted keys, and a runtime that can log in
The module named /var/lib/letta, a layout no definition may carry (ADR
0112); state is now a placed directory holding the bindings and secrets.

letta had no route, while the server it replaces is reached by its public
name (a workflow calls it there). It now contributes one for its `web`
endpoint; reach is the assignment's.

The server needs an OpenAI key for agents on OpenAI models, and nothing
gave it one: `openai-api-key` is an own-secret, accepted from the
operator (a key someone chose, not one the mesh can mint). The
server-password is accepted the same way where a server already has
clients. Both, and the database password inside LETTA_PG_URI, stay in the
server's environment: letta 0.6.x reads settings from the environment
only, and its startup.sh starts an embedded PostgreSQL unless
LETTA_PG_URI is set - the declared reason now says so.

The runtime's tools never authenticated: the client sent only a Bearer
token, and 0.6.x's --secure mode checks X-BARE-PASSWORD ("password <it>")
and answers 401 otherwise. The client now sends both. Its password comes
from the runtime config file (the key client.ts reads first) instead of an
env-file, so the runtime container no longer carries a secret in its
environment.

Image: the same 0.6.8 image, now pinned by the index digest ace runs
rather than its amd64 manifest.

Verified: catalogue tests with MESH_CATALOGUE set; tsc -p tsconfig.json in
the mesh-tools build image. Throwaway containers: a fresh 0.6.8 with its
embedded PG and two blocks made through the API; stopped, copied, dumped
from the copy; restored (schema letta + vector pre-made by the superuser,
--no-owner --role, search_path set on the database as the original had
it) into a grant-shaped database on the postgres module's pgvector image
(PG17); started in this shape: alembic finds nothing to do, both blocks
are there, a wrong password is refused with 401, and the patched client
lists agents. Test containers and data removed.
2026-09-30 12:22:12 +02:00
jschoubben ac8556c590 baserow: placed directories, the database password from a file, and the build ace runs
The module named /var/lib/baserow and /services/baserow/data, a layout no
definition may carry (ADR 0112). State and data are now placed directories;
bindings and the grant's secret live in the placed state.

The all-in-one image's entrypoint honours DATABASE_PASSWORD_FILE (file_env
in /baserow.sh), so the grant's password is mounted rather than put in an
env-file, and "secrets-in-environment" is gone (ADR 0086). SECRET_KEY is no
longer minted: the image keeps it, and its JWT signing key, in the data
directory (.secret, .jwt_signing_key) and imports them on start, so a moved
data directory carries the keys its sessions and tokens were made with.
DISABLE_EMBEDDED_PSQL makes a missing grant fail loudly instead of starting
an empty embedded database.

BASEROW_PUBLIC_URL was http://localhost. Baserow answers only the host of
that URL - any other Host is looked up as a published builder site and gets
404, /api/_health/ included - so it is now https://${bound:route:name}
(depends on mesh-controller #149).

The runtime's tools could never have worked: its config was "{}", and the
client's Host override was silently dropped by Node's fetch, so calls by
container name would 404 even with credentials. The client now uses
node:http (which sends the Host it is given, with a Content-Length -
Baserow reads a chunked body as empty) and re-authenticates once when a
cached JWT is refused (access tokens last minutes, the runtime weeks). The
password is the accepted `admin` secret; the email is an assignment
setting merged into the same file, the host is the route's name.

Image pinned to the develop-latest build ace runs today (Baserow 2.3.4,
built 2026-09-18). The old pin (built 2026-09-04) is older than ace's data.

Verified: catalogue tests with MESH_CATALOGUE set; tsc -p tsconfig.json in
the mesh-tools build image. In throwaway containers of the pinned image: a
fresh embedded-PG instance with a user, workspace and 5-row table; stopped,
copied, dumped from the copy (start-only-db); restored with --no-owner
--role into a grant-shaped database on the pgvector image the postgres
module pins (PG17); started with this shape (root 0600 password file,
embedded PSQL disabled, copied data dir without postgres/): health 200,
the user logs in, the 5 rows are there, SECRET_KEY and the JWT key are
imported from the data dir. The patched client lists applications and rows
through the container name with the public Host, and recovers from a
refused token. Test containers and data removed.
2026-09-30 12:16:04 +02:00
jschoubben 62cecc8a2b supabase: the self-hosted stack as one module, its secrets rendered into files
ace runs Supabase under HAL as upstream's 13-container compose: a 2.2 GB
database (1.8 GB of it the dormant `novox` schema, 5.8 M rows in its largest
table), Kong at supabase.zurag.be, the pooler on 5433/6543. This is that stack
as a catalogue module, same images (the digests ace runs), same container
names so an assignment holds the running ones and a take replaces them.

The database stays inside the module. Supabase is a Postgres distribution: its
own image with pgsodium, pg_graphql, pg_net, vault and timescale preloaded, a
superuser (supabase_admin), a dozen reserved roles and a second database
(_supabase). A postgres-database grant - one database, one unprivileged role -
cannot hold it, so ace's data directory moves as a copy, not a dump/restore.

What HAL did by shell and environment the mesh now renders as files:
- kong.yml carries the anon/service keys and the dashboard login (owned by
  kong's uid 100), instead of an entrypoint that eval'd the environment;
- GoTrue reads a dotenv file (auth -c), PostgREST a config file, Vector its yml
  with the Logflare key in it, the database POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE and a
  jwt.sql rendered with the secret (owned by postgres, uid 105). None of these
  five containers has a secret in its environment.
- realtime, storage, meta, functions, analytics, studio and supavisor read
  their credentials from the environment only; each declares
  secrets-in-environment with the reason (ADR 0086).
- Upstreams are container names (supabase-db, supabase-kong, ...) instead of
  compose service names, which the mesh does not have.
- SITE_URL / API_EXTERNAL_URL / SUPABASE_PUBLIC_URL are
  https://${bound:route:name} (mesh-controller #149); on ace HAL rendered them
  as "https://supabase." - broken today.
- Vector reads the docker socket, as upstream does, but now includes only this
  module's containers instead of every container's logs on the machine.

Three things compose did that a declaration cannot, done as steps: a run-once
seed copies the image's /etc/postgresql-custom into the placed config
directory with cp -n (a named volume did that implicitly; never overwrites the
pgsodium root key), and two run-once gates wait for the database and for
Logflare, which compose expressed as depends_on: service_healthy.

The pooler bootstrap (pooler.exs) takes the tenant id and pool sizes from
settings.json, the module's one merge:json file, so ace keeps its tenant
"zurag"; and it repoints an existing tenant whose database host is not
supabase-db - HAL created ace's with host "db", which no longer resolves.

Secrets (vault, requires "secret"): postgres, jwt, anon-key,
service-role-key, dashboard-user, dashboard, logflare, pooler-vault,
key-base-a + key-base-b (concatenated: Phoenix wants 64+ bytes, a minted
secret is 40), openai. Three cannot be minted on any machine: anon-key and
service-role-key are JWTs signed with jwt, and pooler-vault must be exactly
32 bytes (AES-256-GCM, found in the bed). They are accepted. On ace every
secret the data already knows is accepted (all but key-base-a/b).

Not carried: Kong's 8443 and Logflare's 4000 on all interfaces (nothing
outside the module uses them); realtime's DB_ENC_KEY stays upstream's constant
(realtime deletes and re-seeds that tenant from its environment every start,
and the key must be exactly 16 bytes).

Verified: catalogue tests with MESH_CATALOGUE pointed here on mesh-controller
main and #149 (on main the render is refused for "name", never written
empty). The #149 resolution with stub providers, turned into a throwaway
stack of all 13 pinned digests with dummy secrets and the rendered files at
their owners and modes: the database initialised through the rendered scripts
(jwt setting applied, _analytics/_supavisor created, roles' password from
POSTGRES_PASSWORD_FILE); through Kong: REST 200 with the anon key and 401
without, auth health and settings 200, storage buckets 200, GraphQL 200, pg-meta
200, an edge function 200, Studio 401 without and 200 with the dashboard login,
realtime tenant health 200; the pooler in session and transaction mode as
postgres.zurag; a tenant set to host "db" was repointed to supabase-db by the
bootstrap and connections worked.
2026-09-30 12:12:27 +02:00
jschoubben 157fab5dc8 matrix: Conduit and Element, told their own name by the route
ace runs a Conduit homeserver (matrix.zurag.be, 5.4 GB of RocksDB, federating)
and Element Web under HAL, configured by environment with the domain
templated in, and Element's config.json carrying matrix.zurag.be literally.

A homeserver's server_name is its permanent identity - every user id, room id
and signature in the database carries it - and it is the name the module is
served under. So it comes from ${bound:route:name-homeserver} (mesh-controller
#149), rendered into a conduit.toml the container reads through CONDUIT_CONFIG,
and into Element's config.json (base_url, default_server_name, the room
directory). Without #149 the render is refused ("name-homeserver"), never
written empty. Two routes, one per endpoint: homeserver (label matrix, 6167)
and element (label element, 80).

Federation needs no 8448: Conduit answers /.well-known/matrix/server with
<name>:443, so peers federate through the route. HAL published 8448 on all
interfaces, but the router never forwarded it; checked from outside, the
well-known, federation version and client versions all answer on 443.

Registration defaults to off. HAL ran with CONDUIT_ALLOW_REGISTRATION=true,
which on ace means anyone on the internet can create an account with the
dummy flow (seen: /register offers m.login.dummy) - on 0.10.13, whose
successor 0.10.14 fixes an account-takeover by any local user. Existing
accounts are unaffected; the operator decides whether to reopen it.

Element's config.json is the one merge:json file (it tolerates `endpoints`),
so a machine can add keys. HAL's map_style_url is not carried: it embedded
a map-tile API key, which belongs in an assignment if wanted.

Images are the digests ace runs (Conduit 0.10.13, Element 1.12.28).

Verified: catalogue tests with MESH_CATALOGUE pointed here on mesh-controller
main and #149; a resolution on #149 renders both names (matrix.zurag.be,
element.zurag.be) into both files and both contributions; throwaway
containers of both pinned digests with the rendered files (root 0644, :ro):
client versions 200, well-known says matrix.zurag.be:443, register refused
M_FORBIDDEN, Element 200 serving the rendered config.json.
2026-09-30 11:59:56 +02:00
jschoubben 1247b8c27e redis: place its directories and run the build in use
The manifest stated /services/redis/data and /var/lib/redis-module - novox's
old layout, paths no definition may carry (ADR 0112). State is now the
assignment's root, grants and data are placed, and the config file, the
secret file, receives and grants all name them as ${dir:...}. Paths inside
the sidecar are its own view and are unchanged.

The data directory and config are owned 999:1000: the image's redis user is
uid 999 in gid 1000 (checked in both builds), which is who owns ace's data
today; 999:999 named a group the image does not use.

Image pinned to the 7.4.11-alpine build ace runs (2026-09-17); the old pin was
the same version, built in August. Older-than-running is never the pin.

Nothing is assigned it anywhere today, so no machine changes.

Verified: catalogue tests pass with MESH_CATALOGUE on this tree; the
declaration composes for ace with every path under /var/lib/redis. The pinned
image ran as a throwaway with a 0600 999:1000 config and a 0700 data dir:
unauthenticated PING is refused (NOAUTH), authenticated SET/GET works,
appendonly is on, the server runs as redis.
2026-09-30 11:57:46 +02:00
jschoubben 0fce3ebf5d mssql: place its directories and name the software's port, not a machine's
The manifest stated /var/lib/mssql, its grants and its SA file by path, and
declared it listens on 4848 - the port one machine's predecessor published,
which is an assignment's fact (ADR 0112, 0138). ace is moving its own
SQL Server (80 GB of work databases) onto the mesh, so the module has to be
the same on every machine.

- state is the assignment's root (place "."), grants is placed, and every
  reference (sa.env, the env-file, the SA and grants mounts, receives,
  grants, own-secrets) names them as ${dir:...}.
- the database endpoint listens on 1433, the port SQL Server uses; a machine
  that must keep an older number pins it in its assignment.
- the image pin is unchanged: it is the digest ace runs today (CU27,
  16.0.4295), the same as novox.

novox is untouched: rendered with novox's own setting ({"ports":{"1433":4848}})
through the controller's Declaration and Rules, every resource - paths,
container names, volumes, env-file, the 4848:1433 mapping, owners, modes - is
byte-identical to what main renders; the only difference is the firewall
rule's comment text (still port 4848, from the mesh).

Verified: catalogue tests pass with MESH_CATALOGUE on this tree. The pinned
image ran as a throwaway on a 0700 10001:0 data dir with a root-owned 0600
env-file (dummy SA), answered sqlcmd as sa; a scratch database stopped,
copied with cp -a, checksummed and started on the copy kept its rows and
CHECKSUM_AGG.
2026-09-30 11:57:45 +02:00
jschoubben 5a906b757d keycloak, grafana: their public names come from the mesh, not the manifest
GF_SERVER_ROOT_URL=https://grafana.zurag.be, KC_HOSTNAME=https://keycloak.novox.be
and the served issuer's novox default were domains in definitions — wrong on
every other machine (ADR 0112). The names now come from ${bound:route:name}
(mesh-controller #149, hq 122): grafana's in oidc.env, keycloak's in a
hostname.env its server reads. The issuer includes the realm and stays the
assignment's, with no default: unset, a consumer asking for it is refused
and the provisioner says so, rather than both quietly using novox's URL.

Rendered through mesh-controller #149 from these manifests on a zurag.be
node: KC_HOSTNAME=https://keycloak.zurag.be, GF_SERVER_ROOT_URL=
https://grafana.zurag.be, OIDC URLs from the issuer setting. Needs #149
merged and rolled out first.
2026-09-30 00:49:08 +02:00
jschoubben d8ee88e487 grafana: log in through keycloak's oidc-client provision
HAL's grafana logged in through a hand-made Keycloak client whose secret sat
in its .env. Requiring oidc-client gives it a client the mesh makes and keeps:
the id and URLs come from the binding, the secret arrives as a file grafana
reads itself (__FILE), and the callback it contributes is what keycloak
registers as its redirect.

GF_SERVER_ROOT_URL is still a literal: a module cannot yet learn the public
name the mesh composes for its own endpoint (hq issue 122), and without it
grafana sends a redirect Keycloak refuses.
2026-09-30 00:39:16 +02:00
jschoubben 54557b77bf keycloak: provide oidc-client, one mesh-made client per consumer
A module that logs people in through Keycloak had to be given a client by
hand, with its secret copied into the consumer's environment. As a provision
the mesh derives the client id (the consumer's identity, mesh_<node>_<module>)
and mints its secret, and delivers both ends: keycloak creates exactly that
confidential client, the consumer names it through ${bound:oidc-client:as}.

The consumer says where its browser comes back to (`callback`) and which
endpoint it is reached on (`label`/`endpoint`), so the redirect is built from
the same names the mesh composes for its route. keycloak serves the issuer and
the endpoint paths under it; the issuer is the one value an assignment sets,
and the realm is read out of it, so consumer and client cannot disagree.

Only what the mesh made is touched: its clients carry mesh.provisioned=true;
a client of the same id without the mark is refused, never adopted, updated
or deleted. The runtime now gets the admin password as a file, which its
tools also needed and never had.
2026-09-30 00:39:16 +02:00
jschoubben c1a65e2354 nodered: the sidecar dials the port it was given
The sidecar runs on the host network and dialled 127.0.0.1:1880, the
software's port; the mesh publishes nodered on a machine port it assigns,
so the tools reached whatever else holds 1880, or nothing (hq 088).
2026-09-29 23:50:11 +02:00
jschoubben a5e21cb438 grafana: its directories are placed, its admin password is a file, and it runs the build in use
The module stated /var/lib/grafana-module and /services/grafana/data, a
layout no definition may carry (ADR 0112). State and data are now placed
directories; the admin secret lives beside the broker account under the
mesh's own state.

The admin password reached grafana through an env-file. Grafana honours
GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD__FILE, so it is now a 0400 file owned by the
image's user (472) and mounted, and "secrets-in-environment" is gone
(ADR 0086).

The runtime sidecar was given no credential at all - its config file was
"{}", so GrafanaClient.fromEnv threw and the tools and the alert watcher
did nothing. It now carries user/password from the same secret, and it
calls grafana on the machine port the mesh assigned (${port:3000}) rather
than a literal 3000.

Image pinned to the 13.2.2 build ace's predecessor runs; the old pin was
13.2.1, older than the data it would open.

Verified: catalogue tests with MESH_CATALOGUE pointing here; a throwaway
container of the pinned image with the file-mounted secret answers
/api/health and authenticates admin with the file's value (default
admin/admin refused); restarted over the same data with a different file
value, the original password still holds - so a migrated instance's
password must be accepted, not minted; data owned by another uid fails to
start, so a moved data directory must be chowned to 472.
2026-09-29 23:43:00 +02:00
jschoubben fe0ed3b74e influxdb: place its directories, hand secrets over as files, name its UI
The manifest named /services/influxdb and /var/lib/influxdb-module — one
machine's paths — and passed the admin password and token through the
environment. ace is moving its 2022 instance onto the mesh, so the module
has to be what it is on any machine.

- data, config and state are placed directories; the data keeps 1000:1000,
  the image's influxdb user, which is who owns ace's data today.
- the init secrets reach the image through its own
  DOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_{PASSWORD,ADMIN_TOKEN}_FILE; the vault's files are
  mounted read-only. secrets-in-environment is gone.
- the sidecar reads its token from the same file (MESH_INFLUXDB_TOKEN_FILE,
  added to client.ts) and reaches the server at its assigned machine port
  (${port:8086}) instead of assuming 8086. The unused config-dir mount,
  which held the CLI's copy of the admin token, is dropped.
- the api endpoint contributes a route: the web UI is how people use it,
  and reach is the assignment's to say.

Verified: catalogue tests pass with MESH_CATALOGUE pointed at this tree.
The pinned 2.9.1 image, run on a scratch copy of ace's 2.4.0 data, opens
it, runs its metadata migrations (backing up the pre-upgrade bolt/sqlite)
and hashes the two stored tokens; /health passes. A fresh setup through
the _FILE variables, with dummy secrets as root-owned 0600 files, accepts
the token (200 on /api/v2/buckets) and the password (204 on /signin).
client.ts typechecks strict and reads the token file, tolerating the
endpoints key in its config.
2026-09-29 23:42:18 +02:00
jschoubben 75eee9d4a0 jackett: its config dir is placed, and its tools find their own key
The manifest named /services/jackett/config and /var/lib/mesh/jackett/config.json — host
paths ADR 0112 takes out of definitions. The config dir is now a pathless directory
(${dir:config}) and the runtime's config and route binding live in a placed state dir, as
searxng does.

The image is pinned to v0.24.2627-ls34, the digest ace runs today; the old pin
(v0.24.2517-ls16) was older than the running version.

The runtime reached jackett at a fixed 127.0.0.1:9117; it now uses ${port:9117}, the
machine port the mesh actually assigned.

The tools never loaded: the client needed an API key nobody set. Like sonarr/radarr read
config.xml, it now reads APIKey from Jackett's own ServerConfig.json (the config dir is
already mounted read-only), so no secret goes into an assignment. jackett_indexers called
/api/v2.0/indexers, which is the web UI's endpoint and answers an API key with a redirect;
it now reads the Torznab t=indexers feed, and treats Torznab's 200-with-<error> as a
failure.

Verified: catalogue key tests (MESH_CATALOGUE set, not skipped); a throwaway container of
the pinned image on a fresh 0700 1000:1000 config dir serves its UI; the client discovers
the key from the generated ServerConfig.json, lists 617 indexers through the Torznab feed,
searches via /results, and a wrong key is refused; client.ts typechecks under --strict.
2026-09-29 23:41:21 +02:00
jschoubben 0c91e08bad nodered: its settings are files the mesh writes, and its editor is locked
The catalogue ran the image's defaults: no adminAuth, so a routed Node-RED
editor (which runs arbitrary code) was open to anyone who reached it, and
the module's own tools had no token to present to an install that was locked.

- settings.js (fixed, 0600, uid 1000) carries adminAuth: user admin checked
  against the admin secret -- a minted password, or the bcrypt hash an
  existing install held (accepted), so current logins keep working -- and a
  static bearer token (api-token) the sidecar presents. It loads settings.json
  beside it, the one mergeable file; endpoints is dropped there, and an
  optional timeZone sets process.env.TZ (assignments cannot set env).
- The sidecar's runtime config is no longer merged; it carries the token.
- Directories are placed (state, data), the route binds into state.
- Image pinned to 5.0.7 (a649dd71), what ace runs; the old pin was 5.0.6.
- deployFlows asks for API v2: v1 answers 204 with no body, which the client
  tried to parse as JSON.

Verified: catalogue tests pass against this tree. A throwaway 5.0.7 container
started with the generated files: anonymous /flows 401, bearer api-token 200,
bad token 401, password grant 200/403 with a minted password and with a
bcrypt-hash-accepted one; endpoints and timeZone do not reach /settings;
timeZone Europe/Brussels overrides TZ=Etc/UTC; v1 deploy 204, v2 deploy
answers {rev}.
2026-09-29 23:41:18 +02:00
jschoubben 37c212d5b4 unifi: placed data, mesh-assigned ports, an https route, and its password as a file
The module stated /services/unifi/data and fixed machine ports (8443:8443 and
eight more) — one installation's layout and numbers, which a definition may not
carry (ADR 0038, 0112). Data is now a placed directory (${dir:data}, 1000:1000,
0700), the container publishes its own ports and the mesh assigns the machine
side; an assignment pins them where devices already know them. The L2 endpoint
names the port the software uses (1900), not the one a machine published it on.

The sidecar dialled https://127.0.0.1:8443, true only while the machine port
equals the container's; it now asks for ${port:8443}. Its controller password
was a setting (plaintext in the mesh DB); it is now an own-secret written into
the one mergeable file (ADR 0086). The username stays a setting.

The web UI is contributed as a route to the "web" endpoint over https with
insecure upstream (the controller's own self-signed tls), as mailu's web-tls —
what HAL's hand-written traefik file for unifi does today.

Image pinned to the manifest list ace runs (8.0.24-ls221); the old pin was its
amd64 child, so the image is unchanged.

Verified: catalogue tests pass with MESH_CATALOGUE set; a throwaway container
of the pinned image on a fresh 1000:1000/0700 data dir answers /status (8.0.24,
up) and /inform; the sidecar client built from a config.json carrying site,
password, username and an endpoints key reaches it and is refused only on the
dummy credentials.
2026-09-29 23:39:50 +02:00
jschoubben 718fb12ef7 icecast: its passwords are a file the mesh writes, not the image's environment
The image seds ICECAST_*_PASSWORD from the environment into /etc/icecast.xml;
ADR 0086 wants secrets as files. icecast starts as root, reads its config, then
drops to uid 100, so a root-owned 0600 icecast.xml rendered with ${secret:...}
and mounted read-only works and the entrypoint's seds never fire (no env set).
The "secrets-in-environment" exemption and server.env are gone.

Also: directories are placed (state, logs owned 100:101 so the image's VOLUME
/var/log/icecast is not an anonymous volume per container, as HAL learned);
the server and sidecar share a module network, so the sidecar reaches
http://icecast:8000 instead of assuming machine port 8000 on the host; the
stream endpoint is routed (label "icecast"), as HAL served it via traefik.
Secrets remain mesh-vault grants (requires secret), now under ${dir:state}.

Verified: catalogue tests with MESH_CATALOGUE pointed at this tree; a
throwaway container of the pinned digest (the one ace runs) with the rendered
file (dummy secrets, root 0600, :ro): runs as icecast, status-json 200,
admin 401 without / 200 with the admin secret, a source PUT with the source
secret mounts, a listener receives it, a wrong source password gets 401, logs
land in the uid-100 directory.
2026-09-29 23:39:36 +02:00
jschoubben a32394ec22 mosquitto: its directories are placed, not stated, and it runs the build in use
The module stated /var/lib/mosquitto-module and /services/mosquitto/data —
novox's layout, a path no definition may carry (ADR 0112). State, grants and
data are now placed directories (${dir:state}, ${dir:grants}, ${dir:data}),
the admin secret lives beside the broker account under the mesh's own state,
and the receives/grants maps follow the grants directory. Paths inside the
sidecar are its own view and are unchanged.

Image pinned to the 2.1.2 build ace's predecessor runs (2026-09-17); the old
pin was the same version, built in June.

Found preparing ace, whose broker carries a password-file user (an IoT switch
and home-assistant). Carrying it is a data step, not a manifest one: the
migration repo has scripts/mosquitto-pwdfile-to-dynsec.py, which moves $7$
PBKDF2 entries into the dynsec store hash-for-hash (tested end to end).
2026-09-29 23:05:41 +02:00
mesh-admin 8064e5da8f Merge pull request 'searxng: its settings are a file the mesh writes, not the image's defaults' (#143) from feat/searxng-settings-as-a-file into main 2026-09-29 20:45:13 +00:00
jschoubben 63a255c5cb searxng: bind its route where its state now lives
The route binding still named /var/lib/searxng-module, the directory the
previous commit placed elsewhere — the host would have written it into a
directory nothing declares. Same shape as gitea and nextcloud.
2026-09-29 22:41:56 +02:00
jschoubben 7ad1fbd5c6 searxng: its settings are a file the mesh writes, not the image's defaults
The module ran searxng on the image's built-in settings, which serve html
only — so the module's own search tool (format=json) was refused by the
software it fronts. And there was no way to configure it per machine: the
only file settings reach was the sidecar's.

settings.yml is now the module's one mergeable file (JSON is YAML): generic
defaults in the manifest (json format on, limiter and image proxy off,
valkey wired), and whatever differs per machine — base_url, method,
autocomplete, suspended times — set as the assignment's settings. The
secret key is filled on the machine through ${secret:secret}, so the
secrets-in-environment exception and the env file go. Directories are
placed. Image pinned to 2026.9.20, what ace runs today (the old pin was
older, 2026.9.1).

The sidecar's config.json is no longer mergeable: settings merge into every
mergeable file of a module, and the sidecar would have received searxng's
keys. It only ever read an optional url, which its env already carries.

Verified on ace: the pinned image serves html and json from a read-only,
root-owned 0600 JSON settings.yml.
2026-09-29 22:33:38 +02:00
jschoubben 67f5f4cffd Merge pull request 'ca-trust: a machine trusts the mesh's authority because a module put its root there' (#142) from feat/ca-trust into main 2026-09-29 14:06:36 +00:00
jschoubben 8797335fbc ca-trust: a machine trusts the mesh's authority because a module put its root there
novox/hq ADR 0147, issue 129. Every internal HTTPS name fails verification
on every machine: the certificates are genuine and nothing on a machine has
ever been told what issued them. The proxy's fetch answers for the proxy and
for nothing else — a browser, git over HTTPS and every module calling another
by an internal name read the machine's own trust store.

The module requires internal-acme-ca, fetches the root over the mesh's own
network (no prior trust to have; that is what this establishes), installs it
among the machine's anchors and refreshes the extracted bundles. Being
unassigned stops the unit, and stopping it takes the anchor away and
refreshes them again.

Arch's layout is named out loud: a machine that keeps anchors elsewhere fails
visibly rather than writing a file nothing reads.
2026-09-29 15:07:40 +02:00
mesh-admin 53dc108603 Merge pull request 'Remove the network-checker module: it does not do what was decided' (#141) from chore/remove-the-network-checker-module into main 2026-09-29 12:43:34 +00:00
jschoubben ebf5ba2d4c Remove the network-checker module: it does not do what was decided
What was in the catalogue was the first thing I built, not the thing ADR 0146
describes. It dialled raw ports on machine addresses from one hosting form and
emitted nothing, so findings would have sat in a file on the machine — the exact
thing issue 145 is about. It was never registered, never assigned, and never ran.

0146 says names per hosting form, fetched over TLS with the certificate verified,
and machines discovered over the bus. That shares nothing with this but the word
checker, so it goes rather than being bent into shape. Recorded as work to be
analysed and built deliberately.

Connectivity is checked by hand in the meantime, against the services the mesh
already runs.
2026-09-29 14:43:25 +02:00
mesh-admin bbac08a7d2 Merge pull request 'A network-checker module: dial what the mesh claims, from where the callers are' (#140) from feat/a-network-checker-module into main 2026-09-29 11:44:37 +00:00
jschoubben 784a5a6514 A network-checker module: dial what the mesh claims, from where the callers are
The mesh asserts three things are callable (ADR 0144) — what runs on the same
machine, another machine's service exposed to the private network, and another
machine's service exposed publicly — and has never checked any of them. The first
was broken for eleven hours while the mesh reported every machine healthy.

This runs on every machine, on the cadence the mesh already has, in its own
container: the same position every other module calls from. Not the host and not
the control plane, both of which reach these addresses by paths no ordinary caller
uses and would have passed throughout that outage.

**Its probe is its own endpoint, and that is the point.** Declared reachable over
the private network like any other service, so it is admitted by exactly the rule
that governs every internally-exposed service and fails when that rule is wrong.
The tempting target is a service every machine has, and those are the ones never
closed — ssh above all — which would have passed while the thing that actually
broke was a service exposed to the private network.

It resolves before it dials and says which failed, because a name that does not
resolve and a port that does not answer have different owners. One failure is not
a fault: a machine rebooting is ordinary, so a path is broken after consecutive
runs and the count travels with the result. It reports and repairs nothing.

novox/hq ADR 0145. Eight tests; the consecutive-failure logic proved by reverting
it once. Not yet registered or assigned.
2026-09-29 13:44:16 +02:00
mesh-admin 0c31499fb0 Merge pull request 'Every module names its endpoints, and every route names the one it serves' (#139) from feat/modules-name-their-endpoints into main 2026-09-29 09:51:56 +00:00
98 changed files with 4566 additions and 582 deletions
+6 -7
View File
@@ -9,10 +9,10 @@
"model-access"
],
"binds": {
"model-access": "/var/lib/anthropic-consumer/model.json"
"model-access": "${dir:state}/model.json"
},
"secrets": {
"model-access": "/var/lib/anthropic-consumer/access-token"
"model-access": "${dir:state}/access-token"
},
"own-secrets": {
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/anthropic-consumer/broker"
@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/anthropic-consumer",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "claude-home",
@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@
{
"id": "out",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/anthropic-consumer/out",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
@@ -56,7 +55,7 @@
"/app/modules/anthropic-consumer/dist/apply/index.js"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/anthropic-consumer:/run/state"
"${dir:state}:/run/state"
],
"env": {
"MESH_MODEL_ACCESS_SECRET_FILE": "/run/state/access-token",
@@ -78,7 +77,7 @@
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/anthropic-consumer/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/anthropic-consumer:/run/state"
"${dir:state}:/run/state"
],
"env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
+5 -6
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
"**"
],
"own-secrets": {
"broker": "/var/lib/audit-logger/broker"
"broker": "${dir:state}/broker"
},
"build": {
"on": [
@@ -33,13 +33,12 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/audit-logger",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "trail",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/audit-logger/trail",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
@@ -48,8 +47,8 @@
"name": "mesh-audit-logger",
"network": "host",
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/audit-logger/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/audit-logger/trail:/trail"
"${dir:state}/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"${dir:trail}:/trail"
],
"env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
+54 -23
View File
@@ -2,12 +2,15 @@
// module's tools and anything else baserow-specific import it; nothing outside baserow does.
//
// Baserow authenticates a person with email + password, exchanged for a JWT at /api/user/token-auth/.
// Those credentials are the mesh's own: a person signs up in Baserow (the standard image creates no
// admin from env), and the credential is placed in the runtime config file the mesh mounts. Until
// that happens fromEnv throws and the module simply exposes no tools — the same dormant-until-
// configured shape gitea uses for its token.
// The standard image creates no admin from env, so the account is one a person made in Baserow: its
// password is the module's `admin` secret, accepted from the operator, and its email and the public
// host Baserow answers to reach the runtime config file the mesh mounts (the email from the
// assignment's settings). Until both are there fromEnv throws and the module exposes no tools — the
// same dormant-until-configured shape gitea uses for its token.
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { request as httpRequest } from "node:http";
import { request as httpsRequest } from "node:https";
export interface BaserowApplication {
id: number;
@@ -68,35 +71,63 @@ export class BaserowClient {
return h;
}
/** Exchange email + password for a JWT, caching it for the client's lifetime. Handles both the
/**
* One HTTP exchange. Not `fetch`: Node's fetch drops a caller's Host header and sends the URL's
* own, and Baserow answers only the host of its BASEROW_PUBLIC_URL — any other Host is looked up
* as a published builder site and gets 404, `/api/_health/` included. A co-located caller reaching
* it by container name must present the public host, so the request is made with node:http, which
* sends the Host it is given.
*/
private send(path: string, method: string, headers: Record<string, string>, body?: string): Promise<{ status: number; text: string }> {
const url = new URL(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`);
const request = url.protocol === "https:" ? httpsRequest : httpRequest;
// A length, never chunked: Baserow's server reads a chunked body as empty.
const sent = body === undefined ? headers : { ...headers, "Content-Length": String(Buffer.byteLength(body)) };
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const req = request(url, { method, headers: sent }, (res) => {
let text = "";
res.setEncoding("utf8");
res.on("data", (chunk: string) => (text += chunk));
res.on("end", () => resolve({ status: res.statusCode ?? 0, text }));
res.on("error", reject);
});
req.on("error", reject);
if (body !== undefined) req.write(body);
req.end();
});
}
/** Exchange email + password for a JWT, caching it until Baserow refuses it. Handles both the
* older `{ token }` and the newer `{ access_token }` response shapes. */
async authenticate(): Promise<string> {
if (this.token) return this.token;
const res = await fetch(`${this.baseUrl}/api/user/token-auth/`, {
method: "POST",
headers: this.headers(),
body: JSON.stringify({ email: this.email, password: this.password }),
});
if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`baserow auth failed: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`);
const data = (await res.json()) as { token?: string; access_token?: string };
const res = await this.send(
"/api/user/token-auth/",
"POST",
this.headers(),
JSON.stringify({ email: this.email, password: this.password }),
);
if (res.status < 200 || res.status >= 300) throw new Error(`baserow auth failed: ${res.status} ${res.text}`);
const data = JSON.parse(res.text) as { token?: string; access_token?: string };
const token = data.access_token ?? data.token;
if (!token) throw new Error("baserow auth returned no token");
this.token = token;
return token;
}
private async authed<T>(path: string, options: RequestInit = {}): Promise<T> {
/** An authenticated GET. A refused token is dropped and the call made once more with a fresh one:
* Baserow's access tokens expire after minutes, and the runtime lives for weeks. */
private async authed<T>(path: string): Promise<T> {
for (let attempt = 0; ; attempt++) {
const token = await this.authenticate();
const res = await fetch(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`, {
...options,
headers: this.headers({
Authorization: `JWT ${token}`,
...(options.headers as Record<string, string> | undefined),
}),
});
if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`baserow ${path}: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`);
const text = await res.text();
return (text ? JSON.parse(text) : null) as T;
const res = await this.send(path, "GET", this.headers({ Authorization: `JWT ${token}` }));
if (res.status === 401 && attempt === 0) {
this.token = null;
continue;
}
if (res.status < 200 || res.status >= 300) throw new Error(`baserow ${path}: ${res.status} ${res.text}`);
return (res.text ? JSON.parse(res.text) : null) as T;
}
}
/** The applications (databases) the account can see, across all its workspaces. */
+15 -16
View File
@@ -18,14 +18,14 @@
}
},
"binds": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/baserow/database.json",
"route": "/var/lib/baserow/route.json"
"postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.json",
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
},
"secrets": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/baserow/database.secret"
"postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.secret"
},
"own-secrets": {
"secret-key": "/var/lib/baserow/secret-key.secret",
"admin": "${dir:state}/admin.secret",
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/baserow/broker"
},
"listens": [
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
"port": 80,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "the Baserow web UI and REST API; a public name is a route grant later"
"why": "the Baserow web UI and REST API, served by the image's own Caddy; a public name is the route's"
}
],
"resources": [
@@ -47,22 +47,21 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/baserow",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "data",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/services/baserow/data",
"mode": "0755",
"owner": "9999:9999"
},
{
"id": "server-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/baserow/server.env",
"path": "${dir:state}/server.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "DATABASE_HOST=${bound:postgres-database:at}\nDATABASE_PORT=${bound:postgres-database:port}\nDATABASE_NAME=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nDATABASE_USER=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nDATABASE_PASSWORD=${secret:postgres-database}\nSECRET_KEY=${secret:secret-key}\nBASEROW_PUBLIC_URL=http://localhost\n"
"content": "DATABASE_HOST=${bound:postgres-database:at}\nDATABASE_PORT=${bound:postgres-database:port}\nDATABASE_NAME=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nDATABASE_USER=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nDATABASE_PASSWORD_FILE=/run/secrets/database\nDISABLE_EMBEDDED_PSQL=true\nBASEROW_PUBLIC_URL=https://${bound:route:name}\n"
},
{
"id": "net",
@@ -73,25 +72,25 @@
"id": "server",
"type": "container",
"name": "baserow",
"image": "baserow/baserow@sha256:834424a10413798567f76428f255dc259445b7f8dcec56598c05b4073bb2a124",
"image": "baserow/baserow@sha256:263ea6c4b72c9eccabcd975ffe9fdebf23913a293a514bec6a3897a5e0a5a080",
"network": "baserow",
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/baserow/server.env"
"${dir:state}/server.env"
],
"ports": [
"80"
],
"volumes": [
"/services/baserow/data:/baserow/data"
],
"secrets-in-environment": "baserow reads DATABASE_PASSWORD and SECRET_KEY with os.getenv and has no _FILE twin (settings/base.py); not convertible"
"${dir:data}:/baserow/data",
"${dir:state}/database.secret:/run/secrets/database:ro"
]
},
{
"id": "runtime-config",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/baserow/config.json",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "{}\n",
"content": "{\n \"password\": \"${secret:admin}\",\n \"host\": \"${bound:route:name}\"\n}\n",
"merge": "json"
},
{
+4 -4
View File
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@
{
"id": "workspace",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/builder/workspace",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
@@ -41,7 +40,7 @@
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/builder/builder.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "MESH_BROKER_FILE=/run/mesh/broker\nMESH_NODE=${machine:name}\nMESH_REGISTRY=${bound:artifact-store:at}:${bound:artifact-store:port}\nMESH_PACKAGE_BINDING=/run/mesh/package-registry.json\nMESH_NPM_TOKEN_FILE=/run/mesh/package-registry.secret\nMESH_WORKSPACE=/var/lib/builder/workspace\n"
"content": "MESH_BROKER_FILE=/run/mesh/broker\nMESH_NODE=${machine:name}\nMESH_REGISTRY=${bound:artifact-store:at}:${bound:artifact-store:port}\nMESH_PACKAGE_BINDING=/run/mesh/package-registry.json\nMESH_NPM_TOKEN_FILE=/run/mesh/package-registry.secret\nMESH_WORKSPACE=${dir:workspace}\n"
},
{
"id": "server",
@@ -53,7 +52,7 @@
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/builder:/run/mesh:ro",
"/var/lib/builder/workspace:/var/lib/builder/workspace",
"${dir:workspace}:${dir:workspace}",
"/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock"
],
"restart-on": [
@@ -69,7 +68,8 @@
"kind": "image",
"from": "Dockerfile",
"context": {
"repository": "https://git.novox.be/novox/mesh-controller.git",
"seat": "git",
"repository": "novox/mesh-controller",
"ref": "main"
}
}
+56
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
{
"module": "ca-trust",
"version": "1",
"slug": "catrust",
"capabilities": [
"service-manager"
],
"requires": [
"internal-acme-ca"
],
"seats": [
{
"name": "the-mesh-trust-anchor",
"scope": "node"
}
],
"claims": [
{
"name": "the-mesh-trust-anchor",
"scope": "node"
}
],
"resources": [
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "anchor",
"type": "file",
"path": "${dir:state}/anchor",
"mode": "0755",
"content": "#!/bin/sh\n# The mesh's internal certificate authority, trusted by this machine.\n#\n# Written by the mesh from the ca-trust module's manifest (novox/hq ADR 0147).\n# Editing it here lasts until the next apply.\n#\n# There is no prior trust to verify the fetch against \u2014 this is the thing that\n# establishes it \u2014 so it is made over the mesh's own private network, which is\n# what authenticates it (novox/hq ADR 0098, the same reasoning that lets the\n# route proxy fetch this root for itself). What comes back is checked here: a\n# body that is not a certificate is refused now, rather than believed and then\n# failed by whatever reads the trust store next.\nset -eu\n\nROOTS='https://${bound:internal-acme-ca:at}:${bound:internal-acme-ca:port}${bound:internal-acme-ca:roots}'\nANCHORS=/etc/ca-certificates/trust-source/anchors\nANCHOR=\"$ANCHORS/mesh-internal-ca.crt\"\n\n# Arch's layout, said out loud rather than assumed: a machine that keeps its\n# anchors elsewhere fails here, visibly, instead of writing a file nothing\n# reads. That failure is the signal that this belongs in the host, where one\n# operating system's difference lives (novox/hq ADR 0147, option 2).\n[ -d \"$ANCHORS\" ] || {\n\techo \"this machine keeps no trust anchors in $ANCHORS; ca-trust is written for that layout\" >&2\n\texit 1\n}\n\ncase \"${1:-}\" in\ninstall)\n\ttmp=$(mktemp)\n\ttrap 'rm -f \"$tmp\"' EXIT\n\t# The authority may still be starting, or this machine may have come up\n\t# before it: two minutes of asking, then an honest failure.\n\tn=0\n\twhile [ \"$n\" -lt 60 ]; do\n\t\tif curl --fail --silent --show-error --insecure --max-time 10 \\\n\t\t\t--output \"$tmp\" \"$ROOTS\" &&\n\t\t\tgrep -q 'BEGIN CERTIFICATE' \"$tmp\"; then\n\t\t\tinstall -m 0644 \"$tmp\" \"$ANCHOR\"\n\t\t\tupdate-ca-trust\n\t\t\texit 0\n\t\tfi\n\t\tn=$((n + 1))\n\t\tsleep 2\n\tdone\n\techo \"the authority at $ROOTS did not serve a certificate within two minutes\" >&2\n\texit 1\n\t;;\nremove)\n\t# What stopping the unit does, and therefore what being unassigned does.\n\trm -f \"$ANCHOR\"\n\tupdate-ca-trust\n\t;;\n*)\n\techo \"usage: $(basename \"$0\") install|remove\" >&2\n\texit 2\n\t;;\nesac\n"
},
{
"id": "unit",
"type": "file",
"path": "/etc/systemd/system/mesh-ca-trust.service",
"mode": "0644",
"content": "[Unit]\nDescription=The mesh's internal certificate authority, trusted by this machine\n# novox/hq ADR 0147. Starting this unit places the mesh's root among this\n# machine's trust anchors; stopping it takes the root away again, which is what\n# the host does when the module is no longer assigned here.\nWants=network-online.target\nAfter=network-online.target\n\n[Service]\nType=oneshot\nRemainAfterExit=yes\nExecStart=${dir:state}/anchor install\nExecStop=${dir:state}/anchor remove\n\n[Install]\nWantedBy=multi-user.target\n"
},
{
"id": "trust",
"type": "service",
"unit": "mesh-ca-trust.service",
"state": "running",
"boot": "enabled",
"restart-on": [
"anchor",
"unit"
]
}
]
}
+9 -10
View File
@@ -12,13 +12,13 @@
"public-dns": {}
},
"grants": {
"public-dns": "/var/lib/cloudflare-dns/grants"
"public-dns": "${dir:grants}"
},
"receives": {
"public-dns": "/var/lib/cloudflare-dns/grants/mesh.json"
"public-dns": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
},
"own-secrets": {
"token": "/var/lib/cloudflare-dns/token",
"token": "${dir:state}/token",
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/cloudflare-dns/broker"
},
"emits": [
@@ -35,19 +35,18 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/cloudflare-dns",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "grants",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/cloudflare-dns/grants",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "config",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/cloudflare-dns/config.json",
"path": "${dir:state}/config.json",
"merge": "json",
"content": "{}",
"mode": "0600"
@@ -58,9 +57,9 @@
"name": "mesh-cloudflare-dns",
"network": "host",
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/cloudflare-dns/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro",
"/var/lib/cloudflare-dns/grants:/grants",
"/var/lib/cloudflare-dns/token:/run/secrets/token:ro",
"${dir:state}/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro",
"${dir:grants}:/grants",
"${dir:state}/token:/run/secrets/token:ro",
"/var/lib/mesh/cloudflare-dns/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro"
],
"env": {
+6 -6
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
"version": "1",
"slug": "confl",
"own-secrets": {
"token": "/var/lib/confluence/token",
"token": "${dir:state}/token",
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/confluence/broker"
},
"resources": [
@@ -16,13 +16,13 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/confluence",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "config",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/confluence/config.json",
"path": "${dir:state}/config.json",
"merge": "json",
"content": "{}",
"mode": "0600"
@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
"name": "mesh-runtime-confluence",
"network": "host",
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/confluence/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro",
"/var/lib/confluence/token:/run/secrets/token:ro",
"${dir:state}/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro",
"${dir:state}/token:/run/secrets/token:ro",
"/var/lib/mesh/confluence/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro"
],
"env": {
+12 -9
View File
@@ -15,11 +15,11 @@
}
},
"binds": {
"route": "/var/lib/de-spiegel/route.json"
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
},
"own-secrets": {
"smtp-user": "/var/lib/de-spiegel/smtp-user.secret",
"smtp-pass": "/var/lib/de-spiegel/smtp-pass.secret"
"smtp-user": "${dir:state}/smtp-user.secret",
"smtp-pass": "${dir:state}/smtp-pass.secret"
},
"listens": [
{
@@ -27,20 +27,20 @@
"port": 35621,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "the de-spiegel site and its /contact endpoint over http; the public name de-spiegel.novox.be is a route grant, and route-proxy reaches it on this published port"
"why": "the de-spiegel site and its /contact endpoint over http; its public name is a route grant, and route-proxy reaches it on this published port"
}
],
"resources": [
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/de-spiegel",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "server-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/de-spiegel/server.env",
"path": "${dir:state}/server.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "SMTP_AUTH_USER=${secret:smtp-user}\nSMTP_AUTH_PASS=${secret:smtp-pass}\n"
},
@@ -56,12 +56,15 @@
"image": "registry-api.novox.be/novox/de-spiegel@sha256:e144b72ce9c145870470d765343549f2c60211728cd118b9ff0e4029f36342ba",
"network": "de-spiegel",
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/de-spiegel/server.env"
"${dir:state}/server.env"
],
"ports": [
"35621"
],
"secrets-in-environment": "the application's own code reads SMTP_AUTH_USER/PASS from the environment (de-spiegel server/index.js); converting is that repository's change"
"secrets-in-environment": "the application's own code reads SMTP_AUTH_USER/PASS from the environment (de-spiegel server/index.js); converting is that repository's change",
"names-on-purpose": {
"registry-api.novox.be": "built outside the mesh, from the application's own repository, and pulled from the registry that built it; moves when that repository is a build source on the git seat (novox/hq ADR 0155, issue 122)"
}
}
]
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
],
"claims": [
{
"name": "the-artifact-store",
"name": "mesh-artifact-store",
"scope": "mesh"
}
],
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+7
View File
@@ -95,6 +95,13 @@ export class GiteaClient {
if (res.status === 401) {
token = await this.tokens.renew(token);
res = await this.send(path, options, token);
} else if (res.status === 403) {
// A kept token minted before a scope was added lacks it. The forge says so; the source
// re-mints with the whole list and the call is retried once. Any other 403 stays a 403.
const text = await res.text();
if (!MintedToken.lacksScope(res.status, text)) throw new Error(`Gitea API ${path}: 403 ${text}`);
token = await this.tokens.renew(token);
res = await this.send(path, options, token);
}
if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`Gitea API ${path}: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`);
if (res.status === 204) return null as T;
+61 -2
View File
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ interface Forge {
mints: number;
lastScopes: string[] | null;
tokens: Map<string, string>;
scopesOf: Map<string, string[]>;
admins: Map<string, string>;
close(): Promise<void>;
}
@@ -85,6 +86,20 @@ function fakeForge(): Promise<Forge> {
}
return json(res, 405, { message: "method not allowed" });
}
if (url.pathname === "/api/v1/repos/search") {
// The client lists through the search endpoint since 2026-09-28 (the forge's whole view);
// it sits under `repository`, which write:repository covers.
const h = req.headers.authorization ?? "";
const value = h.startsWith("token ") ? h.slice(6) : "";
if (![...forge.tokens.values()].includes(value)) return json(res, 401, { message: "token is required" });
if (!covers(forge.scopesOf.get(value) ?? [], "read:repository")) {
return json(res, 403, { message: `token does not have at least one of required scope(s), required=[read:repository]` });
}
return json(res, 200, {
ok: true,
data: [{ full_name: "novox/hq", name: "hq", owner: { login: "novox" }, private: true, html_url: "http://fake/novox/hq" }],
});
}
if (url.pathname === "/api/v1/user/repos") {
const h = req.headers.authorization ?? "";
const value = h.startsWith("token ") ? h.slice(6) : "";
@@ -101,6 +116,21 @@ function fakeForge(): Promise<Forge> {
{ full_name: "novox/hq", name: "hq", owner: { login: "novox" }, private: true, html_url: "http://fake/novox/hq" },
]);
}
const adminUser = url.pathname.match(/^\/api\/v1\/admin\/users\/([^/]+)$/);
if (adminUser && req.method === "PATCH") {
const h = req.headers.authorization ?? "";
const value = h.startsWith("token ") ? h.slice(6) : "";
if (![...forge.tokens.values()].includes(value)) return json(res, 401, { message: "token is required" });
if (!covers(forge.scopesOf.get(value) ?? [], "write:admin")) {
return json(res, 403, {
message: `token does not have at least one of required scope(s), required=[write:admin]`,
});
}
const login = decodeURIComponent(adminUser[1]);
if (login === "untouchable") return json(res, 403, { message: "user untouchable may not be edited" });
const patch = await body(req);
return json(res, 200, { login, is_admin: patch?.admin === true });
}
return json(res, 404, { message: "no such route in the fake" });
});
return new Promise((resolve) => {
@@ -111,6 +141,7 @@ function fakeForge(): Promise<Forge> {
get mints() { return forge.mints; },
get lastScopes() { return forge.lastScopes; },
tokens: forge.tokens,
scopesOf: forge.scopesOf,
admins: forge.admins,
close: () => new Promise((r) => server.close(() => r())),
});
@@ -152,14 +183,14 @@ function minted(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv, logs: string[]): GiteaClient {
const forge = await fakeForge();
after(() => forge.close());
test("first start: mints with the admin account, keeps the token at 0600, asks for two scopes only", async () => {
test("first start: mints with the admin account, keeps the token at 0600, asks for the tools' scopes only", async () => {
const { env, file, logs } = await delivered(forge);
const repos = await minted(env, logs).listRepos();
assert.equal(repos[0]?.full_name, "novox/hq");
assert.equal(forge.mints, 1);
assert.deepEqual(forge.lastScopes, ["write:repository", "write:issue", "read:user"]);
assert.deepEqual(forge.lastScopes, ["write:repository", "write:issue", "read:user", "write:admin"]);
assert.deepEqual(forge.lastScopes, [...TOKEN_SCOPES]);
const token = forge.tokens.get("mesh-tools")!;
assert.equal(await readFile(file, "utf8"), token + "\n");
@@ -197,6 +228,34 @@ test("the forge rejects the kept token (its data was restored): minted afresh, o
assert.ok(logs.some((l) => l.startsWith("the forge rejected the kept token")), logs.join("\n"));
});
test("a kept token from before write:admin: the forge refuses the admin route for the scope, the token is re-minted with the whole list, and the call goes through", async () => {
const { env, file, logs } = await delivered(forge);
const client = minted(env, logs);
await client.listRepos();
const before = forge.mints;
const old = forge.tokens.get("mesh-tools")!;
forge.scopesOf.set(old, ["write:repository", "write:issue", "read:user"]); // minted by the previous build
const user = await client.api<{ login: string; is_admin: boolean }>("/admin/users/mesh_novox_builder", {
method: "PATCH",
body: JSON.stringify({ admin: true }),
});
assert.equal(user.is_admin, true);
assert.equal(forge.mints, before + 1);
assert.deepEqual(forge.lastScopes, [...TOKEN_SCOPES]);
assert.notEqual(forge.tokens.get("mesh-tools"), old);
assert.equal(await readFile(file, "utf8"), forge.tokens.get("mesh-tools") + "\n");
assert.ok(logs.some((l) => l.startsWith("the forge rejected the kept token")), logs.join("\n"));
// A 403 that is not about scopes is the forge's answer, not a reason to mint.
const again = forge.mints;
await assert.rejects(
client.api("/admin/users/untouchable", { method: "PATCH", body: JSON.stringify({ admin: true }) }),
/403 .*untouchable/,
);
assert.equal(forge.mints, again);
});
test("the kept file is gone but the forge still holds a token by that name: replaced, not refused", async () => {
const { env, file, logs } = await delivered(forge);
await minted(env, logs).listRepos();
+14 -3
View File
@@ -34,15 +34,21 @@ export const TOKEN_NAME = "mesh-tools";
* It sits under the `user` category despite listing repositories, not `repository`
* — confirmed against the running forge (1.27.3), which answered
* `required=[read:user]` to a token carrying only the other two.
* Nothing under /admin, /orgs or write:user — the escape-hatch tool reaches only what these three cover.
* write:admin — /admin/users: the forge's own users are the mesh's to settle, such as making
* the builder's login a site admin so every repository the mesh may build is
* clonable (novox/hq 229). Nothing under /orgs or write:user.
*
* A token kept from before a scope was added lacks it: the forge answers such a call with
* `403 token does not have at least one of required scope(s)`, and the client treats that like a
* 401 — the source re-mints by name, with the whole list, and the call is retried once.
*/
export const TOKEN_SCOPES: readonly string[] = ["write:repository", "write:issue", "read:user"];
export const TOKEN_SCOPES: readonly string[] = ["write:repository", "write:issue", "read:user", "write:admin"];
/** Where a client's token comes from, and what to do when the forge says it is wrong. */
export interface TokenSource {
/** The token to authenticate with now; minted, read or configured. */
current(): Promise<string>;
/** The forge answered 401 to `rejected`. A fresh token, or a plain error when there is nothing to renew with. */
/** The forge answered 401 to `rejected`, or 403 for a scope it lacks. A fresh token, or a plain error when there is nothing to renew with. */
renew(rejected: string): Promise<string>;
}
@@ -170,6 +176,11 @@ export class MintedToken implements TokenSource {
return this.mint("the forge rejected the kept token — minting a fresh one");
}
/** What the forge's scoped tokens say when a kept token predates a scope the tools now need. */
static lacksScope(status: number, body: string): boolean {
return status === 403 && /required scope/i.test(body);
}
/** One mint at a time: concurrent first calls share it, rather than each minting its own. */
private mint(why: string): Promise<string> {
if (this.inflight === null) {
+6 -6
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
"module": "gitlab",
"version": "1",
"own-secrets": {
"token": "/var/lib/gitlab/token",
"token": "${dir:state}/token",
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/gitlab/broker"
},
"resources": [
@@ -15,13 +15,13 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/gitlab",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "config",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/gitlab/config.json",
"path": "${dir:state}/config.json",
"merge": "json",
"content": "{}",
"mode": "0600"
@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@
"name": "mesh-runtime-gitlab",
"network": "host",
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/gitlab/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro",
"/var/lib/gitlab/token:/run/secrets/token:ro",
"${dir:state}/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro",
"${dir:state}/token:/run/secrets/token:ro",
"/var/lib/mesh/gitlab/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro"
],
"env": {
+74 -16
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"alert.firing"
],
"own-secrets": {
"admin": "/var/lib/grafana-module/admin.secret",
"admin": "/var/lib/mesh/grafana/admin",
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/grafana/broker"
},
"capabilities": [
@@ -30,45 +30,87 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/grafana-module",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "data",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/services/grafana/data",
"mode": "0700",
"owner": "472:472"
},
{
"id": "server-env",
"id": "admin-secret",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/grafana-module/server.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD=${secret:admin}\n"
"path": "${dir:state}/admin.secret",
"mode": "0400",
"owner": "472:472",
"content": "${secret:admin}"
},
{
"id": "oidc-secret",
"type": "file",
"path": "${dir:state}/oidc-client.secret",
"mode": "0400",
"owner": "472:472",
"content": "${secret:oidc-client}"
},
{
"id": "oidc-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "${dir:state}/oidc.env",
"mode": "0644",
"content": "GF_SERVER_ROOT_URL=https://${bound:route:name}\nGF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_ENABLED=true\nGF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_NAME=Keycloak\nGF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=${bound:oidc-client:as}\nGF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET__FILE=/run/secrets/oidc-client\nGF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_SCOPES=openid email profile roles\nGF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_AUTH_URL=${bound:oidc-client:issuer}${bound:oidc-client:authorization-path}\nGF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_TOKEN_URL=${bound:oidc-client:issuer}${bound:oidc-client:token-path}\nGF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_API_URL=${bound:oidc-client:issuer}${bound:oidc-client:userinfo-path}\nGF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_ROLE_ATTRIBUTE_PATH=contains(roles[*], 'admin') && 'Admin' || contains(realm_access.roles[*], 'admin') && 'Admin' || 'Viewer'\nGF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_USE_PKCE=true\nGF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_ALLOW_SIGN_UP=true\nGF_AUTH_GENERIC_OAUTH_ALLOW_ASSIGN_GRAFANA_ADMIN=true\n"
},
{
"id": "influxdb-secret",
"type": "file",
"path": "${dir:state}/influxdb-api.secret",
"mode": "0400",
"owner": "472:472",
"content": "${secret:influxdb-api}"
},
{
"id": "influxdb-datasource",
"type": "file",
"path": "${dir:state}/datasource-influxdb.yaml",
"mode": "0644",
"content": "apiVersion: 1\n# Written by the mesh from grafana's influxdb-api binding; grafana reads it at start. Its own name and\n# uid, so a data source somebody made in the UI is never overwritten, and read-only in the UI because\n# the mesh resets it. The password is read from the file the mesh delivers, never written here.\ndatasources:\n - name: InfluxDB (mesh)\n uid: mesh-influxdb-api\n type: influxdb\n access: proxy\n url: ${bound:influxdb-api:scheme}://${bound:influxdb-api:at}:${bound:influxdb-api:port}\n user: ${bound:influxdb-api:as}\n isDefault: false\n editable: false\n jsonData:\n dbName: ${bound:influxdb-api:bucket}\n httpMode: POST\n secureJsonData:\n password: $__file{/run/secrets/influxdb-api}\n"
},
{
"id": "server",
"type": "container",
"name": "grafana",
"image": "grafana/grafana@sha256:f772d434e8fab0049deb2b1b30abd43342bcfca1537614aa8d36080232cf4283",
"image": "grafana/grafana@sha256:ac461fb352abc50da10a51c7d02462e9c05488f11f53f14b3ad79a8145f638a0",
"ports": [
"3000"
],
"volumes": [
"/services/grafana/data:/var/lib/grafana"
"${dir:data}:/var/lib/grafana",
"${dir:state}/admin.secret:/run/secrets/admin:ro",
"${dir:state}/oidc-client.secret:/run/secrets/oidc-client:ro",
"${dir:state}/influxdb-api.secret:/run/secrets/influxdb-api:ro",
"${dir:state}/datasource-influxdb.yaml:/etc/grafana/provisioning/datasources/mesh-influxdb.yaml:ro"
],
"env": {
"GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD__FILE": "/run/secrets/admin"
},
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/grafana-module/server.env"
"${dir:state}/oidc.env"
],
"secrets-in-environment": "grafana honours GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD__FILE; convertible, awaiting a bed that exercises the admin password (assigned-grafana serves tools only)"
"restart-on": [
"oidc-env",
"oidc-secret",
"influxdb-datasource",
"influxdb-secret"
]
},
{
"id": "runtime-config",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/grafana/config.json",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "{}\n",
"content": "{\n \"user\": \"admin\",\n \"password\": \"${secret:admin}\"\n}\n",
"merge": "json"
},
{
@@ -82,7 +124,7 @@
],
"env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_GRAFANA_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:3000",
"MESH_GRAFANA_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:${port:3000}",
"MESH_GRAFANA_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json"
},
"restart-on": [
@@ -92,16 +134,32 @@
}
],
"requires": [
"route"
"route",
"oidc-client",
"influxdb-api"
],
"contributes": {
"route": {
"label": "grafana",
"endpoint": "web"
},
"oidc-client": {
"label": "grafana",
"endpoint": "web",
"callback": "/login/generic_oauth"
},
"influxdb-api": {
"access": "read"
}
},
"binds": {
"route": "/var/lib/mesh/grafana/route.json"
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json",
"oidc-client": "${dir:state}/oidc.json",
"influxdb-api": "${dir:state}/influxdb.json"
},
"secrets": {
"oidc-client": "/var/lib/mesh/grafana/oidc-client",
"influxdb-api": "/var/lib/mesh/grafana/influxdb-api"
},
"build": {
"on": [
+5 -5
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
}
},
"binds": {
"route": "/var/lib/hello-web/route.json"
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
},
"listens": [
{
@@ -30,13 +30,13 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/hello-web",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "page",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/hello-web/index.html",
"path": "${dir:state}/index.html",
"mode": "0644",
"content": "hello from hello-web, routed by the mesh\n"
},
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@
"8080"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/hello-web/index.html:/www/index.html:ro"
"${dir:state}/index.html:/www/index.html:ro"
],
"args": [
"sh",
+47 -22
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,26 @@
{
"module": "icecast",
"version": "1",
"requires": [
"route",
"secret"
],
"contributes": {
"route": {
"label": "icecast",
"endpoint": "stream"
}
},
"binds": {
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
},
"secrets": {
"secret": {
"source": "${dir:state}/source.secret",
"admin": "${dir:state}/admin.secret",
"relay": "${dir:state}/relay.secret"
}
},
"capabilities": [
"container-runtime"
],
@@ -17,7 +37,7 @@
"port": 8000,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "streams in from sources and out to listeners"
"why": "streams in from sources (HTTP PUT) and out to listeners, plus the status and admin pages; a public name is its route"
}
],
"resources": [
@@ -30,28 +50,43 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/icecast-module",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "server-env",
"id": "logs",
"type": "directory",
"mode": "0700",
"owner": "100:101"
},
{
"id": "server-conf",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/icecast-module/server.env",
"path": "${dir:state}/icecast.xml",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "ICECAST_SOURCE_PASSWORD=${secret:source}\nICECAST_ADMIN_PASSWORD=${secret:admin}\nICECAST_RELAY_PASSWORD=${secret:relay}\nICECAST_ADMIN_USERNAME=admin\n"
"content": "<icecast>\n <!-- Written by the mesh (modules/icecast). Passwords arrive as secrets rendered into this file,\n never as environment: the image's entrypoint seds ICECAST_* variables into the file only\n when they are set, and none are. -->\n <location>Earth</location>\n <admin>icemaster@localhost</admin>\n <limits>\n <clients>100</clients>\n <sources>2</sources>\n <queue-size>524288</queue-size>\n <client-timeout>30</client-timeout>\n <header-timeout>15</header-timeout>\n <source-timeout>10</source-timeout>\n <burst-on-connect>1</burst-on-connect>\n <burst-size>65535</burst-size>\n </limits>\n <authentication>\n <source-password>${secret:source}</source-password>\n <relay-password>${secret:relay}</relay-password>\n <admin-user>admin</admin-user>\n <admin-password>${secret:admin}</admin-password>\n </authentication>\n <!-- The name icecast writes into playlists (.m3u/.xspf: http://<hostname>:<port>/<mount>) and\n would announce to YP (none configured). A machine's own name belongs to its assignment, and\n an assignment merges only into JSON; this XML cannot take it, so the neutral default stays. -->\n <hostname>localhost</hostname>\n <listen-socket>\n <port>8000</port>\n </listen-socket>\n <http-headers>\n <header name=\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin\" value=\"*\" />\n </http-headers>\n <fileserve>1</fileserve>\n <paths>\n <basedir>/usr/share/icecast</basedir>\n <logdir>/var/log/icecast</logdir>\n <webroot>/usr/share/icecast/web</webroot>\n <adminroot>/usr/share/icecast/admin</adminroot>\n <alias source=\"/\" destination=\"/status.xsl\"/>\n </paths>\n <logging>\n <accesslog>access.log</accesslog>\n <errorlog>error.log</errorlog>\n <loglevel>3</loglevel>\n <logsize>10000</logsize>\n </logging>\n <security>\n <chroot>0</chroot>\n <!-- Starts as root, reads this 0600 root-owned file, then drops to the image's icecast user\n (uid 100, group icecast 101) before serving. -->\n <changeowner>\n <user>icecast</user>\n <group>icecast</group>\n </changeowner>\n </security>\n</icecast>\n"
},
{
"id": "net",
"type": "network",
"name": "icecast"
},
{
"id": "server",
"type": "container",
"name": "icecast",
"image": "infiniteproject/icecast@sha256:cd506cf3dfe31ce05fd37d7e672dbd1213e7255cc93d28ecf5a3b547af4e162c",
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/icecast-module/server.env"
],
"network": "icecast",
"ports": [
"8000"
],
"secrets-in-environment": "the image seds ICECAST_*_PASSWORD into icecast.xml and has no _FILE; convertible by mounting a generated icecast.xml, not yet done"
"volumes": [
"${dir:state}/icecast.xml:/etc/icecast.xml:ro",
"${dir:logs}:/var/log/icecast"
],
"restart-on": [
"server-conf"
]
},
{
"id": "runtime-config",
@@ -65,14 +100,14 @@
"id": "runtime",
"type": "container",
"name": "mesh-icecast",
"network": "host",
"network": "icecast",
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/icecast/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/mesh/icecast/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro"
],
"env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_ICECAST_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:8000",
"MESH_ICECAST_URL": "http://icecast:8000",
"MESH_ICECAST_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json"
},
"restart-on": [
@@ -101,15 +136,5 @@
"from": "Dockerfile"
}
]
},
"requires": [
"secret"
],
"secrets": {
"secret": {
"source": "/var/lib/icecast-module/source.secret",
"admin": "/var/lib/icecast-module/admin.secret",
"relay": "/var/lib/icecast-module/relay.secret"
}
}
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ ARG RUNTIME_BASE
FROM ${BUILD_BASE} AS build
WORKDIR /app/modules/influxdb
COPY . .
RUN node /app/node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc client.ts tools/index.ts \
RUN node /app/node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc client.ts grants.ts provisioner/index.ts tools/index.ts \
--module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist
FROM ${RUNTIME_BASE}
@@ -21,4 +21,4 @@ COPY --from=build /app/modules/influxdb/dist /app/modules/influxdb/dist
# Every serve-time entrypoint, loaded by the runtime in serve mode: tools and events serve, and a
# provider's provisioner runs its reconcile loop in the same process, with the broker connected —
# the convention novox/hq issues 060/061 settled.
ENV MESH_TOOL_MODULES=/app/modules/influxdb/dist/tools/index.js
ENV MESH_TOOL_MODULES=/app/modules/influxdb/dist/tools/index.js,/app/modules/influxdb/dist/provisioner/index.js
+118 -3
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,25 @@ export interface InfluxBucket {
retentionSeconds?: number;
}
/** One permission of an authorization, as InfluxDB represents it: an action on a resource type,
* in one org, optionally narrowed to one resource by id (no id = every resource of that type). */
export interface InfluxPermission {
action: "read" | "write";
resource: { type: string; orgID?: string; id?: string; name?: string; org?: string };
}
/** A v1-compatibility ("legacy") authorization: a username (InfluxDB calls it `token`) and a
* password the caller chooses, scoped by permissions. The one credential InfluxDB 2.x lets a
* caller set to a value it did not generate — which is what a mesh-minted password needs. */
export interface LegacyAuthorization {
id: string;
token: string;
orgID: string;
status?: "active" | "inactive";
description?: string;
permissions: InfluxPermission[];
}
/** The settings-merged config the mesh delivers (novox/hq ADR 0046): { url, apiKey, token, password, user, ... }. */
function meshConfig(file?: string): Record<string, string> {
if (!file) return {};
@@ -24,13 +43,20 @@ function meshConfig(file?: string): Record<string, string> {
catch { return {}; }
}
/** A secret delivered as a file, trimmed; undefined when there is none, so the caller can fall back. */
function tokenFromFile(file?: string): string | undefined {
if (!file) return undefined;
try { return readFileSync(file, "utf8").trim() || undefined; }
catch { return undefined; }
}
export class InfluxDBClient {
readonly baseUrl: string;
constructor(
url: string,
private readonly token: string,
private readonly org: string,
readonly org: string,
) {
this.baseUrl = url.replace(/\/$/, "");
}
@@ -43,8 +69,10 @@ export class InfluxDBClient {
static fromEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): InfluxDBClient {
const cfg = meshConfig(env.MESH_INFLUXDB_CONFIG_FILE);
const url = cfg.url ?? env.MESH_INFLUXDB_URL ?? `http://127.0.0.1:${env.INFLUXDB_PORT ?? "8086"}`;
const token = cfg.token ?? env.MESH_INFLUXDB_TOKEN;
if (!token) throw new Error("no InfluxDB token — set MESH_INFLUXDB_TOKEN");
// The token reaches the process as a file (novox/hq ADR 0086); the environment variable stays
// only for a workstation running the tools by hand.
const token = cfg.token ?? tokenFromFile(env.MESH_INFLUXDB_TOKEN_FILE) ?? env.MESH_INFLUXDB_TOKEN;
if (!token) throw new Error("no InfluxDB token — set MESH_INFLUXDB_TOKEN_FILE");
const org = cfg.org ?? env.MESH_INFLUXDB_ORG ?? "mesh";
return new InfluxDBClient(url, token, org);
}
@@ -61,6 +89,93 @@ export class InfluxDBClient {
return res;
}
/** Like request, but the answer is returned whatever its status, for the caller to read. */
private async raw(path: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<Response> {
return fetch(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`, {
...init,
headers: { Authorization: `Token ${this.token}`, ...(init?.headers ?? {}) },
});
}
private async send(path: string, method: string, body?: unknown): Promise<Response> {
return this.request(path, {
method,
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: body === undefined ? undefined : JSON.stringify(body),
});
}
/** The id of the org of this name, or undefined when there is none. */
async orgID(name: string): Promise<string | undefined> {
const res = await this.raw(`/api/v2/orgs?org=${encodeURIComponent(name)}`);
if (res.status === 404) return undefined;
if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`InfluxDB API /api/v2/orgs: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`);
const body = (await res.json()) as { orgs?: { id: string; name: string }[] };
return body.orgs?.find((o) => o.name === name)?.id;
}
/** The bucket of exactly this name in the org, or undefined. */
async findBucket(orgID: string, name: string): Promise<InfluxBucket | undefined> {
const res = await this.raw(`/api/v2/buckets?orgID=${encodeURIComponent(orgID)}&name=${encodeURIComponent(name)}`);
if (res.status === 404) return undefined;
if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`InfluxDB API /api/v2/buckets: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`);
const body = (await res.json()) as { buckets?: { id: string; name: string; orgID?: string }[] };
const b = body.buckets?.find((x) => x.name === name);
return b ? { id: b.id, name: b.name, orgID: b.orgID } : undefined;
}
/** Create a bucket that keeps its data for ever — retention is the operator's choice, never the mesh's. */
async createBucket(orgID: string, name: string, description: string): Promise<InfluxBucket> {
const b = (await (await this.send("/api/v2/buckets", "POST", {
orgID, name, description, retentionRules: [],
})).json()) as { id: string; name: string; orgID?: string };
return { id: b.id, name: b.name, orgID: b.orgID };
}
/** The v1 authorization whose username is exactly this, or undefined. */
async findLegacy(username: string): Promise<LegacyAuthorization | undefined> {
const path = `/private/legacy/authorizations?token=${encodeURIComponent(username)}`;
const res = await this.raw(path);
// InfluxDB answers a filter matching nothing with 404, not an empty list.
if (res.status === 404) return undefined;
if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`InfluxDB API ${path}: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`);
const body = (await res.json()) as { authorizations?: LegacyAuthorization[] };
return body.authorizations?.find((a) => a.token === username);
}
async createLegacy(a: Omit<LegacyAuthorization, "id">): Promise<LegacyAuthorization> {
return (await (await this.send("/private/legacy/authorizations", "POST", a)).json()) as LegacyAuthorization;
}
/** Set a v1 authorization's password. InfluxDB keeps only a hash of it, so it can be set, never read. */
async setLegacyPassword(id: string, password: string): Promise<void> {
await this.send(`/private/legacy/authorizations/${encodeURIComponent(id)}/password`, "POST", { password });
}
async updateLegacy(id: string, patch: { status?: "active" | "inactive"; description?: string }): Promise<void> {
await this.send(`/private/legacy/authorizations/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`, "PATCH", patch);
}
async deleteLegacy(id: string): Promise<void> {
await this.send(`/private/legacy/authorizations/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`, "DELETE");
}
/**
* Whether this username and password sign in on the v1 API — the consumer's own view. Asked with
* a statement that reads nothing (`SHOW DATABASES` lists only what the credential may read), sent
* with Basic auth so the password is never in a URL. 401 is a wrong password or no such user;
* anything else that is not a server error means InfluxDB knew who was asking.
*/
async legacySignsIn(username: string, password: string): Promise<boolean> {
const res = await fetch(`${this.baseUrl}/query?q=${encodeURIComponent("SHOW DATABASES")}`, {
headers: { Authorization: `Basic ${Buffer.from(`${username}:${password}`).toString("base64")}` },
});
await res.arrayBuffer();
if (res.status === 401) return false;
if (res.status >= 500) throw new Error(`InfluxDB v1 /query: ${res.status}`);
return true;
}
/** Server health — the one endpoint that needs no token, but we send it anyway. */
async health(): Promise<InfluxHealth> {
return (await (await this.request("/health")).json()) as InfluxHealth;
+186
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
// What the `influxdb-api` provision means in InfluxDB: one v1-compatibility authorization per
// consumer, in the org this module serves, under the username and password the mesh gave both ends,
// allowed exactly the access the consumer contributed. The provisioner (provisioner/index.ts) is the
// sdk harness calling these; they are here, apart from it, so they can be exercised against a fake
// InfluxDB without a broker or a contributions file.
//
// **Why a v1 authorization and not a v2 API token.** The mesh mints the consumer's password and
// hands it to both ends (novox/hq ADR 0048); the provider sets it, and never hands one back. An
// InfluxDB 2.x API token is generated by the server — `POST /api/v2/authorizations` ignores a token
// the caller sends — so a token could only ever be the operator's to accept, one per pair, by hand.
// A v1 authorization is a username and a password the caller chooses (8–72 characters; the mesh
// mints 40), stored hashed, and it reads and writes through InfluxQL (`/query`) and line protocol
// (`/write`), which every bucket answers under its own name as a database (InfluxDB maps each
// bucket to a database of the same name by itself). That is what grafana's InfluxDB data source
// speaks, and what Node-RED's influxdb nodes speak in their 1.x mode — so the mesh can make every
// consumer's credential, rotate it and withdraw it, with no person in the loop.
//
// **What a consumer contributes.** `access`: "read" (the default), "write" or "read-write".
// `buckets`: the buckets it may use, by name. A reader that names none may read every bucket of the
// org — a dashboard is pointed at data, it does not own it. A writer must name its buckets: writing
// everywhere, the org's system buckets included, is never what a consumer means. A named bucket
// that does not exist is created, keeping its data for ever; the mesh never deletes a bucket.
//
// **Only what the mesh made is touched.** An authorization this module creates is named with the
// mesh's identity prefix and its description starts with MARK. One with the same username that
// lacks the mark is somebody else's: it is refused, never adopted, never updated, never deleted.
// Every other authorization, token, user and bucket in the instance is left exactly as it was.
import type { InfluxDBClient, InfluxPermission, LegacyAuthorization } from "./client.js";
/** How a description marks an authorization as the mesh's own work. */
export const MARK = "[mesh]";
/** The prefix the mesh gives every consumer identity (novox/hq ADR 0049). */
const IDENTITY_PREFIX = "mesh_";
/** One consumer, as the harness hands it over. */
export interface ApiGrant {
readonly as: string;
readonly password: string;
readonly values: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;
readonly consumer?: string;
}
export type Access = "read" | "write" | "read-write";
/** What a contribution asks for, checked. Refused when it cannot be served as asked. */
export function askedFor(values: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>): { access: Access; buckets: string[] } {
const access = values.access ?? "read";
if (access !== "read" && access !== "write" && access !== "read-write") {
throw new Error(`contributes an access of ${JSON.stringify(access)} — it is "read", "write" or "read-write"`);
}
const raw = values.buckets ?? [];
if (!Array.isArray(raw) || raw.some((b) => typeof b !== "string" || b.trim() === "")) {
throw new Error(`contributes buckets of ${JSON.stringify(raw)} — a list of bucket names`);
}
const buckets = [...new Set((raw as string[]).map((b) => b.trim()))].sort();
if (access !== "read" && buckets.length === 0) {
throw new Error(`asks to write and names no bucket (\`buckets\`) — a writer names what it writes to`);
}
if (buckets.some((b) => b.startsWith("_"))) {
throw new Error(`names a system bucket (${buckets.filter((b) => b.startsWith("_")).join(", ")}) — those are InfluxDB's own`);
}
return { access: access as Access, buckets };
}
/** The permissions a grant resolves to, given each named bucket's id. */
export function permissionsFor(orgID: string, access: Access, bucketIDs: string[]): InfluxPermission[] {
const actions: ("read" | "write")[] = access === "read-write" ? ["read", "write"] : [access];
const out: InfluxPermission[] = [];
for (const action of actions) {
if (bucketIDs.length === 0) {
out.push({ action, resource: { type: "buckets", orgID } });
continue;
}
for (const id of bucketIDs) out.push({ action, resource: { type: "buckets", orgID, id } });
}
return out;
}
/** A permission as a comparable string: what InfluxDB answers carries names and links besides. */
function key(p: InfluxPermission): string {
return `${p.action}:${p.resource.type}:${p.resource.orgID ?? ""}:${p.resource.id ?? "*"}`;
}
function samePermissions(a: readonly InfluxPermission[], b: readonly InfluxPermission[]): boolean {
const x = a.map(key).sort();
const y = b.map(key).sort();
return x.length === y.length && x.every((v, i) => v === y[i]);
}
export function marked(a: Pick<LegacyAuthorization, "token" | "description">): boolean {
return a.token.startsWith(IDENTITY_PREFIX) && (a.description ?? "").startsWith(MARK);
}
function describe(g: ApiGrant): string {
return `${MARK} made by the mesh for ${g.consumer ? `a module on ${g.consumer}` : "a consumer"} — do not edit; it is reset`;
}
export class ApiGrants {
constructor(private readonly influx: InfluxDBClient, readonly org: string) {}
private async orgID(): Promise<string> {
const id = await this.influx.orgID(this.org);
if (!id) throw new Error(`InfluxDB has no org ${JSON.stringify(this.org)} — the org this module serves must exist`);
return id;
}
/** The ids of the named buckets, creating any that are missing when `create` says so. Undefined
* when one is missing and may not be created (a read-only question). */
private async bucketIDs(orgID: string, names: string[], create: ApiGrant | undefined): Promise<string[] | undefined> {
const ids: string[] = [];
for (const name of names) {
let b = await this.influx.findBucket(orgID, name);
if (!b) {
if (!create) return undefined;
b = await this.influx.createBucket(orgID, name, `${MARK} made by the mesh for ${create.as}; the mesh never deletes it`);
}
ids.push(b.id);
}
return ids.sort();
}
/** Create the consumer's authorization, or bring the mesh's existing one back to what the grant
* says. Idempotent: a second apply of the same grant changes nothing beyond re-asserting the
* password, which InfluxDB can be told but never asked. */
async ensure(g: ApiGrant): Promise<"created" | "updated" | "unchanged"> {
if (!g.as.startsWith(IDENTITY_PREFIX)) {
throw new Error(`${g.as} is not a mesh identity — the mesh names every consumer ${IDENTITY_PREFIX}<node>_<module>`);
}
const { access, buckets } = askedFor(g.values);
const orgID = await this.orgID();
const found = await this.influx.findLegacy(g.as);
if (found && !marked(found)) {
throw new Error(
`InfluxDB already has a v1 authorization ${g.as} the mesh did not make — left alone; ` +
`delete it if the mesh should own that name`);
}
const want = permissionsFor(orgID, access, (await this.bucketIDs(orgID, buckets, g))!);
if (found && found.orgID === orgID && samePermissions(found.permissions, want)) {
// Only what differs is written. The password cannot be read back, so it is tried instead.
let changed = false;
if (found.status === "inactive") {
await this.influx.updateLegacy(found.id, { status: "active" });
changed = true;
}
if (!(await this.influx.legacySignsIn(g.as, g.password))) {
await this.influx.setLegacyPassword(found.id, g.password);
changed = true;
}
return changed ? "updated" : "unchanged";
}
// InfluxDB cannot change an authorization's permissions in place, so the mesh's own is made
// again. Only ever one the mesh made: a foreign one was refused above.
if (found) await this.influx.deleteLegacy(found.id);
const made = await this.influx.createLegacy({
token: g.as, orgID, status: "active", description: describe(g), permissions: want,
});
await this.influx.setLegacyPassword(made.id, g.password);
return found ? "updated" : "created";
}
/** Whether InfluxDB still holds this consumer's authorization exactly as the grant says: present,
* the mesh's, active, allowed what was asked and nothing more, and signing in with the mesh's
* password. Reads only — a missing bucket is "not held", never created here. */
async holds(g: ApiGrant): Promise<boolean> {
const { access, buckets } = askedFor(g.values);
const orgID = await this.influx.orgID(this.org);
if (!orgID) return false;
const found = await this.influx.findLegacy(g.as);
if (!found || !marked(found) || found.status === "inactive" || found.orgID !== orgID) return false;
const ids = await this.bucketIDs(orgID, buckets, undefined);
if (!ids || !samePermissions(found.permissions, permissionsFor(orgID, access, ids))) return false;
return this.influx.legacySignsIn(g.as, g.password);
}
/** Withdraw a consumer's authorization — only one the mesh made. Its buckets and their data stay. */
async remove(as: string): Promise<"removed" | "absent" | "not ours"> {
const found = await this.influx.findLegacy(as);
if (!found) return "absent";
if (!marked(found)) return "not ours";
await this.influx.deleteLegacy(found.id);
return "removed";
}
}
+58 -30
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,19 @@
{
"module": "influxdb",
"version": "1",
"provides": [
{
"name": "influxdb-api",
"scope": "mesh"
}
],
"capabilities": [
"container-runtime"
],
"own-secrets": {
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/influxdb/broker"
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/influxdb/broker",
"admin": "${dir:state}/admin.secret",
"admin-token": "${dir:state}/admin-token.secret"
},
"listens": [
{
@@ -13,9 +21,23 @@
"port": 8086,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "queries and writes, over http"
"why": "queries, writes and the web UI, over http; consumers granted influxdb-api sign in with the mesh's credential, and a name is a route grant"
}
],
"serves": {
"influxdb-api": {
"scheme": "http",
"port": 8086,
"org": "mesh",
"bucket": "default"
}
},
"receives": {
"influxdb-api": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
},
"grants": {
"influxdb-api": "${dir:grants}"
},
"resources": [
{
"id": "mesh-state",
@@ -26,46 +48,50 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/influxdb-module",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "server-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/influxdb-module/server.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "DOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_MODE=setup\nDOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_USERNAME=admin\nDOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_PASSWORD=${secret:admin}\nDOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_ADMIN_TOKEN=${secret:admin-token}\nDOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_ORG=mesh\nDOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_BUCKET=default\n"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "data",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/services/influxdb/data",
"mode": "0700",
"owner": "1000:1000"
},
{
"id": "config",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/services/influxdb/config",
"mode": "0700",
"owner": "1000:1000"
},
{
"id": "grants",
"type": "directory",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "server-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "${dir:state}/server.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "DOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_MODE=setup\nDOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_USERNAME=admin\nDOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_PASSWORD_FILE=/run/secrets/admin\nDOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_ADMIN_TOKEN_FILE=/run/secrets/admin-token\nDOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_ORG=mesh\nDOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_BUCKET=default\n"
},
{
"id": "server",
"type": "container",
"name": "influxdb",
"image": "influxdb@sha256:f75e48af0598e8aec7986e991a848d19a119101a7d563a2e5db1dfaac9c45daa",
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/influxdb-module/server.env"
"${dir:state}/server.env"
],
"ports": [
"8086"
],
"volumes": [
"/services/influxdb/data:/var/lib/influxdb2",
"/services/influxdb/config:/etc/influxdb2"
],
"secrets-in-environment": "the image honours DOCKER_INFLUXDB_INIT_PASSWORD_FILE and _ADMIN_TOKEN_FILE; convertible, awaiting a bed that proves it"
"${dir:data}:/var/lib/influxdb2",
"${dir:config}:/etc/influxdb2",
"${dir:state}/admin.secret:/run/secrets/admin:ro",
"${dir:state}/admin-token.secret:/run/secrets/admin-token:ro"
]
},
{
"id": "runtime-config",
@@ -83,13 +109,15 @@
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/influxdb/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/mesh/influxdb/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro",
"/services/influxdb/config:/var/lib/influxdb/config:ro"
"${dir:state}/admin-token.secret:/run/secrets/admin-token:ro",
"${dir:grants}:${dir:grants}:ro"
],
"env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_INFLUXDB_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:8086",
"MESH_INFLUXDB_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:${port:8086}",
"MESH_INFLUXDB_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json",
"MESH_INFLUXDB_CONFIG_DIR": "/var/lib/influxdb/config"
"MESH_INFLUXDB_TOKEN_FILE": "/run/secrets/admin-token",
"MESH_RECEIVES": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
},
"restart-on": [
"runtime-config"
@@ -97,6 +125,15 @@
"artifact": "runtime"
}
],
"requires": [
"route"
],
"contributes": {
"route": {
"label": "influxdb",
"endpoint": "api"
}
},
"build": {
"on": [
{
@@ -117,14 +154,5 @@
"from": "Dockerfile"
}
]
},
"requires": [
"secret"
],
"secrets": {
"secret": {
"admin": "/var/lib/influxdb-module/admin.secret",
"admin-token": "/var/lib/influxdb-module/admin-token.secret"
}
}
}
+6 -1
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,14 @@
{
"name": "@novox/module-influxdb",
"version": "0.1.0",
"description": "influxdb — time-series database. Its API client and tools live here (novox/hq ADR 0039).",
"description": "influxdb — time-series database; provides the mesh influxdb-api interface. Its API client, provisioner and tools live here (novox/hq ADR 0039).",
"type": "module",
"private": true,
"scripts": {
"build": "tsc client.ts grants.ts provisioner/index.ts tools/index.ts --module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist",
"typecheck": "tsc -p tsconfig.json",
"test": "npm run build && node --test --experimental-strip-types 'test/*.test.ts'"
},
"dependencies": {
"@novox/mesh-sdk": "^0.1.0"
},
+54
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
// influxdb's provisioner — the adapter that makes influxdb a provider of the mesh `influxdb-api`
// interface. The reconcile loop, the contributions file and reading the mesh's minted secret are the
// sdk harness's; this writes only the per-service half: how InfluxDB creates, checks and removes a
// consumer's credential (novox/hq ADR 0039/0040/0048). What that credential is, and why it is a v1
// authorization, is in ../grants.ts.
//
// The `influxdb-api` interface: a consumer reaches `${bound:influxdb-api:scheme}://…:at:…:port`,
// signs in as `${bound:influxdb-api:as}` with the password the mesh minted for the pair, and reads
// or writes the org's buckets as databases of the same name — `${bound:influxdb-api:bucket}` being
// the one this instance serves by default. The org and the default bucket are the assignment's
// settings, which reach both what is served and this module's config.json, so the org a consumer is
// told and the org its credential is made in cannot disagree.
import { runProvisioner, type Provision } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/provisioner";
import { InfluxDBClient } from "../client.js";
import { ApiGrants } from "../grants.js";
let grants: ApiGrants | undefined;
try {
const influx = InfluxDBClient.fromEnv();
grants = new ApiGrants(influx, influx.org);
} catch (err) {
// No admin token: nothing can be provisioned, and the tools loaded beside this must still serve.
console.error(`[provisioner:influxdb-api] not started: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : err}`);
}
if (grants) serve(grants);
function serve(grants: ApiGrants): void {
runProvisioner("influxdb-api", {
async create(p: Provision): Promise<void> {
const done = await grants.ensure(p);
if (done !== "unchanged") {
console.log(`[provisioner:influxdb-api] ${done} v1 authorization ${p.as} in org ${grants.org}`);
}
},
async remove(p: { as: string }): Promise<void> {
const done = await grants.remove(p.as);
if (done === "not ours") {
console.error(`[provisioner:influxdb-api] ${p.as}: an authorization of that name exists that the mesh did not make — left alone`);
} else if (done === "removed") {
console.log(`[provisioner:influxdb-api] removed v1 authorization ${p.as}; its buckets and their data stay`);
}
},
// Asked every minute by the harness: whether InfluxDB still holds this consumer's authorization
// exactly as the mesh gave it, so one deleted, disabled or re-passworded behind the mesh's back is
// made whole again (hq issue 120).
async holds(p: Provision): Promise<boolean> {
return grants.holds(p);
},
});
}
+246
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
// What holds influxdb to the `influxdb-api` provision (grants.ts): one v1 authorization per consumer,
// under the username and password the mesh gave, allowed only what the consumer contributed; made
// once and brought back on every apply; buckets created when missing and never deleted; and an
// authorization the mesh did not make — same name or not — never adopted, changed or deleted.
//
// InfluxDB is a fake: the routes the module touches, answering with the status codes and shapes
// InfluxDB 2.9 gives (a filter matching nothing is a 404, a password outside 8–72 characters a 400,
// an inactive authorization or a wrong password a 401 on /query). Run against the compiled module
// (npm test builds first), the way the runtime loads it.
import { test, after, beforeEach } from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import { createServer, type IncomingMessage, type ServerResponse } from "node:http";
import { InfluxDBClient } from "../dist/client.js";
import { ApiGrants, MARK, askedFor, marked } from "../dist/grants.js";
type Rec = Record<string, any>;
const ADMIN = "operator-token";
const orgs = new Map<string, string>([["zurag", "org1"]]);
let buckets: Rec[] = [];
let auths: Rec[] = [];
let calls: string[] = [];
let seq = 0;
function body(req: IncomingMessage): Promise<any> {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
let raw = "";
req.on("data", (c) => (raw += c));
req.on("end", () => resolve(raw ? JSON.parse(raw) : undefined));
});
}
function send(res: ServerResponse, status: number, value?: unknown): void {
res.writeHead(status, { "Content-Type": "application/json" });
res.end(value === undefined ? "" : JSON.stringify(value));
}
const server = createServer(async (req, res) => {
const url = new URL(req.url!, "http://fake");
const p = url.pathname;
calls.push(`${req.method} ${p}`);
if (p === "/query") {
const basic = (req.headers.authorization ?? "").replace(/^Basic /, "");
const [u, pw] = Buffer.from(basic, "base64").toString().split(":");
const a = auths.find((x) => x.token === u);
if (!a || a.status !== "active" || a.password === undefined || a.password !== pw) {
return send(res, 401, { code: "unauthorized", message: "Unauthorized" });
}
return send(res, 200, { results: [{ statement_id: 0 }] });
}
if (req.headers.authorization !== `Token ${ADMIN}`) return send(res, 401, { code: "unauthorized" });
if (p === "/api/v2/orgs") {
const id = orgs.get(url.searchParams.get("org") ?? "");
if (!id) return send(res, 404, { code: "not found", message: "organization name not found" });
return send(res, 200, { orgs: [{ id, name: url.searchParams.get("org") }] });
}
if (p === "/api/v2/buckets" && req.method === "GET") {
const found = buckets.filter((b) => b.orgID === url.searchParams.get("orgID") && b.name === url.searchParams.get("name"));
if (found.length === 0) return send(res, 404, { code: "not found", message: "bucket not found" });
return send(res, 200, { buckets: found });
}
if (p === "/api/v2/buckets" && req.method === "POST") {
const b = { ...(await body(req)), id: `b${++seq}` };
buckets.push(b);
return send(res, 201, b);
}
if (p === "/private/legacy/authorizations" && req.method === "GET") {
const found = auths.filter((a) => a.token === url.searchParams.get("token"));
if (found.length === 0) return send(res, 404, { code: "not found", message: "authorization not found" });
// Never answers with the password: InfluxDB keeps only its hash.
return send(res, 200, { authorizations: found.map(({ password, ...a }) => ({ ...a, links: {} })) });
}
if (p === "/private/legacy/authorizations" && req.method === "POST") {
const a = await body(req);
if (auths.some((x) => x.token === a.token)) return send(res, 409, { code: "conflict", message: "token already exists" });
const made = { ...a, id: `a${++seq}`, status: a.status ?? "active" };
auths.push(made);
return send(res, 201, made);
}
const m = /^\/private\/legacy\/authorizations\/([^/]+)(\/password)?$/.exec(p);
const a = m && auths.find((x) => x.id === m[1]);
if (!a) return send(res, 404, { code: "not found" });
if (m![2] && req.method === "POST") {
const { password } = await body(req);
if (typeof password !== "string" || password.length < 8 || password.length > 72) {
return send(res, 400, { code: "invalid", message: "passwords must be between 8 and 72 characters long" });
}
a.password = password;
return send(res, 204);
}
if (req.method === "PATCH") {
Object.assign(a, await body(req));
return send(res, 200, a);
}
if (req.method === "DELETE") {
auths = auths.filter((x) => x !== a);
return send(res, 204);
}
send(res, 405);
});
await new Promise<void>((r) => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", r));
after(() => server.close());
const port = (server.address() as { port: number }).port;
const grants = new ApiGrants(new InfluxDBClient(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}`, ADMIN, "zurag"), "zurag");
const PW = "mesh-minted-password-of-forty-characters";
/** Grafana on ace, as the mesh hands it to the provisioner. */
function grafana(password = PW, values: Record<string, unknown> = { access: "read" }) {
return { as: "mesh_ace_grafana", password, consumer: "ace", values };
}
/** Node-RED on ace: writes one bucket. */
function nodered(password = PW, values: Record<string, unknown> = { access: "write", buckets: ["zurag"] }) {
return { as: "mesh_ace_nodered", password, consumer: "ace", values };
}
function only(token: string): Rec {
const found = auths.filter((a) => a.token === token);
assert.equal(found.length, 1, `exactly one authorization ${token}, found ${found.length}`);
return found[0];
}
function perms(a: Rec): string[] {
return a.permissions.map((p: Rec) => `${p.action}:${p.resource.type}:${p.resource.id ?? "*"}`).sort();
}
beforeEach(() => {
buckets = [{ id: "zb", orgID: "org1", name: "zurag" }];
auths = [];
calls = [];
});
test("what a contribution may ask for, and what is refused", () => {
assert.deepEqual(askedFor({}), { access: "read", buckets: [] });
assert.deepEqual(askedFor({ access: "read-write", buckets: ["b", "a", "a"] }), { access: "read-write", buckets: ["a", "b"] });
assert.throws(() => askedFor({ access: "admin" }), /access/);
assert.throws(() => askedFor({ access: "write" }), /names no bucket/);
assert.throws(() => askedFor({ buckets: "zurag" }), /list of bucket names/);
assert.throws(() => askedFor({ access: "write", buckets: ["_monitoring"] }), /system bucket/);
});
test("a reader is given one authorization, reading every bucket of the org, under the mesh's password", async () => {
assert.equal(await grants.ensure(grafana()), "created");
const a = only("mesh_ace_grafana");
assert.equal(a.orgID, "org1");
assert.equal(a.status, "active");
assert.ok(a.description.startsWith(MARK));
assert.deepEqual(perms(a), ["read:buckets:*"]);
assert.equal(a.password, PW);
assert.equal(await grants.holds(grafana()), true);
});
test("a writer is allowed its own buckets only, and a missing one is made — never deleted", async () => {
assert.equal(await grants.ensure(nodered(PW, { access: "write", buckets: ["zurag", "printer"] })), "created");
const made = buckets.find((b) => b.name === "printer");
assert.ok(made, "the missing bucket was created");
assert.deepEqual(made!.retentionRules, [], "kept for ever: retention is the operator's choice");
assert.deepEqual(perms(only("mesh_ace_nodered")), [`write:buckets:${made!.id}`, "write:buckets:zb"]);
assert.equal(await grants.remove("mesh_ace_nodered"), "removed");
assert.equal(buckets.length, 2, "withdrawing the consumer leaves every bucket and its data");
});
test("applying the same grant again writes nothing", async () => {
await grants.ensure(grafana());
calls = [];
assert.equal(await grants.ensure(grafana()), "unchanged");
assert.ok(calls.every((c) => c.startsWith("GET")), `only reads: ${calls.join(", ")}`);
only("mesh_ace_grafana");
});
test("a rotated password is set in place; a changed access remakes only the mesh's own", async () => {
await grants.ensure(nodered());
const id = only("mesh_ace_nodered").id;
assert.equal(await grants.holds(nodered("rotated-password-0123456789")), false);
assert.equal(await grants.ensure(nodered("rotated-password-0123456789")), "updated");
assert.equal(only("mesh_ace_nodered").id, id, "updated, not replaced");
assert.equal(await grants.holds(nodered("rotated-password-0123456789")), true);
await grants.ensure(nodered(PW, { access: "read-write", buckets: ["zurag"] }));
assert.deepEqual(perms(only("mesh_ace_nodered")), ["read:buckets:zb", "write:buckets:zb"]);
assert.equal(await grants.holds(nodered(PW, { access: "read-write", buckets: ["zurag"] })), true);
});
test("an authorization disabled, re-passworded or deleted behind the mesh's back is not held, and is made whole", async () => {
await grants.ensure(grafana());
only("mesh_ace_grafana").status = "inactive";
assert.equal(await grants.holds(grafana()), false);
assert.equal(await grants.ensure(grafana()), "updated");
assert.equal(await grants.holds(grafana()), true);
only("mesh_ace_grafana").password = "somebody-else-set-this";
assert.equal(await grants.holds(grafana()), false);
await grants.ensure(grafana());
assert.equal(await grants.holds(grafana()), true);
auths = [];
assert.equal(await grants.holds(grafana()), false);
assert.equal(await grants.ensure(grafana()), "created");
});
test("holds only reads, and a bucket gone missing is not held rather than made", async () => {
await grants.ensure(nodered());
buckets = [];
calls = [];
assert.equal(await grants.holds(nodered()), false);
assert.ok(calls.every((c) => c.startsWith("GET")), `only reads: ${calls.join(", ")}`);
assert.equal(buckets.length, 0);
});
test("an authorization of the same name the mesh did not make is refused, and left exactly as it was", async () => {
auths = [{ id: "theirs", token: "mesh_ace_grafana", orgID: "org1", status: "active", description: "hand-made",
permissions: [{ action: "write", resource: { type: "buckets", orgID: "org1" } }], password: "their-password" }];
const before = JSON.stringify(auths);
await assert.rejects(grants.ensure(grafana()), /did not make/);
assert.equal(JSON.stringify(auths), before);
assert.ok(calls.every((c) => c.startsWith("GET")), `only reads: ${calls.join(", ")}`);
assert.equal(await grants.holds(grafana()), false);
assert.equal(await grants.remove("mesh_ace_grafana"), "not ours");
assert.equal(auths.length, 1, "never deleted");
});
test("the predecessor's own v1 users and tokens are never touched", async () => {
auths = [{ id: "hal", token: "grafana", orgID: "org1", status: "active", description: "",
permissions: [{ action: "read", resource: { type: "buckets", orgID: "org1" } }], password: "old-password" }];
await grants.ensure(grafana());
assert.equal(auths.find((a) => a.id === "hal")!.password, "old-password");
assert.equal(await grants.remove("grafana"), "not ours");
assert.equal(marked({ token: "grafana", description: `${MARK} x` }), false, "the mark needs the mesh's name too");
});
test("an org the instance does not have, or a non-mesh name, makes nothing", async () => {
const elsewhere = new ApiGrants(new InfluxDBClient(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}`, ADMIN, "nope"), "nope");
await assert.rejects(elsewhere.ensure(grafana()), /no org "nope"/);
await assert.rejects(grants.ensure({ ...grafana(), as: "grafana" }), /not a mesh identity/);
assert.equal(auths.length, 0);
});
test("a withdrawn consumer's authorization is removed, and an absent one is not an error", async () => {
await grants.ensure(grafana());
assert.equal(await grants.remove("mesh_ace_grafana"), "removed");
assert.equal(auths.length, 0);
assert.equal(await grants.remove("mesh_ace_grafana"), "absent");
});
+6 -1
View File
@@ -8,5 +8,10 @@
"skipLibCheck": true,
"noEmit": true
},
"include": ["client.ts", "tools/index.ts"]
"include": [
"client.ts",
"grants.ts",
"provisioner/index.ts",
"tools/index.ts"
]
}
+17 -11
View File
@@ -26,13 +26,13 @@
}
},
"binds": {
"mongodb-database": "/var/lib/invoicing/database.json",
"s3-bucket": "/var/lib/invoicing/store.json",
"route": "/var/lib/invoicing/route.json"
"mongodb-database": "${dir:state}/database.json",
"s3-bucket": "${dir:state}/store.json",
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
},
"secrets": {
"mongodb-database": "/var/lib/invoicing/database.secret",
"s3-bucket": "/var/lib/invoicing/store.secret"
"mongodb-database": "${dir:state}/database.secret",
"s3-bucket": "${dir:state}/store.secret"
},
"listens": [
{
@@ -60,13 +60,13 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/invoicing",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "api-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/invoicing/api.env",
"path": "${dir:state}/api.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "NODE_ENV=production\nPORT=9000\nMONGO_URL=mongodb://${bound:mongodb-database:as}:${secret:mongodb-database}@${bound:mongodb-database:at}:${bound:mongodb-database:port}/${bound:mongodb-database:as}?authSource=${bound:mongodb-database:as}\nMONGO_DB=${bound:mongodb-database:as}\nMINIO_BUCKET=mesh-novox-invoice\nMINIO_ENDPOINT=${bound:s3-bucket:at}\nMINIO_PORT=${bound:s3-bucket:port}\nMINIO_ACCESSKEY=${bound:s3-bucket:as}\nMINIO_SECRET=${secret:s3-bucket}\n"
},
@@ -87,7 +87,10 @@
},
"ports": [
"80"
]
],
"names-on-purpose": {
"registry-api.novox.be": "built outside the mesh, from the application's own repository, and pulled from the registry that built it; moves when that repository is a build source on the git seat (novox/hq ADR 0155, issue 122)"
}
},
{
"id": "api",
@@ -100,12 +103,15 @@
"GID": "2201"
},
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/invoicing/api.env"
"${dir:state}/api.env"
],
"ports": [
"9000"
],
"secrets-in-environment": "the application's own code reads MONGO_URL and MINIO_SECRET from the environment (invoicing-app server/src/config.js); converting is that repository's change"
"secrets-in-environment": "the application's own code reads MONGO_URL and MINIO_SECRET from the environment (invoicing-app server/src/config.js); converting is that repository's change",
"names-on-purpose": {
"registry-api.novox.be": "built outside the mesh, from the application's own repository, and pulled from the registry that built it; moves when that repository is a build source on the git seat (novox/hq ADR 0155, issue 122)"
}
}
]
}
+53 -16
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
// an indexer proxy: it normalises many torrent trackers behind one Torznab surface. This client
// talks its /api/v2.0 REST API, and only jackett's tools import it.
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { existsSync, readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { join } from "node:path";
export interface JackettIndexer {
id: string;
@@ -43,18 +44,36 @@ export class JackettClient {
/**
* Build from the module's resolved environment. Jackett's REST API is keyed, so both the URL and
* the key must be present — without them there is nothing to talk to, so this throws and the
* module contributes no tools rather than failing half-configured.
* the key must be present. The key is read from the settings-merged config or MESH_JACKETT_API_KEY,
* or, failing those, discovered from Jackett's own ServerConfig.json under MESH_JACKETT_CONFIG_DIR
* — the file Jackett writes it to, as sonarr/radarr read theirs from config.xml — so a running
* server needs no key configured by hand and no secret has to be put in an assignment. Without a
* URL or key there is nothing to talk to, so this throws and the module contributes no tools
* rather than failing half-configured.
*/
static fromEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): JackettClient {
const cfg = meshConfig(env.MESH_JACKETT_CONFIG_FILE);
const url = cfg.url ?? env.MESH_JACKETT_URL;
const apiKey = cfg.apiKey ?? env.MESH_JACKETT_API_KEY;
const apiKey = cfg.apiKey ?? env.MESH_JACKETT_API_KEY
?? JackettClient.detectApiKey(env.MESH_JACKETT_CONFIG_DIR ?? "/config");
if (!url) throw new Error("no Jackett URL — set MESH_JACKETT_URL");
if (!apiKey) throw new Error("no Jackett API key — set MESH_JACKETT_API_KEY");
if (!apiKey) throw new Error("no Jackett API key — set MESH_JACKETT_API_KEY or make the config dir readable");
return new JackettClient(url, apiKey);
}
/** Discover the API key from Jackett's ServerConfig.json (the linuxserver image keeps it at
* <config>/Jackett/ServerConfig.json), falling back to null. */
static detectApiKey(configDir: string): string | null {
for (const file of [join(configDir, "Jackett", "ServerConfig.json"), join(configDir, "ServerConfig.json")]) {
if (!existsSync(file)) continue;
try {
const key = (JSON.parse(readFileSync(file, "utf8")) as { APIKey?: unknown }).APIKey;
if (typeof key === "string" && key) return key;
} catch { /* unreadable or mid-write: try the next, then give up */ }
}
return null;
}
private async get(path: string, params: Record<string, string> = {}): Promise<any> {
const url = new URL(`${this.baseUrl}${path}`);
url.searchParams.set("apikey", this.apiKey);
@@ -64,18 +83,36 @@ export class JackettClient {
return res.json();
}
/** The configured indexers Jackett proxies. `configured=false` also lists the ones not set up. */
/**
* The configured indexers Jackett proxies. `configured=false` also lists the ones not set up.
* Read from the Torznab `t=indexers` feed, not /api/v2.0/indexers: that one is the web UI's and
* wants a login cookie (it answers an API-key request with a redirect), while the Torznab feed is
* what the key is for. The feed carries no last error, so `lastError` stays unset.
*/
async getIndexers(configuredOnly = true): Promise<JackettIndexer[]> {
const raw = await this.get("/api/v2.0/indexers", { configured: configuredOnly ? "true" : "false" });
const list = Array.isArray(raw) ? raw : [];
return list.map((i: any) => ({
id: i.id,
name: i.name,
type: i.type,
configured: i.configured ?? false,
siteLink: i.site_link,
lastError: i.last_error || undefined,
}));
const url = new URL(`${this.baseUrl}/api/v2.0/indexers/all/results/torznab/api`);
url.searchParams.set("apikey", this.apiKey);
url.searchParams.set("t", "indexers");
url.searchParams.set("configured", configuredOnly ? "true" : "false");
const res = await fetch(url.toString(), { headers: { Accept: "application/xml" } });
if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`Jackett API torznab t=indexers: ${res.status} ${await res.text()}`);
const xml = await res.text();
// Torznab reports failures (a wrong key among them) as 200 with an <error> body.
const err = xml.match(/<error code="(\d+)" description="([^"]*)"/);
if (err) throw new Error(`Jackett API torznab t=indexers: error ${err[1]} ${err[2]}`);
const text = (block: string, tag: string) =>
block.match(new RegExp(`<${tag}>([^<]*)</${tag}>`))?.[1];
const out: JackettIndexer[] = [];
for (const m of xml.matchAll(/<indexer id="([^"]+)" configured="([^"]+)">([\s\S]*?)<\/indexer>/g)) {
out.push({
id: m[1],
name: text(m[3], "title") ?? m[1],
type: text(m[3], "type") ?? "unknown",
configured: m[2] === "true",
siteLink: text(m[3], "link"),
});
}
return out;
}
/**
+27 -9
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,19 @@
{
"module": "jackett",
"version": "1",
"provides": [
{
"name": "jackett-api",
"scope": "mesh"
}
],
"serves": {
"jackett-api": {
"scheme": "http",
"port": 9117,
"url-base": ""
}
},
"capabilities": [
"container-runtime"
],
@@ -10,7 +23,7 @@
"port": 9117,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "the indexer proxy"
"why": "the indexer proxy: its web UI, and the Torznab feeds the *arr apps search through, which other modules reach as jackett-api"
}
],
"resources": [
@@ -20,10 +33,15 @@
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/jackett",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "config",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/services/jackett/config",
"mode": "0700",
"owner": "1000:1000"
},
@@ -31,7 +49,7 @@
"id": "server",
"type": "container",
"name": "jackett",
"image": "lscr.io/linuxserver/jackett@sha256:fd72d42b731ebf750b5de9711127251cf3b3f609419c32083ea8b3b3ee840b77",
"image": "lscr.io/linuxserver/jackett@sha256:7b19f4f6ac33d855ca9226600ecbd096ee678f66da28b13a7c09980b035ff583",
"env": {
"PUID": "1000",
"PGID": "1000",
@@ -41,13 +59,13 @@
"9117"
],
"volumes": [
"/services/jackett/config:/config"
"${dir:config}:/config"
]
},
{
"id": "runtime-config",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/jackett/config.json",
"path": "${dir:state}/config.json",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "{}\n",
"merge": "json"
@@ -59,12 +77,12 @@
"network": "host",
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/jackett/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/mesh/jackett/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro",
"/services/jackett/config:/var/lib/jackett/config:ro"
"${dir:state}/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro",
"${dir:config}:/var/lib/jackett/config:ro"
],
"env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_JACKETT_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:9117",
"MESH_JACKETT_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:${port:9117}",
"MESH_JACKETT_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json",
"MESH_JACKETT_CONFIG_DIR": "/var/lib/jackett/config"
},
@@ -87,7 +105,7 @@
}
},
"binds": {
"route": "/var/lib/mesh/jackett/route.json"
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
},
"build": {
"on": [
+1 -1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ export function getJackettTools(jackett: JackettClient): ToolDefinition[] {
return [
{
name: "jackett_indexers",
description: "List the indexers Jackett proxies, with their type and any last error.",
description: "List the indexers Jackett proxies, with their type and site.",
input: { all: { type: "boolean", description: "include indexers not yet configured (default false)" } },
run: async (args) => {
const indexers = await jackett.getIndexers(!args.all);
+6 -6
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
"module": "jira",
"version": "1",
"own-secrets": {
"token": "/var/lib/jira/token",
"token": "${dir:state}/token",
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/jira/broker"
},
"resources": [
@@ -15,13 +15,13 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/jira",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "config",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/jira/config.json",
"path": "${dir:state}/config.json",
"merge": "json",
"content": "{}",
"mode": "0600"
@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@
"name": "mesh-runtime-jira",
"network": "host",
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/jira/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro",
"/var/lib/jira/token:/run/secrets/token:ro",
"${dir:state}/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro",
"${dir:state}/token:/run/secrets/token:ro",
"/var/lib/mesh/jira/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro"
],
"env": {
+2 -2
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ FROM ${BUILD_BASE} AS build
# resolved away.
WORKDIR /app/modules/keycloak
COPY . .
RUN node /app/node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc client.ts index.ts tools/index.ts \
RUN node /app/node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc client.ts oidc.ts index.ts provisioner/index.ts tools/index.ts \
--module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist
FROM ${RUNTIME_BASE}
@@ -27,4 +27,4 @@ COPY --from=build /app/modules/keycloak/dist /app/modules/keycloak/dist
# the convention novox/hq issues 060/061 settled. A container that instead ran only its
# provisioner (`run`) served no tools and emitted no events; a container that named no command
# ran no provisioner at all.
ENV MESH_TOOL_MODULES=/app/modules/keycloak/dist/index.js,/app/modules/keycloak/dist/tools/index.js
ENV MESH_TOOL_MODULES=/app/modules/keycloak/dist/index.js,/app/modules/keycloak/dist/tools/index.js,/app/modules/keycloak/dist/provisioner/index.js
+90 -2
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,45 @@ function meshConfig(file?: string): Record<string, string> {
catch { return {}; }
}
/** A secret file's value, trailing newline trimmed; undefined when unset or unreadable. */
function secretFile(file?: string): string | undefined {
if (!file) return undefined;
try { return readFileSync(file, "utf8").replace(/\n$/, "") || undefined; }
catch { return undefined; }
}
/** A client as the admin API represents it — only the fields this module reads or writes are typed;
* the rest travel through untouched, so an update never drops what somebody else set. */
export interface ClientRepresentation {
id?: string;
clientId: string;
name?: string;
enabled?: boolean;
protocol?: string;
publicClient?: boolean;
clientAuthenticatorType?: string;
secret?: string;
rootUrl?: string;
baseUrl?: string;
redirectUris?: string[];
webOrigins?: string[];
standardFlowEnabled?: boolean;
implicitFlowEnabled?: boolean;
directAccessGrantsEnabled?: boolean;
serviceAccountsEnabled?: boolean;
attributes?: Record<string, string>;
protocolMappers?: ProtocolMapperRepresentation[];
[other: string]: unknown;
}
export interface ProtocolMapperRepresentation {
id?: string;
name: string;
protocol: string;
protocolMapper: string;
config: Record<string, string>;
}
export class KeycloakClient {
readonly baseUrl: string;
readonly defaultRealm: string;
@@ -40,8 +79,13 @@ export class KeycloakClient {
const cfg = meshConfig(env.MESH_KEYCLOAK_CONFIG_FILE);
const url = cfg.url ?? env.MESH_KEYCLOAK_URL ?? `http://127.0.0.1:${env.KEYCLOAK_PORT ?? "8080"}`;
const adminUser = cfg.user ?? env.MESH_KEYCLOAK_ADMIN ?? env.KEYCLOAK_ADMIN ?? "admin";
const adminPass = cfg.password ?? env.MESH_KEYCLOAK_PASSWORD ?? env.KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD;
if (!adminPass) throw new Error("no Keycloak admin password — set MESH_KEYCLOAK_PASSWORD");
// The admin password reaches the runtime as a file (novox/hq ADR 0086): the module's own `admin`
// secret, mounted read-only. The environment forms stay for a co-located server that has them.
const adminPass = cfg.password ?? secretFile(env.MESH_KEYCLOAK_PASSWORD_FILE)
?? env.MESH_KEYCLOAK_PASSWORD ?? env.KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD;
if (!adminPass) {
throw new Error("no Keycloak admin password — set MESH_KEYCLOAK_PASSWORD_FILE (or MESH_KEYCLOAK_PASSWORD)");
}
const realm = cfg.realm ?? env.MESH_KEYCLOAK_REALM ?? "master";
return new KeycloakClient(url, adminUser, adminPass, realm);
}
@@ -159,6 +203,50 @@ export class KeycloakClient {
return client.id as string;
}
/** The one client with exactly this clientId, or undefined. The admin API's `clientId` filter is an
* exact match unless `search=true` is asked for. */
async findClient(realm: string, clientId: string): Promise<ClientRepresentation | undefined> {
const found = await this.request<ClientRepresentation[]>(
`/${realm}/clients?clientId=${encodeURIComponent(clientId)}`);
return found.find((c) => c.clientId === clientId);
}
async createClientFrom(realm: string, rep: ClientRepresentation): Promise<void> {
await this.request(`/${realm}/clients`, { method: "POST", body: JSON.stringify(rep) });
}
/** Replace a client's representation, addressed by its internal id. */
async updateClient(realm: string, id: string, rep: ClientRepresentation): Promise<void> {
await this.request(`/${realm}/clients/${id}`, { method: "PUT", body: JSON.stringify(rep) });
}
async deleteClientById(realm: string, id: string): Promise<void> {
await this.request(`/${realm}/clients/${id}`, { method: "DELETE" });
}
async clientSecretById(realm: string, id: string): Promise<string | undefined> {
const result = await this.request<{ value?: string }>(`/${realm}/clients/${id}/client-secret`);
return result.value;
}
async listClientMappers(realm: string, id: string): Promise<ProtocolMapperRepresentation[]> {
return this.request(`/${realm}/clients/${id}/protocol-mappers/models`);
}
async addClientMapper(realm: string, id: string, mapper: ProtocolMapperRepresentation): Promise<void> {
await this.request(`/${realm}/clients/${id}/protocol-mappers/models`, {
method: "POST",
body: JSON.stringify(mapper),
});
}
async updateClientMapper(realm: string, id: string, mapper: ProtocolMapperRepresentation): Promise<void> {
await this.request(`/${realm}/clients/${id}/protocol-mappers/models/${mapper.id}`, {
method: "PUT",
body: JSON.stringify(mapper),
});
}
async deleteClient(realm: string, clientId: string): Promise<void> {
await this.request(`/${realm}/clients/${await this.resolveClientId(realm, clientId)}`, { method: "DELETE" });
}
+51 -13
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@
{
"module": "keycloak",
"version": "1",
"provides": [
{
"name": "oidc-client",
"scope": "mesh"
}
],
"requires": [
"postgres-database",
"route"
@@ -15,11 +21,11 @@
}
},
"binds": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/keycloak/database.json",
"route": "/var/lib/keycloak/route.json"
"postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.json",
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
},
"secrets": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/keycloak/database.secret"
"postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.secret"
},
"capabilities": [
"container-runtime"
@@ -41,8 +47,21 @@
"why": "anything the mesh runs that authenticates a person"
}
],
"serves": {
"oidc-client": {
"authorization-path": "/protocol/openid-connect/auth",
"token-path": "/protocol/openid-connect/token",
"userinfo-path": "/protocol/openid-connect/userinfo"
}
},
"receives": {
"oidc-client": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
},
"grants": {
"oidc-client": "${dir:grants}"
},
"own-secrets": {
"admin": "/var/lib/keycloak/admin.secret",
"admin": "${dir:state}/admin.secret",
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/keycloak/broker"
},
"resources": [
@@ -55,20 +74,25 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/keycloak",
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "grants",
"type": "directory",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "admin-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/keycloak/admin.env",
"path": "${dir:state}/admin.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "KEYCLOAK_ADMIN=admin\nKEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD=${secret:admin}\n"
},
{
"id": "database-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/keycloak/database.env",
"path": "${dir:state}/database.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "KC_DB_URL=jdbc:postgresql://${bound:postgres-database:at}:${bound:postgres-database:port}/${bound:postgres-database:as}\nKC_DB_USERNAME=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nKC_DB_PASSWORD=${secret:postgres-database}\n"
},
@@ -77,6 +101,13 @@
"type": "network",
"name": "keycloak"
},
{
"id": "hostname",
"type": "file",
"path": "${dir:state}/hostname.env",
"mode": "0644",
"content": "KC_HOSTNAME=https://${bound:route:name}\n"
},
{
"id": "server",
"type": "container",
@@ -90,17 +121,20 @@
"KC_DB": "postgres",
"KC_HTTP_ENABLED": "true",
"KC_HEALTH_ENABLED": "true",
"KC_HOSTNAME": "https://keycloak.novox.be",
"KC_PROXY_HEADERS": "xforwarded"
},
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/keycloak/admin.env",
"/var/lib/keycloak/database.env"
"${dir:state}/admin.env",
"${dir:state}/database.env",
"${dir:state}/hostname.env"
],
"ports": [
"8080"
],
"secrets-in-environment": "KC_DB_PASSWORD is convertible through a generated keycloak.conf (db-password=); KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD is env-only before Keycloak 26; not yet converted"
"secrets-in-environment": "KC_DB_PASSWORD is convertible through a generated keycloak.conf (db-password=); KEYCLOAK_ADMIN_PASSWORD is env-only before Keycloak 26; not yet converted",
"restart-on": [
"hostname"
]
},
{
"id": "runtime-config",
@@ -117,12 +151,16 @@
"network": "host",
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/keycloak/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/mesh/keycloak/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro"
"/var/lib/mesh/keycloak/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro",
"${dir:state}/admin.secret:/run/secrets/admin:ro",
"${dir:grants}:${dir:grants}:ro"
],
"env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_KEYCLOAK_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:${port:8080}",
"MESH_KEYCLOAK_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json"
"MESH_KEYCLOAK_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json",
"MESH_KEYCLOAK_PASSWORD_FILE": "/run/secrets/admin",
"MESH_RECEIVES": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
},
"restart-on": [
"runtime-config"
+185
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
// What the `oidc-client` provision means in Keycloak: one confidential OpenID Connect client per
// consumer, in the realm this module serves, under the name and secret the mesh gave both ends.
// The provisioner (provisioner/index.ts) is the sdk harness calling these; they are here, apart from
// it, so they can be exercised against a fake admin API without a broker or a contributions file.
//
// **The client id and the secret are the mesh's, not Keycloak's (novox/hq ADR 0048).** The mesh
// derives the consumer's identity (`as`, e.g. `mesh_ace_grafana`) and hands it to both ends — the
// consumer names it as its client id through `${bound:oidc-client:as}` — and mints the secret, which
// this sets as the client's secret. Keycloak generates neither.
//
// **Where the consumer's browser comes back to is the consumer's to say.** Its contribution carries
// `callback` (a path, e.g. `/login/generic_oauth`) and the `label`/`endpoint` of the endpoint it is
// reached on; the mesh composes that endpoint's names into `name` (public) and `internal-name`
// (private network) exactly as it does for a route (novox/hq ADR 0056, 0138), so the redirect URI
// registered here is built from the same names the proxy serves the consumer under.
//
// **Only what the mesh made is touched.** A client this module creates carries the attribute
// `mesh.provisioned=true`, and its id starts with the mesh's own prefix. A client with the same id
// that lacks the mark is somebody else's: it is refused, never adopted, never updated, never deleted.
import type { ClientRepresentation, KeycloakClient, ProtocolMapperRepresentation } from "./client.js";
/** The attribute marking a client as the mesh's own work. */
export const MARK = "mesh.provisioned";
/** The mapper every mesh client carries: realm roles as a flat `roles` claim in the id token, the
* access token and userinfo — what a consumer maps its own roles from (grafana's role path reads
* `roles[*]`), and what the predecessor added to its hand-made clients by hand. */
export const ROLES_MAPPER: ProtocolMapperRepresentation = {
name: "realm roles",
protocol: "openid-connect",
protocolMapper: "oidc-usermodel-realm-role-mapper",
config: {
"claim.name": "roles",
"jsonType.label": "String",
multivalued: "true",
"id.token.claim": "true",
"access.token.claim": "true",
"userinfo.token.claim": "true",
},
};
/** One consumer, as the harness hands it over. */
export interface OidcGrant {
readonly as: string;
readonly password: string;
readonly values: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;
readonly consumer?: string;
}
/** The realm named by an issuer URL — `https://id.example/realms/Novox` is realm `Novox`. The issuer is
* the one value an assignment sets (it is also what consumers are served), so the realm is read
* out of it rather than set a second time where the two could disagree. */
export function realmOf(issuer: string): string {
let path: string;
try {
path = new URL(issuer).pathname;
} catch {
throw new Error(`the issuer ${JSON.stringify(issuer)} is not a URL`);
}
const m = /\/realms\/([^/]+)\/?$/.exec(path);
if (!m) throw new Error(`the issuer ${JSON.stringify(issuer)} does not end in /realms/<realm>`);
return decodeURIComponent(m[1]);
}
/** The redirect URIs a consumer's contribution asks for: its callback under each name the mesh
* composed for its endpoint. Refused when there is nothing to register — a client that accepts no
* redirect is a client nobody can log in through, and one that accepts any is worse. */
export function redirectsOf(values: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>): { root: string; redirects: string[] } {
const callback = values.callback;
if (typeof callback !== "string" || !callback.startsWith("/")) {
throw new Error(`contributes no callback path (\`callback\`, starting with "/"): ${JSON.stringify(callback)}`);
}
const names: string[] = [];
for (const key of ["name", "internal-name"]) {
const n = values[key];
if (typeof n === "string" && n.trim() !== "" && !names.includes(n.trim())) names.push(n.trim());
}
if (names.length === 0) {
throw new Error("has no name the mesh composed (`name` / `internal-name`) — contribute a `label` and the `endpoint` it is reached on");
}
return { root: `https://${names[0]}`, redirects: names.map((n) => `https://${n}${callback}`) };
}
/** The fields the mesh owns on a client it made. Everything else on the client is left as found. */
function wanted(g: OidcGrant): ClientRepresentation {
const { root, redirects } = redirectsOf(g.values);
return {
clientId: g.as,
name: g.as,
description: `made by the mesh for ${g.consumer ? `a module on ${g.consumer}` : "a consumer"} — do not edit; it is reset`,
enabled: true,
protocol: "openid-connect",
publicClient: false,
clientAuthenticatorType: "client-secret",
secret: g.password,
rootUrl: root,
baseUrl: root,
redirectUris: redirects,
standardFlowEnabled: true,
implicitFlowEnabled: false,
directAccessGrantsEnabled: false,
serviceAccountsEnabled: false,
};
}
function sameSet(a: readonly string[] | undefined, b: readonly string[]): boolean {
const x = [...(a ?? [])].sort();
const y = [...b].sort();
return x.length === y.length && x.every((v, i) => v === y[i]);
}
function marked(c: ClientRepresentation): boolean {
return c.attributes?.[MARK] === "true";
}
export class OidcClients {
constructor(private readonly kc: KeycloakClient, readonly realm: string) {}
/** Create the consumer's client, or bring the mesh's existing one back to what the grant says.
* Returns whether it was newly created. Idempotent: applying the same grant twice changes nothing
* the second time beyond re-asserting it. */
async ensure(g: OidcGrant): Promise<"created" | "updated"> {
const want = wanted(g);
const found = await this.kc.findClient(this.realm, g.as);
if (found && !marked(found)) {
throw new Error(
`realm ${this.realm} already has a client ${g.as} the mesh did not make — left alone; ` +
`delete or rename it if the mesh should own that id`);
}
if (!found) {
await this.kc.createClientFrom(this.realm, {
...want,
attributes: { [MARK]: "true" },
protocolMappers: [ROLES_MAPPER],
});
return "created";
}
// Overlay what the mesh owns on what is there, so a field Keycloak added or an operator set on a
// field the mesh does not own survives the update.
await this.kc.updateClient(this.realm, found.id!, {
...found,
...want,
attributes: { ...(found.attributes ?? {}), [MARK]: "true" },
});
await this.ensureMapper(found.id!);
return "updated";
}
private async ensureMapper(id: string): Promise<void> {
const mappers = await this.kc.listClientMappers(this.realm, id);
const have = mappers.find((m) => m.name === ROLES_MAPPER.name);
if (!have) {
await this.kc.addClientMapper(this.realm, id, ROLES_MAPPER);
return;
}
const drifted =
have.protocolMapper !== ROLES_MAPPER.protocolMapper ||
Object.entries(ROLES_MAPPER.config).some(([k, v]) => have.config?.[k] !== v);
if (drifted) {
await this.kc.updateClientMapper(this.realm, id, { ...ROLES_MAPPER, id: have.id });
}
}
/** Whether Keycloak still holds this consumer's client exactly as the grant says: present, the
* mesh's, enabled, confidential, with the mesh's secret and the redirects asked for. Reads only. */
async holds(g: OidcGrant): Promise<boolean> {
const want = wanted(g);
const found = await this.kc.findClient(this.realm, g.as);
if (!found || !marked(found) || found.enabled === false || found.publicClient) return false;
if (!sameSet(found.redirectUris, want.redirectUris!)) return false;
const mappers = await this.kc.listClientMappers(this.realm, found.id!);
if (!mappers.some((m) => m.name === ROLES_MAPPER.name)) return false;
return (await this.kc.clientSecretById(this.realm, found.id!)) === g.password;
}
/** Withdraw a consumer's client — only one the mesh made. Returns what happened, for the log. */
async remove(as: string): Promise<"removed" | "absent" | "not ours"> {
const found = await this.kc.findClient(this.realm, as);
if (!found) return "absent";
if (!marked(found)) return "not ours";
await this.kc.deleteClientById(this.realm, found.id!);
return "removed";
}
}
+6 -2
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,15 @@
{
"name": "@novox/module-keycloak",
"version": "0.1.0",
"description": "keycloak — identity and access. Its admin API client, tools and events live here (novox/hq ADR 0039).",
"description": "keycloak — identity and access; provides the mesh oidc-client interface. Its admin API client, provisioner, tools and events live here (novox/hq ADR 0039).",
"type": "module",
"private": true,
"scripts": {
"build": "tsc client.ts oidc.ts index.ts provisioner/index.ts tools/index.ts --module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist",
"test": "npm run build && node --test --experimental-strip-types 'test/*.test.ts'"
},
"dependencies": {
"@novox/mesh-sdk": "^0.1.0"
"@novox/mesh-sdk": "^0.1.1"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@types/node": "^22.0.0",
+73
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
// keycloak's provisioner — the adapter that makes keycloak a provider of the mesh `oidc-client`
// interface. The reconcile loop, the contributions file and reading the mesh's minted secret are the
// sdk harness's; this writes only the per-service half: how Keycloak creates, checks and removes a
// consumer's client (novox/hq ADR 0039/0040/0048). What a client is, and which ones are the mesh's,
// is in ../oidc.ts.
//
// The `oidc-client` interface: a consumer logs people in through the realm this module serves, as
// the confidential client `as` with the secret the mesh minted, and is redirected back to the
// callback it contributed under the names the mesh composed for its endpoint. What it is served —
// the issuer and the endpoint paths under it — is in the manifest's `serves`, settled with the
// assignment's settings.
//
// **The realm is read out of the issuer**, the one value an assignment sets (settings reach both the
// served facts and this module's config.json): a realm set in one place and an issuer in another
// would let the consumer be told one realm while its client is made in another.
import { runProvisioner, type Provision } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/provisioner";
import { emit } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/events";
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { KeycloakClient } from "../client.js";
import { OidcClients, realmOf } from "../oidc.js";
/** The issuer this assignment serves, from the settings-merged config the mesh delivers. */
function issuer(): string {
const file = process.env.MESH_KEYCLOAK_CONFIG_FILE;
let cfg: Record<string, unknown> = {};
if (file) {
try {
cfg = JSON.parse(readFileSync(file, "utf8")) as Record<string, unknown>;
} catch {
// Absent or unreadable: fall through to the environment, and refuse below if that is empty too.
}
}
const said = typeof cfg.issuer === "string" ? cfg.issuer : process.env.MESH_KEYCLOAK_ISSUER;
if (!said) throw new Error("no issuer — the module's config.json carries none and MESH_KEYCLOAK_ISSUER is unset");
return said;
}
const clients = new OidcClients(KeycloakClient.fromEnv(), realmOf(issuer()));
/** Emit a lifecycle event without letting a broker hiccup fail the provisioning itself. */
async function announce(type: string, body: Record<string, string>): Promise<void> {
try {
await emit(type, body);
} catch (err) {
console.error(`[provisioner:oidc-client] emit ${type} failed: ${err}`);
}
}
runProvisioner("oidc-client", {
async create(p: Provision): Promise<void> {
const done = await clients.ensure(p);
if (done === "created") {
console.log(`[provisioner:oidc-client] created client ${p.as} in realm ${clients.realm}`);
await announce("client.created", { realm: clients.realm, clientId: p.as, consumer: p.consumer ?? "" });
}
},
async remove(p: { as: string }): Promise<void> {
const done = await clients.remove(p.as);
if (done === "not ours") {
console.error(`[provisioner:oidc-client] ${p.as}: a client of that id exists that the mesh did not make — left alone`);
} else if (done === "removed") {
console.log(`[provisioner:oidc-client] removed client ${p.as} from realm ${clients.realm}`);
}
},
// Asked every minute by the harness: whether Keycloak still holds this consumer's client exactly as
// the mesh gave it, so a client deleted or edited behind the mesh's back is made again (hq issue 120).
async holds(p: Provision): Promise<boolean> {
return clients.holds(p);
},
});
+239
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
// What holds keycloak to the `oidc-client` provision (oidc.ts): one confidential client per consumer,
// under the id and secret the mesh gave, redirecting only to the consumer's own callback under the
// names the mesh composed; made once and brought back on every apply; and a client the mesh did not
// make — same id or not — never adopted, changed or deleted.
//
// Keycloak is a fake: the admin routes the module touches, answering with the status codes and the
// shapes Keycloak gives. Run against the compiled module (npm test builds first), the way the runtime
// loads it.
import { test, after } from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import { createServer, type IncomingMessage, type ServerResponse } from "node:http";
import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
import { KeycloakClient } from "../dist/client.js";
import { MARK, OidcClients, ROLES_MAPPER, realmOf, redirectsOf } from "../dist/oidc.js";
type Client = Record<string, any>;
/** The realm's clients, by internal id, and what the fake was asked. */
const realm = "Novox";
const clients = new Map<string, Client>();
const calls: string[] = [];
function body(req: IncomingMessage): Promise<any> {
return new Promise((resolve) => {
let raw = "";
req.on("data", (c) => (raw += c));
req.on("end", () => resolve(raw ? JSON.parse(raw) : undefined));
});
}
function send(res: ServerResponse, status: number, value?: unknown): void {
res.writeHead(status, { "Content-Type": "application/json" });
res.end(value === undefined ? "" : JSON.stringify(value));
}
const server = createServer(async (req, res) => {
const url = new URL(req.url!, "http://fake");
calls.push(`${req.method} ${url.pathname}`);
if (url.pathname === "/realms/master/protocol/openid-connect/token") {
return send(res, 200, { access_token: "t", expires_in: 300 });
}
const base = `/admin/realms/${realm}/clients`;
if (!url.pathname.startsWith(base)) return send(res, 404, { error: "Realm not found." });
const rest = url.pathname.slice(base.length).split("/").filter(Boolean);
if (rest.length === 0 && req.method === "GET") {
const want = url.searchParams.get("clientId");
return send(res, 200, [...clients.values()].filter((c) => !want || c.clientId === want));
}
if (rest.length === 0 && req.method === "POST") {
const rep = await body(req);
if ([...clients.values()].some((c) => c.clientId === rep.clientId)) {
return send(res, 409, { errorMessage: `Client ${rep.clientId} already exists` });
}
const id = randomUUID();
const mappers = (rep.protocolMappers ?? []).map((m: Client) => ({ ...m, id: randomUUID() }));
clients.set(id, { ...rep, id, protocolMappers: mappers });
return send(res, 201);
}
const c = clients.get(rest[0]);
if (!c) return send(res, 404, { error: "Could not find client" });
if (rest.length === 1 && req.method === "PUT") {
// Keycloak ignores protocolMappers on a client update: they have their own endpoints.
const rep = await body(req);
clients.set(c.id, { ...rep, id: c.id, protocolMappers: c.protocolMappers });
return send(res, 204);
}
if (rest.length === 1 && req.method === "DELETE") {
clients.delete(c.id);
return send(res, 204);
}
if (rest[1] === "client-secret" && req.method === "GET") {
return send(res, 200, { type: "secret", value: c.secret });
}
if (rest[1] === "protocol-mappers") {
if (req.method === "GET") return send(res, 200, c.protocolMappers ?? []);
if (req.method === "POST") {
c.protocolMappers = [...(c.protocolMappers ?? []), { ...(await body(req)), id: randomUUID() }];
return send(res, 201);
}
if (req.method === "PUT") {
const m = await body(req);
c.protocolMappers = c.protocolMappers.map((x: Client) => (x.id === rest[4] ? m : x));
return send(res, 204);
}
}
send(res, 405);
});
await new Promise<void>((r) => server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", r));
after(() => server.close());
const port = (server.address() as { port: number }).port;
const oidc = new OidcClients(new KeycloakClient(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}`, "admin", "pw"), realm);
/** Grafana on ace, as the mesh hands it to the provisioner. */
function grafana(secret = "s3cret", values: Record<string, unknown> = {}) {
return {
as: "mesh_ace_grafana",
password: secret,
consumer: "ace",
values: {
label: "grafana", endpoint: "web", port: 20010, callback: "/login/generic_oauth",
name: "grafana.zurag.be", "internal-name": "grafana.ace.internal", ...values,
},
};
}
function only(clientId: string): Client {
const found = [...clients.values()].filter((c) => c.clientId === clientId);
assert.equal(found.length, 1, `exactly one client ${clientId}, found ${found.length}`);
return found[0];
}
test("the realm is read out of the issuer, and an issuer that names none is refused", () => {
assert.equal(realmOf("https://keycloak.novox.be/realms/Novox"), "Novox");
assert.equal(realmOf("https://keycloak.novox.be/realms/Novox/"), "Novox");
assert.equal(realmOf("http://127.0.0.1:18500/realms/master"), "master");
assert.throws(() => realmOf("https://keycloak.novox.be"), /realms/);
assert.throws(() => realmOf("keycloak"), /not a URL/);
});
test("the redirect is the consumer's callback under every name the mesh composed for it", () => {
assert.deepEqual(redirectsOf(grafana().values), {
root: "https://grafana.zurag.be",
redirects: ["https://grafana.zurag.be/login/generic_oauth", "https://grafana.ace.internal/login/generic_oauth"],
});
// A route reaching only the private network has only the internal name, and that is enough.
assert.deepEqual(redirectsOf({ callback: "/cb", "internal-name": "x.ace.internal" }).redirects,
["https://x.ace.internal/cb"]);
assert.throws(() => redirectsOf({ name: "grafana.zurag.be" }), /callback/);
assert.throws(() => redirectsOf({ name: "grafana.zurag.be", callback: "login" }), /callback/);
assert.throws(() => redirectsOf({ callback: "/cb" }), /label/);
});
test("a consumer is given one confidential client, under its id and the mesh's secret", async () => {
clients.clear();
assert.equal(await oidc.ensure(grafana()), "created");
const c = only("mesh_ace_grafana");
assert.equal(c.publicClient, false);
assert.equal(c.clientAuthenticatorType, "client-secret");
assert.equal(c.secret, "s3cret");
assert.equal(c.enabled, true);
assert.equal(c.standardFlowEnabled, true);
assert.equal(c.directAccessGrantsEnabled, false);
assert.equal(c.implicitFlowEnabled, false);
assert.deepEqual(c.redirectUris, [
"https://grafana.zurag.be/login/generic_oauth", "https://grafana.ace.internal/login/generic_oauth"]);
assert.equal(c.attributes[MARK], "true");
assert.deepEqual(c.protocolMappers.map((m: Client) => m.name), [ROLES_MAPPER.name]);
assert.equal(await oidc.holds(grafana()), true);
});
test("applying the same grant again makes no second client", async () => {
clients.clear();
await oidc.ensure(grafana());
assert.equal(await oidc.ensure(grafana()), "updated");
assert.equal(await oidc.ensure(grafana()), "updated");
only("mesh_ace_grafana");
assert.equal(only("mesh_ace_grafana").protocolMappers.length, 1, "the roles mapper is not added twice");
});
test("a new secret or a moved name is applied in place, and what the mesh does not own survives", async () => {
clients.clear();
await oidc.ensure(grafana());
const id = only("mesh_ace_grafana").id;
// Something the mesh does not own, set on the client after it was made.
clients.get(id)!.consentRequired = true;
clients.get(id)!.attributes["post.logout.redirect.uris"] = "+";
assert.equal(await oidc.holds(grafana("rotated")), false, "a rotated secret is not held until applied");
await oidc.ensure(grafana("rotated", { name: "dash.zurag.be" }));
const c = only("mesh_ace_grafana");
assert.equal(c.id, id, "updated, not replaced");
assert.equal(c.secret, "rotated");
assert.deepEqual(c.redirectUris, [
"https://dash.zurag.be/login/generic_oauth", "https://grafana.ace.internal/login/generic_oauth"]);
assert.equal(c.rootUrl, "https://dash.zurag.be");
assert.equal(c.consentRequired, true);
assert.equal(c.attributes["post.logout.redirect.uris"], "+");
assert.equal(c.attributes[MARK], "true");
assert.equal(await oidc.holds(grafana("rotated", { name: "dash.zurag.be" })), true);
});
test("a client lost or edited behind the mesh's back is not held, and is made whole again", async () => {
clients.clear();
await oidc.ensure(grafana());
const c = only("mesh_ace_grafana");
c.redirectUris = ["*"];
assert.equal(await oidc.holds(grafana()), false, "a widened redirect is not what the mesh gave");
await oidc.ensure(grafana());
assert.equal(await oidc.holds(grafana()), true);
only("mesh_ace_grafana").protocolMappers = [];
assert.equal(await oidc.holds(grafana()), false, "a client without its roles mapper is not held");
await oidc.ensure(grafana());
assert.equal(await oidc.holds(grafana()), true);
clients.clear();
assert.equal(await oidc.holds(grafana()), false);
});
test("a client of the same id the mesh did not make is refused, and left exactly as it was", async () => {
clients.clear();
clients.set("theirs", { id: "theirs", clientId: "mesh_ace_grafana", secret: "their-secret", redirectUris: ["*"] });
const before = JSON.stringify(clients.get("theirs"));
const writes = calls.length;
await assert.rejects(oidc.ensure(grafana()), /did not make/);
assert.equal(JSON.stringify(clients.get("theirs")), before);
assert.ok(calls.slice(writes).every((c) => c.startsWith("GET") || c.startsWith("POST /realms/master")),
`only reads were made: ${calls.slice(writes).join(", ")}`);
assert.equal(await oidc.holds(grafana()), false);
assert.equal(await oidc.remove("mesh_ace_grafana"), "not ours");
assert.ok(clients.has("theirs"), "a client the mesh did not make is never deleted");
});
test("the predecessor's hand-made client is never touched: the mesh's has its own id", async () => {
clients.clear();
clients.set("hal", { id: "hal", clientId: "grafana", secret: "old", redirectUris: ["https://grafana.zurag.be/*"] });
await oidc.ensure(grafana());
assert.equal(clients.get("hal")!.secret, "old");
only("mesh_ace_grafana");
assert.equal(await oidc.remove("grafana"), "not ours");
assert.ok(clients.has("hal"));
});
test("a withdrawn consumer's client is removed, and an absent one is not an error", async () => {
clients.clear();
await oidc.ensure(grafana());
assert.equal(await oidc.remove("mesh_ace_grafana"), "removed");
assert.equal([...clients.values()].length, 0);
assert.equal(await oidc.remove("mesh_ace_grafana"), "absent");
});
test("a contribution with no callback makes no client at all", async () => {
clients.clear();
await assert.rejects(oidc.ensure({ ...grafana(), values: { name: "grafana.zurag.be" } }), /callback/);
assert.equal(clients.size, 0);
});
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,5 +8,5 @@
"skipLibCheck": true,
"noEmit": true
},
"include": ["client.ts", "index.ts", "tools/index.ts"]
"include": ["client.ts", "oidc.ts", "index.ts", "provisioner/index.ts", "tools/index.ts"]
}
+8 -4
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
// The Letta API client — letta's own code, living in the module (novox/hq ADR 0039). Its tools
// import it; nothing outside letta does.
//
// Letta authenticates with a single server password, presented as a Bearer token. That password is
// a mesh own-secret, minted once and handed to both the server (LETTA_SERVER_PASSWORD) and this
// client (MESH_LETTA_PASSWORD) — so the module's tools are live without anything configured by hand.
// The runtime config file may still override the URL or password.
// Letta authenticates with a single server password. That password is a mesh own-secret handed to
// both the server (LETTA_SERVER_PASSWORD) and this client, through the runtime config file the mesh
// mounts (its `password` key) — so the module's tools are live without anything configured by hand.
// Where a server already has clients, the password is accepted rather than minted.
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
@@ -58,6 +58,10 @@ export class LettaClient {
...options,
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
// The server's --secure mode checks X-BARE-PASSWORD ("password <it>") and answers a Bearer
// token alone with 401 (letta/server/rest_api/app.py, 0.6.x). Both are sent: Bearer is what
// later servers read.
"X-BARE-PASSWORD": `password ${this.password}`,
Authorization: `Bearer ${this.password}`,
...(options.headers as Record<string, string> | undefined),
},
+21 -25
View File
@@ -5,21 +5,28 @@
"container-runtime"
],
"requires": [
"postgres-database"
"postgres-database",
"route"
],
"contributes": {
"postgres-database": {
"name": "letta"
},
"route": {
"label": "letta",
"endpoint": "web"
}
},
"binds": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/letta/database.json"
"postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.json",
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
},
"secrets": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/letta/database.secret"
"postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.secret"
},
"own-secrets": {
"server-password": "/var/lib/letta/server-password.secret",
"server-password": "${dir:state}/server-password.secret",
"openai-api-key": "${dir:state}/openai-api-key.secret",
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/letta/broker"
},
"listens": [
@@ -28,7 +35,7 @@
"port": 8283,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "the Letta agent server REST API and web UI; a public name is a route grant later"
"why": "the Letta agent server REST API and web UI, password-protected (--secure); a public name is the route's"
}
],
"resources": [
@@ -41,15 +48,15 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/letta",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "server-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/letta/server.env",
"path": "${dir:state}/server.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "LETTA_PG_URI=postgresql://${bound:postgres-database:as}:${secret:postgres-database}@${bound:postgres-database:at}:${bound:postgres-database:port}/${bound:postgres-database:as}\nLETTA_SERVER_PASSWORD=${secret:server-password}\nSECURE=true\nTZ=Europe/Brussels\n"
"content": "LETTA_PG_URI=postgresql://${bound:postgres-database:as}:${secret:postgres-database}@${bound:postgres-database:at}:${bound:postgres-database:port}/${bound:postgres-database:as}\nLETTA_SERVER_PASSWORD=${secret:server-password}\nOPENAI_API_KEY=${secret:openai-api-key}\nSECURE=true\nTZ=Europe/Brussels\n"
},
{
"id": "net",
@@ -60,31 +67,24 @@
"id": "server",
"type": "container",
"name": "letta",
"image": "letta/letta@sha256:1d2e0692514287c5ed1a483e14e16ed945f8632d315539f5e66373bb7d7c471b",
"image": "letta/letta@sha256:bfd1e49ce45b9a208c941e832c1d1d194017ff210a3784b0ca6c323aed767a29",
"network": "letta",
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/letta/server.env"
"${dir:state}/server.env"
],
"ports": [
"8283"
],
"secrets-in-environment": "the letta image is env-driven and its file-source support could not be verified; the mesh runtime can take its password from config.json (client.ts) \u2014 not yet converted"
"secrets-in-environment": "letta 0.6.x reads its settings from the environment only (pydantic settings, no secrets_dir or _FILE twin), and its startup.sh starts an embedded PostgreSQL unless LETTA_PG_URI is set - so the database password travels inside that URI (startup.sh also echoes it to the log); LETTA_SERVER_PASSWORD and OPENAI_API_KEY have no file source either"
},
{
"id": "runtime-config",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/letta/config.json",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "{}\n",
"content": "{\n \"password\": \"${secret:server-password}\"\n}\n",
"merge": "json"
},
{
"id": "runtime-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/letta/runtime.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "MESH_LETTA_PASSWORD=${secret:server-password}\n"
},
{
"id": "runtime",
"type": "container",
@@ -99,14 +99,10 @@
"MESH_LETTA_URL": "http://letta:8283",
"MESH_LETTA_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json"
},
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/letta/runtime.env"
],
"restart-on": [
"runtime-config"
],
"artifact": "runtime",
"secrets-in-environment": "the letta image is env-driven and its file-source support could not be verified; the mesh runtime can take its password from config.json (client.ts) \u2014 not yet converted"
"artifact": "runtime"
}
],
"build": {
+4 -5
View File
@@ -6,25 +6,24 @@
"model-access"
],
"binds": {
"model-access": "/var/lib/local-model-consumer/model.json"
"model-access": "${dir:state}/model.json"
},
"resources": [
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/local-model-consumer",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "config",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/local-model-consumer/config",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "openai-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/local-model-consumer/config/openai.env",
"path": "${dir:config}/openai.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "OPENAI_BASE_URL=http://${bound:model-access:at}:${bound:model-access:port}/v1\nOPENAI_MODEL=${bound:model-access:model}\nOPENAI_API_KEY=local\n"
}
+17
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
# mailu
Mail — Mailu, with its provisioner (the `smtp` provision) and tools, on the tool runtime.
## Settings
A definition names no mesh (novox/hq ADR 0112, ADR 0155), so the values that are this
installation's are settings on the assignment, `settings set mailu <file>`:
```json
{"domain": "…", "sitename": "…", "website": "https://…", "proxy-address": "…"}
```
`domain` is the mail domain (also the provisioner's, for a consumer's address); `sitename` and
`website` are shown by the web front; `proxy-address` is what `REAL_IP_FROM` trusts a real-IP
header from — the address the proxy forwards with. The front's own hostname is the name of its
`web` route, told to it by the mesh.
+6 -12
View File
@@ -120,21 +120,21 @@
"port": 7080,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "the web front over http; only the ACME HTTP-01 passthrough is routed here \u2014 everything else 301s to https and would loop a proxy"
"why": "the web front over http; only the ACME HTTP-01 passthrough is routed here — everything else 301s to https and would loop a proxy"
},
{
"name": "web-tls",
"port": 7443,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "the web front over its own TLS (admin, webmail, API); the public name mail.novox.be is a route grant reaching it here"
"why": "the web front over its own TLS (admin, webmail, API); its public name is a route grant reaching it here"
},
{
"name": "autoconfig",
"port": 4243,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "automx: mail client autoconfiguration; autoconfig/autodiscover/automx.novox.be are route grants reaching it here"
"why": "automx: mail client autoconfiguration; the autoconfig, autodiscover and automx names are route grants reaching it here"
}
],
"own-secrets": {
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@
"type": "file",
"path": "${dir:state}/mailu.env",
"mode": "0644",
"content": "ADMIN_ADDRESS=mailu-admin\nANTISPAM_ADDRESS=mailu-antispam\nANTIVIRUS_ADDRESS=mailu-antivirus\nIMAP_ADDRESS=mailu-imap\nSMTP_ADDRESS=mailu-smtp\nFRONT_ADDRESS=mailu-front\nWEBMAIL_ADDRESS=mailu-webmail\nWEBDAV_ADDRESS=mailu-webdav\nREDIS_ADDRESS=mailu-redis\nPORTS=25,80,443,465,993,995,4190,110,143,587\nDOMAIN=novox.be\nHOSTNAMES=mail.novox.be\nPOSTMASTER=admin\nSITENAME=Novox\nWEBSITE=https://novox.be\nTLS_FLAVOR=letsencrypt\nSUBNET=192.168.203.0/24\nCOMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME=mailu\nANTIVIRUS=clamav\nWEBMAIL=roundcube\nWEBDAV=radicale\nFETCHMAIL_ENABLED=True\nFETCHMAIL_DELAY=600\nADMIN=true\nWEB_ADMIN=/admin\nWEB_WEBMAIL=/webmail\nWEBROOT_REDIRECT=/webmail\nAPI=true\nWEB_API=/api\nAUTH_RATELIMIT_IP=6000/hour\nAUTH_RATELIMIT_USER=1000/day\nCREDENTIAL_ROUNDS=12\nPASSWORD_SCHEME=PBKDF2\nDISABLE_STATISTICS=True\nMESSAGE_SIZE_LIMIT=50000000\nMESSAGE_RATELIMIT=200/day\nRECIPIENT_DELIMITER=+\nPOSTFIX_MYNETWORKS=127.0.0.0/8 [::1]/128\nRELAYNETS=\nRELAYHOST=\nREJECT_UNLISTED_RECIPIENT=\nDB_FLAVOR=postgresql\nINITIAL_ADMIN_ACCOUNT=admin\nINITIAL_ADMIN_DOMAIN=novox.be\nINITIAL_ADMIN_MODE=ifmissing\nSMTP_PORT=25\nSMTPS_PORT=465\nSUBMISSION_PORT=587\nPOP3_PORT=110\nPOP3S_PORT=995\nIMAP_PORT=143\nIMAPS_PORT=993\nHTTP_PORT=7080\nHTTPS_PORT=7443\nAUTOMX_PORT=4243\nAMX_SMTP_ADDRESS=mail.novox.be\nAMX_SMTP_PORT=587\nAMX_IMAP_ADDRESS=mail.novox.be\nAMX_IMAP_PORT=143\nAMX_MAIL_DOMAINS=novox.be\nDMARC_RUA=admin\nDMARC_RUF=admin\nLETSENCRYPT_SHORTCHAIN=True\nTZ=Etc/UTC\nLOG_LEVEL=INFO\nWELCOME=false\nREAL_IP_HEADER=X-Real-IP\nREAL_IP_FROM=142.132.152.141\nCOMPRESSION=\nCOMPRESS_LEVEL=\nCOMPRESSION_LEVEL=\nBIND_ADDRESS4=127.0.0.1\nBIND_ADDRESS6=::1\nMAILU_VERSION=1.9\nDOCKER_ORG=mailu\nDOCKER_PREFIX=\nWELCOME_SUBJECT=Welcome to your new email account\nWELCOME_BODY=Welcome to your new email account, if you can read this, then it is configured properly!\n"
"content": "ADMIN_ADDRESS=mailu-admin\nANTISPAM_ADDRESS=mailu-antispam\nANTIVIRUS_ADDRESS=mailu-antivirus\nIMAP_ADDRESS=mailu-imap\nSMTP_ADDRESS=mailu-smtp\nFRONT_ADDRESS=mailu-front\nWEBMAIL_ADDRESS=mailu-webmail\nWEBDAV_ADDRESS=mailu-webdav\nREDIS_ADDRESS=mailu-redis\nPORTS=25,80,443,465,993,995,4190,110,143,587\nDOMAIN=${setting:domain}\nHOSTNAMES=${bound:route:name-web}\nPOSTMASTER=admin\nSITENAME=${setting:sitename}\nWEBSITE=${setting:website}\nTLS_FLAVOR=letsencrypt\nSUBNET=192.168.203.0/24\nCOMPOSE_PROJECT_NAME=mailu\nANTIVIRUS=clamav\nWEBMAIL=roundcube\nWEBDAV=radicale\nFETCHMAIL_ENABLED=True\nFETCHMAIL_DELAY=600\nADMIN=true\nWEB_ADMIN=/admin\nWEB_WEBMAIL=/webmail\nWEBROOT_REDIRECT=/webmail\nAPI=true\nWEB_API=/api\nAUTH_RATELIMIT_IP=6000/hour\nAUTH_RATELIMIT_USER=1000/day\nCREDENTIAL_ROUNDS=12\nPASSWORD_SCHEME=PBKDF2\nDISABLE_STATISTICS=True\nMESSAGE_SIZE_LIMIT=50000000\nMESSAGE_RATELIMIT=200/day\nRECIPIENT_DELIMITER=+\nPOSTFIX_MYNETWORKS=127.0.0.0/8 [::1]/128\nRELAYNETS=\nRELAYHOST=\nREJECT_UNLISTED_RECIPIENT=\nDB_FLAVOR=postgresql\nINITIAL_ADMIN_ACCOUNT=admin\nINITIAL_ADMIN_DOMAIN=${setting:domain}\nINITIAL_ADMIN_MODE=ifmissing\nSMTP_PORT=25\nSMTPS_PORT=465\nSUBMISSION_PORT=587\nPOP3_PORT=110\nPOP3S_PORT=995\nIMAP_PORT=143\nIMAPS_PORT=993\nHTTP_PORT=7080\nHTTPS_PORT=7443\nAUTOMX_PORT=4243\nAMX_SMTP_ADDRESS=${bound:route:name-web}\nAMX_SMTP_PORT=587\nAMX_IMAP_ADDRESS=${bound:route:name-web}\nAMX_IMAP_PORT=143\nAMX_MAIL_DOMAINS=${setting:domain}\nDMARC_RUA=admin\nDMARC_RUF=admin\nLETSENCRYPT_SHORTCHAIN=True\nTZ=Etc/UTC\nLOG_LEVEL=INFO\nWELCOME=false\nREAL_IP_HEADER=X-Real-IP\nREAL_IP_FROM=${setting:proxy-address}\nCOMPRESSION=\nCOMPRESS_LEVEL=\nCOMPRESSION_LEVEL=\nBIND_ADDRESS4=127.0.0.1\nBIND_ADDRESS6=::1\nMAILU_VERSION=1.9\nDOCKER_ORG=mailu\nDOCKER_PREFIX=\nWELCOME_SUBJECT=Welcome to your new email account\nWELCOME_BODY=Welcome to your new email account, if you can read this, then it is configured properly!\n"
},
{
"id": "secret-env",
@@ -315,10 +315,7 @@
"${dir:data-data}:/data",
"${dir:data-dkim}:/dkim"
],
"secrets-in-environment": "mailu-admin honours SECRET_KEY_FILE, DB_PW_FILE and API_TOKEN_FILE (configuration.py) but INITIAL_ADMIN_PW is env-only (start.py); the remaining containers' need for SECRET_KEY is unverified",
"dns": [
"192.168.203.254"
]
"secrets-in-environment": "mailu-admin honours SECRET_KEY_FILE, DB_PW_FILE and API_TOKEN_FILE (configuration.py) but INITIAL_ADMIN_PW is env-only (start.py); the remaining containers' need for SECRET_KEY is unverified"
},
{
"id": "imap",
@@ -493,7 +490,6 @@
"MESH_MAILU_API_KEY_FILE": "/run/secrets/api-token",
"MESH_MAILU_IMAP_CONTAINER": "mailu-imap",
"MESH_MAILU_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json",
"MESH_MAILU_DOMAIN": "novox.be",
"MESH_RECEIVES": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
},
"restart-on": [
@@ -556,9 +552,7 @@
],
"serves": {
"smtp": {
"port": 587,
"domain": "novox.be",
"name": "mail.novox.be"
"port": 587
}
},
"receives": {
+18 -3
View File
@@ -13,17 +13,32 @@
// it to both ends; mailu sets exactly that password every run — so a rotation takes — and seals
// nothing: the consumer already has its copy through the mesh's own channel.
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { runProvisioner, type Provision } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/provisioner";
import { MailuClient } from "../client.js";
const mailu = MailuClient.fromEnv();
// The mail server's own domain. From the environment the manifest composes, because the client's
// config file carries the admin API's coordinates, not the mail domain.
// The mail server's own domain: the operator's value, from the settings the mesh merges into this
// module's config file (`settings set mailu` with {"domain": …}; novox/hq ADR 0112, ADR 0155). A
// definition names no mesh, so it is never a literal in the manifest — and it used to be, as
// MESH_MAILU_DOMAIN, which is still read for a mesh that has not re-registered the manifest.
function domain(): string {
const file = process.env.MESH_MAILU_CONFIG_FILE;
if (file) {
try {
const config = JSON.parse(readFileSync(file, "utf8")) as { domain?: unknown };
if (typeof config.domain === "string" && config.domain.trim() !== "") return config.domain.trim();
} catch {
// Unreadable or not JSON: fall through to the environment, and the error below names both.
}
}
const named = (process.env.MESH_MAILU_DOMAIN ?? "").trim();
if (named === "") {
throw new Error("MESH_MAILU_DOMAIN is not set, so a consumer's address cannot be composed");
throw new Error(
"no mail domain is set, so a consumer's address cannot be composed — `settings set mailu <file>` " +
'with {"domain": "<the mail domain>"}',
);
}
return named;
}
+125
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
{
"module": "matrix",
"version": "1",
"capabilities": [
"container-runtime"
],
"listens": [
{
"name": "client",
"port": 6167,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "Conduit's client-server and federation APIs over plain HTTP. Both arrive through the route on 443: Conduit answers /.well-known/matrix/server with <its name>:443, so other homeservers federate through the proxy and nothing needs the traditional 8448"
},
{
"name": "web",
"port": 80,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "Element Web, the static browser client, served by the image's nginx; reached through its route"
}
],
"requires": [
"route"
],
"contributes": {
"route": {
"homeserver": {
"label": "matrix",
"endpoint": "client"
},
"element": {
"label": "element",
"endpoint": "web"
}
}
},
"binds": {
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
},
"resources": [
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "db",
"type": "directory",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "conduit-conf",
"type": "file",
"path": "${dir:state}/conduit.toml",
"mode": "0644",
"content": "# Written by the mesh (modules/matrix). Conduit reads this file (CONDUIT_CONFIG); nothing comes\n# from the environment. server_name is the homeserver's permanent identity: every user id, room id\n# and signature in the database carries it, so it is the name this module is served under\n# (${bound:route:name-homeserver}) and never changes once a database exists.\n[global]\nserver_name = \"${bound:route:name-homeserver}\"\ndatabase_backend = \"rocksdb\"\ndatabase_path = \"/var/lib/matrix-conduit/\"\naddress = \"0.0.0.0\"\nport = 6167\nmax_request_size = 20000000\nallow_registration = false\nallow_federation = true\nallow_check_for_updates = true\ntrusted_servers = [\"matrix.org\"]\n",
"names-on-purpose": {
"matrix.org": "the federation's public key server, trusted by default; the world's, not this mesh's"
}
},
{
"id": "element-conf",
"type": "file",
"path": "${dir:state}/element.json",
"mode": "0644",
"merge": "json",
"content": "{\n \"default_server_name\": \"${bound:route:name-homeserver}\",\n \"default_server_config\": {\n \"m.homeserver\": {\n \"base_url\": \"https://${bound:route:name-homeserver}\"\n },\n \"m.identity_server\": {\n \"base_url\": \"https://vector.im\"\n }\n },\n \"brand\": \"Element\",\n \"integrations_ui_url\": \"https://scalar.vector.im/\",\n \"integrations_rest_url\": \"https://scalar.vector.im/api\",\n \"integrations_widgets_urls\": [\n \"https://scalar.vector.im/_matrix/integrations/v1\",\n \"https://scalar.vector.im/api\",\n \"https://scalar-staging.vector.im/_matrix/integrations/v1\",\n \"https://scalar-staging.vector.im/api\",\n \"https://scalar-staging.riot.im/scalar/api\"\n ],\n \"bug_report_endpoint_url\": \"https://element.io/bugreports/submit\",\n \"uisi_autorageshake_app\": \"element-auto-uisi\",\n \"show_labs_settings\": true,\n \"room_directory\": {\n \"servers\": [\n \"${bound:route:name-homeserver}\",\n \"matrix.org\",\n \"gitter.im\",\n \"libera.chat\"\n ]\n },\n \"enable_presence_by_hs_url\": {\n \"https://matrix.org\": false,\n \"https://matrix-client.matrix.org\": false\n },\n \"terms_and_conditions_links\": [\n {\n \"url\": \"https://element.io/privacy\",\n \"text\": \"Privacy Policy\"\n },\n {\n \"url\": \"https://element.io/cookie-policy\",\n \"text\": \"Cookie Policy\"\n }\n ],\n \"features\": {\n \"feature_video_rooms\": true,\n \"feature_rust_crypto\": true\n },\n \"element_call\": {\n \"url\": \"https://call.element.dev\"\n }\n}\n",
"names-on-purpose": {
"matrix.org": "the public room directory and the federation's largest homeserver; the world's",
"matrix-client.matrix.org": "the same homeserver's client endpoint; the world's",
"vector.im": "Element's public identity server; the world's",
"scalar.vector.im": "Element's public integration manager; the world's",
"scalar-staging.vector.im": "Element's staging integration manager, named by the upstream default config; the world's",
"scalar-staging.riot.im": "the same, under its former name; the world's",
"element.io": "Element's bug reports, privacy and cookie pages; the world's",
"gitter.im": "a public room directory; the world's",
"libera.chat": "a public room directory; the world's",
"call.element.dev": "Element Call's public instance; the world's"
}
},
{
"id": "net",
"type": "network",
"name": "matrix"
},
{
"id": "homeserver",
"type": "container",
"name": "matrix",
"image": "matrixconduit/matrix-conduit@sha256:b0d24248e94f944ca49f90f10c429e3d65f4472bdde25661ecea9840134fb133",
"network": "matrix",
"env": {
"CONDUIT_CONFIG": "/etc/conduit/conduit.toml"
},
"ports": [
"6167"
],
"volumes": [
"${dir:db}:/var/lib/matrix-conduit",
"${dir:state}/conduit.toml:/etc/conduit/conduit.toml:ro"
],
"restart-on": [
"conduit-conf"
]
},
{
"id": "element",
"type": "container",
"name": "element-web",
"image": "vectorim/element-web@sha256:a8f415462ab8d2600a592ba1b92bea51efe5a4d10eb738aab9bed769f7099613",
"network": "matrix",
"ports": [
"80"
],
"volumes": [
"${dir:state}/element.json:/app/config.json:ro"
],
"restart-on": [
"element-conf"
]
}
]
}
+7 -7
View File
@@ -20,10 +20,10 @@
}
},
"binds": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/mesh-catalog/database.json"
"postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.json"
},
"secrets": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/mesh-catalog/database.secret"
"postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.secret"
},
"own-secrets": {
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/mesh-catalog/broker"
@@ -49,13 +49,13 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh-catalog",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "database-url",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh-catalog/database.url",
"path": "${dir:state}/database.url",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "postgresql://${bound:postgres-database:as}:${secret:postgres-database}@${bound:postgres-database:at}:${bound:postgres-database:port}/${bound:postgres-database:as}\n"
},
@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@
"network": "host",
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/mesh-catalog/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/mesh-catalog:/run/state",
"/var/lib/mesh-catalog/database.url:/run/secrets/database-url:ro"
"${dir:state}:/run/state",
"${dir:state}/database.url:/run/secrets/database-url:ro"
],
"env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
+13
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
# The console (novox/hq ADR 0152, design 34): the mesh's tools for whoever is on a machine, served
# over MCP on that machine's loopback.
#
# **Nothing is compiled here.** The console is the tool runtime's own client — `mesh serve` — which
# the runtime image already carries beside the runtime it runs modules with. This recipe changes the
# program the image starts and nothing else, so the console is exactly the client a person can run by
# hand, started by the mesh instead, on the credential the mesh sealed to the machine.
#
# One base, named rather than pinned: the mesh answers with the copy it holds (novox/hq issue 044).
ARG RUNTIME_BASE
FROM ${RUNTIME_BASE}
ENTRYPOINT ["node", "dist/mesh.js"]
+38
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
# mesh-console
The mesh's tools, on the machine a person sits at, served by a module the mesh assigned there
(novox/hq [ADR 0152](https://git.novox.be/novox/hq), design 34).
Assign it to a machine and an agent on that machine has the mesh's tools at
`http://127.0.0.1:<port>/mcp` — MCP over HTTP, `initialize`, `tools/list`, `tools/call`. A person at
a terminal reaches the same endpoint with `mesh tools --console http://127.0.0.1:<port>` and
`mesh call <module>.<tool> --console …`, with no credential of their own: the console holds it.
## What it is
The tool runtime's own client, `mesh serve`, started by the mesh on the credential it sealed to the
machine for `<node>.mesh-console`. The manifest says three things nothing else in the catalogue says
together:
- `invokes: ["*"]` — it calls every tool on the mesh, and the bus grants exactly that publish side;
- a listener `from: machine` — loopback only, and the filter opens nothing for it;
- no `emits`, no `consumes`, no `tools` — nothing on the bus can address it.
**Loopback is the authority boundary.** Whoever can connect is on the machine, and whoever is on the
machine is the account that owns the mesh there (ADR 0034, ADR 0144). There is no token and no login,
and `mesh serve` refuses to bind anything but a loopback address.
## What it lists
What the running modules answer: every tool runtime serves a `tools` verb for its module, and the
console asks the catalogue which modules the mesh holds and each module what it serves. A module that
did not answer — not assigned, not up, or built before the runtime answered `tools` — is named in the
list's `_meta.notAnswering` and can still be called by `<module>.<tool>`.
The mesh's own verbs (`status`, `push`, `assign`) are the `mesh-controller` seat's tools under
ADR 0132 and are not served on the bus yet; they appear here when they are.
## Port
The manifest declares port 4270 and the mesh assigns the machine port as it does for any listener;
the console binds `127.0.0.1:${port:4270}`. `node show <machine>` says which port a machine was given.
+64
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
{
"module": "mesh-console",
"version": "1",
"slug": "console",
"capabilities": [
"container-runtime"
],
"invokes": [
"*"
],
"own-secrets": {
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/mesh-console/broker"
},
"listens": [
{
"name": "mcp",
"port": 4270,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "machine",
"why": "the mesh's tools for whoever is on this machine, over MCP on loopback; the machine's login is the authority (novox/hq ADR 0152)"
}
],
"resources": [
{
"id": "mesh-state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/mesh-console",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "server",
"type": "container",
"name": "mesh-console",
"network": "host",
"args": [
"serve"
],
"env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_CONSOLE_LISTEN": "127.0.0.1:${port:4270}"
},
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/mesh-console/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro"
],
"artifact": "runtime"
}
],
"build": {
"on": [
{
"arg": "RUNTIME_BASE",
"module": "mesh-tools",
"artifact": "runtime"
}
],
"artifacts": [
{
"name": "runtime",
"kind": "image",
"from": "Dockerfile"
}
]
}
}
+10 -13
View File
@@ -21,10 +21,10 @@
"mesh-vault.secret.deprovisioned"
],
"receives": {
"secret": "/var/lib/mesh-vault/grants/mesh.json"
"secret": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
},
"grants": {
"secret": "/var/lib/mesh-vault/grants"
"secret": "${dir:grants}"
},
"keeps": "/var/lib/mesh-vault/root",
"own-secrets": {
@@ -40,25 +40,22 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh-vault",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "grants",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh-vault/grants",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "ledger",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh-vault/ledger",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "root",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh-vault/root",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
@@ -68,15 +65,15 @@
"network": "host",
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/mesh-vault/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/mesh-vault/grants:/var/lib/mesh-vault/grants:ro",
"/var/lib/mesh-vault/ledger:/var/lib/mesh-vault/ledger",
"/var/lib/mesh-vault/root:/var/lib/mesh-vault/root:ro"
"${dir:grants}:${dir:grants}:ro",
"${dir:ledger}:${dir:ledger}",
"${dir:root}:${dir:root}:ro"
],
"env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_RECEIVES": "/var/lib/mesh-vault/grants/mesh.json",
"MESH_VAULT_LEDGER": "/var/lib/mesh-vault/ledger",
"MESH_VAULT_ROOT": "/var/lib/mesh-vault/root"
"MESH_RECEIVES": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json",
"MESH_VAULT_LEDGER": "${dir:ledger}",
"MESH_VAULT_ROOT": "${dir:root}"
},
"artifact": "runtime"
}
+12 -14
View File
@@ -53,13 +53,13 @@
}
},
"receives": {
"s3-bucket": "/var/lib/minio/grants/mesh.json"
"s3-bucket": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
},
"grants": {
"s3-bucket": "/var/lib/minio/grants"
"s3-bucket": "${dir:grants}"
},
"own-secrets": {
"root": "/var/lib/minio/root.secret",
"root": "${dir:state}/root.secret",
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/minio/broker"
},
"resources": [
@@ -72,21 +72,20 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/minio",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "grants",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/minio/grants",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "root-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/minio/root.env",
"path": "${dir:state}/root.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "MINIO_ROOT_USER=meshroot\n"
"content": "MINIO_ROOT_USER=meshroot\nMINIO_BROWSER_REDIRECT_URL=https://${bound:route:name-console}\n"
},
{
"id": "data",
@@ -112,7 +111,7 @@
":9001"
],
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/minio/root.env"
"${dir:state}/root.env"
],
"ports": [
"9000",
@@ -120,11 +119,10 @@
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/minio-store:/data",
"/var/lib/minio/root.secret:/run/secrets/root:ro"
"${dir:state}/root.secret:/run/secrets/root:ro"
],
"env": {
"MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE": "/run/secrets/root",
"MINIO_BROWSER_REDIRECT_URL": "https://files.novox.be",
"MINIO_REGION": "eu-west"
}
},
@@ -135,8 +133,8 @@
"network": "minio-net",
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/minio/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/minio/grants:/var/lib/minio/grants:ro",
"/var/lib/minio/root.secret:/run/secrets/root:ro"
"${dir:grants}:${dir:grants}:ro",
"${dir:state}/root.secret:/run/secrets/root:ro"
],
"env": {
"MESH_MINIO_ENDPOINT": "http://minio:9000",
@@ -144,7 +142,7 @@
"MESH_MINIO_ROOT_PASSWORD_FILE": "/run/secrets/root",
"MESH_MINIO_REGION": "eu-west",
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_RECEIVES": "/var/lib/minio/grants/mesh.json"
"MESH_RECEIVES": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
},
"artifact": "runtime"
}
+7 -7
View File
@@ -14,10 +14,10 @@
}
},
"binds": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/model-usage/database.json"
"postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.json"
},
"secrets": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/model-usage/database.secret"
"postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.secret"
},
"consumes": [
"*.usage.*"
@@ -35,13 +35,13 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/model-usage",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "database-url",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/model-usage/database.url",
"path": "${dir:state}/database.url",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "postgresql://${bound:postgres-database:as}:${secret:postgres-database}@${bound:postgres-database:at}:${bound:postgres-database:port}/${bound:postgres-database:as}\n"
},
@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@
"network": "host",
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/model-usage/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/model-usage:/run/state",
"/var/lib/model-usage/database.url:/run/secrets/database-url:ro"
"${dir:state}:/run/state",
"${dir:state}/database.url:/run/secrets/database-url:ro"
],
"env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
+1 -1
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ ARG RUNTIME_BASE
FROM ${BUILD_BASE} AS build
WORKDIR /app/modules/mosquitto
COPY . .
RUN node /app/node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc client.ts index.ts tools/index.ts provisioner/index.ts bootstrap/index.ts \
RUN node /app/node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc topics.ts client.ts index.ts tools/index.ts provisioner/index.ts bootstrap/index.ts \
--module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist
FROM ${RUNTIME_BASE}
+38 -24
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
import { promisify } from "node:util";
import { missingAcls, parseRoleAcls, staleAcls, wantedAcls } from "./topics.js";
const run = promisify(execFile);
export interface MqttConn {
@@ -141,14 +143,19 @@ export class MosquittoClient {
}
/**
* Create (or reset to a known state) a client scoped to one topic namespace, idempotently. The
* client is confined to `<prefix>/#` by a same-named role: it may publish to, subscribe to and
* receive on exactly its own subtree and nothing else — the MQTT analog of redis's keyspace-scoped
* ACL user. Called again for an existing client, it resets the password and re-asserts the ACLs.
* Create (or reset to a known state) a client granted exactly these topic filters, idempotently.
* The grant is a same-named role carrying, for every filter, publish, receive and subscribe — and
* nothing else: an ACL the role carries that the filters no longer name is removed, so narrowing a
* consumer's `topics` narrows what it may do. By default the filters are the consumer's own
* subtree, `<as>/#` (see topics.ts). Called again for an existing client, it resets the password
* and re-asserts the ACLs.
*
* Only the role named for this client is ever changed. A client or role the mesh did not make —
* a device carried from the predecessor's password file, its `legacy-full-access` role — is never
* read, changed or removed here.
*/
async createScopedClient(username: string, password: string, topicPrefix: string): Promise<void> {
async createScopedClient(username: string, password: string, filters: readonly string[]): Promise<void> {
const role = username; // one role per client, named for it
const pattern = `${topicPrefix}/#`;
if (await this.clientExists(username)) {
await this.ctl("setClientPassword", username, password);
@@ -161,17 +168,18 @@ export class MosquittoClient {
await this.ctl("createClient", username, "-p", password);
}
// A role carrying exactly this client's topic ACLs. createRole, addRoleACL and addClientRole are
// all one-shot: each rejects with an "already exists" when re-run against a role/ACL/binding it
// created on a previous reconcile. That rejection is the intended terminal state — the ACL is
// deterministic (`<prefix>/#`, allow), so re-adding the identical entry is a no-op — so it is
// swallowed. (Until the exit code was fixed this was invisible: the tool returned 0 and the
// rejection was lost; now it surfaces, and each of these adds must tolerate its own idempotent
// re-run explicitly.)
// createRole and addRoleACL are one-shot: each rejects with an "already exists" when re-run
// against a role/ACL it created on a previous reconcile. That rejection is the intended terminal
// state, so it is swallowed.
await ignoreExisting(this.ctl("createRole", role));
for (const acl of ["publishClientSend", "publishClientReceive", "subscribePattern"]) {
// allow (1) this client to send to, receive on, and subscribe under its own subtree.
await ignoreExisting(this.ctl("addRoleACL", role, acl, pattern, "allow"));
const wanted = wantedAcls(filters);
const current = parseRoleAcls(await this.ctl("getRole", role));
for (const acl of missingAcls(current, wanted)) {
await ignoreExisting(this.ctl("addRoleACL", role, acl.type, acl.topic, "allow"));
}
// What the consumer no longer asks for — added before it narrowed its topics — is taken away.
for (const acl of staleAcls(current, wanted)) {
await ignoreMissing(this.ctl("removeRoleACL", role, acl.type, acl.topic));
}
// Bind the role only when it is not already bound — addClientRole is the one call whose
// idempotent re-run cannot be recognised by message (see clientHasRole).
@@ -181,25 +189,31 @@ export class MosquittoClient {
}
/**
* Whether a consumer's client accepts exactly this password and still carries its own role.
* Read-only. The password is checked the way the consumer is checked, by an MQTT CONNECT as it,
* and the broker's CONNACK code is the answer: 0 accepted, 4 bad credentials, 5 not authorised.
* Nothing rides on argv. An unreachable broker rejects (novox/hq issue 120).
* Whether a consumer's client accepts exactly this password, still carries its own role, and that
* role grants exactly these filters. Read-only. The password is checked the way the consumer is
* checked, by an MQTT CONNECT as it, and the broker's CONNACK code is the answer: 0 accepted,
* 4 bad credentials, 5 not authorised. Nothing rides on argv. An unreachable broker rejects
* (novox/hq issue 120).
*/
async holdsClient(username: string, password: string): Promise<boolean> {
async holdsClient(username: string, password: string, filters: readonly string[]): Promise<boolean> {
const code = await mqttConnack(this.conn.host, this.conn.port, username, password);
if (code === 4 || code === 5) return false;
if (code !== 0) throw new Error(`mosquitto refused ${username} with CONNACK ${code}`);
// The role, asked directly: only "not found" means absent. Any other failure to ask rejects,
// unlike clientHasRole, which reads every failure as "no role".
let out: string;
let client: string;
let role: string;
try {
out = await this.ctl("getClient", username);
client = await this.ctl("getClient", username);
role = await this.ctl("getRole", username);
} catch (err) {
if (/not\s*found|does not exist|no such/i.test(String(err))) return false;
throw err;
}
return new RegExp(`(^|\\s)${escapeRegExp(username)}\\s+\\(priority`, "m").test(out);
if (!new RegExp(`(^|\\s)${escapeRegExp(username)}\\s+\\(priority`, "m").test(client)) return false;
const current = parseRoleAcls(role);
const wanted = wantedAcls(filters);
return missingAcls(current, wanted).length === 0 && staleAcls(current, wanted).length === 0;
}
/** Remove a client and the per-client role created for it, idempotently. */
+19 -18
View File
@@ -20,16 +20,19 @@
"mosquitto.topic.deprovisioned"
],
"serves": {
"mqtt-topic": {}
"mqtt-topic": {
"scheme": "mqtt",
"port": 1883
}
},
"receives": {
"mqtt-topic": "/var/lib/mosquitto-module/grants/mesh.json"
"mqtt-topic": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
},
"grants": {
"mqtt-topic": "/var/lib/mosquitto-module/grants"
"mqtt-topic": "${dir:grants}"
},
"own-secrets": {
"admin": "/var/lib/mosquitto-module/admin.secret",
"admin": "/var/lib/mesh/mosquitto/admin",
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/mosquitto/broker"
},
"listens": [
@@ -58,26 +61,24 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mosquitto-module",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "grants-dir",
"id": "grants",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mosquitto-module/grants",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "data",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/services/mosquitto/data",
"mode": "0700",
"owner": "1883:1883"
},
{
"id": "server-conf",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mosquitto-module/mosquitto.conf",
"path": "${dir:state}/mosquitto.conf",
"mode": "0600",
"owner": "1883:1883",
"content": "persistence true\npersistence_location /mosquitto/data\n\nlog_dest stdout\nlog_type warning\nlog_type error\nlog_type notice\n\n# Every client authenticates; identities and their per-topic ACLs are managed\n# at runtime by the dynamic security plugin, whose store the plugin itself owns.\nallow_anonymous false\nplugin /usr/lib/mosquitto_dynamic_security.so\nplugin_opt_config_file /mosquitto/data/dynamic-security.json\n\n# MQTT listener\nlistener 1883\n\n# MQTT-over-WebSockets listener\nlistener 8081\nprotocol websockets\n"
@@ -93,8 +94,8 @@
"name": "mosquitto-bootstrap",
"run-once": true,
"volumes": [
"/services/mosquitto/data:/mosquitto/data",
"/var/lib/mosquitto-module/admin.secret:/run/secrets/admin:ro"
"${dir:data}:/mosquitto/data",
"/var/lib/mesh/mosquitto/admin:/run/secrets/admin:ro"
],
"env": {
"MESH_PROVISION_MQTT": "mosquitto:1883",
@@ -112,15 +113,15 @@
"id": "server",
"type": "container",
"name": "mosquitto",
"image": "eclipse-mosquitto@sha256:6f8d8a947c506f8a2290ec65cd4bd2bc7cb4d43fb5f6271f861cb013e2ef9797",
"image": "eclipse-mosquitto@sha256:38c0da4f2ef84284d47b3b3eeea1cb3bdeabe81ee10caf0cd5c5ff61ee3ea408",
"network": "mosquitto",
"ports": [
"1883",
"8081"
],
"volumes": [
"/services/mosquitto/data:/mosquitto/data",
"/var/lib/mosquitto-module/mosquitto.conf:/mosquitto/config/mosquitto.conf:ro"
"${dir:data}:/mosquitto/data",
"${dir:state}/mosquitto.conf:/mosquitto/config/mosquitto.conf:ro"
]
},
{
@@ -130,12 +131,12 @@
"network": "mosquitto",
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/mosquitto/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/mosquitto-module/grants:/var/lib/mosquitto-module/grants:ro",
"/var/lib/mosquitto-module/admin.secret:/run/secrets/admin:ro"
"${dir:grants}:${dir:grants}:ro",
"/var/lib/mesh/mosquitto/admin:/run/secrets/admin:ro"
],
"env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_RECEIVES": "/var/lib/mosquitto-module/grants/mesh.json",
"MESH_RECEIVES": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json",
"MESH_PROVISION_MQTT": "mosquitto:1883",
"MESH_PROVISION_ADMIN_USER": "mesh-admin",
"MESH_PROVISION_PASSWORD_FILE": "/run/secrets/admin"
+6 -1
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,14 @@
{
"name": "@novox/module-mosquitto",
"version": "0.1.0",
"description": "mosquitto — provides the mesh mqtt-topic interface. Its admin client, provisioner, tools and events live here (novox/hq ADR 0039).",
"description": "mosquitto \u2014 provides the mesh mqtt-topic interface. Its admin client, provisioner, tools and events live here (novox/hq ADR 0039).",
"type": "module",
"private": true,
"scripts": {
"build": "tsc topics.ts client.ts index.ts tools/index.ts provisioner/index.ts bootstrap/index.ts --module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist",
"typecheck": "tsc -p tsconfig.json",
"test": "node --test --experimental-strip-types 'test/*.test.ts'"
},
"dependencies": {
"@novox/mesh-sdk": "^0.1.1"
},
+24 -6
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,14 @@
//
// The `mqtt-topic` interface: a consumer connects as `as` with the password the mesh minted, and
// publishes and subscribes under `<as>/#`, isolated from every other consumer by a Dynamic Security
// role scoped to exactly that subtree.
// role scoped to exactly that subtree — unless it contributed `topics`, the MQTT topic filters its
// work needs (a home-automation hub needs the devices' topics); then the role grants exactly those
// (topics.ts). A list that is not valid topic filters is refused, and the consumer is not created
// or changed until it is fixed.
//
// What a consumer is told (its binding): `at` — the broker's machine — and `port`, the machine port
// of the MQTT listener (the manifest's `serves`); `as` is its login, and its copy of the password is
// the pair credential the mesh delivers to it.
//
// **The login and password are the mesh's, not the provisioner's (ADR 0048).** The mesh derives the
// login and hands it to both ends so they agree, and mints the password and delivers a copy to each.
@@ -15,6 +22,7 @@
import { runProvisioner, type Provision } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/provisioner";
import { emit } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/events";
import { MosquittoClient } from "../client.js";
import { topicFilters } from "../topics.js";
const mosquitto = MosquittoClient.fromEnv();
@@ -29,13 +37,20 @@ async function announce(type: string, body: Record<string, string>): Promise<voi
runProvisioner("mqtt-topic", {
async create(p: Provision): Promise<void> {
// The topic subtree is scoped to the consumer's own login, so one cannot read another's topics.
const topicPrefix = p.as;
await mosquitto.createScopedClient(p.as, p.password, topicPrefix);
// By default the consumer's own subtree, so one cannot read another's topics; what it
// contributed as `topics` otherwise.
const granted = topicFilters(p.values, p.as);
if ("problem" in granted) {
// Thrown, so the harness logs it and retries: the consumer stays as it was (or absent) until
// its contribution is valid, rather than being given a grant it did not ask for.
throw new Error(`${p.as}: ${granted.problem}`);
}
await mosquitto.createScopedClient(p.as, p.password, granted.filters);
await announce("topic.provisioned", {
consumer: p.consumer ?? "",
username: p.as,
topicPrefix,
topicPrefix: granted.own ? p.as : "",
topics: granted.filters.join(" "),
});
},
@@ -46,6 +61,9 @@ runProvisioner("mqtt-topic", {
// Asked every minute by the harness: whether the backend still holds this consumer exactly as
// the mesh gave it, so a login lost behind the provisioner's back is made again (novox/hq issue 120).
async holds(p: Provision): Promise<boolean> {
return mosquitto.holdsClient(p.as, p.password);
const granted = topicFilters(p.values, p.as);
// An invalid list was never applied; create refuses it again, loudly, on every pass.
if ("problem" in granted) return false;
return mosquitto.holdsClient(p.as, p.password, granted.filters);
},
});
+72
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
// What a consumer of mqtt-topic is granted (topics.ts): its own subtree unless it contributed
// `topics`; a contributed list is granted exactly, refused whole when it is not topic filters; and
// the role is brought to exactly the wanted ACLs — missing ones added, stale ones removed — read from
// `mosquitto_ctrl dynsec getRole` as eclipse-mosquitto 2.1.2 prints it.
import { test } from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import { filterProblem, missingAcls, parseRoleAcls, staleAcls, topicFilters, wantedAcls } from "../topics.ts";
test("a consumer that contributed nothing gets its own subtree", () => {
assert.deepEqual(topicFilters({}, "mesh_ace_hass"), { ok: true, filters: ["mesh_ace_hass/#"], own: true });
assert.deepEqual(topicFilters(undefined, "x"), { ok: true, filters: ["x/#"], own: true });
// Settings merge into every contribution: keys that are not `topics` change nothing.
assert.deepEqual(topicFilters({ endpoints: { web: {} } }, "x"), { ok: true, filters: ["x/#"], own: true });
});
test("a contributed list is granted exactly, duplicates once", () => {
assert.deepEqual(topicFilters({ topics: ["#"] }, "x"), { ok: true, filters: ["#"], own: false });
assert.deepEqual(topicFilters({ topics: ["stat/+/POWER", "tele/#", "tele/#", "/octoprint/x"] }, "x"), {
ok: true,
filters: ["stat/+/POWER", "tele/#", "/octoprint/x"],
own: false,
});
});
test("a list that is not topic filters is refused whole", () => {
for (const topics of [[], "#", [""], ["a/#/b"], ["a#"], ["a/b+"], [42], ["a\u0000b"], {}]) {
const out = topicFilters({ topics } as Record<string, unknown>, "x");
assert.equal(out.ok, false, JSON.stringify(topics));
}
assert.equal(filterProblem("+/+/#"), undefined);
assert.equal(filterProblem("#"), undefined);
});
const GET_ROLE = `Warning: You are running mosquitto_ctrl without encryption.
This means all of the configuration changes you are making are visible on the network, including passwords.
Rolename: u1
ACLs: publishClientSend : allow : # (priority: 0)
subscribePattern : allow : u1/# (priority: 0)
publishClientReceive : deny : secret topic/with space (priority: -1)
`;
test("getRole's ACL lines are read, the warning and headings are not", () => {
assert.deepEqual(parseRoleAcls(GET_ROLE), [
{ type: "publishClientSend", allow: true, topic: "#" },
{ type: "subscribePattern", allow: true, topic: "u1/#" },
{ type: "publishClientReceive", allow: false, topic: "secret topic/with space" },
]);
assert.deepEqual(parseRoleAcls("Rolename: empty\nACLs:\n"), []);
});
test("the role is brought to exactly the wanted ACLs", () => {
const current = parseRoleAcls(GET_ROLE);
const wanted = wantedAcls(["u1/#"]);
assert.deepEqual(wanted, [
{ type: "publishClientSend", allow: true, topic: "u1/#" },
{ type: "publishClientReceive", allow: true, topic: "u1/#" },
{ type: "subscribePattern", allow: true, topic: "u1/#" },
]);
assert.deepEqual(missingAcls(current, wanted), [
{ type: "publishClientSend", allow: true, topic: "u1/#" },
{ type: "publishClientReceive", allow: true, topic: "u1/#" },
]);
assert.deepEqual(staleAcls(current, wanted), [
{ type: "publishClientSend", allow: true, topic: "#" },
{ type: "publishClientReceive", allow: false, topic: "secret topic/with space" },
]);
assert.deepEqual(staleAcls(wanted, wanted), []);
assert.deepEqual(missingAcls(wanted, wanted), []);
});
+107
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
// Which topics a consumer of `mqtt-topic` may use — the one choice a consumer makes about its grant.
//
// **By default, its own subtree and nothing else.** A consumer connects as the login the mesh derived
// (`as`) and may publish, receive and subscribe under `<as>/#` — isolated from every other consumer,
// which is the point of a per-consumer client (novox/hq ADR 0039/0048).
//
// **A consumer whose work IS the shared topic space says so.** Home Assistant discovers devices
// under `homeassistant/#` and `tasmota/discovery/#` and follows whatever state topics they announce;
// Node-RED's flows subscribe to the topics devices publish on (`stat/<device>/POWER`, …). Confined
// to `<as>/#` neither could do its job. So a consumer contributes `topics` to its `mqtt-topic`
// requirement — a list of MQTT topic filters — and the provisioner grants exactly those, both ways.
// Because assignment settings merge into every contribution, an operator narrows (or widens) the
// list per machine with the same key, without editing a manifest.
//
// Pure, so it is tested without a broker (test/topics.test.ts).
/** The dynsec ACL types a granted filter carries: send to it, receive from it, subscribe to it. */
export const GRANTED_ACL_TYPES = ["publishClientSend", "publishClientReceive", "subscribePattern"] as const;
/** One ACL on a role, as `mosquitto_ctrl dynsec getRole` reports it. */
export interface Acl {
type: string;
allow: boolean;
topic: string;
}
export type Filters = { ok: true; filters: string[]; own: boolean } | { ok: false; problem: string };
/**
* The topic filters a consumer is granted: what it contributed as `topics`, or its own subtree when
* it contributed nothing. Refused — never silently narrowed or widened — when the list is not a
* list of valid MQTT topic filters: a grant that quietly differs from what was asked is a consumer
* that fails somewhere far from the cause.
*/
export function topicFilters(values: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>> | undefined, as: string): Filters {
const given = values?.topics;
if (given === undefined || given === null) {
return { ok: true, filters: [`${as}/#`], own: true };
}
if (!Array.isArray(given) || given.length === 0) {
return { ok: false, problem: `topics must be a non-empty list of MQTT topic filters, not ${JSON.stringify(given)}` };
}
const out: string[] = [];
for (const f of given) {
if (typeof f !== "string") {
return { ok: false, problem: `topics holds ${JSON.stringify(f)}, which is not a topic filter` };
}
const problem = filterProblem(f);
if (problem) return { ok: false, problem: `topic filter ${JSON.stringify(f)}: ${problem}` };
if (!out.includes(f)) out.push(f);
}
return { ok: true, filters: out, own: out.length === 1 && out[0] === `${as}/#` };
}
/** Why a string is not a valid MQTT topic filter (MQTT 3.1.1 §4.7), or undefined when it is one. */
export function filterProblem(filter: string): string | undefined {
if (filter.length === 0) return "it is empty";
if (Buffer.byteLength(filter, "utf8") > 65535) return "it is longer than MQTT allows";
if (filter.includes("\u0000")) return "it contains a NUL character";
const levels = filter.split("/");
for (let i = 0; i < levels.length; i++) {
const level = levels[i];
if (level.includes("#") && (level !== "#" || i !== levels.length - 1)) {
return "'#' must be a whole level, and the last one";
}
if (level.includes("+") && level !== "+") return "'+' must be a whole level";
}
return undefined;
}
/** The ACLs a role must carry to grant these filters: every granted type, allowed, on every filter. */
export function wantedAcls(filters: readonly string[]): Acl[] {
const out: Acl[] = [];
for (const topic of filters) {
for (const type of GRANTED_ACL_TYPES) out.push({ type, allow: true, topic });
}
return out;
}
/**
* The ACLs `mosquitto_ctrl dynsec getRole` lists, one per line under its "ACLs:" heading:
* `ACLs: publishClientSend : allow : # (priority: 0)`
* ` subscribePattern : allow : u1/# (priority: 0)`
*/
export function parseRoleAcls(output: string): Acl[] {
const out: Acl[] = [];
const line = /^(?:ACLs:)?\s*([A-Za-z]+)\s*:\s*(allow|deny)\s*:\s*(.*?)\s+\(priority:\s*-?\d+\)\s*$/;
for (const raw of output.split(/\r?\n/)) {
const m = raw.match(line);
if (m) out.push({ type: m[1], allow: m[2] === "allow", topic: m[3] });
}
return out;
}
const key = (a: Acl): string => `${a.type}\u0000${a.allow ? "allow" : "deny"}\u0000${a.topic}`;
/** ACLs a role carries that it should not: in `current` and not in `wanted`. */
export function staleAcls(current: readonly Acl[], wanted: readonly Acl[]): Acl[] {
const want = new Set(wanted.map(key));
return current.filter((a) => !want.has(key(a)));
}
/** ACLs a role should carry and does not. */
export function missingAcls(current: readonly Acl[], wanted: readonly Acl[]): Acl[] {
const have = new Set(current.map(key));
return wanted.filter((a) => !have.has(key(a)));
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -8,5 +8,5 @@
"skipLibCheck": true,
"noEmit": true
},
"include": ["client.ts", "index.ts", "provisioner/index.ts", "tools/index.ts", "bootstrap/index.ts"]
"include": ["topics.ts", "client.ts", "index.ts", "provisioner/index.ts", "tools/index.ts", "bootstrap/index.ts"]
}
+11 -12
View File
@@ -21,23 +21,23 @@
"listens": [
{
"name": "database",
"port": 4848,
"port": 1433,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "modules on any machine that were granted a database. 4848, not 1433: the machine this replaces has served it there since it was installed, and every consumer was handed that number"
"why": "modules on any machine that were granted a database, and the people who were given its address; the machine port is the assignment's to pin"
}
],
"serves": {
"mssql-database": {}
},
"receives": {
"mssql-database": "/var/lib/mssql/grants/mesh.json"
"mssql-database": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
},
"grants": {
"mssql-database": "/var/lib/mssql/grants"
"mssql-database": "${dir:grants}"
},
"own-secrets": {
"sa": "/var/lib/mssql/sa.secret",
"sa": "${dir:state}/sa.secret",
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/mssql/broker"
},
"resources": [
@@ -50,19 +50,18 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mssql",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "grants",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mssql/grants",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "sa-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mssql/sa.env",
"path": "${dir:state}/sa.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "ACCEPT_EULA=Y\nMSSQL_SA_PASSWORD=${secret:sa}\n"
},
@@ -84,7 +83,7 @@
"image": "mcr.microsoft.com/mssql/server@sha256:4402d880dd4c34bfa7d8705e56a86cd6c88da80a1f6bbbe741f999e76264a090",
"network": "mssql",
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/mssql/sa.env"
"${dir:state}/sa.env"
],
"ports": [
"1433"
@@ -101,8 +100,8 @@
"network": "mssql",
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/mssql/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/mssql/grants:/var/lib/mssql/grants:ro",
"/var/lib/mssql/sa.secret:/run/secrets/sa:ro"
"${dir:grants}:/var/lib/mssql/grants:ro",
"${dir:state}/sa.secret:/run/secrets/sa:ro"
],
"env": {
"MESH_PROVISION_MSSQL": "mssql://sa@mssql:1433/master",
+10 -10
View File
@@ -18,14 +18,14 @@
}
},
"binds": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/n8n/database.json",
"route": "/var/lib/n8n/route.json"
"postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.json",
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
},
"secrets": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/n8n/database.secret"
"postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.secret"
},
"own-secrets": {
"basic-auth": "/var/lib/n8n/basic-auth.secret"
"basic-auth": "${dir:state}/basic-auth.secret"
},
"listens": [
{
@@ -33,15 +33,15 @@
"port": 5682,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "the n8n editor and webhook endpoints over http; the public name n8n.novox.be is a route grant, and route-proxy reaches it on this published port"
"why": "the n8n editor and webhook endpoints over http; its public name is a route grant, and route-proxy reaches it on this published port"
}
],
"resources": [
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/n8n",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "data",
@@ -53,9 +53,9 @@
{
"id": "server-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/n8n/server.env",
"path": "${dir:state}/server.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "N8N_HOST=n8n.novox.be\nN8N_PORT=5678\nN8N_PROTOCOL=https\nWEBHOOK_URL=https://n8n.novox.be/\nN8N_BASIC_AUTH_ACTIVE=true\nN8N_BASIC_AUTH_USER=admin\nN8N_BASIC_AUTH_PASSWORD=${secret:basic-auth}\nNODE_FUNCTION_ALLOW_BUILTIN=*\nNODE_FUNCTION_ALLOW_EXTERNAL=*\nDB_TYPE=postgresdb\nDB_POSTGRESDB_HOST=${bound:postgres-database:at}\nDB_POSTGRESDB_PORT=${bound:postgres-database:port}\nDB_POSTGRESDB_DATABASE=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nDB_POSTGRESDB_USER=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nDB_POSTGRESDB_PASSWORD=${secret:postgres-database}\n"
"content": "N8N_HOST=${bound:route:name}\nN8N_PORT=5678\nN8N_PROTOCOL=https\nWEBHOOK_URL=https://${bound:route:name}/\nN8N_BASIC_AUTH_ACTIVE=true\nN8N_BASIC_AUTH_USER=admin\nN8N_BASIC_AUTH_PASSWORD=${secret:basic-auth}\nNODE_FUNCTION_ALLOW_BUILTIN=*\nNODE_FUNCTION_ALLOW_EXTERNAL=*\nDB_TYPE=postgresdb\nDB_POSTGRESDB_HOST=${bound:postgres-database:at}\nDB_POSTGRESDB_PORT=${bound:postgres-database:port}\nDB_POSTGRESDB_DATABASE=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nDB_POSTGRESDB_USER=${bound:postgres-database:as}\nDB_POSTGRESDB_PASSWORD=${secret:postgres-database}\n"
},
{
"id": "net",
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
"image": "n8nio/n8n@sha256:4846eb2f4b874ab04cde7fc1e249d2ddaec66e9aea64439beb2972cfea88e3c0",
"network": "n8n",
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/n8n/server.env"
"${dir:state}/server.env"
],
"ports": [
"5678"
+4 -1
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ ARG RUNTIME_BASE
FROM ${BUILD_BASE} AS build
WORKDIR /app/modules/nodered
COPY . .
RUN node /app/node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc client.ts tools/index.ts \
RUN node /app/node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc client.ts tools/index.ts mqtt/probe.ts mqtt/connection.ts mqtt/index.ts \
--module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist
FROM ${RUNTIME_BASE}
@@ -22,3 +22,6 @@ COPY --from=build /app/modules/nodered/dist /app/modules/nodered/dist
# provider's provisioner runs its reconcile loop in the same process, with the broker connected —
# the convention novox/hq issues 060/061 settled.
ENV MESH_TOOL_MODULES=/app/modules/nodered/dist/tools/index.js
# NOT dist/mqtt/index.js: that is a step the host runs to completion, named by the `mqtt`
# container's args as `mesh-tools run …` (novox/hq ADR 0052). Listed here it would run inside the
# serving sidecar too, and exit it.
+38 -3
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,8 @@
//
// Node-RED exposes a runtime admin API under its base URL: GET/POST /flows for the whole flow
// configuration, GET /nodes for installed node modules. A default install has no auth; when
// adminAuth is on, a bearer token (minted at /auth/token) is required.
// adminAuth is on, a bearer token is required — the module's settings accept the mesh-minted
// api-token, which the runtime config file carries as `token`.
import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
@@ -81,6 +82,35 @@ export class NodeRedClient {
return modules.map((m) => ({ name: m.name, version: m.version, types: m.types ?? [] }));
}
/** The whole flow configuration with its revision (API v2), for a deploy that must not clobber
* a change made meanwhile. */
async flowsWithRev(): Promise<{ rev: string; flows: any[] }> {
const body = await this.req("/flows", { headers: this.headers({ "Node-RED-API-Version": "v2" }) });
return { rev: String(body?.rev ?? ""), flows: Array.isArray(body?.flows) ? body.flows : [] };
}
/** A node's stored credentials as Node-RED shows them: plain fields, and `has_<field>` for secret ones. */
async credentials(type: string, id: string): Promise<{ user?: string; has_password?: boolean }> {
return (await this.req(`/credentials/${encodeURIComponent(type)}/${encodeURIComponent(id)}`, { headers: this.headers() })) ?? {};
}
/**
* Deploy the flow configuration read at `rev`. Node-RED answers 409 when the flows changed since,
* rather than overwriting what someone deployed in between. A node carrying `credentials` has them
* stored (encrypted) and counts as changed, so a "nodes" deploy restarts it and nothing else.
*/
async deployFlowsAt(rev: string, config: any[], type = "nodes"): Promise<void> {
await this.req("/flows", {
method: "POST",
headers: this.headers({
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Node-RED-API-Version": "v2",
"Node-RED-Deployment-Type": type,
}),
body: JSON.stringify({ rev, flows: config }),
});
}
/**
* Replace the whole flow configuration and deploy. Returns the new revision. `type` maps to
* Node-RED's deployment types — "full" (default), "nodes", or "flows".
@@ -88,8 +118,13 @@ export class NodeRedClient {
async deployFlows(config: any[], type = "full"): Promise<{ rev?: string; nodeCount: number }> {
const body = await this.req("/flows", {
method: "POST",
headers: this.headers({ "Content-Type": "application/json", "Node-RED-Deployment-Type": type }),
body: JSON.stringify(config),
// v2 answers { rev }; v1 answers 204 with no body, which req() cannot parse.
headers: this.headers({
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Node-RED-API-Version": "v2",
"Node-RED-Deployment-Type": type,
}),
body: JSON.stringify({ flows: config }),
});
return { rev: body?.rev, nodeCount: config.length };
}
+85 -7
View File
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@
"flows.deployed"
],
"own-secrets": {
"admin": "/var/lib/mesh/nodered/admin",
"api-token": "/var/lib/mesh/nodered/api-token",
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/nodered/broker"
},
"capabilities": [
@@ -26,26 +28,63 @@
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/nodered",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "data",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/services/nodered/data",
"mode": "0700",
"owner": "1000:1000"
},
{
"id": "written",
"type": "directory",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "settings-code",
"type": "file",
"path": "${dir:state}/settings.js",
"mode": "0600",
"owner": "1000:1000",
"content": "// Node-RED's settings, written by the mesh from the nodered module. What an assignment may change\n// is settings.json beside this file (merged key by key); the credentials are the mesh's secrets and\n// reach Node-RED only through this file. The flows' own credentials stay encrypted in the user\n// directory under the key Node-RED keeps there (.config.runtime.json), which is data, not this.\nconst fs = require(\"fs\");\nconst path = require(\"path\");\nconst crypto = require(\"crypto\");\n\nconst ADMIN_PASSWORD = \"${secret:admin}\";\nconst API_TOKEN = \"${secret:api-token}\";\nconst ADMIN = { username: \"admin\", permissions: \"*\" };\n\nconst settings = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(__dirname, \"settings.json\"), \"utf8\"));\n// The mesh's keys, not Node-RED's: endpoints lands in every merged file; timeZone is the\n// assignment's way to set the zone flows schedule and format in; mqtt names the broker nodes the\n// module's MQTT step keeps pointed at the mesh's broker; topics is what nodered asks the broker for.\nif (settings.timeZone) process.env.TZ = settings.timeZone;\ndelete settings.timeZone;\ndelete settings.endpoints;\ndelete settings.mqtt;\ndelete settings.topics;\n\nfunction same(a, b) {\n const x = crypto.createHash(\"sha256\").update(String(a)).digest();\n const y = crypto.createHash(\"sha256\").update(String(b)).digest();\n return crypto.timingSafeEqual(x, y);\n}\n\n// The admin secret is a password, or, accepted from an existing install, the bcrypt hash its\n// settings held, so the password people already use keeps working.\nfunction passwordMatches(given) {\n if (/^\\$2[aby]\\$\\d\\d\\$/.test(ADMIN_PASSWORD)) return require(\"bcryptjs\").compare(String(given), ADMIN_PASSWORD);\n return Promise.resolve(same(given, ADMIN_PASSWORD));\n}\n\nmodule.exports = Object.assign(settings, {\n uiPort: 1880,\n adminAuth: {\n type: \"credentials\",\n users: (username) => Promise.resolve(username === ADMIN.username ? ADMIN : null),\n authenticate: (username, password) =>\n username === ADMIN.username\n ? passwordMatches(password).then((ok) => (ok ? ADMIN : null))\n : Promise.resolve(null),\n // The module's own tools call the admin API with this bearer token.\n tokens: (token) => Promise.resolve(same(token, API_TOKEN) ? { username: \"mesh\", permissions: \"*\" } : null),\n },\n});\n"
},
{
"id": "settings",
"type": "file",
"path": "${dir:state}/settings.json",
"mode": "0600",
"owner": "1000:1000",
"merge": "json",
"content": "{\n \"flowFile\": \"flows.json\",\n \"flowFilePretty\": true,\n \"diagnostics\": { \"enabled\": true, \"ui\": true },\n \"runtimeState\": { \"enabled\": false, \"ui\": false },\n \"logging\": { \"console\": { \"level\": \"info\", \"metrics\": false, \"audit\": false } },\n \"exportGlobalContextKeys\": false,\n \"externalModules\": {},\n \"editorTheme\": { \"projects\": { \"enabled\": false } },\n \"functionExternalModules\": true,\n \"debugMaxLength\": 1000,\n \"mqttReconnectTime\": 15000,\n \"serialReconnectTime\": 15000\n}\n"
},
{
"id": "server",
"type": "container",
"name": "nodered",
"image": "nodered/node-red@sha256:02a2b92a41b73d2bc388238b86e4fcaab7fb5466373adb24e1df6aa5845265ff",
"image": "nodered/node-red@sha256:a649dd711d55490151a2c39a8e48ad0c44325488fbc0e66315f2d2e19e5e1ace",
"env": {
"TZ": "Etc/UTC"
},
"ports": [
"1880"
],
"args": [
"--settings",
"/data/settings.js"
],
"volumes": [
"/services/nodered/data:/data"
"${dir:data}:/data",
"${dir:state}/settings.js:/data/settings.js:ro",
"${dir:state}/settings.json:/data/settings.json:ro"
],
"restart-on": [
"settings-code",
"settings"
]
},
{
@@ -53,8 +92,7 @@
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/nodered/config.json",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "{}\n",
"merge": "json"
"content": "{\n \"token\": \"${secret:api-token}\"\n}\n"
},
{
"id": "runtime",
@@ -67,26 +105,66 @@
],
"env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_NODERED_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:1880",
"MESH_NODERED_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:${port:1880}",
"MESH_NODERED_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json"
},
"restart-on": [
"runtime-config"
],
"artifact": "runtime"
},
{
"id": "mqtt",
"type": "container",
"name": "mesh-nodered-mqtt",
"network": "host",
"run-once": true,
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/nodered/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro",
"${dir:written}:/var/lib/nodered-provisions",
"${dir:state}/mqtt-topic.json:/run/provisions/mqtt-topic.json:ro",
"${dir:state}/mqtt-topic.secret:/run/provisions/mqtt-topic.secret:ro",
"${dir:state}/settings.json:/run/provisions/settings.json:ro"
],
"env": {
"MESH_NODERED_URL": "http://127.0.0.1:${port:1880}",
"MESH_NODERED_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json",
"MESH_PROVISIONS_DIR": "/run/provisions",
"MESH_WRITTEN_DIR": "/var/lib/nodered-provisions"
},
"args": [
"run",
"/app/modules/nodered/dist/mqtt/index.js"
],
"restart-on": [
"bound-mqtt-topic",
"secret-mqtt-topic",
"settings"
],
"artifact": "runtime"
}
],
"requires": [
"mqtt-topic",
"route"
],
"contributes": {
"mqtt-topic": {
"topics": [
"#"
]
},
"route": {
"label": "nodered",
"endpoint": "web"
}
},
"binds": {
"route": "/var/lib/mesh/nodered/route.json"
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json",
"mqtt-topic": "${dir:state}/mqtt-topic.json"
},
"secrets": {
"mqtt-topic": "${dir:state}/mqtt-topic.secret"
},
"build": {
"on": [
+232
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
// Node-RED's MQTT broker config node, pointed at the broker the mesh bound — `mqtt-topic`.
//
// **Why a step.** Node-RED keeps a broker as a config node in its flows (`flows.json`) and the login
// and password in its encrypted credentials file, both of them Node-RED's to write. So this reads the
// binding and the pair credential and makes the broker node say the same thing through Node-RED's
// admin API — `GET /flows`, then `POST /flows` with the changed node and its `credentials`, deployed
// as "nodes" so only what changed restarts — with the module's own `api-token`.
//
// **Which broker nodes are the mesh's.** Never guessed: a flow may talk to a broker that has nothing
// to do with this mesh. The step owns the node it creates itself (id `mesh-mqtt-topic`, "mesh:
// mqtt-topic") and the ones an assignment names in settings (`mqtt.brokers`: node ids — how ace's
// existing broker node, which every one of its MQTT flows uses, is handed over). With none named and
// none made yet, it makes one, so a fresh Node-RED has a broker the flows can pick.
//
// **Only the connection, and only when it differs.** Host, port, TLS off (the broker serves plain
// MQTT), login, password. Every other field of the node — client id, keepalive, birth/close/will
// messages — is left as it is. Node-RED never hands a stored password back, so the step keeps a
// digest of what it last wrote: equal host/port/login and an equal digest is "already as the mesh
// says".
//
// **Nothing loses its connection without someone seeing it.** The broker is asked first whether it
// takes the delivered login; if not, nothing is written and the step fails saying why.
//
// Pure logic over two seams (Node-RED, the broker), tested against fakes (test/mqtt.test.ts).
import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
import type { Probe } from "./probe.js";
export const PROVISION = "mqtt-topic";
/** The id and name of the broker node the step makes when none is named. */
export const MESH_BROKER_ID = "mesh-mqtt-topic";
export const MESH_BROKER_NAME = "mesh: mqtt-topic";
/** What the mesh wrote at `binds.mqtt-topic`. */
export interface Binding {
provision?: string;
from?: string;
at?: string;
as?: string;
serves?: Record<string, unknown>;
}
export type Outcome =
| { what: string; result: "unchanged"; note?: string }
| { what: string; result: "written"; fields: string[]; note?: string }
| { what: string; result: "refused"; problem: string };
/** A flow node; a broker config node carries `broker`, `port`, `usetls`. */
export interface FlowNode {
id: string;
type: string;
[key: string]: unknown;
}
/** Node-RED's admin API, as the step uses it. */
export interface NodeRed {
/** The whole flow configuration and its revision (API v2). */
flows(): Promise<{ rev: string; flows: FlowNode[] }>;
/** A node's stored credentials as Node-RED shows them: the user, and only whether a password is set. */
credentials(type: string, id: string): Promise<{ user?: string; has_password?: boolean }>;
/** Deploy the configuration against the revision it was read at; "nodes" restarts only what changed. */
deploy(rev: string, flows: FlowNode[]): Promise<void>;
}
export interface Marks {
get(name: string): Promise<string | undefined>;
set(name: string, digest: string): Promise<void>;
}
export interface Deps {
nodered: NodeRed;
probe: Probe;
marks: Marks;
}
export interface Wanted {
host: string;
port: number;
user: string;
password: string;
}
export function digest(...parts: (string | number)[]): string {
return createHash("sha256").update(parts.map(String).join("\u0000")).digest("hex");
}
function isLoopback(host: string): boolean {
const h = host.toLowerCase();
return h === "localhost" || h === "::1" || h === "[::1]" || /^127\./.test(h);
}
/**
* The broker and login the mesh says Node-RED uses. A loopback `at` — what the mesh hands a machine
* that is not on the private network — is refused: from Node-RED's own container it is Node-RED.
*/
export function wanted(binding: Binding | undefined, credential: string | undefined): { ok: true; want: Wanted } | { ok: false; problem: string } {
if (!binding) return { ok: false, problem: `no binding for ${PROVISION} was delivered — the mesh writes it before this step runs` };
const host = typeof binding.at === "string" ? binding.at.trim() : "";
if (!host) return { ok: false, problem: `the ${PROVISION} binding names no host (at)` };
if (isLoopback(host)) {
return {
ok: false,
problem:
`the ${PROVISION} binding says the broker is at ${host}, which from Node-RED's own container is Node-RED ` +
`itself; put the machine on the private network so the broker has an address Node-RED can dial`,
};
}
const port = Number(binding.serves?.port);
if (!Number.isInteger(port) || port <= 0 || port > 65535) {
return { ok: false, problem: `the ${PROVISION} binding serves no usable port (${String(binding.serves?.port)})` };
}
const scheme = binding.serves?.scheme;
if (scheme !== undefined && scheme !== "mqtt") return { ok: false, problem: `the ${PROVISION} binding serves scheme ${String(scheme)}; this step writes plain MQTT` };
const user = typeof binding.as === "string" ? binding.as.trim() : "";
if (!user) return { ok: false, problem: `the ${PROVISION} binding names no login (as)` };
const password = (credential ?? "").replace(/\n$/, "");
if (!password) return { ok: false, problem: `the ${PROVISION} credential is empty or was not delivered` };
return { ok: true, want: { host, port, user, password } };
}
/** The broker node ids an assignment named in settings (`mqtt.brokers`), or none. */
export function namedBrokers(settings: unknown): string[] {
const brokers = (settings as { mqtt?: { brokers?: unknown } } | undefined)?.mqtt?.brokers;
return Array.isArray(brokers) ? brokers.filter((b): b is string => typeof b === "string" && b.length > 0) : [];
}
/** A new broker node, Node-RED 5's defaults, pointed at the broker. */
export function newBrokerNode(want: Wanted): FlowNode {
return {
id: MESH_BROKER_ID, type: "mqtt-broker", name: MESH_BROKER_NAME,
broker: want.host, port: String(want.port), clientid: "", autoConnect: true, usetls: false,
protocolVersion: "4", keepalive: "60", cleansession: true, autoUnsubscribe: true,
birthTopic: "", birthQos: "0", birthRetain: "false", birthPayload: "", birthMsg: {},
closeTopic: "", closeQos: "0", closeRetain: "false", closePayload: "", closeMsg: {},
willTopic: "", willQos: "0", willRetain: "false", willPayload: "", willMsg: {},
userProps: "", sessionExpiry: "",
};
}
const markFor = (id: string, w: Wanted): string => digest("nodered-mqtt", id, w.host, w.port, w.user, w.password);
function scrub(err: unknown, secret: string): string {
let text = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
for (const form of new Set([secret, encodeURIComponent(secret)])) text = text.split(form).join("***");
return text;
}
/**
* Bring the mesh's broker nodes in line with the binding: one outcome per node. Never throws. A node
* the settings name that is not in the flows is refused (the others are still put right).
*/
export async function reconcileBrokers(deps: Deps, binding: Binding | undefined, credential: string | undefined, named: readonly string[]): Promise<Outcome[]> {
const w = wanted(binding, credential);
if ("problem" in w) return [{ what: "mqtt", result: "refused", problem: w.problem }];
const want = w.want;
let note: string | undefined;
try {
const probe = await deps.probe(want.host, want.port, want.user, want.password, "#");
if (probe.connack === 4 || probe.connack === 5) {
return [{
what: "mqtt",
result: "refused",
problem:
`the broker at ${want.host}:${want.port} does not (yet) take the login ${want.user} with the delivered password ` +
`(CONNACK ${probe.connack}); mosquitto's provisioner creates it from the grant — nothing was written`,
}];
}
if (probe.connack !== 0) return [{ what: "mqtt", result: "refused", problem: `the broker at ${want.host}:${want.port} answered CONNACK ${probe.connack}; nothing was written` }];
if (probe.suback === 0x80) note = `warning: ${want.user} may not subscribe to every topic; flows subscribing outside its grant will get nothing`;
} catch (err) {
return [{ what: "mqtt", result: "refused", problem: `the broker at ${want.host}:${want.port} could not be asked: ${scrub(err, want.password)}; nothing was written` }];
}
const outcomes: Outcome[] = [];
for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 2; attempt++) {
outcomes.length = 0;
try {
const { rev, flows } = await deps.nodered.flows();
const targets = named.length > 0 ? [...named] : [MESH_BROKER_ID];
const changed: { id: string; fields: string[] }[] = [];
for (const id of targets) {
let node = flows.find((n) => n.id === id);
if (node && node.type !== "mqtt-broker") {
outcomes.push({ what: `broker ${id}`, result: "refused", problem: `node ${id} is a ${node.type}, not an mqtt-broker` });
continue;
}
if (!node) {
if (id !== MESH_BROKER_ID) {
outcomes.push({ what: `broker ${id}`, result: "refused", problem: `the settings name broker node ${id}, and Node-RED's flows have no such node` });
continue;
}
node = newBrokerNode(want);
flows.push(node);
node.credentials = { user: want.user, password: want.password };
changed.push({ id, fields: ["node"] });
continue;
}
const fields: string[] = [];
if (String(node.broker ?? "") !== want.host) fields.push("broker");
if (Number(node.port ?? 0) !== want.port) fields.push("port");
if (node.usetls === true) fields.push("usetls");
const creds = await deps.nodered.credentials("mqtt-broker", id);
if ((creds.user ?? "") !== want.user) fields.push("user");
if (!creds.has_password || (await deps.marks.get(`broker-${id}`)) !== markFor(id, want)) fields.push("password");
if (fields.length === 0) {
outcomes.push(note ? { what: `broker ${id}`, result: "unchanged", note } : { what: `broker ${id}`, result: "unchanged" });
continue;
}
node.broker = want.host;
node.port = String(want.port);
node.usetls = false;
node.credentials = { user: want.user, password: want.password };
changed.push({ id, fields });
}
if (changed.length > 0) {
await deps.nodered.deploy(rev, flows);
for (const c of changed) {
await deps.marks.set(`broker-${c.id}`, markFor(c.id, want));
outcomes.push({ what: `broker ${c.id}`, result: "written", fields: c.fields, ...(note ? { note } : {}) });
}
}
return outcomes;
} catch (err) {
// A deploy against a revision someone else changed meanwhile (409) is read again once.
if (attempt === 0 && /\b409\b/.test(String(err))) continue;
return [...outcomes, { what: "mqtt", result: "refused", problem: scrub(err, want.password) }];
}
}
return outcomes;
}
+102
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
// nodered's MQTT step — run once by the host after Node-RED starts, and again whenever the
// `mqtt-topic` binding, its pair credential or the settings change (the container's `restart-on`,
// novox/hq ADR 0099). It points the mesh's broker config nodes at the broker the mesh bound, through
// Node-RED's admin API (connection.ts). It connects to no mesh broker.
//
// Exits non-zero when anything could not be put right, so the node reports the step failed and the
// host runs it again on the next apply. Declared last in the manifest, so its failing gates nothing
// else of nodered's (novox/hq ADR 0136). Never prints a password.
import { mkdir, readFile, rename, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { NodeRedClient } from "../client.js";
import { namedBrokers, reconcileBrokers, type Binding, type Marks } from "./connection.js";
import { probeBroker } from "./probe.js";
const dir = process.env.MESH_PROVISIONS_DIR ?? "/run/provisions";
const writtenDir = process.env.MESH_WRITTEN_DIR ?? "/var/lib/nodered-provisions";
const waitSeconds = Number(process.env.MESH_NODERED_WAIT_SECONDS ?? "180");
const readIfThere = (path: string): Promise<string | undefined> => readFile(path, "utf8").catch(() => undefined);
const parse = <T>(raw: string | undefined): T | undefined => {
if (raw === undefined) return undefined;
try {
return JSON.parse(raw) as T;
} catch {
return undefined;
}
};
const marks: Marks = {
async get(name) {
return (await readIfThere(join(writtenDir, `${name}.digest`)))?.trim() || undefined;
},
async set(name, value) {
await mkdir(writtenDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
const path = join(writtenDir, `${name}.digest`);
await writeFile(`${path}.tmp`, `${value}\n`, { mode: 0o600 });
await rename(`${path}.tmp`, path);
},
};
let client: NodeRedClient;
try {
client = NodeRedClient.fromEnv();
} catch (err) {
console.error(`[nodered-mqtt] ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`);
process.exit(1);
}
/** Node-RED answers the admin API once its flows are loaded and the token is good. */
async function ready(): Promise<boolean> {
const until = Date.now() + waitSeconds * 1000;
for (;;) {
try {
await client.flowsWithRev();
return true;
} catch (err) {
if (/\b(401|403)\b/.test(String(err))) {
console.error("[nodered-mqtt] Node-RED refuses the api-token — settings.js and this step disagree");
return false;
}
}
if (Date.now() >= until) return false;
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 2000));
}
}
if (!(await ready())) {
console.error(`[nodered-mqtt] Node-RED's admin API did not answer at ${client.baseUrl} within ${waitSeconds}s`);
process.exit(1);
}
const binding = parse<Binding>(await readIfThere(join(dir, "mqtt-topic.json")));
const secret = await readIfThere(join(dir, "mqtt-topic.secret"));
const settings = parse<unknown>(await readIfThere(join(dir, "settings.json")));
const outcomes = await reconcileBrokers(
{
nodered: {
flows: () => client.flowsWithRev(),
credentials: (type, id) => client.credentials(type, id),
deploy: (rev, flows) => client.deployFlowsAt(rev, flows, "nodes"),
},
probe: probeBroker,
marks,
},
binding,
secret,
namedBrokers(settings),
);
let failed = 0;
for (const o of outcomes) {
if (o.result === "unchanged") console.log(`[nodered-mqtt] ${o.what}: already as the mesh says${o.note ? ` — ${o.note}` : ""}`);
else if (o.result === "written") console.log(`[nodered-mqtt] ${o.what}: wrote ${o.fields.join(", ")}${o.note ? ` — ${o.note}` : ""}`);
else {
failed++;
console.error(`[nodered-mqtt] ${o.what}: ${o.problem}`);
}
}
process.exitCode = failed > 0 ? 1 : 0;
+117
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
// Ask the broker, before Node-RED is told anything, whether it takes the login and password the
// mesh delivered — and whether that login may subscribe to every topic, as flows expect.
//
// One MQTT 3.1.1 session: CONNECT (clean, a throwaway client id, so no flow's session is taken
// over), read the CONNACK, optionally SUBSCRIBE once and read the SUBACK, DISCONNECT. No dependency:
// the handful of bytes MQTT needs for this are written here.
import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
import { connect } from "node:net";
export interface ProbeResult {
/** 0 accepted; 4 bad username or password; 5 not authorised. */
connack: number;
/** The SUBACK return code for the filter asked about: 0–2 granted, 0x80 refused. */
suback?: number;
}
export type Probe = (host: string, port: number, username: string, password: string, subscribe?: string) => Promise<ProbeResult>;
function str(v: string): Buffer {
const b = Buffer.from(v, "utf8");
const len = Buffer.alloc(2);
len.writeUInt16BE(b.length);
return Buffer.concat([len, b]);
}
function packet(type: number, body: Buffer): Buffer {
let remaining = body.length;
const lenBytes: number[] = [];
do {
let byte = remaining % 128;
remaining = Math.floor(remaining / 128);
if (remaining > 0) byte |= 0x80;
lenBytes.push(byte);
} while (remaining > 0);
return Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([type, ...lenBytes]), body]);
}
/** The first complete packet in `buf`: its type byte, its body, and how many bytes it took. */
export function firstPacket(buf: Buffer): { type: number; body: Buffer; used: number } | undefined {
if (buf.length < 2) return undefined;
let length = 0;
let multiplier = 1;
let i = 1;
for (;;) {
if (i >= buf.length) return undefined;
const byte = buf[i++];
length += (byte & 0x7f) * multiplier;
if ((byte & 0x80) === 0) break;
multiplier *= 128;
if (i > 4) throw new Error("malformed MQTT remaining length");
}
if (buf.length < i + length) return undefined;
return { type: buf[0], body: buf.subarray(i, i + length), used: i + length };
}
export const probeBroker: Probe = (host, port, username, password, subscribe) => {
const connectBody = Buffer.concat([
str("MQTT"),
Buffer.from([4, 0xc2, 0, 10]), // level 4 (3.1.1); username + password + clean session; keepalive 10s
str(`mesh-probe-${randomBytes(6).toString("hex")}`),
str(username),
str(password),
]);
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const socket = connect({ host, port });
let buf = Buffer.alloc(0);
const result: ProbeResult = { connack: -1 };
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
socket.destroy();
reject(new Error(`no answer from the broker at ${host}:${port} within 10s`));
}, 10_000);
const finish = (): void => {
clearTimeout(timer);
if (result.connack === 0) socket.end(Buffer.from([0xe0, 0]));
else socket.destroy();
resolve(result);
};
socket.on("connect", () => socket.write(packet(0x10, connectBody)));
socket.on("data", (chunk) => {
buf = Buffer.concat([buf, chunk]);
for (;;) {
let p;
try {
p = firstPacket(buf);
} catch (err) {
clearTimeout(timer);
socket.destroy();
reject(err);
return;
}
if (!p) return;
buf = buf.subarray(p.used);
const kind = p.type >> 4;
if (kind === 2) {
result.connack = p.body[1] ?? -1;
if (result.connack !== 0 || !subscribe) return finish();
// SUBSCRIBE, packet id 1, one filter at QoS 0.
socket.write(packet(0x82, Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([0, 1]), str(subscribe), Buffer.from([0])])));
} else if (kind === 9) {
result.suback = p.body[2];
return finish();
}
}
});
socket.on("error", (err) => {
clearTimeout(timer);
reject(err);
});
socket.on("close", () => {
if (result.connack === -1) {
clearTimeout(timer);
reject(new Error(`the broker at ${host}:${port} closed the connection without answering`));
}
});
});
};
+6 -1
View File
@@ -1,9 +1,14 @@
{
"name": "@novox/module-nodered",
"version": "0.1.0",
"description": "nodered — flow-based automation. Its client and tools live here (novox/hq ADR 0039).",
"description": "nodered \u2014 flow-based automation. Its client and tools live here (novox/hq ADR 0039).",
"type": "module",
"private": true,
"scripts": {
"build": "tsc client.ts tools/index.ts mqtt/probe.ts mqtt/connection.ts mqtt/index.ts --module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist",
"typecheck": "tsc -p tsconfig.json",
"test": "node --test --experimental-strip-types 'test/*.test.ts'"
},
"dependencies": {
"@novox/mesh-sdk": "^0.1.0"
},
+124
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
// What holds nodered's MQTT step (mqtt/connection.ts): the broker nodes the mesh owns — the one it
// makes, or the ones settings name — are made to use the broker and login the mesh bound, only after
// the broker takes that login; every other field of a node is kept; nothing is deployed when nothing
// differs; a node that is not named is never touched; a loopback broker address is refused.
//
// Node-RED and the broker are fakes answering as the real ones do (admin API v2 of nodered/node-red
// 5.0.7, the build ace runs).
import { test } from "node:test";
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import { MESH_BROKER_ID, namedBrokers, reconcileBrokers, type Binding, type FlowNode, type Marks, type NodeRed } from "../mqtt/connection.ts";
import type { Probe } from "../mqtt/probe.ts";
const MINTED = "mesh-minted-password";
const binding = (at = "ace.internal"): Binding => ({ provision: "mqtt-topic", from: "ace", at, as: "mesh_ace_nodered", serves: { scheme: "mqtt", port: 1883 } });
/** ace's flows, reduced: its one broker node (dead, zurag.be:1884) and a node that uses it. */
function aceFlows(): FlowNode[] {
return [
{ id: "2b0aece9c5f3b307", type: "mqtt-broker", name: "MQTT Broker", broker: "zurag.be", port: "1884", clientid: "", usetls: false, protocolVersion: "4", keepalive: "60" },
{ id: "fe0cae96f1e3ae4d", type: "mqtt in", topic: "stat/sonoff_office_light_switch/RESULT", broker: "2b0aece9c5f3b307", z: "t" },
{ id: "other-broker", type: "mqtt-broker", name: "someone else's", broker: "test.mosquitto.org", port: "1883" },
];
}
function fakeNodeRed(flows: FlowNode[], creds: Record<string, { user?: string; password?: string }> = {}) {
let rev = "r1";
const deploys: FlowNode[][] = [];
const nodered: NodeRed = {
async flows() {
return { rev, flows: structuredClone(flows) };
},
async credentials(_type, id) {
const c = creds[id] ?? {};
return { user: c.user, has_password: Boolean(c.password) };
},
async deploy(at, next) {
if (at !== rev) throw new Error("Node-RED /flows: 409 version_mismatch");
for (const n of next) {
if (n.credentials) creds[n.id] = { ...(creds[n.id] ?? {}), ...(n.credentials as object) };
}
flows.splice(0, flows.length, ...next.map(({ credentials: _c, ...n }) => n as FlowNode));
deploys.push(next);
rev = `r${deploys.length + 1}`;
},
};
return { nodered, deploys, flows, creds };
}
const marks = (): Marks & { store: Map<string, string> } => {
const store = new Map<string, string>();
return { store, get: async (k) => store.get(k), set: async (k, v) => void store.set(k, v) };
};
const takes: Probe = async (_h, _p, user, pass) => ({ connack: user === "mesh_ace_nodered" && pass === MINTED ? 0 : 5, suback: 0 });
test("ace: the named broker node is moved to the bound broker and login; the other broker is not touched", async () => {
const f = fakeNodeRed(aceFlows(), { "2b0aece9c5f3b307": { user: "luffy", password: "old" }, "other-broker": { user: "x", password: "y" } });
const m = marks();
const out = await reconcileBrokers({ nodered: f.nodered, probe: takes, marks: m }, binding(), `${MINTED}\n`, ["2b0aece9c5f3b307"]);
assert.deepEqual(out, [{ what: "broker 2b0aece9c5f3b307", result: "written", fields: ["broker", "port", "user", "password"] }]);
const node = f.flows.find((n) => n.id === "2b0aece9c5f3b307");
assert.deepEqual(node, { ...aceFlows()[0], broker: "ace.internal", port: "1883", usetls: false });
assert.deepEqual(f.creds["2b0aece9c5f3b307"], { user: "mesh_ace_nodered", password: MINTED });
assert.deepEqual(f.flows.find((n) => n.id === "other-broker"), aceFlows()[2]);
assert.deepEqual(f.creds["other-broker"], { user: "x", password: "y" });
// Only the changed node carried credentials in the deploy.
assert.deepEqual(f.deploys[0].filter((n) => n.credentials).map((n) => n.id), ["2b0aece9c5f3b307"]);
// Again: nothing differs, nothing is deployed.
const again = await reconcileBrokers({ nodered: f.nodered, probe: takes, marks: m }, binding(), MINTED, ["2b0aece9c5f3b307"]);
assert.deepEqual(again, [{ what: "broker 2b0aece9c5f3b307", result: "unchanged" }]);
assert.equal(f.deploys.length, 1);
});
test("fresh: with nothing named, the step makes its own broker node", async () => {
const f = fakeNodeRed([]);
const out = await reconcileBrokers({ nodered: f.nodered, probe: takes, marks: marks() }, binding(), MINTED, []);
assert.deepEqual(out, [{ what: `broker ${MESH_BROKER_ID}`, result: "written", fields: ["node"] }]);
assert.equal(f.flows[0].type, "mqtt-broker");
assert.equal(f.flows[0].broker, "ace.internal");
assert.deepEqual(f.creds[MESH_BROKER_ID], { user: "mesh_ace_nodered", password: MINTED });
});
test("a login the broker does not take is never written", async () => {
const f = fakeNodeRed(aceFlows());
const out = await reconcileBrokers({ nodered: f.nodered, probe: async () => ({ connack: 5 }), marks: marks() }, binding(), MINTED, ["2b0aece9c5f3b307"]);
assert.equal(out[0].result, "refused");
assert.equal(f.deploys.length, 0);
});
test("a named node that is not there, or a loopback broker, is refused", async () => {
const f = fakeNodeRed(aceFlows());
const out = await reconcileBrokers({ nodered: f.nodered, probe: takes, marks: marks() }, binding(), MINTED, ["gone"]);
assert.match((out[0] as { problem: string }).problem, /no such node/);
const lo = await reconcileBrokers({ nodered: f.nodered, probe: takes, marks: marks() }, binding("127.0.0.1"), MINTED, []);
assert.match((lo[0] as { problem: string }).problem, /Node-RED itself/);
assert.equal(f.deploys.length, 0);
});
test("a deploy that raced another is read again once", async () => {
const f = fakeNodeRed(aceFlows());
let first = true;
const racing: NodeRed = {
...f.nodered,
async flows() {
const got = await f.nodered.flows();
if (first) {
first = false;
return { ...got, rev: "stale" };
}
return got;
},
};
const out = await reconcileBrokers({ nodered: racing, probe: takes, marks: marks() }, binding(), MINTED, ["2b0aece9c5f3b307"]);
assert.equal(out[0].result, "written");
assert.equal(f.deploys.length, 1);
});
test("settings name broker nodes under mqtt.brokers", () => {
assert.deepEqual(namedBrokers({ mqtt: { brokers: ["a", "", 3, "b"] } }), ["a", "b"]);
assert.deepEqual(namedBrokers({ endpoints: {} }), []);
assert.deepEqual(namedBrokers(undefined), []);
});
+7 -1
View File
@@ -8,5 +8,11 @@
"skipLibCheck": true,
"noEmit": true
},
"include": ["client.ts", "tools/index.ts"]
"include": [
"client.ts",
"tools/index.ts",
"mqtt/probe.ts",
"mqtt/connection.ts",
"mqtt/index.ts"
]
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
"port": 9070,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "the document server over http; the public name office.novox.be is a route grant, and route-proxy reaches it on this published port"
"why": "the document server over http; its public name is a route grant, and route-proxy reaches it on this published port"
}
],
"resources": [
+5 -6
View File
@@ -9,22 +9,21 @@
"model-access"
],
"binds": {
"model-access": "/var/lib/openai-consumer/model.json"
"model-access": "${dir:state}/model.json"
},
"secrets": {
"model-access": "/var/lib/openai-consumer/api-key"
"model-access": "${dir:state}/api-key"
},
"resources": [
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/openai-consumer",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "config",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/openai-consumer/config",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
@@ -38,7 +37,7 @@
"/app/modules/openai-consumer/dist/apply/index.js"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/openai-consumer:/run/state"
"${dir:state}:/run/state"
],
"env": {
"MESH_MODEL_ACCESS_SECRET_FILE": "/run/state/api-key",
+8 -5
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
}
},
"binds": {
"route": "/var/lib/photos-eef/route.json"
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
},
"listens": [
{
@@ -23,15 +23,15 @@
"port": 4012,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "the eef photos client site over http; the public name eef.novox.be is a route grant, and route-proxy reaches it on this published port"
"why": "the eef photos client site over http; its public name is a route grant, and route-proxy reaches it on this published port"
}
],
"resources": [
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/photos-eef",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "net",
@@ -46,7 +46,10 @@
"network": "photos-eef",
"ports": [
"80"
]
],
"names-on-purpose": {
"registry-api.novox.be": "built outside the mesh, from the application's own repository, and pulled from the registry that built it; moves when that repository is a build source on the git seat (novox/hq ADR 0155, issue 122)"
}
}
]
}
+8 -5
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
}
},
"binds": {
"route": "/var/lib/photos-filip/route.json"
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
},
"listens": [
{
@@ -23,15 +23,15 @@
"port": 4013,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "the filip photos client site over http; the public name filip.novox.be is a route grant, and route-proxy reaches it on this published port"
"why": "the filip photos client site over http; its public name is a route grant, and route-proxy reaches it on this published port"
}
],
"resources": [
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/photos-filip",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "net",
@@ -46,7 +46,10 @@
"network": "photos-filip",
"ports": [
"80"
]
],
"names-on-purpose": {
"registry-api.novox.be": "built outside the mesh, from the application's own repository, and pulled from the registry that built it; moves when that repository is a build source on the git seat (novox/hq ADR 0155, issue 122)"
}
}
]
}
+18 -12
View File
@@ -22,13 +22,13 @@
}
},
"binds": {
"s3-bucket": "/var/lib/photos/store.json",
"mongodb-database": "/var/lib/photos/database.json",
"route": "/var/lib/photos/route.json"
"s3-bucket": "${dir:state}/store.json",
"mongodb-database": "${dir:state}/database.json",
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
},
"secrets": {
"s3-bucket": "/var/lib/photos/store.secret",
"mongodb-database": "/var/lib/photos/database.secret"
"s3-bucket": "${dir:state}/store.secret",
"mongodb-database": "${dir:state}/database.secret"
},
"listens": [
{
@@ -43,20 +43,20 @@
"port": 4001,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "the admin client site over http; the public name photos.novox.be is a route grant, and route-proxy reaches it on this published port"
"why": "the admin client site over http; its public name is a route grant, and route-proxy reaches it on this published port"
}
],
"resources": [
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/photos",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "server-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/photos/server.env",
"path": "${dir:state}/server.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "NODE_ENV=production\nPORT=9000\nMONGO_URL=mongodb://${bound:mongodb-database:as}:${secret:mongodb-database}@${bound:mongodb-database:at}:${bound:mongodb-database:port}/${bound:mongodb-database:as}?authSource=admin\nMONGO_DB=${bound:mongodb-database:as}\nMINIO_ENDPOINT=${bound:s3-bucket:at}\nMINIO_PORT=${bound:s3-bucket:port}\nMINIO_BUCKET=mesh-novox-photos\nMINIO_ACCESSKEY=${bound:s3-bucket:as}\nMINIO_SECRET=${secret:s3-bucket}\nMINIO_USE_SSL=false\n"
},
@@ -72,12 +72,15 @@
"image": "registry-api.novox.be/novox/photos-server@sha256:3f165acbbd1fd731b12fe798c95879c081a44b00e2c569ef7f47165f6a527201",
"network": "photos",
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/photos/server.env"
"${dir:state}/server.env"
],
"ports": [
"9000"
],
"secrets-in-environment": "the application's own code reads MONGO_URL and MINIO_SECRET from the environment (photos server/src/config.js); converting is that repository's change"
"secrets-in-environment": "the application's own code reads MONGO_URL and MINIO_SECRET from the environment (photos server/src/config.js); converting is that repository's change",
"names-on-purpose": {
"registry-api.novox.be": "built outside the mesh, from the application's own repository, and pulled from the registry that built it; moves when that repository is a build source on the git seat (novox/hq ADR 0155, issue 122)"
}
},
{
"id": "admin-client",
@@ -87,7 +90,10 @@
"network": "photos",
"ports": [
"80"
]
],
"names-on-purpose": {
"registry-api.novox.be": "built outside the mesh, from the application's own repository, and pulled from the registry that built it; moves when that repository is a build source on the git seat (novox/hq ADR 0155, issue 122)"
}
}
]
}
+4 -4
View File
@@ -8,10 +8,10 @@
"listens": [
{
"name": "web",
"port": 9090,
"port": 9000,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "the dashboard over http; portainer.novox.be is a route grant and the proxy reaches it here \u2014 the machine side of 9090:9000, the predecessor's number"
"why": "the dashboard over http; its public name is a route grant and the proxy reaches it here"
},
{
"name": "web-tls",
@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@
"name": "portainer",
"image": "portainer/portainer-ce@sha256:4d616db18cfeb5dd41a69c0958bc825c84483ea9cde1106eb82a5d26f3bd8b0e",
"ports": [
"9090:9000",
"9443:9443"
"9000",
"9443"
],
"volumes": [
"${dir:data}:/data",
+10 -11
View File
@@ -42,13 +42,13 @@
}
},
"receives": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/postgres/grants/mesh.json"
"postgres-database": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
},
"grants": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/postgres/grants"
"postgres-database": "${dir:grants}"
},
"own-secrets": {
"superuser": "/var/lib/postgres/superuser.secret",
"superuser": "${dir:state}/superuser.secret",
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/postgres/broker"
},
"resources": [
@@ -61,13 +61,12 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/postgres",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "grants",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/postgres/grants",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
@@ -91,7 +90,7 @@
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh-store:/var/lib/postgresql/data",
"/var/lib/postgres/superuser.secret:/run/secrets/superuser:ro"
"${dir:state}/superuser.secret:/run/secrets/superuser:ro"
]
},
{
@@ -101,15 +100,15 @@
"network": "host",
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/postgres/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/postgres/grants:/var/lib/postgres/grants:ro",
"/var/lib/postgres/superuser.secret:/run/secrets/superuser:ro"
"${dir:grants}:${dir:grants}:ro",
"${dir:state}/superuser.secret:/run/secrets/superuser:ro"
],
"env": {
"MESH_PROVISION_POSTGRES": "postgres://postgres@127.0.0.1:5432/postgres?sslmode=disable",
"MESH_PROVISION_POSTGRES": "postgres://postgres@127.0.0.1:${port:5432}/postgres?sslmode=disable",
"MESH_PROVISION_POSTGRES_PORT": "${seat:mesh-store:5432}",
"MESH_PROVISION_PASSWORD_FILE": "/run/secrets/superuser",
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_RECEIVES": "/var/lib/postgres/grants/mesh.json"
"MESH_RECEIVES": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
},
"artifact": "runtime"
}
+26
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
# records' runtime: the tool runtime, carrying this module's compiled reader and its tools.
#
# **Built from this module's own directory and nothing else.** The sdk is in the base image, so
# nothing is copied out of a neighbouring checkout (novox/hq ADR 0069).
#
# Two bases, named rather than pinned: the image this is COMPILED in, and the image it RUNS in
# (novox/hq issue 044). Declared in module.json's `build.on`; deliberately no defaults.
ARG BUILD_BASE
ARG RUNTIME_BASE
FROM ${BUILD_BASE} AS build
WORKDIR /app/modules/records
COPY . .
RUN node /app/node_modules/typescript/bin/tsc records.ts index.ts tools/index.ts \
--module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist
FROM ${RUNTIME_BASE}
# **A module may need something the base image does not carry.** The reader keeps a checkout of the
# repository it reads (novox/hq ADR 0153) — a git working copy, kept current, not a derived copy — and
# the base image has no git. Certificates too, because the origin may be reached over TLS.
RUN apt-get update \
&& apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends git ca-certificates \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
COPY --from=build /app/modules/records/dist /app/modules/records/dist
# Both entrypoints, loaded in serve mode: the consumer that pulls on a merge, and the tools.
ENV MESH_TOOL_MODULES=/app/modules/records/dist/index.js,/app/modules/records/dist/tools/index.js
+41
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
# records
The record, read where it is written (novox/hq [ADR 0025](https://git.novox.be/novox/hq), ADR 0153).
A module that keeps a checkout of a repository of decisions, designs and issues — the mesh's own
`hq`, or any repository of markdown on the forge — and answers questions about it over the bus, so
whoever holds the console sees `records_search` beside every other tool and a symptom can be looked up
in the design record without knowing it is there.
**A checkout, not a copy.** The same bytes the repository holds, at a commit every answer names,
brought up to date on every merge the forge announces (`gitea.pull.merged`) and every ten minutes
besides. Nothing is indexed, transformed or summarised, so nothing can drift from the source except by
lagging behind it, and the lag is in `records_status`.
## Tools
| tool | answers |
|---|---|
| `records_search` `{query, limit?}` | where a phrase appears, as written: document, line, nearest heading, and the commit read |
| `records_read` `{path}` | one document, whole |
| `records_list` `{folder?}` | what a folder holds |
| `records_status` | repository, forge, commit and its date, last sync, document count, last error |
| `records_sync` | bring the checkout up to date now |
## Configuring it
The module names no mesh (ADR 0112). It requires the `git` provision — the forge — and reads the
repository its **settings** name:
```
settings set records repository.json # {"repository": "<owner>/<name>"}
```
Public repositories only: it asks for no credential. Until a repository is set, it serves no tools and
says so in its log.
## The check ADR 0025 names
Search the mesh, through the console, for a phrase that appears only in one design document here, and
get it back. `records_search {"query": "…"}` is that search; its test does the same against a
repository it makes.
+34
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
// records' consumer: keep the checkout current (novox/hq ADR 0153).
//
// Synced when the runtime binds the broker, on every merge the forge announces, and on a timer for
// the merges it did not hear about — a restart during a merge, a repository the forge does not emit
// for. The timer is unhurried: the record changes when thinking changes, not by the minute.
import { on } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/events";
import { recordsFromEnv, type Records } from "./records.js";
let records: Records | null = null;
try {
records = await recordsFromEnv();
} catch (err) {
console.log(`[records] not reading — ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`);
}
if (records) {
const reader = records;
void reader.sync().then(async () => {
const s = await reader.standing();
console.log(`[records] ${s.repository} at ${s.commit.slice(0, 8) || "(no commit)"}, ${s.documents} document(s)${s.lastError ? ` — ${s.lastError}` : ""}`);
});
setInterval(() => void reader.sync(), 10 * 60 * 1000).unref();
// A merge on the forge into the repository this reads: pull now. The event names the repository
// by owner and name (gitea's `pull.merged`); anything else is somebody else's merge.
await on<{ owner?: string; repo?: string; base?: string }>("gitea.pull.merged", async (event) => {
const merged = `${event.body.owner ?? ""}/${event.body.repo ?? ""}`;
if (merged !== reader.repository) return;
console.log(`[records] ${merged} merged; syncing`);
await reader.sync();
});
}
export { records };
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{
"module": "records",
"version": "1",
"slug": "records",
"capabilities": [
"container-runtime"
],
"requires": [
"git"
],
"binds": {
"git": "/var/lib/mesh/records/git.json"
},
"own-secrets": {
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/records/broker"
},
"consumes": [
"gitea.pull.merged"
],
"tools": [
"records_search",
"records_read",
"records_list",
"records_status",
"records_sync"
],
"resources": [
{
"id": "mesh-state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/records",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "checkout",
"type": "directory",
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "config",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/records/config.json",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "{}\n",
"merge": "json"
},
{
"id": "origin",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/records/origin",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "${bound:git:scheme}://${bound:git:at}:${bound:git:port}\n"
},
{
"id": "runtime",
"type": "container",
"name": "records",
"network": "host",
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/records/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/mesh/records/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro",
"/var/lib/mesh/records/origin:/run/config/origin:ro",
"${dir:checkout}:${dir:checkout}"
],
"env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_RECORDS_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json",
"MESH_RECORDS_ORIGIN_FILE": "/run/config/origin",
"MESH_RECORDS_DIR": "${dir:checkout}"
},
"artifact": "runtime",
"restart-on": [
"config",
"origin"
]
}
],
"build": {
"on": [
{
"arg": "BUILD_BASE",
"module": "mesh-tools",
"artifact": "build"
},
{
"arg": "RUNTIME_BASE",
"module": "mesh-tools",
"artifact": "runtime"
}
],
"artifacts": [
{
"name": "runtime",
"kind": "image",
"from": "Dockerfile"
}
]
}
}
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{
"name": "@novox/module-records",
"version": "0.1.0",
"description": "records — reads a repository of decisions, designs and issues where it is written, and answers questions about it (novox/hq ADR 0025, ADR 0153).",
"type": "module",
"private": true,
"scripts": {
"build": "tsc records.ts index.ts tools/index.ts --module NodeNext --moduleResolution NodeNext --target ES2022 --outDir dist",
"test": "node --test --experimental-strip-types 'test/*.test.ts'"
},
"dependencies": {
"@novox/mesh-sdk": "^0.1.1"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@types/node": "^22.0.0",
"typescript": "^5.6.0"
}
}
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/**
* The record, read where it is written (novox/hq ADR 0025, ADR 0153).
*
* A repository of decisions, designs and issues — markdown, nothing else — cloned from the mesh's own
* forge and kept current. **A checkout, not a copy**: the same bytes the repository holds, at a commit
* every answer names, refreshed on every merge the forge announces and on a timer besides. Nothing is
* transformed, indexed or summarised on the way, so there is nothing that can drift from the source
* except by lagging behind it, and the lag is a number in every answer.
*
* What it answers: a search for a phrase, a document by path, what a folder holds, and where the
* checkout stands. The reasoning is in the documents; this only finds them.
*/
import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
import { promises as fs } from "node:fs";
import { join, normalize, relative, sep } from "node:path";
import { promisify } from "node:util";
const run = promisify(execFile);
/** One place a phrase was found. */
export interface Hit {
/** The document, relative to the repository's root. */
path: string;
/** The line it was found on, from 1. */
line: number;
/** The nearest heading above it, so a hit reads as where in the document it is. */
heading: string;
/** The line itself, trimmed. */
text: string;
}
export interface Standing {
repository: string;
origin: string;
/** The commit the checkout is at, or empty before the first clone. */
commit: string;
/** When that commit was made, as the repository says. */
committed: string;
/** When this reader last brought the checkout up to date. */
fetched: string;
/** How many markdown documents the checkout holds. */
documents: number;
/** Why the last sync failed, if it did; the checkout stands where it was. */
lastError?: string;
}
/** Search answers at most this many places; a phrase found more often is a phrase to narrow. */
export const MOST_HITS = 50;
/** A document longer than this is answered in part, and says so. */
export const MOST_BYTES = 200_000;
export class Records {
/** Where the checkout lives; the mesh gives the module the directory. */
readonly dir: string;
/** The forge's address, `scheme://host:port`, from the git provision's binding. */
readonly origin: string;
/** The repository's path on it, `owner/name`, from this module's settings. */
readonly repository: string;
private syncing: Promise<void> | undefined;
private fetched = "";
private lastError: string | undefined;
constructor(dir: string, origin: string, repository: string) {
this.dir = dir;
this.origin = origin;
this.repository = repository;
}
/** The clone URL: the forge, the repository. Public repositories only; a credential would be a
* secret this module has not asked for. */
get url(): string {
return `${this.origin.replace(/\/$/, "")}/${this.repository}.git`;
}
/** Bring the checkout up to date, cloning it if it does not exist. One at a time: a second call
* while one runs joins it rather than racing it. Never throws — a failed sync is recorded in
* `standing()` and the checkout stands where it was, which is still an answer. */
sync(): Promise<void> {
if (!this.syncing) {
this.syncing = this.doSync().finally(() => {
this.syncing = undefined;
});
}
return this.syncing;
}
private async doSync(): Promise<void> {
try {
const cloned = await exists(join(this.dir, ".git"));
if (!cloned) {
await fs.mkdir(this.dir, { recursive: true });
await run("git", ["clone", "--quiet", "--depth", "50", this.url, this.dir]);
} else {
// The checkout is the mesh's, so a local change is nobody's: reset to what the forge has,
// rather than merging into something a hand may have touched.
await run("git", ["-C", this.dir, "fetch", "--quiet", "--depth", "50", "origin"]);
await run("git", ["-C", this.dir, "reset", "--quiet", "--hard", "origin/HEAD"]);
}
this.fetched = new Date().toISOString();
this.lastError = undefined;
} catch (e) {
this.lastError = e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e);
console.error(`[records] could not sync ${this.url}: ${this.lastError}`);
}
}
async standing(): Promise<Standing> {
let commit = "";
let committed = "";
if (await exists(join(this.dir, ".git"))) {
try {
commit = (await run("git", ["-C", this.dir, "rev-parse", "HEAD"])).stdout.trim();
committed = (await run("git", ["-C", this.dir, "log", "-1", "--format=%cI"])).stdout.trim();
} catch {
// A checkout without a commit yet: said as empty rather than thrown.
}
}
const documents = commit ? (await this.documents()).length : 0;
return {
repository: this.repository,
origin: this.origin,
commit,
committed,
fetched: this.fetched,
documents,
...(this.lastError ? { lastError: this.lastError } : {}),
};
}
/** Every markdown document, relative to the root, in a stable order. */
async documents(): Promise<string[]> {
const out: string[] = [];
const walk = async (at: string): Promise<void> => {
let entries: import("node:fs").Dirent[];
try {
entries = await fs.readdir(at, { withFileTypes: true });
} catch {
return;
}
for (const e of entries) {
if (e.name === ".git" || e.name === "node_modules") continue;
const full = join(at, e.name);
if (e.isDirectory()) await walk(full);
else if (e.isFile() && e.name.endsWith(".md")) out.push(relative(this.dir, full).split(sep).join("/"));
}
};
await walk(this.dir);
return out.sort();
}
/**
* Where a phrase appears, case-insensitively, as written — no stemming, no ranking, because a
* design record is found by its own words and a reader deciding which words matter would be a
* second opinion about somebody else's document. Bounded, and says when it was.
*
* **The record is wrapped prose, and a phrase does not know where the line ends.** Every document
* here wraps at a hundred columns, so a phrase of six words is as likely to straddle a line break
* as not; matched line by line, the first live search for a sentence of ADR 0025 found nothing.
* So a line is matched together with the one after it, joined by a space, and emphasis marks
* are ignored — `**reachable**` is the word reachable. A hit still names the line it starts on.
*/
async search(query: string, limit = MOST_HITS): Promise<{ hits: Hit[]; more: boolean; commit: string }> {
const needle = plain(query).toLowerCase().replace(/\s+/g, " ").trim();
if (!needle) throw new Error("search for a phrase; an empty one matches every line of every document");
const cap = Math.max(1, Math.min(limit, MOST_HITS));
const hits: Hit[] = [];
let more = false;
for (const path of await this.documents()) {
const text = await fs.readFile(join(this.dir, path), "utf8");
let heading = "";
const lines = text.split("\n");
const flat = lines.map((l) => plain(l).toLowerCase().replace(/\s+/g, " ").trim());
for (let i = 0; i < lines.length; i++) {
const line = lines[i]!;
if (/^#{1,6}\s/.test(line)) heading = line.replace(/^#+\s*/, "").trim();
const here = flat[i]!;
const next = i + 1 < flat.length ? flat[i + 1]! : "";
// On this line, or across the break into the next — but not a phrase that begins on the
// next line alone, which is that line's hit.
const onThis = here.includes(needle);
const acrossTheBreak = !onThis && next !== "" && `${here} ${next}`.includes(needle) && !next.includes(needle);
if (onThis || acrossTheBreak) {
if (hits.length >= cap) {
more = true;
break;
}
hits.push({ path, line: i + 1, heading, text: acrossTheBreak ? `${line.trim()} ${lines[i + 1]!.trim()}` : line.trim() });
}
}
if (more) break;
}
const commit = (await this.standing()).commit;
return { hits, more, commit };
}
/** One document, whole, or its first part with a note when it is very long. The path is kept
* inside the checkout: `..` and absolute paths are refused, not resolved. */
async read(path: string): Promise<{ path: string; content: string; truncated: boolean; commit: string }> {
const clean = normalize(path).split(sep).join("/");
if (!clean || clean.startsWith("..") || clean.startsWith("/") || clean.includes("/../")) {
throw new Error(`"${path}" is not a path inside the repository`);
}
let content: string;
try {
content = await fs.readFile(join(this.dir, clean), "utf8");
} catch {
throw new Error(`the repository holds no ${clean} — \`records_list\` says what it holds`);
}
const truncated = content.length > MOST_BYTES;
return {
path: clean,
content: truncated ? content.slice(0, MOST_BYTES) + "\n\n[… truncated; the document is longer than this answer carries]" : content,
truncated,
commit: (await this.standing()).commit,
};
}
/** What a folder holds: its sub-folders and its documents, one level. */
async list(folder = ""): Promise<{ folder: string; folders: string[]; documents: string[] }> {
const clean = normalize(folder || ".").split(sep).join("/").replace(/^\.\/?/, "");
if (clean.startsWith("..") || clean.startsWith("/")) {
throw new Error(`"${folder}" is not a folder inside the repository`);
}
const at = clean ? join(this.dir, clean) : this.dir;
let entries: import("node:fs").Dirent[];
try {
entries = await fs.readdir(at, { withFileTypes: true });
} catch {
throw new Error(`the repository holds no folder ${clean || "/"}`);
}
const folders = entries.filter((e) => e.isDirectory() && e.name !== ".git" && e.name !== "node_modules").map((e) => e.name).sort();
const documents = entries.filter((e) => e.isFile() && e.name.endsWith(".md")).map((e) => e.name).sort();
return { folder: clean, folders, documents };
}
}
/** The reader as the mesh configures it: the directory it was given, the forge it was bound to, and
* the repository its settings name. Refuses to guess any of the three (novox/hq ADR 0112). */
export async function recordsFromEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): Promise<Records> {
const dir = env.MESH_RECORDS_DIR;
if (!dir) throw new Error("MESH_RECORDS_DIR is unset: the mesh gives this module the directory its checkout lives in");
const originFile = env.MESH_RECORDS_ORIGIN_FILE;
if (!originFile) throw new Error("MESH_RECORDS_ORIGIN_FILE is unset: the forge's address comes from the git provision's binding");
const origin = (await fs.readFile(originFile, "utf8")).trim();
if (!origin) throw new Error(`${originFile} is empty: the git provision has not been bound yet`);
const configFile = env.MESH_RECORDS_CONFIG_FILE;
if (!configFile) throw new Error("MESH_RECORDS_CONFIG_FILE is unset");
let config: { repository?: unknown } = {};
try {
config = JSON.parse(await fs.readFile(configFile, "utf8")) as { repository?: unknown };
} catch (e) {
throw new Error(`${configFile} is not JSON: ${e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e)}`);
}
const repository = typeof config.repository === "string" ? config.repository.trim() : "";
if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+\/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$/.test(repository)) {
throw new Error(
"this module reads the repository its settings name, and none is set: " +
'`settings set records <file>` with {"repository": "<owner>/<name>"} — a module names no mesh (novox/hq ADR 0112)',
);
}
return new Records(dir, origin, repository);
}
/** A line without its markdown emphasis, so a phrase matches the words and not the marks. */
function plain(line: string): string {
return line.replace(/[*_`]/g, "");
}
async function exists(path: string): Promise<boolean> {
try {
await fs.stat(path);
return true;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
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/**
* The reader against a real repository: a checkout, a phrase found where it is written, a document
* read whole, a merge pulled — and the check novox/hq ADR 0025 names: search for a phrase that appears
* only in one design document, and get it back.
*/
import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import { test } from "node:test";
import { execFileSync } from "node:child_process";
import { mkdtempSync, mkdirSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { Records } from "../records.ts";
function aRepository(): string {
const dir = mkdtempSync("/tmp/records-origin-");
const git = (...args: string[]) => execFileSync("git", ["-C", dir, ...args], { stdio: "pipe" });
git("init", "--quiet", "--initial-branch=main");
git("config", "user.email", "t@example.invalid");
git("config", "user.name", "t");
mkdirSync(join(dir, "02-DECISIONS"));
mkdirSync(join(dir, "03-DESIGN"));
writeFileSync(join(dir, "README.md"), "# A repository\n\nWhat this is.\n");
writeFileSync(join(dir, "02-DECISIONS/0001-a-decision.md"), "# 1. A decision\n\n## Context\n\nThe context.\n\n## Decision\n\nWe decided the thing.\n");
writeFileSync(join(dir, "03-DESIGN/07-knowledge.md"), "# Knowledge\n\n## The stores\n\nSilence and success must never look alike.\n\nA phrase that is wrapped at the\ncolumn where every document wraps, and **reachable is not the same as\nsurfacing** under emphasis.\n");
git("add", "-A");
git("commit", "--quiet", "-m", "first");
return dir;
}
test("a phrase that appears in one design document comes back from where it is written", async () => {
const origin = aRepository();
const records = new Records(mkdtempSync("/tmp/records-checkout-"), "file://" + origin.replace(/\/[^/]+$/, ""), origin.split("/").pop()!);
// A file:// origin has no `.git` suffix; point the clone at the directory itself.
Object.defineProperty(records, "url", { get: () => origin });
await records.sync();
const found = await records.search("never look alike");
assert.equal(found.hits.length, 1);
assert.equal(found.hits[0]!.path, "03-DESIGN/07-knowledge.md");
assert.equal(found.hits[0]!.heading, "The stores");
assert.match(found.commit, /^[0-9a-f]{40}$/, "the answer names the commit it was read at");
// Wrapped prose: a phrase across the line break is found, once, at the line it starts on; and
// emphasis marks are not part of the words.
const wrapped = await records.search("wrapped at the column where");
assert.deepEqual(wrapped.hits.map((h) => [h.path, h.line]), [["03-DESIGN/07-knowledge.md", 7]]);
const emphasised = await records.search("reachable is not the same as surfacing");
assert.deepEqual(emphasised.hits.map((h) => [h.path, h.line]), [["03-DESIGN/07-knowledge.md", 8]]);
const alsoOnOneLine = await records.search("under emphasis");
assert.equal(alsoOnOneLine.hits.length, 1, "a phrase on one line is not also counted from the line before it");
const doc = await records.read("02-DECISIONS/0001-a-decision.md");
assert.match(doc.content, /We decided the thing/);
assert.equal(doc.truncated, false);
const root = await records.list();
assert.deepEqual(root.folders, ["02-DECISIONS", "03-DESIGN"]);
assert.deepEqual(root.documents, ["README.md"]);
const standing = await records.standing();
assert.equal(standing.documents, 3);
assert.equal(standing.lastError, undefined);
// A merge on the origin, pulled: the checkout follows the source and names the new commit.
writeFileSync(join(origin, "02-DECISIONS/0002-another.md"), "# 2. Another\n\nA phrase nobody wrote before.\n");
execFileSync("git", ["-C", origin, "add", "-A"], { stdio: "pipe" });
execFileSync("git", ["-C", origin, "commit", "--quiet", "-m", "second"], { stdio: "pipe" });
await records.sync();
const after = await records.search("nobody wrote before");
assert.equal(after.hits.length, 1);
assert.notEqual(after.commit, found.commit);
});
test("a path outside the repository is refused, and an empty search is too", async () => {
const records = new Records(mkdtempSync("/tmp/records-checkout-"), "http://forge.invalid:3000", "novox/hq");
await assert.rejects(() => records.read("../etc/passwd"), /not a path inside/);
await assert.rejects(() => records.read("/etc/passwd"), /not a path inside/);
await assert.rejects(() => records.search(" "), /empty one/);
assert.equal(records.url, "http://forge.invalid:3000/novox/hq.git");
});
test("a sync that fails leaves the checkout standing and says why", async () => {
const records = new Records(mkdtempSync("/tmp/records-checkout-"), "http://127.0.0.1:1", "novox/hq");
await records.sync();
const standing = await records.standing();
assert.equal(standing.commit, "");
assert.ok(standing.lastError, "a failed sync is said, not swallowed");
});
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// records' tools — how the record is asked (novox/hq ADR 0025, ADR 0153).
//
// Five questions, each answered from the checkout at the commit it names: where does a phrase
// appear, what does one document say, what does a folder hold, where does the checkout stand, and
// bring it up to date now. The reasoning stays in the documents; the tools only find them.
import { registerModuleTools, type ToolDefinition } from "@novox/mesh-sdk/tools";
import { recordsFromEnv, type Records } from "../records.js";
export function getRecordsTools(records: Records): ToolDefinition[] {
return [
{
name: "records_search",
description:
"Where a phrase appears in the decisions, designs and issues, as written: document, line, nearest heading. " +
"Search the literal words of a symptom or a term before forming a hypothesis; the answer names the commit it was read at.",
input: {
query: { type: "string", description: "the phrase, matched case-insensitively as written" },
limit: { type: "number", description: "at most this many places (default 50)" },
},
run: async (args) => records.search(String(args.query ?? ""), args.limit ? Number(args.limit) : undefined),
},
{
name: "records_read",
description: "One document, whole, by its path in the repository — a decision record, a design document, an issue report.",
input: { path: { type: "string", description: "the document's path, e.g. 02-DECISIONS/0025-....md" } },
run: async (args) => records.read(String(args.path ?? "")),
},
{
name: "records_list",
description: "What a folder of the repository holds: its sub-folders and its documents. The root when no folder is named.",
input: { folder: { type: "string", description: "a folder inside the repository (optional)" } },
run: async (args) => records.list(args.folder ? String(args.folder) : ""),
},
{
name: "records_status",
description: "Where the checkout stands: the repository, the forge it is read from, the commit and its date, when it was last brought up to date.",
input: {},
run: async () => records.standing(),
},
{
name: "records_sync",
description: "Bring the checkout up to date now, and say where it stands.",
input: {},
run: async () => {
await records.sync();
return records.standing();
},
},
];
}
// The reader is made once, at load, from the environment the runtime resolves; the contributor is
// synchronous and is called at every collection. Without a repository to read there is nothing to
// answer, and the module exposes no tools rather than five that fail — the sdk's contract: a
// contributor returning [] is normal.
let reader: Records | null = null;
try {
reader = await recordsFromEnv();
} catch (err) {
console.log(`[records] no tools — ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`);
}
registerModuleTools("records", () => (reader ? getRecordsTools(reader) : []));
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@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
{
"compilerOptions": {
"target": "ES2022",
"module": "NodeNext",
"moduleResolution": "NodeNext",
"strict": true,
"esModuleInterop": true,
"skipLibCheck": true,
"noEmit": true
},
"include": ["records.ts", "index.ts", "tools/index.ts"]
}
+14 -16
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@@ -27,13 +27,13 @@
}
},
"receives": {
"redis-cache": "/var/lib/redis-module/grants/mesh.json"
"redis-cache": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
},
"grants": {
"redis-cache": "/var/lib/redis-module/grants"
"redis-cache": "${dir:grants}"
},
"secrets": {
"secret": "/var/lib/redis-module/default.secret"
"secret": "${dir:state}/default.secret"
},
"own-secrets": {
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/redis/broker"
@@ -57,29 +57,27 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/redis-module",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "grants-dir",
"id": "grants",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/redis-module/grants",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "data",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/services/redis/data",
"mode": "0700",
"owner": "999:999"
"owner": "999:1000"
},
{
"id": "server-conf",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/redis-module/redis.conf",
"path": "${dir:state}/redis.conf",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "requirepass ${secret:secret}\nappendonly yes\ndir /data\n",
"owner": "999:999"
"owner": "999:1000"
},
{
"id": "net",
@@ -90,14 +88,14 @@
"id": "server",
"type": "container",
"name": "redis",
"image": "redis@sha256:ff02b58f971e7d7d156a1267e283fcbbeee91773b6aa36c49dac28ecfe28eadf",
"image": "redis@sha256:520775a41a63e77e06c73e35d2fd9cc15921a609516818796b4ecbb813078bc7",
"network": "redis",
"ports": [
"6379"
],
"volumes": [
"/services/redis/data:/data",
"/var/lib/redis-module/redis.conf:/etc/redis/redis.conf:ro"
"${dir:data}:/data",
"${dir:state}/redis.conf:/etc/redis/redis.conf:ro"
],
"args": [
"/etc/redis/redis.conf"
@@ -113,8 +111,8 @@
"network": "redis",
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/redis/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/redis-module/grants:/var/lib/redis-module/grants:ro",
"/var/lib/redis-module/default.secret:/run/secrets/default:ro"
"${dir:grants}:/var/lib/redis-module/grants:ro",
"${dir:state}/default.secret:/run/secrets/default:ro"
],
"env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
+7 -7
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
"route": {}
},
"receives": {
"route": "/var/lib/route-adapter/routes/mesh.json"
"route": "${dir:routes-dir}/mesh.json"
},
"accesses": [
{
@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/route-adapter",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "routes-dir",
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
{
"id": "config",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/route-adapter/config.json",
"path": "${dir:state}/config.json",
"merge": "json",
"mode": "0644",
"content": "{\n \"dynamic\": \"/services/traefik/dynamic\",\n \"entrypoint\": \"websecure\",\n \"certificate-resolver\": \"le\",\n \"machine\": \"host.docker.internal\"\n}\n"
@@ -51,12 +51,12 @@
"artifact": "runtime",
"run-once": true,
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/route-adapter/routes/mesh.json:/var/lib/route-adapter/routes/mesh.json:ro",
"/var/lib/route-adapter/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro",
"${dir:routes-dir}/mesh.json:${dir:routes-dir}/mesh.json:ro",
"${dir:state}/config.json:/run/config/config.json:ro",
"/services/traefik/dynamic:/services/traefik/dynamic"
],
"env": {
"MESH_RECEIVES": "/var/lib/route-adapter/routes/mesh.json",
"MESH_RECEIVES": "${dir:routes-dir}/mesh.json",
"MESH_ROUTE_ADAPTER_CONFIG": "/run/config/config.json"
},
"args": [
+18 -17
View File
@@ -15,15 +15,15 @@
"route": {}
},
"receives": {
"route": "/var/lib/route-proxy/routes/mesh.json"
"route": "${dir:routes-dir}/mesh.json"
},
"requires": [
"acme-ca",
"internal-acme-ca"
],
"binds": {
"acme-ca": "/var/lib/route-proxy/acme-ca.json",
"internal-acme-ca": "/var/lib/route-proxy/internal-acme-ca.json"
"acme-ca": "${dir:state}/acme-ca.json",
"internal-acme-ca": "${dir:state}/internal-acme-ca.json"
},
"listens": [
{
@@ -45,8 +45,8 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/route-proxy",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "routes-dir",
@@ -69,14 +69,14 @@
{
"id": "acme-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/route-proxy/acme.env",
"path": "${dir:state}/acme.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "ACME_DIRECTORY=https://${bound:acme-ca:at}:${bound:acme-ca:port}${bound:acme-ca:path}\nACME_ROOTS=https://${bound:acme-ca:at}:${bound:acme-ca:port}${bound:acme-ca:roots}\nACME_ROOTS_PATH=${bound:acme-ca:roots}\n"
},
{
"id": "internal-acme-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/route-proxy/internal-acme.env",
"path": "${dir:state}/internal-acme.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "INTERNAL_ACME_DIRECTORY=https://${bound:internal-acme-ca:at}:${bound:internal-acme-ca:port}${bound:internal-acme-ca:path}\nINTERNAL_ACME_ROOTS=https://${bound:internal-acme-ca:at}:${bound:internal-acme-ca:port}${bound:internal-acme-ca:roots}\nINTERNAL_ACME_ROOTS_PATH=${bound:internal-acme-ca:roots}\n"
},
@@ -88,10 +88,10 @@
"run-once": true,
"network": "host",
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/route-proxy/acme.env"
"${dir:state}/acme.env"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/route-proxy/ca:/ca"
"${dir:ca-dir}:/ca"
],
"args": [
"sh",
@@ -110,10 +110,10 @@
"run-once": true,
"network": "host",
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/route-proxy/internal-acme.env"
"${dir:state}/internal-acme.env"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/route-proxy/ca:/ca"
"${dir:ca-dir}:/ca"
],
"args": [
"sh",
@@ -131,13 +131,13 @@
"artifact": "server",
"network": "host",
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/route-proxy/acme.env",
"/var/lib/route-proxy/internal-acme.env"
"${dir:state}/acme.env",
"${dir:state}/internal-acme.env"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/route-proxy/routes:/routes:ro",
"/var/lib/route-proxy/acme:/acme",
"/var/lib/route-proxy/ca:/ca:ro"
"${dir:routes-dir}:/routes:ro",
"${dir:acme-cache}:/acme",
"${dir:ca-dir}:/ca:ro"
],
"env": {
"ROUTES": "/routes/mesh.json",
@@ -162,7 +162,8 @@
"kind": "image",
"from": "Dockerfile",
"context": {
"repository": "https://git.novox.be/novox/mesh-controller.git",
"seat": "git",
"repository": "novox/mesh-controller",
"ref": "main"
}
},
+21 -20
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
"container-runtime"
],
"own-secrets": {
"secret": "/var/lib/searxng-module/secret.secret",
"secret": "/var/lib/mesh/searxng/secret",
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/searxng/broker"
},
"listens": [
@@ -27,22 +27,14 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/searxng-module",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "valkey-data",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/searxng-module/valkey-data",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "server-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/searxng-module/server.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "SEARXNG_SECRET=${secret:secret}\nSEARXNG_VALKEY_URL=valkey://valkey:6379/0\n"
},
{
"id": "net",
"type": "network",
@@ -63,30 +55,39 @@
"warning"
],
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/searxng-module/valkey-data:/data"
"${dir:valkey-data}:/data"
]
},
{
"id": "settings",
"type": "file",
"path": "${dir:state}/settings.yml",
"mode": "0600",
"merge": "json",
"content": "{\n \"use_default_settings\": true,\n \"server\": {\n \"secret_key\": \"${secret:secret}\",\n \"base_url\": false,\n \"limiter\": false,\n \"image_proxy\": false,\n \"public_instance\": false\n },\n \"search\": {\n \"formats\": [\"html\", \"json\"]\n },\n \"valkey\": {\n \"url\": \"valkey://valkey:6379/0\"\n }\n}\n"
},
{
"id": "server",
"type": "container",
"name": "searxng",
"image": "searxng/searxng@sha256:c7cc75852051bf6254afda6ed1b920dd1677d8efe4ab141bf558f02e582f4371",
"image": "searxng/searxng@sha256:cd8812607ab73730a0b1a0dc4990223fe1b9e383f6f35947114d0bef7f8bb441",
"network": "searxng",
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/searxng-module/server.env"
],
"ports": [
"8080"
],
"secrets-in-environment": "SEARXNG_SECRET is env-only, but settings.yml carries server.secret_key; convertible by mounting a generated settings.yml, not yet done"
"volumes": [
"${dir:state}/settings.yml:/etc/searxng/settings.yml:ro"
],
"restart-on": [
"settings"
]
},
{
"id": "runtime-config",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/searxng/config.json",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "{}\n",
"merge": "json"
"content": "{}\n"
},
{
"id": "runtime",
@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@
}
},
"binds": {
"route": "/var/lib/searxng-module/route.json"
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
},
"build": {
"on": [
+8 -8
View File
@@ -20,10 +20,10 @@
"postgres-database"
],
"binds": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/showcase/database.json"
"postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.json"
},
"secrets": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/showcase/database.secret"
"postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.secret"
},
"own-secrets": {
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/showcase/broker"
@@ -100,13 +100,13 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/showcase",
"mode": "0755"
"mode": "0755",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "settings",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/showcase/showcase.env",
"path": "${dir:state}/showcase.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "SHOWCASE_GREETING=hello\nSHOWCASE_EVERY_SECONDS=30\nSHOWCASE_STATE=/var/lib/showcase\nSHOWCASE_DATABASE=${bound:postgres-database:at}\nSHOWCASE_LISTEN=${port:8080}\n"
},
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@
],
"run-once": true,
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/showcase/showcase.env"
"${dir:state}/showcase.env"
]
},
{
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@
],
"user": "showcase",
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/showcase/showcase.env"
"${dir:state}/showcase.env"
],
"restart-on": [
"settings"
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@
],
"schedule": "0 3 * * *",
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/showcase/showcase.env"
"${dir:state}/showcase.env"
]
},
{
+3 -3
View File
@@ -46,9 +46,9 @@
{
"id": "home",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/step-ca",
"mode": "0700",
"owner": "1000:1000"
"owner": "1000:1000",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "config",
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@
"DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_REMOTE_MANAGEMENT": "false"
},
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/step-ca:/home/step",
"${dir:home}:/home/step",
"/var/lib/mesh/step-ca:/run/mesh:ro"
],
"secrets-in-environment": "the entrypoint honours DOCKER_STEPCA_INIT_PASSWORD_FILE; convertible, awaiting a bed that proves it"
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
+18 -19
View File
@@ -19,14 +19,14 @@
}
},
"binds": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/umami/database.json",
"route": "/var/lib/umami/route.json"
"postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.json",
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
},
"secrets": {
"postgres-database": "/var/lib/umami/database.secret",
"postgres-database": "${dir:state}/database.secret",
"secret": {
"app-secret": "/var/lib/umami/app.secret",
"admin": "/var/lib/umami/admin.secret"
"app-secret": "${dir:state}/app.secret",
"admin": "${dir:state}/admin.secret"
}
},
"provides": [
@@ -39,10 +39,10 @@
"analytics": {}
},
"receives": {
"analytics": "/var/lib/umami/grants/mesh.json"
"analytics": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json"
},
"grants": {
"analytics": "/var/lib/umami/grants"
"analytics": "${dir:grants}"
},
"own-secrets": {
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/umami/broker"
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
"port": 3000,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "one port serves two surfaces \u2014 the dashboard and the collection endpoint that the browsers of every tracked site POST to. Both are reached through the proxy, by name, so the port is how the proxy reaches this module and nothing else (novox/hq ADR 0045). It said \"anywhere\" and gave the reason that the collection endpoint must be public, which is true of the name and not of the port: opened, the machine-side port served the dashboard over plain HTTP to the internet, bypassing every rule the proxy applies by path"
"why": "one port serves two surfaces — the dashboard and the collection endpoint that the browsers of every tracked site POST to. Both are reached through the proxy, by name, so the port is how the proxy reaches this module and nothing else (novox/hq ADR 0045). It said \"anywhere\" and gave the reason that the collection endpoint must be public, which is true of the name and not of the port: opened, the machine-side port served the dashboard over plain HTTP to the internet, bypassing every rule the proxy applies by path"
}
],
"resources": [
@@ -66,28 +66,27 @@
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/umami",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "grants",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/umami/grants",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "server-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/umami/server.env",
"path": "${dir:state}/server.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "DATABASE_URL=postgresql://${bound:postgres-database:as}:${secret:postgres-database}@${bound:postgres-database:at}:${bound:postgres-database:port}/${bound:postgres-database:as}\nDATABASE_TYPE=postgresql\nAPP_SECRET=${secret:app-secret}\n"
},
{
"id": "provisioner-env",
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/umami/provisioner.env",
"path": "${dir:state}/provisioner.env",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "MESH_PROVISION_UMAMI_URL=http://umami:3000\nGRANTS=/var/lib/umami/grants\n"
"content": "MESH_PROVISION_UMAMI_URL=http://umami:3000\nGRANTS=${dir:grants}\n"
},
{
"id": "net",
@@ -101,7 +100,7 @@
"image": "ghcr.io/umami-software/umami@sha256:85909afc45bdcda1917394594a087421fdbb05610fded0fa9f6fb861abb2f367",
"network": "umami",
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/umami/server.env"
"${dir:state}/server.env"
],
"ports": [
"3000"
@@ -115,16 +114,16 @@
"network": "umami",
"volumes": [
"/var/lib/mesh/umami/broker:/run/secrets/broker:ro",
"/var/lib/umami/grants:/var/lib/umami/grants",
"/var/lib/umami/admin.secret:/run/secrets/admin:ro"
"${dir:grants}:${dir:grants}",
"${dir:state}/admin.secret:/run/secrets/admin:ro"
],
"env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_RECEIVES": "/var/lib/umami/grants/mesh.json",
"MESH_RECEIVES": "${dir:grants}/mesh.json",
"MESH_UMAMI_ADMIN_PASSWORD_FILE": "/run/secrets/admin"
},
"env-file": [
"/var/lib/umami/provisioner.env"
"${dir:state}/provisioner.env"
],
"artifact": "runtime"
}
+41 -21
View File
@@ -10,35 +10,35 @@
"port": 8443,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "the controller web UI, over its own self-signed tls; reaching it from outside is a route grant later"
"why": "the controller web UI and API, over its own self-signed tls; named through the proxy as an https route"
},
{
"name": "inform",
"port": 8080,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "device inform \u2014 how APs and switches check in and are adopted"
"why": "device inform, how APs and switches check in and are adopted; the controller tells devices this number, so the machine must publish it on the same one"
},
{
"name": "stun",
"port": 3478,
"protocol": "udp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "STUN, so managed devices can find the controller through NAT"
"why": "STUN for managed devices; the controller tells devices this number, so the machine must publish it on the same one"
},
{
"name": "discovery",
"port": 10001,
"protocol": "udp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "device discovery \u2014 the controller finds unadopted devices on the network"
"why": "device discovery broadcasts from unadopted devices and the UniFi apps"
},
{
"name": "discovery-l2",
"port": 1902,
"port": 1900,
"protocol": "udp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "layer-2 (UBNT) discovery broadcasts; published on 1902, the container listens on 1900"
"why": "make-controller-discoverable-on-L2 (SSDP); the software listens on 1900, which machines commonly have taken by another SSDP speaker"
},
{
"name": "portal-tls",
@@ -76,10 +76,15 @@
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/unifi",
"mode": "0700"
},
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "data",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/services/unifi/data",
"mode": "0700",
"owner": "1000:1000"
},
@@ -87,17 +92,17 @@
"id": "server",
"type": "container",
"name": "unifi-controller",
"image": "lscr.io/linuxserver/unifi-controller@sha256:fcd5d8b13a77a588c79c1b49e5fc9ad08115aa3bb1a3576c589c64908a68845f",
"image": "lscr.io/linuxserver/unifi-controller@sha256:0ae315a3a45635e443899e30e86bd507c2c48922cb27f4bc7241777885f4650e",
"ports": [
"8443:8443",
"8080:8080",
"3478:3478/udp",
"10001:10001/udp",
"1902:1900/udp",
"8843:8843",
"8880:8880",
"6789:6789",
"5514:5514/udp"
"8443",
"8080",
"3478/udp",
"10001/udp",
"1900/udp",
"8843",
"8880",
"6789",
"5514/udp"
],
"env": {
"PUID": "1000",
@@ -107,7 +112,7 @@
"MEM_STARTUP": "1024"
},
"volumes": [
"/services/unifi/data:/config"
"${dir:data}:/config"
]
},
{
@@ -115,7 +120,7 @@
"type": "file",
"path": "/var/lib/mesh/unifi/config.json",
"mode": "0600",
"content": "{}\n",
"content": "{\n \"site\": \"default\",\n \"password\": \"${secret:controller}\"\n}\n",
"merge": "json"
},
{
@@ -129,7 +134,7 @@
],
"env": {
"MESH_BROKER_FILE": "/run/secrets/broker",
"MESH_UNIFI_URL": "https://127.0.0.1:8443",
"MESH_UNIFI_URL": "https://127.0.0.1:${port:8443}",
"MESH_UNIFI_CONFIG_FILE": "/run/config/config.json"
},
"restart-on": [
@@ -138,8 +143,23 @@
"artifact": "runtime"
}
],
"requires": [
"route"
],
"contributes": {
"route": {
"label": "unifi",
"endpoint": "web",
"scheme": "https",
"insecure": true
}
},
"binds": {
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
},
"own-secrets": {
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/unifi/broker"
"broker": "/var/lib/mesh/unifi/broker",
"controller": "/var/lib/mesh/unifi/controller"
},
"build": {
"on": [
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
{
"module": "novox.be",
"module": "website",
"version": "1",
"capabilities": [
"container-runtime"
@@ -14,38 +14,41 @@
}
},
"binds": {
"route": "/var/lib/novox.be/route.json"
"route": "${dir:state}/route.json"
},
"listens": [
{
"name": "web",
"port": 4000,
"port": 8080,
"protocol": "tcp",
"from": "mesh",
"why": "the public website over http; the public name novox.be is a route grant, and route-proxy reaches it on this published port"
"why": "the public website over http; its public name is a route grant, and route-proxy reaches it on this published port"
}
],
"resources": [
{
"id": "state",
"type": "directory",
"path": "/var/lib/novox.be",
"mode": "0700"
"mode": "0700",
"place": "."
},
{
"id": "net",
"type": "network",
"name": "novox-be"
"name": "website"
},
{
"id": "server",
"type": "container",
"name": "novox-be",
"name": "website",
"image": "registry-api.novox.be/novox/www@sha256:aa7ed20a293e1d7444c5c5d59b6d8bdb382bad159559a22e006810e379cae69c",
"network": "novox-be",
"network": "website",
"ports": [
"8080"
]
],
"names-on-purpose": {
"registry-api.novox.be": "built outside the mesh, from the application's own repository, and pulled from the registry that built it; moves when that repository is a build source on the git seat (novox/hq ADR 0155, issue 122)"
}
}
]
}