sonarr: its config dir is placed, its image is the one ace runs #157

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mesh-admin wants to merge 7 commits from feat/sonarr-for-ace into main
7 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
jschoubben 28b756f1c9 sonarr: reach nzbget, qbittorrent and jackett through the mesh
sonarr reached its download clients as nzbget:6789 and qbittorrent:8112 and its indexers
through jackett:9117 or indexers.zurag.be - HAL container names and a public route,
typed into its database by hand. Nothing on the mesh answers those names.

It now requires nzbget-api, qbittorrent-api and jackett-api. A run-once step
(downloads/, declared last, restart-on its bindings, credentials and settings) writes
host, port, TLS, base path, user and credential into sonarr through sonarr's own API:

- A download client is the mesh's when its name is downloads.<provision>.name and its
  kind the provider's; it is registered when missing. A jackett feed is the mesh's when
  its host is the bound one, one the step bound before, or one in
  downloads.jackett-api.adopt-hosts; the jackett indexers in
  downloads.jackett-api.indexers are registered when missing. Every other entry is left
  alone, and nothing is ever deleted.
- Only connection fields, only when they differ. The stored password is masked, so the
  app tests the entry with the credential it holds; only if that fails is the delivered
  one written. Categories, priorities and "enabled" are never touched.
- Each credential is tried against its provider first. A minted value (nothing accepted
  yet) is never written; the step exits 1 naming the exact secret accept.

The step is byte-identical in sonarr, radarr, lidarr and bookshelf (the same Servarr
API, v3 or v1): each module builds from its own directory, so each carries a copy, and
test/downloads.test.ts fails if a sibling's copy differs.

Verified: strict typecheck, the Dockerfile build, 14 unit tests; and the compiled step
against fresh pinned sonarr/radarr/lidarr/bookshelf with throwaway nzbget, qBittorrent
and jackett - minted credentials refused with nothing written, accepted ones registered
and tested by the app, a migration-shaped radarr repointed, reruns unchanged.
2026-09-30 13:07:10 +02:00
jschoubben d543defae6 sonarr: its config dir is placed, its image is the one ace runs
The manifest named /services/sonarr/config and /var/lib/mesh/sonarr/route.json, host
paths ADR 0112 takes out of definitions. The config dir is now a pathless ${dir:config}
(0700, 1000:1000) mounted into the server and, read-only, into the runtime that reads the
API key from config.xml; the route binding lives in a placed state dir, as jackett and
searxng do. /var/lib/mesh/sonarr stays for the broker secret.

The image is pinned to 4.0.20.3014-ls325, the digest ace runs today. The old pin
(4.0.19.2979-ls322) was older than the running version, and Sonarr migrates its database
forward on start, so pointing the older build at ace's data is not safe.

The container mount points stay /series, /anime and /downloads: Sonarr's database stores
its root folders and the download clients' reported paths under exactly those names, and
there are no remote path mappings to absorb a change. The generic access paths stay;
ace's (/storage/media/*, /storage/downloads) and its media owner 1001:2000 wait on hq 153.

Based on feat/servarr-api-provision (#156), which makes sonarr provide sonarr-api.

Verified: catalogue key tests with MESH_CATALOGUE set (73 manifests parsed, not skipped);
a throwaway container of the pinned image on a fresh 0700 1000:1000 config dir answers
/ping, serves the v3 API with the key it generated and refuses a wrong one (401), accepts
/series as a writable root folder; the runtime's client discovers the key from that
config.xml and reads the queue.
2026-09-30 11:53:43 +02:00
jschoubben f14c763463 ombi: reach sonarr, radarr and lidarr through the mesh
ombi keeps its Servarr connections in its own database, so the mesh has no
file to write them into. A run-once step reads the three bindings and pair
credentials and writes host, port, TLS, base path and key into ombi through
ombi's own API - only when they differ, and nothing else ombi keeps.

Until the operator accepts an app's key for this pair the mesh delivers a
value it minted, which no Servarr app accepts. The step tries the key against
the app first and, refused, writes nothing and fails naming the secret accept
that fixes it, so the old working key in ombi is never replaced by a dead one.

Declared last so its failing gates nothing else of ombi (ADR 0136), and
restart-on its six inputs so it runs again when a provider moves (ADR 0099).
2026-09-30 00:39:19 +02:00
jschoubben ab44ff02e1 sonarr, radarr, lidarr: provide their API to the mesh
A consumer on another machine (ombi first; jackett, bazarr and home-assistant
later) reached these by container name on HAL's shared network, which the mesh
does not have. Each app now provides <app>-api at mesh scope and serves the
software port, so the mesh tells a consumer where it is and redirects the
port to where the machine published it.

Named per app, not one servarr-api: a requirement is matched by name and
answered by exactly one provider per node, so a consumer cannot require one
name from three providers - and ombi's code is written against each app's
own API version (ADR 0027).

No grants and no provisioner: a Servarr instance has one API key, which the
mesh cannot mint. The operator accepts it as the pair credential for each
consumer (ADR 0092).
2026-09-30 00:39:19 +02:00
jschoubben c4c44efb1b Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/fix/sidecars-dial-the-port-they-were-given' into feat/servarr-api-provision 2026-09-30 00:25:55 +02:00
jschoubben 5cc6258326 Sidecars dial the port they were given, not the software's
A host-network sidecar reaches its service over the machine's loopback, and
the mesh publishes that service on a machine port it assigns (ADR 0038) —
so dialling the software's port reaches whatever else holds it. On ace,
searxng's sidecar dialled 127.0.0.1:8080 and got unifi's inform port. The
same shape in bazarr, bookshelf, lidarr, nzbget, qbittorrent, radarr and
sonarr; each now asks with ${port:N} (hq 088). Found in review of ace's
module preparation.
2026-09-29 23:50:19 +02:00
jschoubben 21f5301268 ombi: its config is placed, its image is the one ace runs
ombi's definition named /services/ombi/config (a HAL machine path) in three
places and pinned an image older than the one ace runs. Ombi migrates its
own SQLite schema, so a take onto the older pin (v4.53.10-ls267) would start
it on a database the newer build (ls269) already touched.

- config is a pathless placed directory, mounted as ${dir:config}
- a state directory placed at the assignment root carries route.json
- image pinned to the digest ace runs today (v4.53.10-ls269)
- the sidecar reaches ombi on the machine port the mesh assigns
  (${port:3579}) rather than assuming 3579 is free
- the sidecar no longer mounts ombi's data directory: MESH_OMBI_CONFIG_DIR
  is read by no code, and the mount exposed the databases for nothing

Verified: catalogue tests (MESH_CATALOGUE set, 6 pass, none skipped); the
pinned image starts as PUID 1000 in a 0700 dir and answers /api/v1/Status
200; data owned 1001:2000 (ace's media ids) under a 1000:1000 dir is
re-owned by the image's init and serves 200; a minted ApiKey is refused
(401) - the api-key secret must be accepted from ombi's own settings.
2026-09-29 23:38:56 +02:00