mosquitto passed the broker's admin password to mosquitto_ctrl as -P on every docker exec, and the container runtime keeps every exec's command line in its event stream, where docker_events returned it. The admin credentials now reach mosquitto_ctrl as a 0600 options file fed on stdin, client passwords at its own prompt, and an argv carrying a secret is refused before it runs. The admin secret says it is taken at start: the bootstrap re-runs when the mesh replaces it and re-keys the broker online from the value it last applied, so it can be rotated. docker_events redacts what an exec's command line carried, and docker_secrets_in_events names such secrets by name. keycloak's repair hands kcadm its passwords through KC_CLI_PASSWORD; minio gives mc its root alias through MC_HOST_mesh.
518 lines
24 KiB
TypeScript
518 lines
24 KiB
TypeScript
// mosquitto's admin client — mosquitto's own code, living in the module (novox/hq ADR 0039). Both
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// this module's tools and its provisioner import it, and nothing outside mosquitto does.
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//
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// Client, role and ACL administration is driven through `mosquitto_ctrl dynsec`, not a hand-rolled
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// MQTT stack: the module may take NO npm dependency beyond @novox/mesh-sdk, and mosquitto ships the
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// exact admin client for its Dynamic Security plugin — so it shells out to it, the same way postgres
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// drives itself through `psql`, minio through `mc` and mailu through `doveadm`. One boundary,
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// `ctl()`, and every method is built on it.
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//
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// Why the Dynamic Security plugin and not `password_file`: dynsec creates and revokes clients while
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// the broker runs, over an admin connection, with no broker restart and no file the host rewrites —
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// the true analog of redis's runtime ACL users. A `password_file` would have to be re-read on a
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// SIGHUP the runtime cannot cleanly send across containers, and — declared as a managed file — would
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// be rewritten by the host on every reconcile, wiping every provisioned user (novox/nox issue 011).
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// The one cost dynsec carries is the bootstrap file; see initBootstrapFile() and the module README.
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import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
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import { connect as tcpConnect } from "node:net";
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import { readFileSync } from "node:fs";
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import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
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import { basename, dirname } from "node:path";
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import { promisify } from "node:util";
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import { missingAcls, parseRoleAcls, staleAcls, wantedAcls } from "./topics.js";
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const run = promisify(execFile);
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export interface MqttConn {
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readonly host: string;
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readonly port: number;
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/** The Dynamic Security admin client the runtime authenticates as. */
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readonly adminUser: string;
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readonly adminPassword: string;
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/**
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* The broker's own container, when `mosquitto_ctrl` is run inside it rather than from this
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* machine's packages. The broker's image carries the tool at the broker's version, and inside it
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* the broker listens on 127.0.0.1:1883 whatever port the machine publishes.
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*/
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readonly container?: string;
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/** The broker's image, to seed the security file before the broker has ever started. */
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readonly image?: string;
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}
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export class MosquittoClient {
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constructor(private readonly conn: MqttConn) {}
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/**
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* Build from the module's resolved environment. Reads MESH_MQTT_* first (the documented names),
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* falling back to the MESH_PROVISION_* keys the manifest already sets on the provisioner
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* container. Throws if it cannot find a host and an admin password — the right failure, because
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* without them nothing it does can work.
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*/
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static fromEnv(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv = process.env): MosquittoClient {
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const endpoint = env.MESH_PROVISION_MQTT ?? ""; // "host:port"
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const host = env.MESH_MQTT_HOST ?? (endpoint ? endpoint.split(":")[0] : undefined);
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const port =
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Number(env.MESH_MQTT_PORT ?? (endpoint.includes(":") ? endpoint.split(":")[1] : "") ?? "1883") || 1883;
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const adminUser = env.MESH_MQTT_ADMIN_USER ?? env.MESH_PROVISION_ADMIN_USER ?? "mesh-admin";
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const adminPassword = env.MESH_MQTT_PASSWORD ?? readSecretFile(env.MESH_PROVISION_PASSWORD_FILE);
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if (!host || !adminPassword) {
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throw new Error(
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"mosquitto host or admin password is not set — mosquitto's own code cannot reach the broker",
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);
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}
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return new MosquittoClient({
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host, port, adminUser, adminPassword: adminPassword ?? "",
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container: env.MESH_MQTT_CTRL_CONTAINER || undefined,
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image: env.MESH_MQTT_CTRL_IMAGE || undefined,
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});
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}
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get host(): string {
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return this.conn.host;
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}
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get port(): number {
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return this.conn.port;
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}
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get adminUser(): string {
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return this.conn.adminUser;
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}
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/**
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* Run one `mosquitto_ctrl dynsec <args>` command against the broker as the admin client and return
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* its stdout. A failed command rejects — a failure here is an error, not a success with a warning.
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*
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* **No secret rides on a command line** (novox/hq issue 282). The admin's name and password reach
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* `mosquitto_ctrl` as an options file (`-o`), and a password a command sets reaches it at its own
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* prompt, both on stdin: a small shell, given no secret, reads the two admin lines into a 0600 file
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* that it removes as it exits, and hands the rest of stdin to the prompts. A password on argv is
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* kept by everything that records a command line — the container runtime records every exec's in
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* its event stream, which `docker events` shows to anyone who may ask the runtime — and the
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* earlier `-P <password>` put the broker's admin password there on every call. Verified against
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* mosquitto_ctrl 2.1.2: `-o` takes the connect options from a file, and `createClient` without
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* `-p` and `setClientPassword` without a password prompt for it twice, reading stdin.
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* `assertNoSecret` refuses, before anything runs, an argv that still carries one.
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*
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* The exit code cannot carry the verdict: `mosquitto_ctrl` 2.x exits 0 from its dynsec
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* subcommands **even when they fail** — a "Client not found", an "already exists", a rejected
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* "Connection error: Not authorized", an "Unable to connect" all return status 0 and report the
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* failure only as a line of text, on stdout or stderr (verified live against 2.0.11). Trusting the
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* exit code is exactly how a `createClient` the broker refused reads back as a provisioned
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* consumer. So the combined output is scanned for the tool's error markers and a match is raised as
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* the failure it is.
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*/
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async ctl(...args: string[]): Promise<string> {
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return this.ctlPrompted([], args);
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}
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/** `ctl`, answering the command's password prompt with `password` — typed twice, as asked. */
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async ctlWithPassword(password: string, ...args: string[]): Promise<string> {
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return this.ctlPrompted([password, password], args);
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}
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private async ctlPrompted(prompted: string[], args: string[]): Promise<string> {
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const inside = this.conn.container !== undefined;
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const connect = ["-h", inside ? "127.0.0.1" : this.conn.host, "-p", inside ? "1883" : String(this.conn.port)];
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oneLine("the admin user", this.conn.adminUser, true);
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oneLine("the admin password", this.conn.adminPassword, true);
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for (const p of prompted) oneLine("a client password", p, false);
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const input = [this.conn.adminUser, this.conn.adminPassword, ...prompted].map((l) => l + "\n").join("");
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let stdout: string;
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let stderr: string;
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try {
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const [command, argv] = this.ctrl([...connect, "dynsec", ...args]);
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this.assertNoSecret([command, ...argv], prompted);
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({ stdout, stderr } = await runWithInput(command, argv, input));
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} catch (err) {
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if (err instanceof SecretOnArgvError) throw err;
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// Said without the argv or the input, so a failure carries nothing it was given.
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const e = err as { code?: unknown; signal?: unknown; stderr?: string; stdout?: string };
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const detail = `${e.stderr ?? ""}${e.stdout ?? ""}`.trim().slice(0, 500);
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throw new Error(`mosquitto_ctrl dynsec ${args[0] ?? ""} could not run (${e.code ?? e.signal ?? "error"}): ${detail}`);
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}
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const failure = ctlError(`${stdout}\n${stderr}`);
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if (failure) {
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throw new Error(`mosquitto_ctrl dynsec ${args[0] ?? ""} failed: ${failure}`);
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}
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return stdout;
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}
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/**
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* Refuse to run a command whose argv carries a secret this client holds: the admin password, or a
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* password it was asked to set (novox/hq issue 282). Said by name, never by value.
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*/
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assertNoSecret(argv: readonly string[], others: readonly string[] = []): void {
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const secrets: Array<[string, string]> = [["the broker's admin password", this.conn.adminPassword]];
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for (const o of others) secrets.push(["a client password", o]);
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for (const [name, value] of secrets) {
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if (value && argv.some((a) => a.includes(value))) {
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throw new SecretOnArgvError(name, argv[0] ?? "");
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}
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}
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}
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/** Whether a dynsec client with this username already exists. */
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async clientExists(username: string): Promise<boolean> {
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try {
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await this.ctl("getClient", username);
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return true;
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} catch (err) {
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// Only "not found" means the client is genuinely absent. Any other failure — an auth
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// rejection, an unreachable broker — must NOT be read as "absent": that would send us down
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// the createClient path and bury the real error. Re-raise anything that is not a clean miss.
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if (/not\s*found|does not exist|no such/i.test(String(err))) return false;
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throw err;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Whether this client already carries this role. mosquitto_ctrl has no idempotent addClientRole:
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* re-binding a role the client already has does not report "already exists" — it reports a bare
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* "Internal error" (verified against 2.0.11), indistinguishable from a genuine fault, so it cannot
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* be swallowed by message. Instead the binding is checked first. `getClient` lists each assigned
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* role under its "Roles:" heading as `<role> (priority: N)`; the role is matched as a whole token.
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*/
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async clientHasRole(username: string, role: string): Promise<boolean> {
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let out: string;
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try {
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out = await this.ctl("getClient", username);
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} catch {
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return false; // no such client (or unreadable) — it certainly has no role
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}
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return new RegExp(`(^|\\s)${escapeRegExp(role)}\\s+\\(priority`, "m").test(out);
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}
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/**
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* Create (or reset to a known state) a client granted exactly these topic filters, idempotently.
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* The grant is a same-named role carrying, for every filter, publish, receive and subscribe — and
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* nothing else: an ACL the role carries that the filters no longer name is removed, so narrowing a
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* consumer's `topics` narrows what it may do. By default the filters are the consumer's own
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* subtree, `<as>/#` (see topics.ts). Called again for an existing client, it resets the password
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* and re-asserts the ACLs.
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*
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* Only the role named for this client is ever changed. A client or role the mesh did not make —
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* a device carried from the predecessor's password file, its `legacy-full-access` role — is never
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* read, changed or removed here.
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*/
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async createScopedClient(username: string, password: string, filters: readonly string[]): Promise<void> {
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const role = username; // one role per client, named for it
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if (await this.clientExists(username)) {
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await this.ctlWithPassword(password, "setClientPassword", username);
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// A disabled client is refused like a wrong password, so the check the provisioner runs
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// reports it lost; applying again must enable it, or the two would disagree for ever.
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if (/Disabled:\s*true/i.test(await this.ctl("getClient", username))) {
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await this.ctl("enableClient", username);
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}
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} else {
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await this.ctlWithPassword(password, "createClient", username);
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}
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// createRole and addRoleACL are one-shot: each rejects with an "already exists" when re-run
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// against a role/ACL it created on a previous reconcile. That rejection is the intended terminal
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// state, so it is swallowed.
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await ignoreExisting(this.ctl("createRole", role));
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const wanted = wantedAcls(filters);
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const current = parseRoleAcls(await this.ctl("getRole", role));
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for (const acl of missingAcls(current, wanted)) {
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await ignoreExisting(this.ctl("addRoleACL", role, acl.type, acl.topic, "allow"));
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}
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// What the consumer no longer asks for — added before it narrowed its topics — is taken away.
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for (const acl of staleAcls(current, wanted)) {
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await ignoreMissing(this.ctl("removeRoleACL", role, acl.type, acl.topic));
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}
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// Bind the role only when it is not already bound — addClientRole is the one call whose
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// idempotent re-run cannot be recognised by message (see clientHasRole).
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if (!(await this.clientHasRole(username, role))) {
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await this.ctl("addClientRole", username, role);
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}
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}
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/**
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* Whether a consumer's client accepts exactly this password, still carries its own role, and that
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* role grants exactly these filters. Read-only. The password is checked the way the consumer is
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* checked, by an MQTT CONNECT as it, and the broker's CONNACK code is the answer: 0 accepted,
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* 4 bad credentials, 5 not authorised. Nothing rides on argv. An unreachable broker rejects
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* (novox/hq issue 120).
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*/
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async holdsClient(username: string, password: string, filters: readonly string[]): Promise<boolean> {
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const code = await mqttConnack(this.conn.host, this.conn.port, username, password);
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if (code === 4 || code === 5) return false;
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if (code !== 0) throw new Error(`mosquitto refused ${username} with CONNACK ${code}`);
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// The role, asked directly: only "not found" means absent. Any other failure to ask rejects,
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// unlike clientHasRole, which reads every failure as "no role".
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let client: string;
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let role: string;
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try {
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client = await this.ctl("getClient", username);
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role = await this.ctl("getRole", username);
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} catch (err) {
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if (/not\s*found|does not exist|no such/i.test(String(err))) return false;
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throw err;
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}
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if (!new RegExp(`(^|\\s)${escapeRegExp(username)}\\s+\\(priority`, "m").test(client)) return false;
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const current = parseRoleAcls(role);
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const wanted = wantedAcls(filters);
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return missingAcls(current, wanted).length === 0 && staleAcls(current, wanted).length === 0;
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}
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/** Remove a client and the per-client role created for it, idempotently. */
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async deleteScopedClient(username: string): Promise<void> {
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await ignoreMissing(this.ctl("deleteClient", username));
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await ignoreMissing(this.ctl("deleteRole", username));
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}
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/** The dynsec client list, parsed from `listClients`. */
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async listClients(): Promise<string[]> {
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const out = await this.ctl("listClients");
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return out
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.split(/\r?\n/)
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.map((l) => l.trim())
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.filter((l) => l.length > 0);
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}
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/**
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* Write the Dynamic Security bootstrap file offline, creating the admin client the plugin loads at
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* broker startup. This is a one-time seed, NOT part of the reconcile loop: run once before the
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* broker first starts, against the same path the broker's `plugin_opt_config_file` names. It must
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* never be a host-reconciled managed file — see novox/nox issue 011.
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*/
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async initBootstrapFile(configFile: string): Promise<void> {
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// `dynsec init <file> <admin-username>` is an offline file operation — it does not connect to
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// the broker. Without the optional password argument it prompts for the password twice, and the
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// answers are given on stdin (novox/hq issue 282): an argument would be on the command line of
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// the container below, which the runtime keeps in what it says about the container.
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oneLine("the admin password", this.conn.adminPassword, true);
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const input = `${this.conn.adminPassword}\n${this.conn.adminPassword}\n`;
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let command: string;
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let argv: string[];
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if (this.conn.image) {
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// Before the broker has ever started there is no container to enter: a throwaway one from the
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// broker's own image writes the file into the directory the broker will mount.
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command = "docker";
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argv = [
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"run", "--rm", "-i", "--entrypoint", "mosquitto_ctrl",
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"-v", `${dirname(configFile)}:/mosquitto/data`,
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this.conn.image,
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"dynsec", "init", `/mosquitto/data/${basename(configFile)}`, this.conn.adminUser,
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];
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} else {
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command = "mosquitto_ctrl";
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argv = ["dynsec", "init", configFile, this.conn.adminUser];
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}
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this.assertNoSecret([command, ...argv]);
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try {
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await runWithInput(command, argv, input);
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} catch (err) {
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const e = err as { code?: unknown; signal?: unknown; stderr?: string; stdout?: string };
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const detail = `${e.stderr ?? ""}${e.stdout ?? ""}`.trim().slice(0, 500);
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throw new Error(`mosquitto_ctrl dynsec init could not run (${e.code ?? e.signal ?? "error"}): ${detail}`);
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}
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}
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/**
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* Whether the broker takes this admin password: the CONNACK of a connect as the admin client — 0
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* accepted, 4 or 5 refused — or undefined when the broker cannot be reached. Nothing rides on argv.
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*/
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async adminAccepted(password: string): Promise<boolean | undefined> {
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let code: number;
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try {
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code = await mqttConnack(this.conn.host, this.conn.port, this.conn.adminUser, password);
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} catch {
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return undefined;
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}
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if (code === 0) return true;
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if (code === 4 || code === 5) return false;
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throw new Error(`mosquitto answered the admin client with CONNACK ${code}`);
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}
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/** The same client, connecting with another admin password. */
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withAdminPassword(adminPassword: string): MosquittoClient {
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return new MosquittoClient({ ...this.conn, adminPassword });
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}
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/**
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* How `mosquitto_ctrl` is run here: inside the broker's container when one is named, through the
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* shell that turns the first two lines of stdin into its options file (OPTIONS_SHELL).
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*/
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ctrl(argv: string[]): [string, string[]] {
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if (this.conn.container) {
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return ["docker", ["exec", "-i", this.conn.container, "sh", "-c", OPTIONS_SHELL, "mosquitto_ctrl", ...argv]];
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}
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return ["sh", ["-c", OPTIONS_SHELL, "mosquitto_ctrl", ...argv]];
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}
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}
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/** Generate a URL-safe password with no argv- or MQTT-hostile characters. */
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export function generatePassword(): string {
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return randomBytes(24).toString("base64url");
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}
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/**
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* The shell `mosquitto_ctrl` runs under: it reads the admin's name and password from the first two
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* lines of stdin into an options file only it can read, removed as it exits, and runs the tool with
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* `-o` naming it — so neither is ever an argument. The rest of stdin is left to the tool's own
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* password prompts: `read` takes a pipe one byte at a time and so stops at the second line. The
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* script holds no secret; it is the same text on every call.
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*/
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export const OPTIONS_SHELL = [
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"umask 077",
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'f=$(mktemp) || exit 1',
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"trap 'rm -f \"$f\"' EXIT",
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'IFS= read -r u || exit 1',
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'IFS= read -r p || exit 1',
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`printf '%s\\n' "-u $u" "-P $p" > "$f"`,
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'mosquitto_ctrl -o "$f" "$@"',
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].join("\n");
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/**
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* Why a dynsec command would put a password on a command line, or undefined (novox/hq issue 282).
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* A command line is recorded by the container runtime for anyone who may ask it; a password is set
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* through the provisioner, which answers mosquitto_ctrl's prompt on stdin, never through this tool.
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*/
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export function passwordOnArgv(parts: readonly string[]): string | undefined {
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const [verb, ...rest] = parts;
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if (verb === "init") return "init writes a new store with a password; the module's bootstrap seeds the store";
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if (verb === "createClient" && rest.includes("-p")) {
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return "createClient -p puts the password on a command line; a client is created by provisioning it";
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}
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if (verb === "setClientPassword" && rest.length > 1) {
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return "setClientPassword with a password puts it on a command line; a client's password is the mesh's to set";
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}
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return undefined;
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}
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/** A secret found on a command line about to run: named, never quoted. */
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export class SecretOnArgvError extends Error {
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|
constructor(secret: string, program: string) {
|
|
super(`refused to run ${program}: its command line would carry ${secret}, and a command line is recorded ` +
|
|
`where anyone who may ask the container runtime reads it (novox/hq issue 282)`);
|
|
this.name = "SecretOnArgvError";
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Refuse a value that cannot be handed over as one line of stdin — or, for the admin's, as one word
|
|
* of an options file, which `mosquitto_ctrl` splits at spaces. Named, never quoted.
|
|
*/
|
|
function oneLine(what: string, value: string, oneWord: boolean): void {
|
|
if (/[\r\n]/.test(value) || (oneWord && /\s/.test(value))) {
|
|
throw new Error(`${what} ${oneWord ? "holds whitespace" : "spans lines"} and cannot be handed to mosquitto_ctrl on stdin`);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Run a program with this text on its stdin, answering its stdout and stderr. */
|
|
function runWithInput(command: string, argv: string[], input: string): Promise<{ stdout: string; stderr: string }> {
|
|
const p = run(command, argv, { maxBuffer: 16 << 20, timeout: 30_000 });
|
|
p.child.stdin?.on("error", () => { /* a program that exits before reading all of it is judged by its output */ });
|
|
p.child.stdin?.end(input);
|
|
return p;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Escape a string for literal use inside a RegExp. */
|
|
function escapeRegExp(s: string): string {
|
|
return s.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, "\\$&");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Find the failure `mosquitto_ctrl` reported in text while still exiting 0. Its dynsec subcommands
|
|
* surface errors in three shapes, on stdout or stderr:
|
|
* - `<command>: Error: <message>` e.g. "createClient: Error: Client already exists"
|
|
* - `Connection error: <message>` e.g. "Connection error: Not authorized"
|
|
* - `Unable to connect (<message>)` e.g. "Unable to connect (Lookup error.)."
|
|
* The only other line it prints unprompted is the "running without encryption" warning, which
|
|
* carries none of these markers. Returns the offending line, or undefined when the output is clean.
|
|
*/
|
|
function ctlError(output: string): string | undefined {
|
|
for (const raw of output.split(/\r?\n/)) {
|
|
const line = raw.trim();
|
|
if (!line) continue;
|
|
if (/(^|:\s)Error:/i.test(line) || /^Connection error:/i.test(line) || /^Unable to connect/i.test(line)) {
|
|
return line;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return undefined;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Swallow a "already exists" failure so create paths are idempotent; rethrow anything else. */
|
|
async function ignoreExisting(p: Promise<string>): Promise<void> {
|
|
try {
|
|
await p;
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
if (!/exist/i.test(String(err))) throw err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Swallow a "not found" failure so delete paths are idempotent; rethrow anything else. */
|
|
async function ignoreMissing(p: Promise<string>): Promise<void> {
|
|
try {
|
|
await p;
|
|
} catch (err) {
|
|
if (!/not\s*found|does not exist|no such/i.test(String(err))) throw err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function readSecretFile(path: string | undefined): string | undefined {
|
|
if (!path) return undefined;
|
|
try {
|
|
return readFileSync(path, "utf8").trim();
|
|
} catch {
|
|
return undefined;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Connect once over MQTT 3.1.1 with a username and password, return the broker's CONNACK return code,
|
|
* and disconnect. A clean session under a throwaway client id, so no consumer session is taken over.
|
|
*/
|
|
export function mqttConnack(host: string, port: number, username: string, password: string): Promise<number> {
|
|
const str = (v: string): Buffer => {
|
|
const b = Buffer.from(v, "utf8");
|
|
const len = Buffer.alloc(2);
|
|
len.writeUInt16BE(b.length);
|
|
return Buffer.concat([len, b]);
|
|
};
|
|
const variable = Buffer.concat([str("MQTT"), Buffer.from([4, 0xc2, 0, 10])]); // level 4; user+pass+clean; keepalive 10s
|
|
const payload = Buffer.concat([str(`mesh-holds-${randomBytes(6).toString("hex")}`), str(username), str(password)]);
|
|
let remaining = variable.length + payload.length;
|
|
const lenBytes: number[] = [];
|
|
do {
|
|
let byte = remaining % 128;
|
|
remaining = Math.floor(remaining / 128);
|
|
if (remaining > 0) byte |= 0x80;
|
|
lenBytes.push(byte);
|
|
} while (remaining > 0);
|
|
const packet = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([0x10, ...lenBytes]), variable, payload]);
|
|
|
|
return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
|
|
const socket = tcpConnect({ host, port });
|
|
let buf = Buffer.alloc(0);
|
|
const timer = setTimeout(() => {
|
|
socket.destroy();
|
|
reject(new Error(`no CONNACK from ${host}:${port} within 10s`));
|
|
}, 10_000);
|
|
socket.on("connect", () => socket.write(packet));
|
|
socket.on("data", (chunk) => {
|
|
buf = Buffer.concat([buf, chunk]);
|
|
if (buf.length < 4) return;
|
|
clearTimeout(timer);
|
|
if (buf[0] !== 0x20) {
|
|
socket.destroy();
|
|
reject(new Error(`unexpected MQTT packet 0x${buf[0].toString(16)} instead of CONNACK`));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
const code = buf[3];
|
|
if (code === 0) socket.end(Buffer.from([0xe0, 0])); // DISCONNECT
|
|
else socket.destroy();
|
|
resolve(code);
|
|
});
|
|
socket.on("error", (err) => {
|
|
clearTimeout(timer);
|
|
reject(err);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
}
|