The swap from a named volume to the host directory left the mount undeclared, which main's own
manifest check now refuses: a bind the module did not declare is created by the runtime as root, so
the module's owner and mode never reach it and ADR 0030's data rule does not cover it.
The directory is the broker's — lavinmq declares it as its own, mode 0700 — so from here it is an
access, read-only: a pre-existing path this module is granted use of and does not own.
Implements novox/hq ADR 0110 and 0111.
The seat set lives in internal/catalogue/seats.go: fourteen seats, each with a scope, what occupying
it delivers, and the record that made it one. A test asserts the count and a decision per entry, so
changing the set means finding the argument, as the host's vocabulary test does. The first set is
every seat already claimed — including the-private-network, which the network module claims from a
manifest composed in this repository's code, not from any module.json — plus npm-package-registry
(ADR 0109) and git (ADR 0111). A test parses every catalogue manifest and this repository's own and
fails on any refused claim, so closing the set refuses nothing in use.
ParseManifest now refuses a claim on a seat the mesh does not define, a seat claimed at another
scope, and a delivering seat claimed by a module that does not provide what it delivers. A
malformed claim is refused once, for being malformed.
Resolution: among several providers of a mesh provision, a pin still wins; then the holder of the
seat that delivers it; then the only provider; otherwise refused as before. ADR 0009's "never
guessed" holds — the seat is the choice made once, mesh-wide, rather than a pin per consumer node.
A provider now carries the module it came from, because a provider is a (node, module) pair and the
pair is what tells a holder from a neighbour on the same machine.
The planner's second pass is now given the first pass's holdings. Without them, a node consuming a
seat-delivered provision was refused there, and a refused node's own claims dropped out of what the
mesh holds — letting a second holder of one of its seats pass unrefused.
`seats [--json]` lists every seat, what it delivers, and each holder, derived from assignments
every time and never stored. Unheld seats are listed. A stored claim outside the set — possible
for a manifest registered before the set closed, since stored manifests are not re-validated — is
shown rather than hidden.
`build --self <owner>/<repo>` builds from a repository on the git seat's holder. The clone URL is
composed at build time from the holder's node and what it serves for git; the recorded source is the
path and the seat (migration 0032), never an address, so a moved forge changes nothing recorded.
Nobody holding the seat refuses self-hosted builds and says so; external URLs are unchanged. An
address passed with --self is refused rather than recorded as a path.
Replaces three foundation tests that defended the builder's carried package binding. The catalogue
removed that binding when the builder began requiring the registry through a real grant, so the
tests were already failing on main; they now assert the builder requires what the npm seat delivers
and carries no copy of its own, and that the forge holds the npm and git seats.
Verified: go vet clean; the whole suite passes against a throwaway Postgres (make postgres), the new
inventory tests included; gofmt clean apart from cmd/mesh-builder/stdout_test.go, which fails on
main too.
Found reviewing my own change before merging it, and it was load-bearing rather than cosmetic.
Priority was read with asPort, which caps at 65535. A rule declared above that silently became
priority 0 and stopped shadowing the route it exists to shadow. The one real rule this has to
reproduce is declared at 100000 — so path scoping and refusal would both have shipped looking
complete, passing their tests, and doing nothing on the only case that motivated them.
A priority is an ordering and has no range. asWhole takes any whole number the mesh wrote and
rejects a non-integral one, which was not meant as a priority.
Also: a host may now be routed on some paths and not others, which made the 404 dishonest — it
said "no route for this name" while listing that very name as served, a contradiction an
operator has to disbelieve the proxy to get past. An uncovered path now says so, and a name
that is genuinely not served still lists what is.
Two regression tests, both through the proxy rather than against the parser, because the parser
was where the bug looked fine.
Implements novox/hq ADR 0108, closing issue 116. The proxy's request path was a host lookup
and a forward, so it applied nothing — while the ingress it replaces relies on four things it
had none of.
Path scoping came first because it is a prerequisite, not a sibling. The table mapped a host
to one target, so a host could not be routed two ways, and the refusal this issue turns on
matches a path on a host already routed to a workload. No amount of authentication or source
filtering would have made it expressible. The table is now host to an ordered list of rules,
matched on path prefix.
The order is total, not just by priority. Sorting on priority alone leaves rules that share
one in whatever order the map produced, so the same declaration would serve differently
between restarts — a fault that works, and works differently each time, which is the hardest
kind to believe when reported. Within a priority the longer path wins, which is also the
intuitive reading.
auth names a secret and never holds one. A declaration carrying a credential is refused
whole rather than served unprotected, so the option ADR 0108 rejected cannot return by
accident. A secret that cannot be read makes the route refuse and say so, rather than serve
the workload unprotected — a gate that cannot check is not a gate that opens, and the
alternative turns a missing file into a silently public admin surface.
Authentication costs one bcrypt comparison on every path including an unknown user, so an
unknown user is not measurably faster than a known one with a wrong password. That difference
is a way to enumerate a route's users from outside it.
Redirects keep the request's own path and query, or canonicalising one name onto another
would land every deep link on the front page and raise no error doing it.
Eleven tests, four of them for the capabilities and two for the failure modes that rot
quietly: the credential-in-a-declaration refusal, and the unreadable secret failing closed.
Nothing else breaks if those stop working, so nothing else would report it.
No new dependency: bcrypt comes from the x/crypto module already required.
jochen