object-store.json and minio.json described the same thing: same image, same provision at the same scope, same provisioner. Not two implementations a person could choose between — one module written twice. Assigning both to a node would have collided on `s3-bucket`. It exists because it was written first, to pair with photos.json for the README's worked edge, and minio.json was the fuller version of the same module written later. Nobody removed the first. The pair test keeps its point and now reads the surviving one. Checked across the rest: this was the only duplicate.
327 lines
12 KiB
Go
327 lines
12 KiB
Go
package inventory
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"context"
|
|
"errors"
|
|
"fmt"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/novox/mesh-control/internal/secrets"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// Where sealed secrets live.
|
|
//
|
|
// The table holds nothing usable — see the migration and internal/secrets for why that is the
|
|
// design rather than an inconvenience.
|
|
|
|
// Secret is one provision's credential, sealed to each end.
|
|
type Secret struct {
|
|
Name string
|
|
Consumer string
|
|
// ConsumerModule is which module on that machine it is for.
|
|
//
|
|
// **Part of the key, not a label** (novox/hq 04-ISSUES/022). Two modules on one node wanting
|
|
// the same provision are two consumers, and were one credential until this.
|
|
ConsumerModule string
|
|
Provider string
|
|
ForConsumer string
|
|
ForProvider string
|
|
ConsumerKey string
|
|
ProviderKey string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SecretFor is the credential one module uses for one provision, making it the first time.
|
|
//
|
|
// **Made once and kept**, rather than regenerated whenever it is asked for. A secret that changed
|
|
// on every declaration would restart both ends on every push and would mean the password a
|
|
// provider was told to create never matches the one a consumer was given — which is a mesh that
|
|
// reports success and cannot connect.
|
|
//
|
|
// **Remade when either end's sealing key changes.** A node that rejoined generated a new key and
|
|
// can no longer open what was sealed to the old one, so keeping the blob would deliver something
|
|
// unreadable for ever. The new secret reaches both ends in the same push, which is the only
|
|
// moment they can be changed together.
|
|
func (i *Inventory) SecretFor(ctx context.Context, name, consumer, consumerModule, provider string) (
|
|
Secret, error) {
|
|
consumerKey, err := i.SealingKeyOf(ctx, consumer)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return Secret{}, err
|
|
}
|
|
providerKey, err := i.SealingKeyOf(ctx, provider)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return Secret{}, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
consumerNode, err := i.NodeByName(ctx, consumer)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return Secret{}, err
|
|
}
|
|
providerNode, err := i.NodeByName(ctx, provider)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return Secret{}, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var held Secret
|
|
err = i.store.Pool().QueryRow(ctx,
|
|
`select for_consumer, for_provider, consumer_key, provider_key from secret
|
|
where name = $1 and consumer = $2 and consumer_module = $3 and provider = $4`,
|
|
name, consumerNode.ID, consumerModule, providerNode.ID).
|
|
Scan(&held.ForConsumer, &held.ForProvider, &held.ConsumerKey, &held.ProviderKey)
|
|
if err == nil && held.ConsumerKey == consumerKey && held.ProviderKey == providerKey {
|
|
held.Name, held.Consumer, held.Provider = name, consumer, provider
|
|
held.ConsumerModule = consumerModule
|
|
return held, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
made, err := secrets.Make(consumerKey, providerKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return Secret{}, err
|
|
}
|
|
_, err = i.store.Pool().Exec(ctx,
|
|
`insert into secret (name, consumer, consumer_module, provider, for_consumer, for_provider,
|
|
consumer_key, provider_key)
|
|
values ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6, $7, $8)
|
|
on conflict (name, consumer, consumer_module, provider) do update set
|
|
for_consumer = excluded.for_consumer, for_provider = excluded.for_provider,
|
|
consumer_key = excluded.consumer_key, provider_key = excluded.provider_key,
|
|
created_at = now()`,
|
|
name, consumerNode.ID, consumerModule, providerNode.ID,
|
|
made.ForConsumer, made.ForProvider, made.ConsumerKey, made.ProviderKey)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return Secret{}, err
|
|
}
|
|
return Secret{Name: name, Consumer: consumer, ConsumerModule: consumerModule,
|
|
Provider: provider,
|
|
ForConsumer: made.ForConsumer, ForProvider: made.ForProvider,
|
|
ConsumerKey: made.ConsumerKey, ProviderKey: made.ProviderKey}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// RotateSecret discards what was there, so the next declaration carries a new one.
|
|
//
|
|
// Only a delete. Nothing reads the old value first, because nothing can — and making the
|
|
// replacement here rather than on the next read would be a second path to the same act, which is
|
|
// how two ends come to hold different passwords.
|
|
//
|
|
// The new secret then reaches both ends on the same push, together, which is what makes rotation
|
|
// a single event rather than a fanout with a window where half the mesh holds a dead credential.
|
|
func (i *Inventory) RotateSecret(ctx context.Context, name, consumer, consumerModule, provider string) error {
|
|
consumerNode, err := i.NodeByName(ctx, consumer)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
providerNode, err := i.NodeByName(ctx, provider)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
_, err = i.store.Pool().Exec(ctx,
|
|
`delete from secret where name = $1 and consumer = $2 and consumer_module = $3
|
|
and provider = $4`,
|
|
name, consumerNode.ID, consumerModule, providerNode.ID)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SecretsFrom is every credential a provider node was issued, so it can be told what to create.
|
|
func (i *Inventory) SecretsFrom(ctx context.Context, provider string) ([]Secret, error) {
|
|
providerNode, err := i.NodeByName(ctx, provider)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
rows, err := i.store.Pool().Query(ctx,
|
|
`select s.name, c.name, s.consumer_module, s.for_provider from secret s
|
|
join node c on c.id = s.consumer
|
|
where s.provider = $1 order by s.name, c.name, s.consumer_module`, providerNode.ID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
defer rows.Close()
|
|
|
|
var out []Secret
|
|
for rows.Next() {
|
|
s := Secret{Provider: provider}
|
|
if err := rows.Scan(&s.Name, &s.Consumer, &s.ConsumerModule, &s.ForProvider); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
out = append(out, s)
|
|
}
|
|
return out, rows.Err()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// SecretForModule is a secret a module needs in order to be itself, on one machine.
|
|
//
|
|
// Not the credential a consumer is given: a superuser password is not *for* anybody. Made once
|
|
// and kept, because regenerating it on every declaration would change the password a running
|
|
// database has already been started with — and remade when the node's sealing key changes, for
|
|
// the same reason as everything else sealed here.
|
|
// ModuleSecretIfIssued is what a module already holds on a node, and nothing if it holds nothing.
|
|
//
|
|
// **The read half of SecretForModule**, which mints one when there is none — an insert, and a row
|
|
// lock, on a path that also serves questions. Composing a declaration to answer *is this machine
|
|
// running what I would send it* went through the minting version for every module on every node,
|
|
// so asking wrote to the database and blocked against the machine it was asking about.
|
|
//
|
|
// A module with no secret yet has never been sent one, which is the same answer the caller wanted
|
|
// anyway: this machine is not running what the mesh would send it.
|
|
func (i *Inventory) ModuleSecretIfIssued(
|
|
ctx context.Context, node, module, name string,
|
|
) (string, bool, error) {
|
|
key, err := i.SealingKeyOf(ctx, node)
|
|
if err != nil || key == "" {
|
|
return "", false, err
|
|
}
|
|
record, err := i.NodeByName(ctx, node)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", false, err
|
|
}
|
|
var sealed, against, origin string
|
|
err = i.store.Pool().QueryRow(ctx,
|
|
`select sealed, node_key, origin from module_secret
|
|
where node = $1 and module = $2 and name = $3`,
|
|
record.ID, module, name).Scan(&sealed, &against, &origin)
|
|
if errors.Is(err, pgx.ErrNoRows) {
|
|
return "", false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", false, err
|
|
}
|
|
// Sealed to a key the node no longer has is not something it holds. Reported as absent rather
|
|
// than as an error: this is the read, and refusing here would make a question fail for a
|
|
// condition its writing counterpart is the right place to explain.
|
|
if against != key {
|
|
return "", false, nil
|
|
}
|
|
return sealed, true, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (i *Inventory) SecretForModule(ctx context.Context, node, module, name string) (string, error) {
|
|
key, err := i.SealingKeyOf(ctx, node)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
if key == "" {
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"%s needs a secret and %s has no sealing key, so nothing can be sealed to it",
|
|
module, node)
|
|
}
|
|
record, err := i.NodeByName(ctx, node)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var sealed, against, origin string
|
|
err = i.store.Pool().QueryRow(ctx,
|
|
`select sealed, node_key, origin from module_secret
|
|
where node = $1 and module = $2 and name = $3`,
|
|
record.ID, module, name).Scan(&sealed, &against, &origin)
|
|
if err == nil && against == key {
|
|
return sealed, nil
|
|
}
|
|
if err == nil && origin == "accepted" {
|
|
// Sealed to a key this node no longer has, and not the mesh's to invent again. Making one
|
|
// would put 32 random bytes where a working credential was: the machine would apply it,
|
|
// report success, and whatever reads it would fail to authenticate somewhere else
|
|
// entirely — with the mesh insisting the secret was delivered, which it was.
|
|
return "", fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"%s on %s holds %q, which was given to the mesh rather than made by it, and %s has "+
|
|
"since generated a new sealing key. The mesh cannot make another; issue it again",
|
|
module, node, name, node)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
made, err := secrets.Make(key, key)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
// Sealed once, to one recipient. Make seals to two ends because a provision has two; here
|
|
// both are the same machine, and only one copy is kept.
|
|
if _, err := i.store.Pool().Exec(ctx,
|
|
`insert into module_secret (node, module, name, sealed, node_key, origin)
|
|
values ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, 'made')
|
|
on conflict (node, module, name) do update set
|
|
sealed = excluded.sealed, node_key = excluded.node_key,
|
|
origin = excluded.origin, made_at = now()`,
|
|
record.ID, module, name, made.ForConsumer, key); err != nil {
|
|
return "", err
|
|
}
|
|
return made.ForConsumer, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AcceptSecretForModule keeps a value somebody supplied as a module's own secret.
|
|
//
|
|
// The counterpart to SecretForModule, which generates one. Some of what a module needs the mesh
|
|
// cannot invent: a broker account exists because the broker was told about it, and the password is
|
|
// whatever was agreed with the broker at that moment. The mesh's job is to carry it to the machine
|
|
// that will use it without being able to read it afterwards.
|
|
//
|
|
// Sealed on the way in and the plaintext discarded, exactly as a generated one is — so the only
|
|
// difference between the two is where the value came from.
|
|
func (i *Inventory) AcceptSecretForModule(ctx context.Context, node, module, name, value string) error {
|
|
key, err := i.SealingKeyOf(ctx, node)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
if key == "" {
|
|
return fmt.Errorf(
|
|
"%s has no sealing key, so nothing can be sealed to it — it joins again to get one",
|
|
node)
|
|
}
|
|
record, err := i.NodeByName(ctx, node)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sealed, err := secrets.Accept(value, key, key)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
_, err = i.store.Pool().Exec(ctx,
|
|
`insert into module_secret (node, module, name, sealed, node_key, origin)
|
|
values ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, 'accepted')
|
|
on conflict (node, module, name) do update set
|
|
sealed = excluded.sealed, node_key = excluded.node_key,
|
|
origin = excluded.origin, made_at = now()`,
|
|
record.ID, module, name, sealed.ForConsumer, key)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Holder is one end-to-end credential: who gets it and who must create it.
|
|
type Holder struct {
|
|
Provision string
|
|
Consumer string
|
|
// ConsumerModule is which module on that machine holds it. Part of what identifies a
|
|
// credential (novox/hq 04-ISSUES/022), so rotating one consumer's does not touch another's.
|
|
ConsumerModule string
|
|
Provider string
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// HoldersOf is every pair sharing a credential for one provision.
|
|
//
|
|
// **The question rotation has to ask, and the one HAL could not.** There, a provision had a single
|
|
// shared credential and rotating it updated the provider's row; nothing enumerated who else held
|
|
// the old one, so three nodes carried dead credentials for two days and the mesh reported success
|
|
// (novox/hq ADR 0001). Here each pair has its own credential, and this is the list that makes
|
|
// "every consumer" a set the mesh can name rather than a hope.
|
|
//
|
|
// Empty consumer means all of them.
|
|
func (i *Inventory) HoldersOf(ctx context.Context, provision, consumer string) ([]Holder, error) {
|
|
rows, err := i.store.Pool().Query(ctx,
|
|
`select s.name, c.name, s.consumer_module, p.name from secret s
|
|
join node c on c.id = s.consumer
|
|
join node p on p.id = s.provider
|
|
where s.name = $1 and ($2 = '' or c.name = $2)
|
|
order by c.name, s.consumer_module, p.name`, provision, consumer)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
defer rows.Close()
|
|
|
|
var out []Holder
|
|
for rows.Next() {
|
|
var h Holder
|
|
if err := rows.Scan(&h.Provision, &h.Consumer, &h.ConsumerModule, &h.Provider); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
out = append(out, h)
|
|
}
|
|
return out, rows.Err()
|
|
}
|