mesh/merge-gate head 5c8e768ef520 merged into trunk ef26dba2753a — pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes wi…
getent passwd reads an all-digit key as a uid, so a tool runner's account named
"1000" resolved to whoever has uid 1000 and the entry went to them. Only an answer
naming the account asked for is taken.
The controller cannot know the operator's account's uid, names an access by its
declared id (which holds a slash), and should not parse words. A tool runner's
account may now come by name alone and is read here (refused when absent or root's,
its uid said in the access's listing); the take act matches the declared id exactly;
an access wait says its reason (keep or disk) and, for a filesystem that refuses
ACLs, whether the take act can enable them.
mesh/merge-gate head d12bba01090d merged into trunk dd9ab7927d96 — pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes wi…
The build seat runs merge-check as root, so every folder a test made was root's
data, which is never kept (§12), and 28 tests failed for that alone. A test's
folders now stand for an operator's: run as root, they are given to nobody before
they are judged. The root rule is unchanged.
mesh/merge-gate head c85c2804a010 merged into trunk dd9ab7927d96 — pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes wi…
mesh/repo-check head c85c2804a010 merged into trunk dd9ab7927d96 — fail: its merge-check.sh failed: --- FAIL: TestAnAccessTheMeshMayNotKeepYetIsSaidAsAWait…
The engine delivers before the controller half, and today's controller sends no
identities, users or taken. Keeping now starts only for an access whose folder has
users, or a declaration with identities; every other access is mounted when present
and refused when absent as on main, with nothing made, kept, held or judged. A
leftover whose walk could not run says why, not always that its disk is away.
A name read that timed out gave an empty name, which differed from the recorded one
and so reset the record: a folder kept while empty asked again, a warranted one was
walked again. An unnamed filesystem now leaves the folder exactly as it is, the
access is said not known for that look, and it resumes once it is named.
NFS and FUSE report a zero f_fsid, so another export or another FUSE mount at the
same point was named alike and kept without a warrant; xfs's f_fsid follows the
device number. A filesystem is now named by its UUID (its device matched in
/dev/disk/by-uuid), else a nonzero f_fsid, else mountinfo's source; one that cannot
be named is never kept or taken. Entries left on a filesystem not back within 30 days
are forgotten, said once, and the naming read is shared per mount.
An ext4 or xfs library mounted by UUID can come back from a reboot as another device
(/dev/sdb1 as /dev/sdc1); naming the filesystem by mountinfo's source read that as a
move, stripped the warranted library's entries and asked for a new Approve. A
filesystem is now named by statfs's f_fsid (from the UUID, or the ZFS dataset), its
type and its mount point. Entries left on the filesystem a folder is on now are
merged back or held, never walked away, and a TakenOn naming a mount point is not
taken.
A folder kept because it was empty, then covered by its disk, was said as unhealthy
leftover entries for ever: its entries sit on a hidden empty folder and grant nothing,
so they are now forgotten, and only entries walked onto data under a warrant are kept
to be taken out. A warrant and a kept folder now name their filesystem by mount point,
source and type, so another pool at the same point is a move; records naming a mount
point are read as its name. A record with no access ids is said under a path-free name.
A container was still created over an unmounted mount point, so its writes landed on
the filesystem below; a folder moved to another disk was kept on the old warrant; and
entries left by a drop or a move that could not run lived only in a log line. Every
container mounting an access whose disk is away now waits, the warrant holds only for
the filesystem it was carried out on (the wait names the new one, path-free), entries
left on a filesystem are recorded per mount and taken out when it is back, and every
leftover is said as unhealthy until it is. A hung stat is shared per path, and a
widened mask takes from other entries only the bits it adds.
A walk run while a dataset was unmounted wrote onto root's empty mount point, or
"dropped" entries from it and forgot the ones on the data; a folder kept while empty
below an unnamed mount was then swept whole once the disk mounted, with no warrant.
Every walk is now judged as an apply is, a changed mount judges the folder afresh, and
systemd .mount units and mounts seen are read for the first-sight rule. Widening a
mask caps the entries it limited, so the owning group gains nothing. The watch lets
go of removed folders, re-arms on lost notice, reads users under its lock and ends
with its context. A drop that cannot read an ACL is counted, a broken folder's words
carry no path, a grant's group that could not be left is tried again, and a folder's
stat is bounded.
A module's containers ran as whatever their image chose and shared folders were
made writable by putting accounts in the folder's group (ADR 0312), which ADR 0325
supersedes. The engine now makes each declared module identity as a system account
with the controller's numbers, runs a container declaring `identity` as it, and keeps
each placed shared folder usable through one POSIX ACL entry per user, set through
the kernel's xattrs on descriptors it opened itself. A folder holding data is kept
only after the operator's warrant (the take act); a missing folder is made where its
data lives and waits where its disk is not; root's data is never kept. A watch and a
bounded sweep put back what an app narrows. The group grant is removed, and what it
put an account in is taken back.
Reuses the descriptor walks, the create act, the missing-path wait and the warrant-
backed act message from the paused issue 567 branch.
The fix is an order, and nothing failed if the trust call moved after the
push or went: steps 7 and 8 are now one function a test drives against a
runtime that refuses an untrusted push. Preflight now refuses, before
anything is raised, a runtime file that is no JSON object, a docker.service
that is not loaded and active, and a dockerd started with
--insecure-registry, which would refuse the reload. The comment names the
order the docker module's takeover rests on.
Genesis pushed the control plane's image to the mesh's plain-HTTP registry
before anything told the container runtime to trust it; the docker module
that writes that trust is applied long after. Genesis now writes the trust
itself at the registry step, with the same into-json writer and a reload,
for the address given and the node's mesh name on the node's registry
port, and refuses before any push unless the runtime says it trusts each.
The docker module later finds the mesh name there and takes it over
without a change.
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
A mesh directory outside every home was chmodded and chowned by path, so a
parent turned into a link between two applies carried root's chmod and chown
to the link's target. It is now made and changed through the descriptor of
the walk from / that follows a link only root alone could have made.
A directory that walk refuses is a refusal like the placement guard's
(review 47): judged before anything is applied, and again when the
directory is applied, used as found or not; refused at either point it gates
its module and refuses what is below it, so no file is written into the
link's target and the report does not say everything was attempted.
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
Once a mesh directory's mode and owner go only through a walk that follows no
link another account could make, a directory behind such a link is refused
and its module gated: on the control-node that could stop the controller.
The operator is to be told which directories that walk would refuse on every
node before it lands. So the engine judges the declaration it keeps with the
same walk, making and changing nothing: on a signed ask from the controller
(mesh.node.<node>.ask.judge-directories, held to the hand-over's checks) and
as `nox-mesh-host judge-directories` at the machine.
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
The engine is built without cgo, so a check by name missed a root group a name
service holds or one number carrying another name: the root groups are resolved
to numbers (now with kmem and shadow) and a number named nothing is refused for
containers too. A group without write is granted nothing (§2). The look reads
each path off the lock within five seconds, so a dead network mount cannot stop
every health statement. A grant's account may not start with a dash. A group a
record leaves for another asker is handed to it, so it is still taken back when
the last asker goes (§5). The scheduler skips paths issue 339's guard refuses.
The engine reads the group owning the accessed path at apply and gives it to the
containers and the tools' account an access's new `grant` names: --group-add for a
container (recreated with it), an account group for the account (recorded, taken
back as ADR 0252 takes back). The path is never changed; an access whose group
cannot write is stated unhealthy for the operator to decide; group 0 and the
root-granting groups are refused by name. The tool runner restarts through the
restart-on the controller gives it, because the access reports updated exactly
when the account's groups moved. Health says GrantContract (4), which tells the
controller it may send `grant`.
The controller is to ask mesh-delivery whether a merge's delivery
group still has a member to merge, so that a merge in no waiting group
is cut at once (ADR 0304, ADR 0306); its bus grant names the verb, and
the installer's first user list must too, as for times (212a3cc).
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
A module-less action that stopped the apply after a module was gated was reported as
everything else attempted. The failure now names the gated modules and the stop, counts
skipped resources apart from applied ones, and the tests cover an archive below a refused
path, a gated module tried again by the next apply, and a refused file among the failures.
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
On ace the engine refused Docker's data root as not placed, said nothing was touched, then
wrote a file into it and ran the module's step. A refused directory now gates the rest of
its module as a failed step does, a file is refused in a forbidden tree or below a refused
path, and the failure names the modules whose rest was not attempted.
Both fail on main: the shape seen on ace, a refused directory, a file below it and a
step after it, writes the file, runs the step and reports that everything was attempted.
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
A newer sequence carrying an older view of the assignments undeclared four
assigned modules on 2026-10-04; the sequence cannot tell it, the generation
can. The engine keeps the highest generation it applied, refuses an older one
before reading the machine unless the declaration is a gate's put-back, and
says the refusal in its report so the controller can name the sender. A
declaration without a generation is applied as before, and every report says
it reads one, so the controller sends it only to engines that do.
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
A failure recorded nothing, so the record of the step's last success stayed and
the next apply skipped it, opening ADR 0136's gate on what it had just refused.
The record is kept, for removal, with what it was run as cleared.
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
A refusal waiting for its request parsed it into a 64 KiB reader for up to 5 s,
on a socket every account may open. It now drains at most 4 KiB through a small
buffer for at most 1 s and never past the accept-time deadline, only 32 wait at
once, and an unknown account is refused before it takes a slot. The busy tests
wait for the first line with a timeout and say what came of it (novox/hq issue 434).
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
The engine answered busy and closed before the client's request had landed;
the client's write then broke and it never read the refusal waiting for it.
Under the whole suite's load this failed the busy test (novox/hq issue 434).
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
A file's own details (lstat) may be read from the disk as a directory is,
so a directory of tens of thousands of files was read without a look and
the header's promise that no burst is longer than PaceLook did not hold.
The walk now asks the pacer before each file as well; the 250 ms gate
makes that a clock read per file. A test with one directory of twenty
files fails without it. The clock is read once after a run of pauses,
and the constants test says that it guards the constants only.
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
The review of #79 found that pacing alone brought back issue 361's
fault. The control-node's own I/O pressure sits near the 10 % bound with
no walk running, so a walk that paused 30 s for every 250 ms it read
would read 0.8 % of the time: a 16-minute walk would take some 32 hours,
outlive the age a search judges for, and be begun again at an engine
restart, leaving the machine unjudged.
A run of pauses is now at most nine times as long as the walk read since
the one before, so the walk keeps at least a tenth of the time whatever
the pressure, and takes at most ten times as long as unpaced: about
2.7 hours for the 16-minute walk, inside the 12 hours the controller
waits quietly. A test ties the bound to rootsearch.Quiet.
The pressure is the share of the time since the last look in which some
task waited on I/O, from PSI's cumulative counter, not its ten-second
average, which the kernel moves only every two seconds. A pause is
500 ms, then the pressure is looked at again.
The engine's walker is built in one place, engineWalker, and a test
fails if it is not paced by /proc/pressure/io. What the walk cannot read
is said through the search's own channel (the cache's Say), as the rest
of the search is, with what it means for the disk.
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
The walk for setuid programs is put in the idle I/O class so it yields
to everything else, but only a scheduler that schedules by class (BFQ)
honours that. The control-node's disks run mq-deadline, which does not,
so the walk read at full priority. On 2026-10-11 the walk started at
01:27, right after the engine applied a new controller, and ran sixteen
minutes; it kept two spinning disks saturated, the bus whose store
shares them stalled for half a minute twice, and the controller lost
its lease and restarted each time.
The walk now also paces itself by PSI, which reads the same whatever
the scheduler: before it reads a directory, while some task has waited
on I/O for more than 10 % of the last ten seconds, it pauses two
seconds at a time. It looks at most every 250 ms, pauses at most 30 s
in a row and then reads one more directory, so a machine that is never
quiet is walked slowly but still judged. Its own reads count in the
pressure, so on an otherwise idle machine it holds the disk below the
bound. Pressure it cannot read pauses nothing, and is said once.
A paced walk finds what an unpaced one finds; a walk ended while it
pauses is an incomplete walk, never one that found nothing.
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
A resource that passed, then waited, then failed once after its grace was
still stated healthy from the old pass; and a change of what it waits for
alone raised no change event, so the controller could miss it.
mesh/merge-gate pass: builds mesh-host → ace, g14, novox, shanks; no bus step; every machine composes with the change as it did without (4 of 4 compose)
A module whose only fault was a secret the operator had not given yet was
stated unhealthy, failed its first-node gate and was put back. The engine
now reads the tool's answer through mesh-sdk go/health and states such a
resource waiting, with what it waits for, on one look; a malformed wait
stays unhealthy.